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Map 2. Central Asturias, showing municipalities, relevant settlements and 
major rivers and railways (map drawn by Cox Cartographic Ltd).
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‘Introduction’, in M. Kerry, Unite, Proletarian Brothers! Radicalism and Revolution in the Spanish Second 
Republic, 1931–6 (London, 2020), pp. 1–17. License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0.
Introduction
‘UHP. Swear on these letters, brothers, death before tyranny’ read the words 
daubed in white paint on the side of a railway carriage departing from 
Barcelona for the Republican front during the early days of the Spanish 
Civil War. Above the slogan, smiling men leaned out of the windows and 
raised their clenched fists in an antifascist salute towards Robert Capa, the 
Hungarian photographer who captured the moment in an iconic image.1 
During the months prior to the war, ‘UHP’ was often seen scrawled across 
walls, on the labels of cognac bottles and as a decorative motif on pottery.2 
The letters – shorthand for ‘unite, proletarian brothers’ (Uníos, hermanos 
proletarios!) – had been coined two years previously during a two-week 
revolutionary insurrection in the northern region of Asturias. In October 
1934, the Spanish socialist movement triggered plans for a hazily defined 
and poorly prepared ‘revolutionary movement’ in response to the ascent 
to government of a right-wing party that professed little respect for the 
young Second Republic (1931–6). Envisaged as a nationwide revolt, only in 
Asturias did the October rebellion take the form of a prolonged assault on 
state power and an experiment in revolution.
While the Asturian capital, Oviedo, reverberated with the sound of gunfire 
and exploding dynamite as government forces and left-wing militias fought 
for control of the streets, revolutionary patrols performed the clenched 
fist salute and demanded the password of ‘UHP’ in the coalfields that 
constituted the heartland of the insurrection. The towns and villages of the 
narrow, steep-sided coal valleys lay in the hands of revolutionary committees 
staffed by local politicians and trade unionists drawn from the ranks of the 
socialists, anarchists and communists. The committees undertook a range of 
self-consciously revolutionary acts, from banning money to centralizing the 
distribution of requisitioned goods and foodstuffs, while also reconfiguring 
the local economy for the needs of a rudimentary war effort, including 
1 See <https://pro.magnumphotos.com/image/PAR75398.html> [accessed 2 Aug. 
2019]. Both Capa, who was born André Friedmann, and his partner Gerda Taro published 
photographs under the name of Robert Capa, but their images from the beginning of the 
Civil War can be distinguished thanks to their use of different equipment.
2 J. Langdon-Davies, Behind the Spanish Barricades (New York, 1936), pp. 4, 23; Avance, 
11 July 1936. 
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retooling steel plants to armour-plate vehicles. Patrols detained alleged 
enemies of the revolution, including rightists, employers and, in particular, 
members of the Catholic Church, who accounted for nearly two-thirds of 
the approximately fifty victims of the revolutionary ‘furies’ who were either 
murdered or died in unclear circumstances during the insurrection.3 After 
two weeks, the movement was defeated by the Spanish army. The total 
number of dead approached 1,500, which translated into more than half of 
the deaths caused by political violence during the Second Republic.4
The revolutionary insurrection was not the only episode of mass left-
wing mobilization in Europe in 1934. Austrian socialists rebelled when 
Chancellor Dollfuss strengthened his authoritarian grip on the developing 
Catholic, corporatist state while almost simultaneously rank-and-file 
French socialists and communists united in a massive protest against the 
threat posed by extreme right-wing leagues to the French Third Republic.5 
The episodes were rooted in the particular period of crisis between 1933 
and 1935 as the left grappled with the continued growth of fascism and 
the authoritarian right, and the effects of the Great Depression.6 But these 
defensive reactions did not match the scale and revolutionary pretensions of 
the Asturian insurrection. Not only was this the most important episode of 
revolutionary upheaval in Europe between the early 1920s and the Spanish 
Civil War, it was also the last attempt at the seizure of state power via a mass 
armed insurrection by the working class in Europe.7
How and why thousands of inhabitants of the coalfields became willing 
to take up arms against the government and participate in the revolt are the 
questions at the heart of this study, which examines the origins, unfolding 
and ramifications of the Asturian October within the context of the Second 
3 For a comparative study of the ‘furies’ in the French and Russian Revolutions, see A. J. 
Mayer, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions (Princeton, N.J., 
2000).
4 For a discussion of the figures, see E. González Calleja, Cifras cruentas: las víctimas 
mortales de la violencia sociopolítica en la Segunda República española (1931–1936) (Granada, 
2015), pp. 11, 175–6. Further discussion in ch. 5 of this volume. This book went to press 
before the publication of Pablo Gil Vico, Verdugos de Asturias. La violencia y sus relatos en la 
revolución de Asturias de 1934 (Gijón, 2019).
5 See A. Rabinbach, The Crisis of Austrian Socialism: from Red Vienna to Civil War, 1927–
1934 (Chicago, Ill., 1983) and B. Jenkins and C. Millington, France and Fascism: February 
1934 and the Dynamics of Political Crisis (Abingdon, 2015).
6 See G.-R. Horn, European Socialists Respond to Fascism: Ideology, Activism and 
Contingency in the 1930s (New York, 1996) and G. Eley, Forging Democracy: the History of the 
Left in Europe, 1850–2000 (Oxford, 2002), ch. 17.




Republic. On a superficial level, the insurrection was sparked by an order 
from the socialist leadership, yet socialist conspiring does not explain the force 
of the revolt in Asturias. Nor do existing explanations of the ‘radicalization’ 
process – which is central to histories of the Republic – capture the breadth, 
nature and dynamism of conflict and militancy in the coalfields during the 
1930s. This book re-evaluates radicalism as a confrontational mode of politics 
– as defined in more detail below – that emerged from cleavages and conflicts 
at the local level and the lived experience of politics. It frees radicalization 
from the strictures of union and party politics and the conventional timeframe 
of 1933–4 by examining how inhabitants of the coalfields claimed to speak 
for and ‘police’ the community. The ideas and actions of these activists were 
moulded by social relations and the experience of politics and state power at 
the local level, yet imagined and understood in relation to a wider national 
and international context.8 
Radicalization is a touchstone in histories of the Second Republic. It is 
central to the long-running debate as to who was responsible for delivering 
Spain to the threshold of civil war five years after the proclamation of the 
Republic promised its supporters a new beginning of democracy, freedom, 
secularism and social justice.9 Historians have either emphasized the 
unwillingness of sectors of the right, Church, landowners and businesses 
to accept the reforming intentions of Republican-socialist governments, 
which radicalized supporters of the government, or else accused the left 
of ‘excluding’ the right and adopting a possessive attitude towards the 
Republic.10 Accordingly, the Asturian October was either a gesture aimed 
at stemming the rise of a radicalizing right or confirmation of the left’s 
undemocratic values and methods. Such visions neglect the view from 
the coalfields and the revolutionary pretensions of Asturian militants and 
reify a particular idea of the Republic that overlooks the shifting, disputed 
understandings of the regime between 1931 and 1936. 
8 I am influenced by narrative approaches to collective action. For an overview, see F. 
Polletta and B. G. Gardner, ‘Narrative and social movements’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Social Movements, ed. D. Della Porta and M. Diani (Oxford, 2015), pp. 534–48. See also M. 
R. Somers, ‘Narrativity, narrative identity, and social action: rethinking English working-
class formation’, Social Science History, xvi (1992), 591–629.
9 For an extended discussion on the promise of the Republic, see R. Cruz, Una revolución 
elegante: España 1931 (Madrid, 2014), pp. 203–53.
10 The classic work on reform and reaction is P. Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil 
War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic (London, 1978). For alleged 
socialist ‘intransigence’ and exclusion, see, e.g., S. Payne, The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 
1933–1936: the Origins of the Civil War (New Haven, Conn., 2006). See also Palabras como 
puños: la intransigencia política en la Segunda República, ed. F. del Rey (Madrid, 2011).
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Seeking answers to the alleged failure of democratic politics in the interwar 
period was a principal concern for historians during the 1970s and 1980s, 
as was writing the history of the revolutions and politics of the European 
working class left between the wars.11 The latter largely fell out of fashion 
at the end of the Cold War.12 More recent histories of political cultures 
during the interwar period have eroded the previous tendency to make 
stark distinctions between left and right in favour of uncovering crossovers, 
interaction and mimicry. For example, Timothy Brown examined why some 
left-wing radicals in the late Weimar period switched to the Nazi Party, 
something he attributed to their holding common assumptions regarding a 
radical approach to politics.13 Nadine Rossol and Joan Tumblety questioned 
the existence of a distinctive fascist aesthetic by revealing an emphasis on 
mass spectacle and aesthetics across the political spectrum, while Jessica 
Wardhaugh showed that shared symbols and language constituted a key 
political battleground between different groups as France underwent a crisis 
of representation of the ‘people’ between 1934 and 1938.14 An emphasis on 
how politics is waged in an interactional, relational way at the level of the 
community is central to this book, which examines how political differences 
were understood and negotiated in the context of a local social order 
dominated by the left. As Joachim Häberlen recently highlighted regarding 
Weimar Germany, a focus on the interplay between the understanding of 
politics and political action may provide a way of writing a new social and 
cultural history of radical politics.15 Such an approach could be applied 
11 A landmark essay questioning the alleged failure of the Weimar Republic is P. Fritzsche, 
‘Did Weimar fail?’, Journal of Modern History, lxviii (1996), 629–56.
12 As ever, there are exceptions, e.g., Horn, European Socialists and P. Swett, Neighbors 
and Enemies: the Culture of Radicalism in Berlin, 1929–1933 (Cambridge, 2004). One of the 
first of a new wave of studies of the German revolution of 1918–19 is Germany 1916–23: a 
Revolution in Context, ed. K. Weinhauer, A. McElligott and K. Heinsohn (Bielefeld, 2015). 
Classic earlier studies include F. L. Carsten, Revolution in Eastern Europe (London, 1972) and 
Rabinbach, Crisis. In contrast, debates on the right have remained rich, e.g., J. Wasserman’s 
study of interwar Austrian ‘radical’ politics: Black Vienna: the Radical Right in the Red City, 
1918–1938 (Ithaca, N.Y., 2014).
13 T. S. Brown, Weimar Radicals: Nazis and Communists between Authenticity and 
Performance (New York, 2009). 
14 N. Rossol, Performing the Nation: Sport, Spectacle and Political Symbolism, 1926–1936 
(Basingstoke, 2010); J. Tumblety, ‘Rethinking the fascist aesthetic: mass gymnastics, political 
spectacle and the stadium in 1930s France’, European History Quarterly, xliii (2013), 707–30; 
J. Wardhaugh, In Pursuit of the People: Political Culture in France, 1934–1939 (Basingstoke, 
2009).
15 J. Häberlen, ‘Scope for agency and political options: the German working-class 
movement and the rise of Nazism’, Politics, Religion and Ideology, xiv (2013), 377–94. 
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more widely, and this book seeks to provide an example of how this may be 
achieved in the context of Spain.
Radicalism in Europe and Spain
The European interwar period is often depicted as a ‘radical era’.16 This 
radicalism can refer to the construction of the world’s first socialist state in 
Russia, the waves of strike action in the aftermath of the First World War, 
the acuteness of social and political conflict, or the emergence of the new 
ideologies of fascism and Communism or new ways of waging politics, 
particularly street-fighting between paramilitary groups. 
One way of approaching left-wing radicalism is to focus on ‘red cities’ 
or ‘little Moscows’: localities or neighbourhoods with distinctive left-wing 
traditions, which pursued projects of ‘municipal socialism’ or were particular 
hotbeds of activism.17 Vienna is the iconic example.18 Examinations of 
conflict and radicalism in these areas have often paid close attention to 
the degree of political and social homogeneity of the locality or district 
in question, although  fragmentation and rivalry have also been used 
to explain radicalism. In the context of provincial Austria, for example, 
socialist strongholds were isolated and surrounded by antagonistic political 
forces, and their sense of weakness was channelled into a militant hostility 
to Catholic conservatism.19 Other cases similarly argue for the importance 
of local rivalries and disputed territory in the development of radical 
politics. The ‘radical’ districts of Neukölln and Kreuzberg in Weimar 
Berlin harboured important levels of support for both Communism and 
16 D. Priestland, ‘The left and revolutions’, in The Oxford Handbook of European history, 
1914–1945, ed. N. Doumanis (Oxford, 2016), p. 78.
17 The literature on these areas is extensive, e.g., J. Merriman, The Red City: Limoges and 
the French Nineteenth Century (New York, 1985); Red Barcelona: Social Protest and Labour 
Mobilization in the Twentieth Century, ed. A. Smith (London, 2002); T. Kaplan, Red City, 
Blue Period: Social Movements in Picasso’s Barcelona (Berkeley, Calif., 1992); T. Stovall, 
The Rise of the Parisian Red Belt (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); D. H. Bell, Sesto San Giovanni: 
Workers, Culture and Politics in an Italian Town, 1880–1922 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1986); 
S. Macintyre, Little Moscows: Communism and Working Class Militancy in Interwar Britain 
(London, 1980); L. Boswell, Rural Communism in France, 1920–1939 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1998). 
See also A. Knotter, ‘‘‘Little Moscows’’ in western Europe: the ecology of small-place 
communism’, International Review of Social History, lvi (2011), 475–510.
18 E.g., H. Gruber, Red Vienna: Experiment in Working Class Culture, 1919–1934 (New 
York, 1991). 
19 C. Jeffery, Social Democracy in the Austrian Provinces, 1918–1934: Beyond Red Vienna 
(London, 1995), pp. 62ff.
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Nazism.20 While not an area where municipal socialism operated, the 
Asturian coalfields have nevertheless long been identified as a red area that 
was underpinned by a number of political cultures, including socialism, 
anarchism and communism. These movements shared an idiom and certain 
political values, but were separated by rivalry and at times hatred. The 
right, although a minority force in the valleys, continued to attract support. 
The situation of left-wing hegemony – which was assumed by left-wing 
activists to mean a political monopoly – undercut by a significant right-
wing presence is vital to understanding the conflict and resultant radicalism 
in the coalfields in the 1930s. 
A different yet complimentary approach to interwar radicalism is evident 
in studies of the explosion of ‘working-class unrest and revolutionary 
potential … unparalleled in the twentieth century’ that followed the First 
World War.21 The pressures of total war loom large in such interpretations 
of post-war radicalism. The disciplining of labour for the needs of total 
war, shortages of basic goods and price rises led to growing strikes towards 
the end of the conflict. The perceived opening of a new horizon of 
revolutionary possibility in the wake of the collapse of Tsarism and the 
Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia further stimulated militancy. Post-war 
radicalism manifested itself in a combination of strike waves across Europe, 
the council movement in Italy and the proclamation of ‘soviets’ in areas 
like Hungary and Munich, where radicalized sections of the left attempted 
to press beyond the replacement of the collapsed imperial order with new 
republics.22 However, even as Europe appeared to be on the threshold of 
social revolution, workers’ demands tended to centre on wage increases and 
improvements to working conditions rather than overturning the social 
order.23 The Asturian insurrection of 1934 shared the pretensions of some of 
these post-war attempts at revolution, although the context of the 1930s was 
significantly different and Spain was not emerging from an international 
armed conflict. The insurrection was nevertheless shaped by the particular 
political dynamics of the 1930s and how international developments were 
interpreted at a local level.  
20 Swett, Neighbors, pp. 54–5. 
21 D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: the West European Left in the Twentieth 
Century (London, 1996), p. 32. See also Eley, Forging, pp. 131–8. 
22 See Challenges of Labour: Central and Western Europe, 1917–1920, ed. C. Wrigley 
(London, 1993).
23 As argued in, e.g., R. Bessel, ‘Revolution’, in The Cambridge History of the First World 
War, ed. J. Winter (3 vols, Cambridge, 2014), ii. 126–44 and Priestland, ‘The left’.
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Spain did not participate in the First World War, yet was not immune 
to the effects of the conflict.24 An economic boom fuelled rising inflation 
and widespread discontent, which added to the pressures on the corrupt, 
controlled parliamentary regime of the Restoration monarchy (1875–1923). 
In 1917, the government faced three interlocking crises: a conspiracy among 
army officers, a revolutionary strike and demands for greater autonomy 
for Catalonia. The government ceded to the pressures from sectors of the 
army while resisting the other challenges. The nationwide revolutionary 
strike in August, which lasted longest in the Asturian coal valleys, was not 
well prepared for, and easily suppressed by the army. As a revolutionary 
movement organized by socialists, it appears to show parallels with October 
1934, yet it has differing characteristics. In contrast to the insurrectionary 
and revolutionary character of 1934, the 1917 movement was envisaged 
as an auxiliary action to support Republican-socialist demands for a new 
parliament that would construct a new regime.25 Like the rest of Europe, 
Spain saw waves of strikes in industrial areas over the following years with 
the red city of Barcelona a particular hotspot, while peasants undertook 
land occupations in the south. Although termed the Spanish ‘Bolshevik 
triennium’, the degree to which the strikers desired revolutionary change is 
questionable. 
In September 1923, Miguel Primo de Rivera, captain general of 
Barcelona, removed parliamentary rule via a military coup sanctioned by 
King Alfonso XIII. Primo de Rivera aimed to put an end to labour conflict, 
resolve the protracted crisis of the political system and restore Spain’s 
honour after an embarrassing defeat at the hands of Moroccan forces in 
North Africa. His seven-year experiment in constructing an authoritarian, 
Catholic, corporatist regime combined massive investment in public 
works and a nationalizing project that cracked down on the anarchist 
movement and Catalan and Basque nationalism. While anarchists faced 
persecution, the socialist movement adopted a neutral position towards 
the dictatorship and participated in the corporatist mechanisms of the 
regime to protect its members and increase its influence. Towards the 
end of the 1920s, Primo de Rivera’s project lost momentum, funding for 
public works disappeared after the Wall Street Crash and the socialists 
joined Republican parties in conspiring against the regime. Primo de 
Rivera resigned in January 1930 and municipal elections fifteen months 
24 For a discussion of Spain within a European context, see J. Casanova, ‘Republic, civil 
war and dictatorship: the peculiarities of Spanish history’, Journal of Contemporary History, 
lii (2017), 148–56. 
25 E.g., The Agony of Spanish Liberalism: from Revolution to Dictatorship 1913–23, ed. F. J. 
Romero Salvadó and A. Smith (Basingstoke, 2010).
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later delivered a pro-Republican result that caused King Alfonso XIII to 
flee into exile.26
Spain’s experience of authoritarian right-wing dictatorship under Primo 
de Rivera was far from distinctive in the context of interwar Europe, but 
the attempt to construct a democratic Republic after an experiment in 
dictatorship set Spain apart. The establishment of the Second Republic in 
April 1931 constituted the last breaker of the democratizing wave that had 
surged through Europe at the end of the First World War. The rollback of 
restrictions on democratic rule began in Hungary and Italy and gathered 
pace in central and Eastern Europe in the 1930s as European states battled 
the consequences of the Great Depression, including the linked problems of 
mass unemployment and disaffected voters, along with renewed radicalism 
and scenes of political violence on the streets. Even as the prevailing 
political winds shifted away from the advance of liberal democracy, in Spain 
a Republican-socialist coalition (1931–3) attempted to implement its vision 
of a secular, liberal, democratic state. 
The bulwark of the new Republic was the socialist movement. The 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) joined European counterparts in 
gaining its first experience of government office after the war in a situation 
‘unimaginable before 1914’.27 The Spanish socialist movement formed the 
backbone of the new democracy insofar as it provided the mass membership 
that the Republican parties lacked.28 The social and political influence of the 
socialist movement on a national level during the Republic – and as the 
principal political and trade union force in the Asturian coalfields – has 
ensured that no history of the Second Republic would be complete without 
the ‘phenomenon known as the radicalization of the socialists’.29 
‘Radicalization’ serves to describe the shift in the socialist movement 
from participating in government in 1931–3 to planning a revolutionary 
movement in 1933–4. The crucial turning point is usually held to be the 
summer of 1933, when socialist leader Francisco Largo Caballero responded 
to developing rank-and-file frustration by adopting a more radical 
rhetoric. This is the standard portrayal of radicalization, yet it has long 
26 On the dictatorship, see e.g., S. Ben-Ami, Fascism from Above: the Dictatorship of Primo 
de Rivera in Spain, 1923–30 (Oxford, 1983); A. Quiroga, Making Spaniards: Primo de Rivera 
and the Nationalization of the Masses, 1923–30 (Basingstoke, 2007).
27 S. Berman, The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar 
Europe (Boston, Mass., 1998), p. 2.
28 P. Radcliff, ‘The political “left” in the interwar period, 1924–1939’, in The Oxford 
handbook of European history, 1914–1945, ed. N. Doumanis (Oxford, 2016), pp. 286–7. 




been bemoaned as underexplored and little understood.30 There are also a 
number of problems with how the process is traditionally described. First, 
the lack of clarity as to the definition of radicalization and its usage means it 
lacks analytical purchase, for it has become shorthand for a period as much 
as a process.31 Second, so closely linked is the term to the socialists that it is 
much less commonly used in the context of anarchism or the political right, 
even if the term does provide insight into these movements.32 Third, the 
desire to explain October 1934 through radicalization encourages teleology 
at the expense of contingency and dynamism. Fourth, the measurement 
and description of socialist radicalization is often reduced to the figure of 
Largo Caballero, who laid the plans for the ‘revolutionary movement’ in 
1934. His adoption of radical rhetoric and ascent to presiding over both 
the socialist trade union federation (UGT) and the PSOE are deployed as 
evidence for radicalization. This is founded on Largo Caballero’s reputation 
as a bellwether of the rank-and-file mood. Even so, scholars have long 
noted that his radical rhetoric is subtler than simple appeals for revolution.33 
Finally, as regards the rank and file, strikes and unemployment figures have 
been the usual indicator of the mood of the working class and peasantry, 
although by 1982 José Manuel Macarro Vera had rightly questioned the 
use of strike figures.34 As he pointed out, strikes were often ‘moderate’ and 
30 For criticism that radicalization is not explained adequately, see e.g., Preston, Coming of 
the Spanish Civil War, p. 2; J. M. Macarro Vera, ‘Causas de la radicalización socialista en la II 
República’, Revista de historia contemporánea, i (1982), 178–226, at p. 222; S. Souto Kustrín, 
‘Taking the street: workers’ youth organizations and political conflict in the Spanish Second 
Republic’, European History Quarterly, xxxiv (2004), 131–56, at pp.132, 134.
31 Foundational accounts include A. de Blas Guerrero, El socialismo radical en la II 
República (Madrid, 1978) and M. Bizcarrondo, ‘Democracia y revolución en la estrategia 
socialista de la Segunda República’, Estudios de Historia Social, xvi–xvii (1981), 227–459. 
32 Exceptions are C. Ealham, Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898–1937 
(Abingdon, 2005); E. González Calleja, Contrarrevolucionarios: radicalización violenta de las 
derechas durante la Segunda República, 1931–1936 (Madrid, 2011); S. Lowe, Catholicism, War 
and the Foundation of Francoism (Eastbourne, 2010). ‘Fascistization’ serves a similar purpose, 
e.g., I. Saz, Fascismo y franquismo (Valencia, 2004) and E. González Calleja, ‘La violencia y 
sus discursos: los límites de la “fascistización” de la derecha española durante el régimen de 
la Segunda República’, Ayer, lxxi (2008), 85–116. 
33 S. Juliá, ‘Los socialistas y el escenario de la futura revolución’, in Octubre 1934: cincuenta 
años para la reflexión, ed. G. Jackson et al. (Madrid, 1985), pp. 103–30. For Largo Caballero 
responding to the grassroots, see e.g., H. Graham, Socialism and War: the Spanish Socialist 
Party in Power and Crisis, 1936–1939 (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 44–7 and J. Aróstegui, Largo 
Caballero: el tesón y la quimera (Barcelona, 2013), p. 297.
34 Blas Guerrero, El socialismo, pp. 20–1.
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aimed at defending the Republic and social legislation.35 Conflict was not 
coterminous with radicalism.
More convincing explanations of radicalization have tended to 
combine economic and political factors. Marta Bizcarrondo argued that 
the radicalization resulted from the ‘intensification of class struggle’ due 
to the rightist ‘counteroffensive against reformism’, the economic context, 
the ascent of fascism and the ‘rapid deterioration of the political situation’ 
in early 1933.36 Nevertheless, these arguments are inevitably anchored in 
the assumptions of 1970s and 1980s labour history, allowing little room 
for engagement with cultural approaches. Where the threat of fascism is 
recognized, it is a contextual, international factor rather than present in the 
thoughts, ideas and experiences of citizens in everyday life.  
Explanations as to why the Asturian mineworkers rebelled have tended 
to mirror the broader narrative of socialist radicalization. David Ruiz’s 
early interpretation emphasized the importance of unemployment, but the 
number of layoffs in the coal industry was small and cannot be easily mapped 
onto surges in militancy.37 Ruiz later revised his argument to incorporate 
the influence of culture, highlighting that the revolutionaries’ ideas were 
the result of their accumulated experiences, while still emphasizing socialist 
conspiring and the achievement of working class unity via the Asturian 
Workers’ Alliance.38 However, the much lauded and mythologized Workers’ 
Alliance does not explain the origins of the insurrection. 
Adrian Shubert’s pre-history of the Asturian October consisted of an 
examination of the long-term formation of the Asturian mining working 
class. His reconstruction of the living conditions, work experience and 
conflicts that served to shape the local working class remains a valuable 
classic social history. Only one chapter is devoted to the Republic, in 
which he argued that working-class hopes were frustrated by the failure 
of Republican reform. This bred radicalism, which translated into a 
politicization of strikes hitherto focused on economic issues. Such an 
approach neglects the wider struggles within the coalfields beyond trade 
union politics and pays less attention to the language of frustration, fear 
and radicalism, which is understandable given that The Road to Revolution 
is rooted in the tradition of 1960s and 1970s social histories.39 The politics 
35 Macarro Vera, ‘Causas’, pp. 183–6. 
36 Bizcarrondo, ‘Democracia’.
37 D. Ruiz, Insurrección defensiva y revolución obrera: el octubre español de 1934 (Barcelona, 
1988), especially p. 63.
38 Ruiz, Octubre. 
39 A. Shubert, The Road to Revolution in Spain: the Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860–1934 
(Urbana, Ill., 1987). 
11
Introduction
of labour were a fundamental aspect of conflict in the coalfields, but the net 
needs to be cast wider to consider other points of friction and cleavages at 
the local level. From rent activism, to struggles over the role of Catholicism 
in Spanish society, to fears over the emergence of fascism, a wide range 
of factors combined to fuel militancy. Understanding them requires close 
attention to political language and imaginaries, and how social, political 
and cultural boundaries were policed at the local level. 
The meaning of radicalism
Little attempt is made to define the concept of ‘radicalism’ or ‘radicalization’ 
in studies of Republican Spain. This could reflect a wider lack of interest in 
theorizing about radicalism, particularly compared to associated concepts 
like revolution. The meaning of radicalism is instead assumed to be self-
evident. Scholars who have meditated on the concept of radicalism have 
tended to take an etymological approach, according to which radicalism 
has its origins in the Latin term radicalis (root).40 Yet defining radicalism 
as seeking the root of a problem fails to shed much light on radicalism as a 
historical phenomenon and neither does it distinguish between radicalism 
and revolutionary politics.
It is more useful to reframe the history of radicalism in terms of shifting, 
myriad challenges as to what constituted the realm of politics.41 This 
encompasses different historical moments in which individuals and groups 
have contested the place it occupies in private and public spheres, who is 
permitted to participate in political processes and how political struggle 
should be waged. Such an understanding of radicalism allows similarities, 
contrasts and continuities to be drawn between episodes like the struggles 
by nineteenth-century radicals to extend boundaries or citizenship; the 
‘politicization of aspects of daily life once considered outside the political 
realm’ that Pamela Swett noted in Weimar Berlin; and attempts by 1970s 
radicals to embody a new way of being and feeling that challenged the 
capitalist order.42 The character of radicalism thus changed in accordance 
40 E.g., P. McLaughlin, Radicalism: a Philosophical Study (Basingstoke, 2012).
41 Accordingly, radicalism has tended to be associated with the left, even if scholars argue 
that the two are not coterminous. For an important critique, see C. Calhoun, The Roots 
of Radicalism: Tradition, the Public Sphere and Early Nineteenth-Century Social Movements 
(Chicago, Ill., 2012).
42 E.g., Swett, Neighbors, quotation at p. 139; J. Häberlen, The Emotional Politics of the 
Alternative Left: West Germany, 1968–1984 (Cambridge, 2018). For 19th-century radicals, see 
G. Claeys and C. Lattek, ‘Radicalism, republicanism and revolutionism: from the principles 
of ’89 to the origins of modern terrorism’, in The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century 
Political Thought, ed. G. Claeys and G. Stedman Jones (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 200–54.
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with the evolving nature of politics. This can also be applied to the use of 
radicalism as a term. Shifts in meaning could be abrupt. Zsuzsa Nagy’s 
examination of the background to the Hungarian Soviet pinpoints a sudden 
change in the meaning of radicalism: whereas previously it designated 
bourgeois opposition to feudalism, in early 1919 the term was refashioned 
to signify support for Bolshevism and opposition to the young Hungarian 
Republic.43
Rooting the meaning of radicalism in its historical context is therefore 
important. This study employs radicalism to characterize a way of doing 
politics defined by a confrontational, militant style that corresponds with 
the interwar period. This mode of politics manifested itself in an assertive, 
even aggressive policing of political and geographical communities. By 
extension, ‘radicalization’ was the dynamic, unstable and contingent 
process by which this confrontational style of radicalism was adopted.44 
Radicalization signified growing militancy and confrontation rather 
than the pursuit or defence of a ‘fixed’ radical position. Radicalism often 
slid into revolutionary politics, yet did not simply equate to exhibiting 
Communist sympathies or a lurch to the left, as some have argued.45 It was 
quite possible for Communist parties to be conservative in their mode of 
action. As a contingent way of doing politics, radicalism could be inflected 
with particular qualities, as the following chapters will show. For example, 
Spanish socialists unsuccessfully tried to harness the radical impulse among 
the rank and file and reorient it towards moderation in 1932, while four years 
later radicalism would be inflected with fragility as boycotts and political 
purges in the coalfields revealed a crisis of community in the wake of the 
insurrection and government repression. This book traces radicalism on a 
collective level by weaving together episodes of conflict, the experiences of 
individuals and the shifting nature of political language at the local level.
This book roots radicalism within the context of the interwar period, 
rather than defining it against the backdrop of mining. This marks a 
departure from the long-running debate in the literature regarding the 
alleged correlation between coalfields and radical politics. Since the Kerr-
Siegel hypothesis predicated on mineworkers living in isolated, homogenous 
communities, scholars have proposed contrasting theories as to why this 
43 Z. Nagy, ‘Budapest and the revolutions of 1918–19’, in Wrigley, Challenges, p. 78.
44 Some sociological perspectives have begun to move in a similar direction, e.g., E. 
Y. Alimi, L. Bosi and C. Demetriou, The Dynamics of Radicalization: a Relational and 
Comparative Perspective (Oxford, 2015).
45 See Souto Kustrín, ‘Taking’, pp. 134–5 and J. Uría, ‘Asturias 1920–1937, el espacio 
cultural comunista y la cultura de la izquierda: historia de un diálogo entre dos décadas’, in 
Los comunistas en Asturias (1920–1982), ed. F. Erice (Gijón, 1996), pp. 271–5.
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group of workers was more likely to strike than any other. Recent scholarly 
attention paid to figures who do not fit the archetype of the combative miner 
and to mining areas lacking in militancy have revealed this debate to rest on 
shaky foundations.46 The industrial environment of the Asturian coalfields 
was an important factor in conditioning the political dynamics and social 
and economic relationships in the Asturian coalfields, particularly because 
of its high levels of union membership and dense network of political and 
cultural institutions. However, radicalism needs to be seen as emerging 
from the interaction of this particular political and social order and the 
wider national and international context of the 1930s.
The trade unions were mass organizations that remained central to the 
dynamics of economic and political struggle in the coalfields, but society in 
the valleys cannot be reduced to the unions. Instead, a focus on ‘community’ 
provides an opportunity to capture a wider range of conflicts beyond strike 
action and avoids approaching local politics through the institutional lens 
of the union. The concept of community has long been criticized, often 
for its haziness and positive connotations, to the extent of appeals for it 
to be jettisoned completely as an analytical category.47 However, the term 
‘community’ encapsulates the meaning of the Spanish term ‘pueblo’, which 
signifies both people and town or village. It blurs the distinction between 
geography and collective identity as well as resonating with affective power. 
This duality makes ‘community’ an evocative and productive concept for 
examining local politics in the 1930s. In the context of this study, community 
is an imagined collective group that overlays or is associated with a given 
geographical area. The group has no fixed boundaries, but is at once fluid, 
and subject to a constant process of delineation and contestation through 
informal and formal ‘policing’ by individuals and collective groups.48 
During the interwar period, the governance of town, village or 
neighbourhood continued to be the space in which many people engaged 
with politics. It provided a reference point for understanding the wider 
political world and was a ‘common source of grievance and a common 
46 For the original theory, see C. Kerr and A. Siegel, ‘The interindustry propensity to 
strike – an international comparison’, in Industrial Conflict, ed. A. Kornhauser, R. Kubin 
and A. Ross (New York, 1954), pp. 189–212. For a skewering of the link between mining and 
radicalism, see D. Geary, ‘The myth of the radical miner’, in Towards a Comparative History 
of Coalfield Societies, ed. S. Berger, A. Croll and N. LaPorte (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 43–64.  
47 E.g., Macfarlane, ‘History, anthropology and the study of communities’, cited in H. 
Barron, The 1926 Miners’ Lockout: Meanings of Community in the Durham Coalfield (Oxford, 
2009), p. 6.
48 My thinking on community is influenced by A. Cohen, The Symbolic Construction of 
Community (London, 1985). See also G. Delanty, Community (London, 2003).
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medium of political expression’, whether in Spain, interwar Berlin or 
the Durham coalfields.49 In Spain, the locality has traditionally played a 
prominent role in identities and as a source for political action, whether in 
rural areas or industrial zones, although how ideas of the local community 
were projected and mobilized is not a common object of study, with the 
exception of the important work of Pamela Radcliff, Temma Kaplan and 
Chris Ealham.50 Ideas of who and what constituted the local community, 
how the Republic was to be constructed at the local level, and claims 
to represent and embody the local community were all ways in which 
community was a fundamental component of political action and conflict, 
and fed into radicalism. It is therefore a mistake to label community-rooted 
protest as a decidedly less ‘modern’ form of collective action.51
The following chapters will show how the idea of community was 
disputed at a local level, from leftists identifying the working class with 
the community or rejecting Catholicism as a legitimate expression of local 
identity, to community-based defence against the alleged invasion of state 
police forces into ‘their’ communities.52 The first two chapters introduce 
themes and provide a framework for understanding the mechanics of 
radicalism in the rest of the book. Chapter 1 surveys the industrial, social 
and political environment of the coalfields prior to 1931. An examination 
of politics and how conflict was waged in 1931 and 1932 follows in chapter 
2, where the focus is on the construction of the Republic. The next two 
chapters reveal the development of radicalism between 1932 and 1934 
through an analysis of a range of factors, from rivalries over anticlericalism 
and Catholicism to local imaginings of fascism. After chapter 5 examines 
49 E. Rosenhaft, Beating the Fascists? The German Communist Party and Political Violence, 
1929–1933 (Cambridge, 1983), p. 11. Similar arguments appear in e.g., Swett, Neighbors; 
Barron, 1926, p. 271; Ealham, Class, p. 21.
50 E.g. as noted by observers, including R. Ford, in A Handbook for Travellers in Spain (2 
vols, Cambridge, 2011 [1845]), i. 2; G. Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth: an Account of the Social 
and Political Background of the Civil War (London, 1966 [1943]), ix; and J. Pitt-Rivers, The 
People of the Sierra (London, 1954), e.g. pp. 28–30. Scholarly approaches are in P. Radcliff, 
From Mobilization to Civil War: the Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijón, 1900–
1937 (Cambridge, 1996); Kaplan, Red City; Ealham, Class. See also discussion in A. Shubert, 
A Social History of Modern Spain (London, 1990), pp. 190–2. Classic anthropological studies 
often made the community an object of study, but tended to focus on rural areas, e.g., 
C. Lisón Tolosana, Belmonte de los Caballeros: Anthropology and History in an Aragonese 
Community (Princeton, N.J., 1983); W. A. Christian, Person and God in a Spanish Valley 
(New York, 1972).  
51 E.g., R. Cruz, who builds on Tilly in Protestar en España (Madrid, 2015). 
52 Similar approaches are found in Rosenhaft, Beating and C. Millington, ‘Street-fighting 
men: political violence in interwar France’, English Historical Review, cxxix (2014), 606–38.
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the revolution as a liminal moment in which revolutionaries were caught 
between reasserting control over their communities and re-founding the 
social order, chapters 6 and 7 explore the effects of the insurrection and 
the repression. In 1936, these last led to a crisis of community that was 
particularly evident in boycotts and purges. These mechanisms were an 
attempt to remake community even as they simultaneously fuelled a fragile 
radicalism that underpinned the identities of those who would set out to 
resist the military coup of July 1936 that plunged Spain into a three-year 
civil war.
Sources
In order to reconstruct the lived experience of politics in the Asturian coalfields 
during the 1930s, this study rests principally on three complimentary source 
bases, which provide a kaleidoscopic lens through which to observe the 
period: the press, municipal records and court files. All three are incomplete 
due to the loss of documentation during the 1934 insurrection, Civil War 
and Francoist dictatorship. 
The provincial press provides the best overarching vision of local politics 
and is often the only surviving source for what occurred in certain localities 
during the Republic. The titles that form the basis of this study are Región, 
El Noroeste and the Asturian socialist press, all surviving editions of which 
were consulted for the entire period between April 1931 and July 1936. In 
late 1931 the Asturian socialist daily Avance replaced the veteran weekly La 
Aurora Social. Avance enjoyed a wide readership under the editorship of 
Javier Bueno and reached a print run of 25,000 in 1934.53 So important was 
the perceived role of Avance in inciting the revolutionary insurrection that 
police arrested Bueno when it began, and government troops destroyed 
the printing presses. Some limited socialist publications were permitted 
in 1935 (La Tarde and Asturias), but these were smaller operations which 
faced censorship and the threat of sequestration. Together, the pre-eminent 
right-wing daily Región, Gijón-based liberal Republican El Noroeste and the 
socialist press provide panoramic, contrasting visions of the coalfields and 
wider Asturias during the 1930s.
Región, El Noroeste and Avance were all efficient, modern press operations. 
They had sections dedicated to local news that relied on a network of 
correspondents in towns and villages and contributions by readers and 
political groups.54 Each newspaper maintained its own editorial line, but 
53 Shubert, Road, p. 151.
54 J. Uría, ‘Cultura y comunicación de masas en Asturias (1931–1934): aproximación a su 
estudio’, Estudios de Historia Social, xxxi (1984), 145–60, at p. 147.
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the newspapers attempted to balance the editor’s position with providing a 
voice to the towns and villages, lending them a choral character. Different 
and even contradictory reports could be published in the same newspaper. 
El Noroeste’s liberal principles – and animosity towards the socialists – 
ensured that it provided a space for anarchist and Communist writers to 
announce meetings and publish reports. Even as different political groups 
maintained their own mouthpieces, rival newspapers were not always taboo 
for readers; the socialist press was a source of news and opinion for the 
wider left, particularly from 1934. The effect of the local news pages was to 
create a public sphere within the pages themselves and between newspapers. 
Local news sections thus constituted a voice of the local community, even 
if this did not represent the majority of the town or village in question, and 
was refracted through the opinions of the author.
Documents from local and provincial Asturian archives enrich the vision 
of the 1930s further. The minutes of municipal council meetings [actas 
municipales] have been underused by historians but show a different facet 
of local politics beyond the trade unions, particularly in terms of how 
councillors envisaged the Republic and attempted to balance the demands 
of administrating local affairs and pursuing a political agenda. The archive 
of the provincial authority in charge of public order, the office of the civil 
governor, has not survived, but court records from district and provincial 
tribunals allow for analysis of episodes of crime, in this case violence. The loss 
of records means that a comprehensive study is impossible, but individual 
cases – and particularly witness statements therein – allow an examination 
of how politics and community were imagined and policed in violent 
encounters, and offer a voice to those absent from other sources. Letters 
housed in the Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica (CDMH) in 
Salamanca denouncing neighbours to military officials in the wake of the 
insurrection provide similar insight into how the local social and political 
order was imagined, as well as the effects of the repression on the coalfield 
communities.
Newspaper production ceased during the revolutionary insurrection. The 
committees that managed the revolutionary process produced a number of 
proclamations [bandos] that historians have disregarded for their fervour 
and falsehoods, yet used with care, they allow a glimpse into revolutionary 
dreams and ideas as the insurrection unfolded. The flood of reports 
published in the wake of October 1934 that related the terror wreaked by 
the revolutionary hordes, or else the deeds of the heroic revolutionaries, 
is similarly problematic: they include personal testimony, eyewitness 
statements or even novelized accounts. These left-wing texts formed part 
of a nationwide struggle to control the narrative of the insurrection in the 
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high-stakes political context of 1935–6.55 They disseminated the lessons, 
names of the revolutionary martyrs and symbols of the insurrection, which 
cemented the place of ‘unite, proletarian brothers!’ as an antifascist slogan 
and battle cry for the Spanish left.56
Author’s note
Place names are spelled according to current conventions. Andalucía is 
anglicized to Andalusia, as is Sevilla to Seville, but Zaragoza is preferred to 
Saragossa and Navarra to Navarre. Villages in the Asturian coalfields that 
do not appear on the map are followed by the municipality in brackets. 
According to convention and in the interest of brevity, newspaper articles 
are referenced by the title and date of the publication only. The names 
of individuals whose identity is secondary to the information conveyed 
about the social and political context by their crime have been cited in a 
shortened form that reduces surnames to initials (for example, ‘Jaime C.’). 
The names of ideologies and parties are not capitalized, with the exception 
of Communism and Republicanism. Communism is capitalized to denote 
the ‘official’ Communist Party whereas communism in the lowercase refers 
to those estranged from Comintern orthodoxy. Republicanism, indicating 
support for the principles of the Second Republic, is capitalized. Anarchism 
is employed as an umbrella term to designate the broad, heterogeneous 
Spanish anarchist movement.
55 See B. D. Bunk, Ghosts of Passion: Martyrdom, Gender, and the origins of the Spanish 
Civil War (Durham, N.C., 2007).
56 UHP was even incorporated into book titles, e.g., M. Álvarez Suárez, Sangre de octubre: 
U.H.P. Episodios de la revolución en Asturias (Madrid, 1936); N. Molins i Fábrega, UHP: la 
insurrección proletaria en Asturias (Gijón, 1977 [1935]).
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1. Rethinking the red valleys
Dark dust floated in the air, covering the lush, green hillsides. As the train 
snaked its way down the narrow valley in tandem with the rushing black 
waters of the river Candín, lines of straw-hatted men and women shovelling 
huge piles of coal could be observed from the carriage. The valley widened 
and opened onto the industrial expanse of La Felguera. On alighting, 
Roberto Arlt was struck by the landscape of Asturian industry, from the 
sight of ‘armour-plated blast furnaces’ and pitheads to ‘chimneys spewing 
plumes of smoke sideways’. For the Argentine journalist, industry lent 
the Asturian coal valleys an air of ‘severe, sombre dynamism’.1 The region 
was the country’s coal capital and, together with the Basque Country and 
Catalonia, one of the heartlands of Spanish industry, but the image of a 
smoke-belching powerhouse requires careful examination. This chapter 
explores the industrial, social and political development of the coalfields 
within a wider Spanish context from the vantage point of 1931, before 
ending with a look at the proclamation of the Second Republic in April 
1931 and the political panorama at the national and local level.
The Asturian coalfields have long had a reputation as ‘red valleys’ with 
the mineworkers mythologized as the vanguard of the organized Spanish 
working class, as witnessed not only in the 1934 revolutionary insurrection 
but also in the 1962 ‘silent’ strike against the Francoist dictatorship. As an 
area with strong, distinctive left-wing traditions and political activism, 
the coal valleys can be compared to similar areas in Europe and beyond, 
from ‘little Moscows’ like Halluin in northern France or ‘red Clydeside’ in 
Glasgow, to the ‘red cities’ of Vienna and Turin.2 While the left – understood 
in broad terms – was hegemonic in the coalfields, society was neither 
monolithic nor monochrome. Scholars have often emphasized the rivalry 
between socialists, anarchists and Communists, yet it is also necessary to 
incorporate the presence of the right and Catholicism, and to complicate 
1 R. Arlt, Aguafuertes (andaluzas, marroquíes, gallegas, asturianas, vascas y madrileñas) 
(Paracuellos de Jarama, 2015), p. 276.
2 E.g., L. Boswell, Rural Communism in France, 1920–1939 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1998); T. Stovall, 
The Rise of the Parisian Red Belt (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); D. H. Bell, Sesto San Giovanni: 
Workers, Culture and Politics in an Italian Town, 1880–1922 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1986); C. 
Ealham, Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898–1937 (Abingdon, 2005).
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the relationship between left-wing groups in order to provide a fuller 
picture of political dynamics in the coalfields.3 The combination of small 
communities and overlapping networks of sociability, work and politics 
meant that male mineworkers of different beliefs coexisted in the village and 
in the workplace, ensuring interaction and friction, but also the possibility 
of understanding. Communities were thus multi-layered, which meant 
that multiple axes of identification and mobilization existed, including 
affiliations along the lines of politics, class, one’s workplace, gender or place 
of residence. This was vital for the evolution of the struggles examined in 
the following chapters.4 Radicalism emerged from a combination of the 
left’s position of power and local rivalries and cleavages. 
Environment and industry
Some 450km and an 11-hour train journey north of Madrid in the 1930s, 
Asturias – or the province of Oviedo as it was then officially known – 
comprises over 10,000km2 nestled between the Cantabrian Sea and peaks 
of the cordillera that divide it from the central plains of the Spanish Meseta. 
The rolling hills along the coast and mountainous valleys traditionally 
supported a largely subsistence economy, based mainly on cattle rearing, 
fishing and smallholdings, but by the twentieth century, coal and iron 
production had emerged to form the backbone of the Asturian economy. 
The provincial capital was the regional seat of banking and commerce, but 
also accommodated two arms producers, two explosives factories and a 
cement plant within its municipal boundaries. The capital was rivalled by 
the port city of Gijón, which was both a ‘summer resort and [an] industrial 
powerhouse’, thanks to coal exporting, shipbuilding and metallurgy, as well 
as glass-making, ceramics, textiles, tobacco, fishing and construction.5 The 
principal coal zones were the steep-sided, winding valleys of the Nalón, 
Caudal, Aller and Turón rivers to the south of Oviedo, towered over by 
peaks up to 1000m tall.6 Outside the central area formed by Oviedo, Gijón 
3 On rivalry, see e.g., D. Ruiz, Insurrección defensiva y revolución obrera: el octubre español 
de 1934 (Barcelona, 1988).
4 For similar approaches, see e.g., H. Barron, The 1926 Miners’ Lockout: Meanings of 
Community in the Durham Coalfield (Oxford, 2009); S. Ward, Unemployment and the 
State in Britain: the Means Test and Protest in 1930s South Wales and North-East England 
(Manchester, 2013). 
5 P. Radcliff, From Mobilization to Civil War: the Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City 
of Gijón, 1900–1937 (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 19–20, 66. 
6 The Nalón valley accounted for 43% of coal production, the Caudal (including Turón) 
28% and the Aller 18% in 1931 (Estadística Minera y Metalúrgica de España [1931] (2 vols, 
Madrid, 1931), ii. 281).
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and the coalfields, the rest of the province’s 800,000 inhabitants – of a 
national population of 23.5 million in 1931 – were widely dispersed.7
The mining of coal in Asturias began in the eighteenth century, but 
the industry developed slowly. Geology and geography posed significant 
obstacles. Asturian coal was soft and required washing. Extraction was 
difficult and the labour process resisted mechanization, for seams were 
usually narrow and sloped diagonally. The poor quality of the coal and costly 
transportation out of the valleys meant that Asturian coal was expensive 
and initially a product destined primarily for local consumption. From the 
mid nineteenth century onwards, an increase in demand, improvements in 
transport and infrastructure, the consolidation of larger mining companies, 
including Fábrica de Mieres (1879), Sociedad Hullera Española (1892) and 
Duro-Felguera (1900), and the introduction of a tariff on foreign coal, 
stimulated the development of the industry. Output, which had oscillated 
between 350,000 and 500,000 tons between 1870 and 1887, increased to 
over a million tons in 1895 and reached two million tons in 1907.8 As a 
result, Asturian coal went from being a product for local consumption, 
to one for export to other provinces by train and ship, although its price 
ensured that it continued to struggle to compete with foreign imports on 
the domestic market. 
Even as the capital of Spanish coal, the Asturian coalfields never rivalled 
areas like the Ruhr, northern England or south Wales, which were much 
larger in scale and production.9 Nor could Asturias match the success and 
wealth of the other two heartlands of Spanish industry: the Basque Country 
and Catalonia, whose industrial foundations rested on iron ore extraction 
and textile production respectively. The Basques were favoured by large 
deposits of the phosphorous-free iron ore required by the Bessemer process 
and exported it to Britain; cheap coal flowed in the opposite direction to 
fuel the Basque Country’s own steel production.10 The interruption of this 
7 V. Rodríguez Infiesta, ‘Asturias en los siglos xx y xxi’, in Historia de Asturias, ed. A. 
Fernández Pérez and F. Friera Suárez (Oviedo, 2005), p. 702; A. Shubert, A Social History of 
Modern Spain (London, 1990), p. 24. 
8 G. Ojeda, Asturias en la industrialización española, 1833–1907 (Madrid, 1985), pp. 335, 
355, 363. 
9 The Ruhr coal basin yielded 123 million tons in 1929 before the onset of the Great 
Depression (J. Gillingham, Industry and Politics in the Third Reich: Ruhr Coal, Hitler and 
Europe (London, 1985), p. 58). The ‘precarious’ south Welsh coal industry produced 36 
million tons in 1898 (C. Williams, Capitalism, Community, and Conflict: the South Wales 
Coalfield, 1898–1947 (Cardiff, 1998), ch. 2, at p. 26). 
10 G. Tortella, The Development of Modern Spain: an Economic History of the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), pp. 86–9. See also J. P. Fusi, Política 
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trade during the First World War sparked a boom in profits for Asturian 
coal companies. When British coal reappeared on the Spanish market after 
the war, the contraction was sharp. In an attempt to stay competitive, 
mining companies lowered wages while forcing mineworkers to cut 
increased amounts of Asturian coal. Production reached nearly five million 
tons in 1929 before further economic problems hit the industry during the 
Republic.11 
The expansion of the coal industry during the First World War had 
created thousands of jobs, which later disappeared in the post-war slump. 
Dismissals helped the companies maintain the pressure on wages during 
the 1920s. The mining workforce had peaked at 39,000 in 1920 – which 
translated into a three-fold increase since 1900 – and had largely been 
fuelled by an influx of migrants from Portugal and other areas of Spain. The 
post-war difficulties in the industry meant that between 1922 and 1934 the 
number of mineworkers fluctuated between 25,000 and 30,000.12 The iron 
and steel industry in the valleys was much smaller, employing approximately 
2,100 and 1,300 workers in La Felguera and Ablaña (Mieres) respectively. (A 
further plant in Gijón employed another 1,300 workers.)13 
Coalmining was almost entirely a male occupation thanks to a legal 
prohibition on women labouring in the pit galleries. Women were 
employed in the coal-washing facilities, but their number was in long-term 
decline and by 1934, they summed only 700 workers.14 In contrast, women 
outnumbered male workers in the explosives factories that supplied the 
mines.15 According to official figures, much of women’s employment in the 
province was concentrated in agriculture, domestic service and tailoring, 
which reflected national patterns, although such sources neglect less 
formalized activities and unpaid labour.16 Fragments from contemporary 
accounts, the press or court records show that women worked in bars 
and shops, ran lodging houses and market stalls, and engaged in informal 
activities to supplement the family income, such as coal picking.17 Even 
obrera en el País Vasco, 1880–1923 (Madrid, 1975), p. 19.
11 A. Shubert, The Road to Revolution in Spain: the Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860–1934 
(Urbana, Ill., 1987), pp. 27–30.
12 Shubert, Road, pp. 29, 38–40.
13 Estadística Minera y Metalúrgica de España [1931], ii. 306–7. 
14 Estadística Minera y Metalúrgica de España [1934], 477.
15 Estadística Minera y Metalúrgica de España [1931], i. 94.
16 Ministerio del Trabajo, Censo de la población de España [1930] … regiones de Asturias y 
León. Cuadernos III y X (Madrid, 1942), pp. 40–1, 44–5; Shubert, Social History, p. 38. 
17 For lodging houses, see e.g., cases in Archivo Histórico Provincial de Asturias (AHPA), 
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so, paid employment among young women was high enough in the 
1920s for Dr Jove y Canella to lament that young women in San Martín 
del Rey Aurelio were not prepared for homemaking, as they spent their 
youth working rather than learning their domestic duties.18 Jove y Canella 
published several ‘medical topographies’ of coalfield districts in the 1920s 
and 1930s, in which he surveyed the factors that impacted on the health 
of residents, from living conditions and lifestyles to nutrition and disease. 
For the men who worked in coal extraction, mine work varied greatly 
from pit to pit. Companies sank the first shafts in 1916 and thereafter 
hundreds of workers queued every day for the cages that plummeted to 
the galleries in the deeper pits, like Sotón, Fondón or the Lláscares mine 
visited by Roberto Arlt.19 In Aller, in contrast, drift mines peppered the 
valley sides and the first shaft did not enter into operation until 1942. Drift 
mines employed much smaller workforces and groups of workers trekked, 
‘staff in […] hand’, up the mountainsides.20 The level of mechanization 
inside the mines varied significantly between different pits, and workforces 
were highly stratified according to their role and wage. Subcontracting had 
become increasingly prevalent and served as a further potential dividing 
factor within the workforce.21 Stratification and different workplace 
experiences posed potential obstacles to solidarity and co-operation. 
While the image of a highly industrialized area and the identity of the 
‘mineworker’ loomed large and proudly in the collective imagination, the 
reality was inevitably more complicated. That mineworkers sought other 
ways of earning a living, from running bars to book-selling, is unsurprising 
given the precarious nature of employment in the coal industry, and can be 
illustrated by the cases of two young socialists. Herminio Vallina appears 
in the archival record as a mineworker, correspondent for the socialist 
newspaper, Avance, and shop assistant in a pharmacy, while Silverio 
Audiencia Provincial (AP), box 78436. A woman in a police investigation defined as a 
homemaker actually ran a bar, see AHPA, AP, box 79435, file 251 (1934). For coal picking, 
see Región, 28 Oct. 1931. For lodging houses in Bilbao, see P. Pérez-Fuentes Hernández, 
“Ganadores de pan” y “amas de casa”: otras miradas sobre la industrialización vasca (Bilbao, 
2003), pp. 46–8.
18 J. M. Jove y Canella, Topografía médica del concejo de San Martín del Rey Aurelio 
(Madrid, 1923), pp. 64, 84–5. 
19 Arlt, Aguafuertes, pp. 278–84.
20 S. Nevares, El patrono ejemplar: una obra maestra de Acción Social (Madrid, 1936), pp. 
16–17.
21 Shubert, Road, pp. 47, 58–9. It was also present in Britain ‘well into the twentieth 
century’ (R. Church and Q. Outram, Strikes and Solidarity: Coalfield Conflict in Britain, 
1889–1966 (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 27–9).
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Castañón described working in construction and selling newspapers and 
novels after he was sacked for striking.22 Many mineworkers continued to be 
connected to the rural environment, both in terms of labour and sociability. 
Historians have suggested that ‘mixed workers’, who combined mining and 
agricultural labour, predominated prior to 1914, but mineworkers returned 
to agriculture amid the crisis in the coal industry at the end of the First 
World War.23 As women worked the land more than men, reframing the 
unit of economic analysis on the family also highlights that mining families 
continued to be entangled in some of the rhythms and practices of rural 
society. Police investigations from the 1930s also reveal quarrels between 
mineworkers over the demarcation of plots of land belonging to family 
members and brawling at an esfoyaza, a traditional communal gathering to 
strip leaves from maize.24
If the reality was more nuanced than Arlt’s vision of the coalfields, the 
valleys were still starkly different from much of Spain, which continued to be 
predominantly agricultural. The percentage of Spain’s population working 
in agriculture – over 50 per cent – was aligned with Mediterranean Europe 
(Italy and Greece) and halfway between the agrarian east of the continent 
and more industrialized western and northern Europe.25 As travellers 
and observers have long remarked, Spain exhibits great geographical and 
climatological variation from the rainy, fertile valleys of the north to the 
arid plains of the interior. The different conditions shaped the selection 
of crops, farming methods and property structures. Market gardening 
and livestock husbandry tended to characterize the smallholdings of the 
north. Cereals and legumes were concentrated on the north-central plains – 
although they were cultivated all over Spain where the topography allowed 
– and olive trees, vines and fruit trees were mainly grown in Andalusia 
and on the Mediterranean coast. While large agricultural estates [latifundia] 
are associated with the southern regions of Extremadura, La Mancha and 
22 La Libertad, 7 Aug. 1930; Avance, 14 Apr. 1932; AHPA, AP, box 97435, file 280 (1934); 
Mundo Gráfico, 1 Sept. 1937. See also R. García Montes’ recollections of his father in Ángeles 
rojos sin alas para volar (Siero, 2009), pp. 19–20.
23 Shubert, Road, p. 42; Jove y Canella, Topografía médica del concejo de San Martín del Rey 
Aurelio, p. 142.
24 J. M. Jove y Canella, Topografía médica del concejo de Laviana (Madrid, 1927) p. 63; 
AHPA, AP, box 78437, file 335 (1934) and box 79435, file 319 (1934). For a description of an 
esfoyaza, see Jove y Canella, Topografía médica del concejo de San Martín del Rey Aurelio, p. 
65.
25 L. Boswell, ‘Rural society in crisis’, in The Oxford Handbook of European history, 1914–
1945, ed. N. Doumanis (Oxford, 2016), p. 245.
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Andalusia, even in these areas the size of farms varied greatly.26 Although less 
than one per cent of the landowners possessed nearly half of the agricultural 
land of Jaén province, the presence of small tenants and sharecroppers 
should not be overlooked.27 Likewise, small farms [minifundia] populated 
the valleys and rolling hills of the northern coast, but there were also 
important differences between regions like Galicia and the Basque Country. 
Whereas family farms were indivisible and passed to the eldest son in the 
latter, Galician smallholdings were ‘minute’ and subject to ‘fragmented 
ownership’. The subdivision of plots stimulated emigration abroad to 
escape poverty.28
The dependence on agriculture traditionally resulted in a portrait of Spain 
as economically backward and stagnant, but recent research has depicted 
instead a country experiencing uneven development and highlighted the 
evolving nature of the agricultural sector. Mechanization and the use of 
artificial fertilizers were underdeveloped, but expanded during the early 
twentieth century, while at the same time agriculture became increasingly 
oriented towards a capitalist market economy.29 Land dedicated to 
agriculture increased by nearly a third between 1900 and 1939, and market 
demands stimulated a gradual shift towards cultivating more profitable 
products, which in Asturias translated into an increase in cattle production 
as peasants slowly became integrated into capitalist market dynamics.30 The 
number of landless agricultural labourers who worked the large estates in 
the south was in long-term decline, even if their underemployment, poverty 
and thirst for land posed an important problem for the governments of the 
Second Republic. The Spanish economy thus followed a ‘Mediterranean 
path’ of development, characterized by sluggish but consistent growth 
26 As noted early on by E. Malefakis in Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: 
Origins of the Spanish Civil War (New Haven, Conn., 1970), pp. 35–6, and frequently 
emphasized since.
27 F. Cobo Romero, De campesinos a electores: modernización agraria en Andalucía, 
politización campesina y derechización de los pequeños propietarios y arrendatarios: el caso de la 
provincia de Jaén, 1931–1936 (Madrid, 2003), p. 133. 
28 This summary is based on J. Simpson, Spanish Agriculture: the Long Siesta, 1765–1965 
(Cambridge, 1995), ch. 2. For more detail on Ourense, see J. Prada Rodríguez, De la agitación 
republicana a la represión franquista (Ourense 1934–1939) (Barcelona, 2006), pp. 12–13.
29 Simpson, Spanish Agriculture, chs 5 and 7. 
30 F. Sánchez Marroyo, La España del siglo XX: economía, demografía y sociedad (Madrid, 
2003), p. 41. For the shift from cereals to wine in La Mancha, see F. Rey, Paisanos en lucha: 
exclusión política y violencia en la Segunda República española (Madrid, 2008), p. 31 and for 
the preference for almonds in Andalusia, see Cobo Romero, De campesinos, pp. 89–90. See 
also Shubert, Social History, p. 13. On Asturias, see J. Uría, ‘Asturias, 1898–1914: el fin de un 
campesinado amable’, Hispania, lxii (2002), 1059–98.
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compared to its northern European neighbours. Rapid transformation of 
the agrarian sector would only occur during the 1950s and 1960s.31
As the economy evolved during the first third of the twentieth century, 
Spain underwent an important demographic transformation. Between 
1900 and 1931, the population increased from 18.5 million to 23.5 million, 
facilitated by a decrease in the death rate. Cities across the country 
expanded.32 Madrid nearly doubled in size, rising from 540,000 to almost 
one million inhabitants, alongside provincial capitals like Zaragoza and 
Córdoba, which swelled from 99,000 and 58,000 to 173,000 and 103,000 
inhabitants respectively. Barcelona’s industrial complexes attracted labour 
from southern Spain in search of job opportunities, with the result that a 
third of the city’s residents were not Catalan by birth in 1930.33 The Asturian 
coalfields mirrored these wider demographic trends. During the first third 
of the century, the number of inhabitants of Mieres, San Martín del Rey 
Aurelio and Langreo more than doubled; in the latter, the population 
increased from 19,000 to over 39,000. By 1930 the principal coalfield 
municipalities totalled over 140,000 residents, while 75,000 lived in the 
municipal district of Oviedo – 42,000 in the capital itself.34 
The swelling population posed a significant challenge for housing and 
infrastructure in the coalfields. Some of the mining companies had financed 
housing, schools, medical services, company shops, churches, water 
supplies, washing facilities, and even posts for the national police force, the 
Civil Guard.35 However, provision was uneven. Not all areas bore the same 
imprint of paternalism as Turón, where every ‘manifestation of cultural or 
mechanical labour’ in the valley allegedly had the ‘constant and determined 
support’ of the mining company Hulleras del Turón.36 Some historians have 
tended to understand these paternalistic practices reductively as an attempt 
to inhibit the growth of socialist politics, but this fails to account for why 
paternalism shrank from the First World War onwards just as the socialist 
31 See Tortella, Development; Sánchez Marroyo, España, p. 26. 
32 Shubert, Social History, p. 23. 
33 Ealham, Class, p. 4. 
34 ‘Alteraciones de los municipios en los censos de población desde 1842’ <http://www.ine.
es/intercensal/> [accessed 5 May 2017].
35 For a contemporary description of Aller, see Nevares, El patrono, pp. 42–4. For a 
recent analysis, see J. Muñiz Sánchez, Del pozo a casa: genealogías del paternalismo minero 
contemporáneo en Asturias (Gijón, 2007). On housing, see e.g., J. Sierra Álvarez, ‘Política de 
vivienda y políticas industriales paternalistas’, Ería, viii (1985), 61–71. On education, see e.g., 
M. V. Álvarez Fernández, La escuela del paternalismo industrial asturiano (1880–1937) (Gijón, 
2006).
36 Región, 24 June 1931. 
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mining union expanded and sought recognition.37 More convincingly, 
paternalism was a form of ‘social engineering’ designed to attract and ‘fix’ 
an agricultural society to industrial discipline, and the paternalist drive was 
considered less necessary during the boom of immigrant labour during the 
First World War.38 By the 1930s, paternalism was limited to the building 
of schools, company shops and housing, although provision of the latter 
continued to be uneven, piecemeal and never sufficient for the needs of the 
local population.
Company decisions on industrial development shaped patterns of 
urbanization in the coalfields. As coal pits were sunk, urban density increased 
on the valley floors, although the lack of overall investment in housing 
meant that many mineworkers continued to live in the villages clinging to 
the steep valley-sides. The peculiar case of Aller demonstrates how company 
decisions on industrial development determined settlement patterns. In the 
Aller valley, Sociedad Hullera Española (SHE) had resisted the construction 
of a railway to prevent the emergence of larger conurbations and what 
the company perceived to be associated vices, including socialism.39 This 
resistance, combined with the lack of pits, meant that urban settlements 
in Aller did not reach the size of their counterparts in Mieres and Langreo.
Yet even the more densely populated areas in the coalfields did not see 
the emergence of large urban centres. Residential patterns resembled the 
valleys of south Wales rather than the large conurbations of the Ruhr or the 
self-contained coal villages in north-east England.40 A large proportion of 
the Asturian coalfield population continued to live in villages and hamlets, 
as Jove y Canella observed in the early 1920s. He calculated that in San 
Martín del Rey Aurelio a quarter of the 16,000 inhabitants lived in the 
main urban centres and the rest were distributed among 124 villages and 
hamlets.41 San Martín del Rey Aurelio was somewhat exceptional. Forty-
seven per cent of the municipality’s population lived in settlements of fewer 
than 100 inhabitants in 1930, which was higher than in Langreo (18 per 
cent), Mieres (25 per cent) and Laviana (39 per cent). Even so, the largest 
conurbations in the coalfields in Langreo and Laviana only accommodated 
37 See Shubert, Road, ch. 4. 
38 J. Sierra Álvarez, El obrero soñado: ensayo sobre el paternalismo industrial (Asturias, 1860–
1917) (Madrid, 1990).
39 Muñiz Sánchez, Del pozo, pp. 181, 190. 
40 L. James, The Politics of Identity and Civil Society in Britain and Germany: the Miners in 
the Ruhr and South Wales, 1890–1926 (Manchester, 2008), p. 31; Ward, Unemployment, p. 9.




between 2,000 and 5,000 residents, and represented approximately a third 
of the municipal population, while in Mieres only 15 per cent resided in the 
capital.42 The contrast with the south of Spain is striking. The population 
of the coalfields was less urbanized than in certain parts of the agricultural 
south, where day labourers who worked on the large estates often resided 
in large agro-towns. Three quarters of the population of Jaén province lived 
in towns of more than 5,000 people, including 70 per cent of the province’s 
day labourers.43 
The consequences of these settlement patterns in the coalfields were two-
fold. First, the coalfield villages were not isolated, self-contained units. It was 
common for mineworkers to live in one settlement and work in another.44 
Neighbours and local kinship networks did not necessarily overlap with 
their network of workmates in the pit. Both the place of residence and 
the workplace were sites of sociability and identification that could form 
the basis for collective action. Second, the Asturian coalfields were largely 
formed of small communities in which residents were known to one another. 
This proximity was a double-edged sword. It could serve to forge solidarity 
rooted in identification with the community or engender bitter disputes 
and cleavages. Social pressures and gossip in these small communities could 
contribute to radicalism. 
Social life and politics
In 1931, eleven years after construction had begun, the Casa del Pueblo 
opened in La Oscura (San Martín del Rey Aurelio). Measuring 1,526m2, the 
building was another jewel in the crown of the Asturian socialist movement. 
The network of Asturian socialist ‘Houses of the People’ had developed 
from the first planned Casa del Pueblo in Mieres in 1900 to number sixty-
six in the 1930s. Although the size and facilities varied, the Casas del Pueblo, 
in addition to housing local socialist union and party sections, could offer 
assembly halls, theatres, co-operatives, libraries, cinemas, schools, sports 
clubs, choirs and friendly societies to their male and female members.45 
42 Shubert, Road, p. 66. 
43 Cobo Romero, De campesinos, p. 129.
44 Shubert, Road, pp. 66–7. 
45 L. Arias González and M. J. Álvarez García, Los palacios obreros: Casas del Pueblo 
socialistas en Asturias, 1902–1937 (Oviedo, 2010), pp. 83–111, 187, 190–3, 196; L. Arias 
González and F. de Luis Martín, ‘Las Casas del Pueblo y sus implicaciones geograficas’, 
Biblio 3W: Revista bibliográfica de geografía y ciencias sociales, xv (2010), available at <http://
www.ub.edu/geocrit/b3w-884.htm> [accessed 12 Sept. 2018]. For a contemporary overview, 
see Boletín de la Unión General de Trabajadores de España, liii, May 1933.
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The Casas del Pueblo were not solely an Asturian phenomenon, although 
the coalfields possessed a particularly dense, active and well-resourced 
network of such institutions. They existed across the country and in other 
parts of Europe, where they had first emerged as meeting rooms for socialist 
organizations towards the end of the nineteenth century. Often financed by 
co-operatives or mutual aid societies, they responded to a need for spaces 
in which to educate, socialize, or organize campaigns.46 The network of 
socialist institutions in ‘red Vienna’ was particularly well developed. By 
1931–2, the party had established forty cultural organizations, published 127 
newspapers and provided a range of sporting activities for its followers. The 
objective was to provide cultural education for the working masses in order 
to forge fit, educated citizens for the Republic and work towards the future 
establishment of socialism.47
The development of the Casas del Pueblo in Asturias came after the 
consolidation of an embryonic socialist movement at the turn of the 
century. An Asturian socialist newspaper – La Aurora Social – was founded 
in 1896 and there were over 4,200 Asturian members of the socialist trade 
union federation, the UGT, by the time the Asturian Socialist Federation 
(FSA) was established five years later.48 Mineworkers continued to organize 
in pit-based unions until the creation of the socialist Mineworkers’ Union 
of Asturias (SOMA) in 1910, which quickly became a powerful voice for 
the coal miners. The key figure behind the establishment of the SOMA 
was Manuel Llaneza. His experience in self-imposed exile in northern 
France after being sacked for striking in Mieres in 1906 convinced him 
of the need for sector-wide trade unions along the lines of the reformist, 
centralized Vieux Syndicat. Llaneza was also a prominent advocate of the 
construction of Casas del Pueblo, for he believed they would draw workers 
into the socialist sphere, away from both company paternalism and the 
vices of alcohol and sport.49
The SOMA’s first decade was successful. It attracted members and achieved 
improved wages and working conditions. The union initially adopted a 
combative stance in labour relations, which led to rapid expansion – 10,000 
members within two years – and forced the mining companies to recognize 
46 M. Kohn, Radical Space: Building the House of the People (Ithaca, N.Y., 2003), pp. 95ff. 
47 Gruber is nevertheless skeptical as to the achievements of these organizations, see H. 
Gruber, Red Vienna: Experiment in Working Class Culture, 1919–1934 (New York, 1991), ch. 4.
48 Shubert, Road, p. 108.
49 J. Muñiz Sánchez, ‘Encontrando el Norte: Manuel Llaneza y la influencia francesa en el 
sindicalismo español de principios del siglo XX’, Hispania: Revista española de historia, lxix 
(2009), 793–820. For the early history of the SOMA, see also E. Moradiellos, El Sindicato de 
los Obreros Mineros de Asturias, 1910–1930 (Oviedo, 1986).
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the union as the legitimate representative of the workforce. The SOMA then 
assumed a more moderate and reformist approach in accordance with the 
strategy of the UGT and the philosophy of Spanish socialism as a whole. By 
1919, it boasted 29,000 members out of a mining workforce of 35,000, for 
whom it had managed to secure the historic achievement of a seven-hour 
working day in the mines.50 The union’s growth aided the consolidation of 
socialism in the coalfields. In elections held in 1918, the PSOE had obtained 
40 per cent of the vote in Mieres and San Martín del Rey Aurelio.51
Yet political and economic circumstances conspired to throw the 
SOMA into crisis during the next decade. The post-war contraction in 
the coal industry led companies to dismiss thousands of mineworkers and 
repeatedly cut wages, while the Communist call for the left to join the Third 
International caused a traumatic split in the Spanish socialist movement. 
The SOMA hierarchy struggled to respond to these challenges, which 
produced wildcat strikes and infighting for control of the union between 
1920 and 1922. The expulsion of twenty-one SOMA sections did not resolve 
the union’s woes and membership continued to slide. It had collapsed from 
nearly 30,000 in 1919 to 7,000 in 1922, before recovering to 12,000 two 
years later and then slipping again to 8,000 in 1926.52 
Llaneza met with Primo de Rivera soon after he seized power in 1923, 
but socialist co-operation with the regime, including participation in the 
corporatist mechanisms of the dictatorship, did not improve the fortunes 
of the SOMA. Socialists defended co-operation with the dictatorship on 
the basis of defending workers and protecting their organizations. While 
the UGT maintained a similar level of membership in 1928 compared to 
1922, such a situation was not reflected in Asturias, where the SOMA was 
incapable of defending mineworkers from short-time working, closures and 
layoffs.53 Primo de Rivera’s decision in 1927 to withdraw the seven-hour day 
tested SOMA’s moderation further. The union executive finally decided to 
organize a strike, but only thanks to rank-and-file pressure.54
The SOMA’s fortunes changed at the end of the decade, thanks to 
the socialist movement shifting to oppose the dictatorship, although the 
50 Shubert, Road, p. 112.
51 A. R. Felgueroso Durán and A. Fernández García, ‘La gestión de los socialistas en el 
Ayuntamiento de Langreo entre 1909 y 1936’, in Historia del socialismo en Langreo 1897–1997, 
ed. A. Fernández García and J. Girón (Gijón, 1997), pp. 153–4.
52 Shubert, Road, p. 133.
53 J. L. Martín Ramos, Historia de la UGT, ii: Entre la revolución y el reformismo, 1914–1931 
(6 vols, Madrid, 2008), p. 157.
54 Shubert, Road, ch. 6. 
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SOMA continued to advocate moderation. The union’s membership 
doubled between 1930 and 1932, by which time it claimed 21,000 members 
and 69 per cent of the workforce, cementing its position as the primary 
trade union force in the coalfields.55 The spectacular recovery in the SOMA 
appeared to be the result of returning former members. Growth in the 
wider UGT, which reached over one million members in June 1932, came 
from newcomers to the union, particularly in rural areas via the National 
Federation of Landworkers (FNTT).56
The main rival to the socialist unions both in Asturias and at a national 
level was the anarchist movement, whose presence in Spain stretched back 
to the 1870s. United by a desire to emancipate citizens through abolishing 
capitalism and authority – identified with the state and the Church – and 
establishing libertarian communism, anarchism nevertheless remained a 
heterogeneous movement. In 1910, syndicalists founded Spanish anarchism’s 
most prominent organization – the National Confederation of Labour 
(CNT) – which sought to use direct action to gain material improvements 
for workers and further the anarchist cause. The CNT swelled to over 
700,000 members at the end of the decade, before entering a spiralling 
crisis of radicalization and repression in the early 1920s. The Primo de Rivera 
dictatorship forced the union underground. After legalization in 1930, the 
CNT again grew rapidly to boast 800,000 members by the end of 1931.57
Anarchism had two particular strongholds in Asturias, whose differences 
reflected an important division within the overall movement. The port city 
of Gijón had long been the centre for a moderate syndicalism that was 
open to collaborating with socialists and in 1919 a prominent local anarchist 
and educator, Eleuterio Quintanilla, had proposed unification with the 
socialist movement. This is important, for the impulse behind the Asturian 
Workers’ Alliance signed in spring 1934 originated in the Gijonese anarchist 
movement. In contrast, the anarchists of the iron and steel town of La 
Felguera were associated with the more radical, voluntarist and doctrinaire 
FAI (Iberian Anarchist Federation) – a clandestine organization of small 
affinity groups formed in 1927.58 Anarchism had a greater hegemony over the 
steelworkers in La Felguera than over the mineworkers. The CNT-affiliated 
55 Shubert, Road, pp. 135, 142.
56 M. Bizcarrondo, Historia de la UGT, iii. Entre la democracia y la revolución, 1931–1936 
(6 vols, Madrid, 2008), p. 18. 
57 J. Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain (1931–1939) (Abingdon, 
2004), p. 51. 
58 For anarchism in Asturias, see Á. Barrio Alonso, Anarquismo y anarcosindicalismo en 
Asturias (1890–1936) (Madrid, 1988).
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mining union – the Mineworkers’ Single Union (SUM) – vied with the 
SOMA for mineworkers’ support but had much fewer members. While 
most rank-and-file SUM members were anarchists, in reality the union had 
been a coalition of anarchists and Communists since its creation in 1922 
from the twenty-one sections expelled from the SOMA. Membership of the 
SUM swelled to 9,000 in June 1931 – just over a year after it was authorized 
to operate – yet this also coincided with the eruption during a strike of 
underlying tensions within the union due to an unstable combination of a 
largely anarchist rank and file and a Communist leadership.59
Even though the coalfields were an area of relative strength for the 
official Communist Party of Spain (PCE), the movement was small both 
in Asturias and in Spain as a whole. Throughout the 1920s, Asturian 
Communists struggled in the face of harassment by the state, frictions 
with the socialists and internal disagreement, which continued through the 
beginning of the Republic. There were less than a thousand members of 
the PCE in Asturias in 1932 and just over a thousand in the Communist 
Youth (JC).60 The weakness of the PCE was also evident in its lack of bricks-
and-mortar institutions when compared to the socialist Casas del Pueblo. 
Communists organized meetings and rallies in cinemas, theatres and bars, 
as did anarchists outside their stronghold of La Felguera, where ‘La Justicia’ 
was the hub for anarchist activity and was frequently raided by the police. 
There was a third mineworkers’ union beyond the SOMA and the 
SUM: the Catholic Mineworkers’ Union (SCOM). The SCOM had 
been created in response to SOMA’s attempts to organize mineworkers 
employed by Sociedad Hullera Española in Aller. SHE rejected proposals 
for an independent Catholic organization from one Spain’s leading social 
Catholic voices, Maximiliano Arboleya, in favour of a yellow union that 
was amenable to the employers. The struggle between the SOMA and the 
SCOM in Aller culminated in a shootout in Moreda in 1920, by which time 
the SCOM had already reached its peak level of influence. Thereafter the 
SCOM’s membership declined despite the favourable Catholic corporatist 
climate of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. By 1932, it could only muster 
half of the 2,300 members it had claimed in 1919.61 During the 1930s, the 
SCOM maintained a union centre in Moreda, but the main trace of its 
59 For the SUM, see C. Álvarez, El Sindicato Único de Mineros de Asturias (Oviedo, 2004).
60 See F. Erice, ‘El PCE en Asturias, de los orígenes a la guerra civil’, in Los comunistas en 
Asturias (1920–1982), ed. F. Erice (Gijón, 1996), pp. 41–84.
61 A. Shubert, ‘Entre Arboleya y Comillas: el fracaso del sindicalismo católico en Asturias’, 
in Octubre 1934: cincuenta años para la reflexión, ed. G. Jackson et al. (Madrid, 1985), pp. 
243–52. See also D. Benavides, El fracaso social del catolicismo español: Arboleya Martínez, 
1870–1951 (Barcelona, 1973).
33
Rethinking the red valleys
public life was through opinion pieces published in Región penned by 
Vicente Madera Peña, SCOM leader and cousin of Ramón González Peña, 
a SOMA leader and so-called generalísimo of the Asturian October.
The centres operated by the trade unions constituted one hub of 
associational life and political and cultural education in the coalfields. Their 
main rival was the ateneo, which was a liberal, interclass cultural centre that 
tended to propagate Republican ideals and had its roots in the nineteenth 
century. The ateneos formed part of a constellation of initiatives including 
lending libraries and cultural associations that focused on enlightening 
citizens through education and culture, and which mushroomed during 
the 1930s. Ateneos appeared in neighbourhoods like working-class La 
Argañosa in Oviedo and settlements like La Canga in Langreo, where 
the Ateneo Popular and library newly inaugurated in 1932 boasted a 
membership of twenty-eight in a hamlet of only twenty-six inhabitants.62 
Membership levels were high, but overwhelmingly male. The ateneos in 
Mieres and Turón claimed 1,000 and 800 members respectively in 1932, 
and in Trubia the Casino-Theatre boasted 2,000. The Ateneo Popular in 
Mieres controversially voted to admit women members in autumn 1932, 
although they were only permitted to attend talks – and indeed, there were 
lectures on topics including women’s health and rights.63 Young women 
nevertheless were often an integral part of initiatives like theatre groups 
(cuadros artísticos).64 
The ateneos were founded on a desire for collective self-improvement 
shared across Republicanism and the left. As one ‘son of Langreo’ declared, 
the ‘weapon’ of the time was the ‘book, the newspaper’.65 Ateneos organized 
a range of activities, including lectures, music and theatre, and frequently 
housed a reading room or library and often a radio.66 Theatrical performances 
helped to mould and cement left-wing political values through social and 
political criticism, including the propagation of anticlerical ideas.67 As in 
62 El Noroeste, 19 Oct. 1932.
63 Á. Mato Díaz, La Atenas del norte: ateneos, sociedades culturales y bibliotecas populares en 
Asturias (1876–1937) (Oviedo, 2008), p. 96; El Noroeste, 20 Jan. 1932. For lectures on women’s 
issues, see e.g., El Noroeste, 27 Aug. 1931, 18, 26 Feb. 1932.
64 For a Communist cuadro, see e.g., El Noroeste, 10 June 1932.
65 El Noroeste, 5 May 1931. For a similar focus in the Austrian socialist movement, see 
Gruber, Red Vienna, p. 87.
66 For the installation of radios in ateneos in Trubia and Mieres, see El Noroeste, 9 Sept. 
1931 and Región, 4 May 1932.
67 See Uría, ‘Traditional popular culture and industrial work discipline’, in A Social 
History of Spanish Labour: New Perspectives on Class, Politics and Gender, ed. J. A. Piqueras 
and V. Sanz Rozalén (New York, 2007), pp. 166–7.
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Vienna, where over 80 per cent of books loaned from socialist libraries 
were novels and poetry, there was a strong preference for literature over 
politics and economics. Popular authors included Vicente Blasco Ibáñez 
and Benito Pérez Galdós, whose works had a decidedly anticlerical flavour.68 
Ateneos emphasized their eschewal of formal politics, yet political debate 
was difficult to avoid in the 1930s, not least given that the membership of 
ateneos overlapped with that of parties and unions. The Ateneo Popular in 
Oviedo elected Javier Bueno as its president in 1934. Bueno was the editor 
of the socialist newspaper Avance and renowned for his radical views.69
Outside the workplace, ateneos and Casas del Pueblo vied with the 
football pitch, brothel and tavern as spaces of masculine leisure and 
sociability.70 Bars were ubiquitous – Dr Jove y Canella claimed that there 
were no hamlets without a bar in San Martín del Rey Aurelio – and central 
to male working-class sociability. Bars were sites of leisure, but also places 
to find work and of political education, even if unions and political parties 
disapproved of bars as a vice-ridden distraction from politics.71 Women’s 
spaces of sociability are often hidden from view in the sources. Women 
would have come into contact through daily chores and errands imposed 
by running the household and caring for family members.72 The riverbank 
or public washhouses were particularly important as sites where women 
gathered to talk as they laundered clothes.73 Trade unions for women were 
formed in 1931, including that for seamstresses in the Nalón valley. Female 
socialist militancy continued to grow throughout 1932. Politically active 
women had to struggle against misogyny. Women in Laviana created their 
own socialist section after complaining that the local socialist group would 
not let them join.74
68 Gruber, Red Vienna, p. 95; Uría, ‘Cultura’, p. 156.
69 See the encyclopaedic Mato Díaz, La Atenas.
70 For football, see Ruiz, Octubre, pp. 222–5. For prostitution and male sociability, see 
J-L. Guereña, ‘El burdel como espacio de sociabilidad’, Hispania, lxiii (2003), 551–69. 
Anecdotally, see criticism of the distractions of football and sex from Vegadotos (Mieres) in 
La Aurora Social, 24 May 1929.
71 Jove y Canella, Topografía médica del concejo de San Martín del Rey Aurelio, p. 59; Uría, 
‘Asturias 1920–1937’, p. 272 and his ‘La taberna en Asturias a principios del siglo XX: notas 
para su estudio’, Historia contemporánea, v (1991), pp. 64–7. For southern Spain, see J. Sierra 
Álvarez, ‘“Rough characters”: miners, alcohol and violence in Linares at the end of the 
nineteenth century’, in Piqueras and Sanz Rozalén, Social History, pp. 176–96. 
72 As in Gijón, see Radcliff, Mobilization, p. 98. 
73 Women also petitioned for improved washing facilities (El Noroeste, 27 March, 6 Apr. 1932). 
74 M. A. Mateos, ¡Salud, compañeras! Mujeres socialistas en Asturias (1900–1937) (Oviedo, 
2007), pp. 108–10, 129–30; Avance, 8 May, 15 June 1932.
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Ateneos and bars attracted more heterogeneous crowds than the Casas 
del Pueblo, although the socialists did not limit themselves solely to the 
latter – the ‘Red Bar’ in Sama was a meeting place for Communists and the 
left in general.75 Due to patterns of urban settlement and the organization 
of mining trade unions, there was no stark separation of individuals of 
different political affiliation in such spaces of sociability, at the workplace 
or at the level of the locality. Mining trade union sections were small and 
organized at the level of the locality. Whereas the CNT metalworkers’ 
union in La Felguera claimed 3,000 members, the CNT-affiliated SUM 
in Ciaño-Santa-Ana had only twenty-five.76 In the municipal district of 
San Martín del Rey Aurelio, there were nineteen SOMA sections for a 
population of less than 17,000.77 Even as certain localities are associated 
with the predominance of a particular political culture, such as anarchism 
in La Felguera and Communism in Turón, pockets of Communism and 
anarchism coexisted with socialism throughout the valleys. The resultant 
image of the coalfields is one in which small communities predominated 
and where ideological rivals coexisted in villages and at the workplace. Such 
a picture is different to how scholars have sketched the relationship between 
social groups and political positions in the German-speaking lands and the 
Low Countries. Through ‘pillarization’ and ‘milieu’ they have argued for the 
close correlation of politics with the life-world of particular groups: each 
had its own values, spaces of sociability, institutions and representatives and 
was segregated from others.78
The effect of the patterns of residence, sociability and political and 
union affiliation in the coal valleys was that rivals tended to know one 
another intimately. In the slurs and attacks printed in the provincial press, 
they revealed a familiarity with the background and trajectories of their 
neighbours and political rivals.79 Sabino Menéndez, a PCE member, used 
one such intimate encounter to challenge socialists to an open debate. He 
alleged that he was ‘calmly’ discussing politics at the annual La Laguna 
fiesta in Ciaño-Santa Ana when a group of drunken socialists approached 
him. Menéndez touched one of them on the arm in a sign of friendship, 
75 Erice, ‘El PCE’, p. 77.
76 M. Villar, El anarquismo en la insurrección de Asturias: la CNT y la FAI en octubre de 1934 
(Madrid, 1994 [1935]), p. 68; El Noroeste, 2 March 1932.
77 La Aurora Social, 16 Oct. 1931. 
78 The idea of pillarization has been the subject of some debate. For a critique, see J. C. H. 
Blom, ‘Pillarisation in perspective’, West European Politics, xxiii (2000), pp. 153–164. For a 
comparative discussion of milieux in the Ruhr and South Wales, see James, Politics, pp. 4–6. 
79 E.g. criticism of Benjamín Escobar, Avance, 25 June 1932.
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but was brushed off with the comment, ‘do not touch me; you’ll defile 
me’.80 The details were doubtless exaggerated, but encounters with rivals 
were nevertheless a quotidian occurrence, as a Communist warned rival 
anarchists: ‘they forget … that we communists do not live on the moon, 
that we go to the workshop, mine and factory to work alongside our 
exploited companions, and it is there that we think of ways of mitigating 
our state of slavery’.81 
Rivalry and conflict did not correlate with separation or estrangement, 
which is important for comprehending the dynamics of radicalism in 
the coalfields during the Republic. On the one hand, familiarity with a 
neighbour’s background could provide fuel for impugning his anticlerical 
credentials and lead to radicalism, as chapter 3 will examine. On the other, 
familiarity with a rival who was more than a faceless socialist, anarchist 
or Communist could lay the foundations for solidarity and collaboration, 
which would emerge at the level of the workplace in 1933 and 1934. In 
the coalfields, the face-to-face communities and intersecting networks, 
combined with certain shared practices and values, explain the bitterness of 
the disputes, even though engagement could also open the door to mutual 
understanding. This is suggestive of the ‘volatile intimacy’ Radcliff used 
to describe the violent encounters between political opponents in Gijón. 
The blows exchanged suggested the ‘existence of community ties, not their 
disintegration’.82
Later alliances between union rivals built on not only on the inhabitation 
of the same social spaces, but also shared values and practices across the 
left. This left-wing culture provided a common idiom through which 
different groups communicated and bitterly disagreed with one another. 
Rivals engaged with one another at the local level in a fractious and unstable 
form of grassroots ‘democracy’, characterized by a combination of dialogue 
and confrontation. During strikes, mineworkers from different unions 
participated in workplace assemblies to debate, and elect representatives to 
negotiate on their behalf.83 More confrontational were the controversias – a 
form of verbal sparring in which local union or political figures debated 
formally and struggled to influence an expectant and critical audience. 
At times activists disrupted rival union meetings by shouting slogans and 
80 El Noroeste, 15 July 1932.
81 El Noroeste, 21 Aug. 1932.
82 Radcliff, Mobilization, p. 98. 
83 E.g. at Carbones La Nueva in 1933 the SOMA was chosen to represent the whole 
workforce, as it it represented 90% of mineworkers (Avance, 17 Aug. 1933).
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demands for a platform for debate in an improvised controversia.84 The 
ritualized rhetorical boxing of a controversia frequently descended into bitter 
conflict, as revealed in an observer’s surprise at the good-natured atmosphere 
during an impromptu debate at a CNT rally in Barros (Langreo), at which 
all three speakers shook hands: ‘a wonderful example of magnanimity … if 
only it was always thus!’85
Together the controversias and workplace assemblies provided the 
structures of a grassroots democratic culture, based not on consensus, but 
on dialogue and confrontation. Yet there was an interest in engaging with 
opposing ideas and sufficient openness and respect for two cathedral canons 
to be invited to the Communist stronghold of Turón to speak at the Ateneo 
on separate occasions. They both commented on how respectfully they were 
treated.86 Two years later the most violent episode of anticlerical bloodletting 
during the revolutionary insurrection occurred in this same valley.87 
There were significant frictions between the socialist, anarchist and 
Communist movements, but the differences between them at the local level 
could be difficult to identify. Boundaries were often more blurred than neat 
political labels imply, even if rivalries were very real. A more nebulous reality 
is unsurprising given that working-class movements across Europe were 
‘eclectic’ and ‘autodidactic’ at the grassroots.88 As Jorge Uría acknowledged, 
it is difficult to disentangle a specific Communist culture from a wider 
‘radical culture’ in the coalfields.89 PCE distinctiveness came in part through 
performing the self-image of the PCE member as a disciplined, austere and 
self-sacrificing activistas opposed to possessing a thorough knowledge of 
Communist doctrine, not least because key concepts like ‘soviet’ were not 
always well understood by the rank and file.90 
An interest in the Soviet experiment was far from the exclusive domain of 
the Communists. In early 1932, Florentino Moral and Antonio Seoane gave 
a series of talks in the theatres and union centres of the coalfields on their 
impressions of their two-month visit to Russia (paid for by the International 
84 E.g. Communist disruption of a socialist meeting in Blimea (El Noroeste, 12 May 1932).
85 El Noroeste, 14 May 1932. 
86 Región, 2, 30 Apr. 1932.
87 For Arboleya’s later reflections, see D. Benavides, ‘Arboleya y su interpretación de la 
Revolución de Octubre’, in Jackson, Octubre, pp. 259–60.
88 G. Eley, Forging Democracy: the History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000 (Oxford, 2002), 
p. 46.
89 See Uría, ‘Asturias 1920–1937’, pp. 250–9.
90 For Communist culture, see R. Cruz, El Partido Comunista de España en la Segunda 
República (Madrid, 1987), pp. 77–9, 86. 
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Association of Friends of the Soviet Union). The talks were well attended by 
interested workers from across the left. The travellers’ political affiliations 
were important. They had been elected at public assemblies to visit the USSR 
as objective – even critical – observers and ‘authentic workers’ in order to 
cut through polarized reports of the realities of the Soviet experiment.91 The 
SOMA in Laviana ceded space for Moral to speak ‘because he [was] not a 
Communist activist’.92 Stressing this alleged neutrality was common. Most 
loquacious was PCE member Olegario Vega: ‘The workers of Ciaño-Santa 
Ana said that no one could provide an account as impartial as Florentino, 
as he is an authentic worker, a metalworker and free of all prejudices that 
produce passion for one side or the other’.93 It is possible that Moral was 
secretly a Communist, but the emphasis on authenticity and independence 
is nevertheless revealing of the interplay between the desire for objective 
knowledge of the USSR and anxieties over Communist proselytizing. 
Beyond an interest in the Soviet Union, which ranged from critical and 
reserved curiosity to whole-hearted enthusiasm, there were shared reference 
points and practices across the left. At the most fundamental level all 
three movements promoted class-based solidarity, which was a matter of 
collective and personal pride. Newspapers published lists of contributors 
to strike funds and one worker even wrote to El Noroeste to correct the 
appearance of his name next to a 0.25-peseta donation. He had actually 
handed over a peseta and the confusion originated in two workers sharing 
the same name.94 In 1933, a collective barbershop opened in Mieres offering 
free haircuts to the unemployed while municipal workers in Sama decided 
to donate a percentage of their wages to those out of work.95 A commitment 
to anti-militarism meant that anti-war committees included delegates from 
a variety of groups, as in Mieres, where it represented Radical Socialists, 
Communists, socialists, cultural institutions, trade unions and local 
choirs.96 Processions, banners and speeches honouring the working class on 
1 May were an established tradition, although unions tended to organize 
separate celebrations.
One of the cornerstones of Spanish left-wing political culture was a 
commitment to secular or even anticlerical values. Activists expressed their 
values in ceremonies marking milestones in their own lives, facilitated by 
91 El Noroeste, 6, 10 Jan. 1932. Moral was even interviewed in Región, 16 Feb. 1932. 
92 El Noroeste, 12 March 1932. See also in Turón, El Noroeste, 6 Apr. 1932.
93 El Noroeste, 17 Feb. 1932.
94 El Noroeste, 23 Apr. 1932.
95 Avance, 1 Feb., 22, 28 June 1933.
96 Avance, 18 Oct. 1933.
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the Republic’s establishment of civil marriage as the default option. There 
are few details of these rites of passage in the press, but the description 
of the wedding of Gloria Orviz and José González provides a glimpse of 
what they could be like. The celebration included an ‘intimate meal’ in 
the ‘Red Bar’ – the local Communist haunt – attended by 200 guests. 
Two ‘enormous portraits’ of Lenin and Stalin against a red cloth presided 
over the meal and the well-wishing speech was followed by a collective 
intonation of The Internationale accompanied by the gramophone and 
dancing.97 Such practices served to integrate individuals into particular 
political communities and cement left-wing identities. 
This image of a left-wing working-class community that marched behind 
banners on 1 May, assiduously attended talks on international politics at the 
local ateneo and thumbed novels penned by Zola and Dumas does not tell 
the whole story of the coalfields. Left-wing culture predominated sufficiently 
for activists to project it onto their understanding of the community, yet 
hegemony did not signify a monopoly. The political right and Catholicism 
offered different world-views and visions of the community and both 
existed in the coalfields, although historians have hitherto neglected their 
presence. Catholic activists claimed to have obtained 2,000 and 3,300 
signatures protesting against the secularizing intentions of the Republic 
in Ciaño-Santa Ana and Moreda respectively, both of which were areas of 
important socialist influence.98
To a certain extent, the Catholic community appeared separated from 
those exhibiting secular or anticlerical values. Catholic organizations and 
local elites maintained their own networks for charitable work and spaces 
for sociability, such as associations for the alumni of Catholic schools, or 
casinos – clubs for the middle and upper classes.99 Overall, however, the 
working class far outnumbered middle-class residents of the coalfields 
and the Catholic community was less formally organized than the left. 
Catholic Youth circles were not created in coalfield towns until the end of 
1931.100 Catholicism continued to be woven into the physical fabric of the 
valleys and the lives of residents via the network of parish churches, shrines 
and the schools. The latter, owned by mining companies and staffed by 
religious orders and congregations, namely the Brothers of the Christian 
97 El Noroeste, 29 June 1932. For ‘red baptisms’ and ‘red confirmations’, see Cruz, El 
Partido, p. 88. 
98 Región, 14 June, 6 July 1931. 
99 The situation is complicated as some working class institutions also employed casino as 
a descriptor, like the Casino Obrero in Trubia.
100 For the Catholic Youth, see Región, 24 Nov., 11 Dec. 1931.
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Doctrine (de la Salle Brothers) and Dominicans, served over 5,000 children 
in the 1932–3 school year and inevitably catered for left-wing families.101 
Catholic schooling would become an important point of contention in 
1932. Moreover, the liturgical calendar still had an imprint on social life 
in the valleys. Although many Holy Week processions disappeared from 
public space during the Republic, processions of children making their 
first communion or celebrating Corpus Christi were annual events – in 
1931 300 and 400 children processed in Moreda and Ciaño respectively.102 
Catholicism maintained a public presence even in areas with a ‘red’ 
reputation. Grappling with the right and the Church would prove to be at 
the heart of radicalization between 1932 and 1934.
Catholicism did not suffuse local society in the coalfields as it did in other 
parts of Spain where ‘the village and the parish were conterminous’.103 In 
areas like the Basque town of Villava – a stronghold of the ultra-conservative, 
Catholic and monarchist Carlist movement – or the Andalusian village of 
Casas Viejas, where ‘Catholic ritual and canon were interwoven into daily 
life’, Catholic rituals could mark belonging to and the reproduction of a 
Catholic notion of community.104 This did not necessarily mean regular 
attendance at mass, but rituals that marked the life course, like baptisms 
and funerals, or the practices of popular religiosity, such as leaving votive 
candles at local shrines.105
Comparing the Asturian coalfields with such areas throws the polarizing 
division over religion in the latter into sharp relief, which is clearer still 
when the valleys are contrasted with other mining regions. In Spain – and 
the coalfields in particular – the secular–religious divide mapped onto the 
left–right political cleavage in Spain with relative clarity, given Catholicism’s 
close association with the monarchy and conservatism. In the Ruhr, religion 
was a divisive and fragmentary factor. Sectarianism was more important 
than a secular–religious divide. The Catholic–Protestant fracture existed 
both horizontally within the workforce and vertically, as pit owners were 
usually Protestant, while the workforce was further fragmented by ethnicity 
101 Á. Mato Díaz, La escuela primaria en Asturias (1923–1937): los procesos de alfabetización y 
escolarización (Oviedo, 1992), p. 205. 
102 Región, 3 June 1931.
103 F. Lannon, Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy: the Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1975 
(Oxford, 1987), p. 20. See also M. Vincent, Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: 
Religion and Politics in Salamanca, 1930–1936 (Oxford, 1996).
104 J. Mintz, The Anarchists of Casas Viejas (Bloomington, Ind., 1994 [1982]), p. 67; J. 
Balduz, Segunda República y Guerra Civil en Villava (1931–1939) (Villava, 2006). 
105 See Lannon, Privilege, p. 24. For popular religiosity and community in a later period, 
see W. A. Christian, Person and God in a Spanish Valley (New York, 1972).
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– Polish Catholics had their own ministers. In Wales, in contrast, non-
conformism had provided ‘social cement’ in mining villages and ‘cut across 
… ethnic divisions’. Religious institutions did not attempt to rival the clubs 
and activities as they did in Ruhr, where society was much more ‘rigidly 
divided’.106 
Whatever their ideological persuasion, individuals in the coalfields 
mapped their beliefs onto the community. Local identity served as a 
battleground, for it constituted a common point of reference for different 
ideologies and groups. The community identity associated with originating 
or inhabiting a particular locality was particularly sharply drawn on the 
occasion of the annual feast of the patron saint of the town or village, which 
combined civic and ‘profane’ acts with masses and processions. Special two-
page spreads in local newspapers attempted to capture the essence and 
character of the pueblo while young males engaged in the traditional forging 
of masculine bonds and affirmation of community identity by brawling 
with outsiders who descended on the locality to partake in the festivities.107 
The strong sense of a geographically rooted community based on residence 
was also betrayed by anxieties about vagrants, beggars and the unemployed 
from ‘outside’, which were expressed from left and right.108 Yet concerns 
over alleged outsiders did not preclude solidarity. One of the core principles 
of left-wing organizations was to build solidarity between workers, whether 
on a local, regional or transnational level. The introduction of tourism 
societies to the coalfields was a strategy that sought to overcome localist 
impulses and encourage enlightened attitudes by arranging trips that aimed 
to forge fraternal bonds between towns.109
As a point of reference, the ‘community’ was also an arbiter that was 
invoked in the context of local political struggles and strikes. The pueblo 
had a moral authority that could confer legitimacy on conflicts. In Tudela 
Veguín, in the midst of the cement factory strike, a meeting was held so that 
106 James, Politics, pp. 34–7. See also S. H. F. Hickey, Workers  in Imperial Germany: the 
Miners of the Ruhr (Oxford, 1985), ch. 3. For a comparative overview, see S. Berger, ‘Difficult 
(re-)alignments – comparative perspectives on social democracy and religion from late-
nineteenth-century to interwar Germany and Britain’, Journal of Contemporary History, liii 
(2018), 574–96.
107 E.g. Avance, 23 July 1932. For fights between youths in the south of Spain, see J. Pitt-
Rivers, The People of the Sierra (London, 1954), p. 11.
108 E.g. Región, 29 May 1931; El Noroeste, 9 March, 1 Apr. 1932. For similar anxieties in 
southern Spain in the 1950s, see Pitt-Rivers, People, p. 27. 
109 E.g. El Noroeste, 9, 25 July, 16 Sept. 1931. A Feminist Trip Society in Trubia organized a 




the community could judge the conduct of the strike committee, alleged by 
the contractors to be ‘revolutionaries, troublemakers who the community 
[pueblo] hates’.110 Appealing to the community as the ultimate guarantor of 
moral authority was common during the Republic and occurred not only 
in the context of strike action, but also when coalfield society grappled with 
the fallout from the repression of the Asturian October. 
The springtime of the people
During the election campaign of spring 1931 it seemed highly unlikely that 
Spain would wake up as a Republic on 14 April. Yet municipal elections 
succeeded where a botched military uprising supported by a general strike 
organized by the Republicans and socialists had failed five months earlier. 
The election campaign was one of intense activity and became a de facto 
plebiscite on the monarchy.111 Although the elections returned a majority 
for monarchist candidates, the widespread vote-rigging, intimidation and 
manipulation by local bosses in rural areas – a system known as caciquismo 
– meant that clear victories for the Republican–socialist slate in urban areas 
signalled a defeat for the monarchy. Within two days, King Alfonso XIII had 
fled into exile (although he believed it to be temporary) and the Republic 
was proclaimed. Joyous crowds celebrated the results and new regime in 
a ‘popular fiesta’ that expressed the ‘redemption and emancipation’ of the 
people.112 The crowds destroyed monarchist symbols, as in Mieres, where 
portraits of the king were burnt, and renamed public spaces in honour of 
Republican heroes, as occurred in Sama.113
In the Asturian coalfields, the Republican–socialist coalition was 
victorious and appeared to confirm not only left-wing political hegemony, 
but also the socialist movement as the most influential political force. The 
socialists (10) were second to the left Republicans (13) in Langreo, but 
outnumbered their right Republican (3), monarchist (1), and Communist 
(3) opponents. In Mieres and Laviana, the socialists formed the largest 
minority on the council and in San Martín del Rey Aurelio they obtained 
110 El Noroeste, 13 Oct. 1931.
111 R. Cruz, Una revolución elegante: España 1931 (Madrid, 2014), pp. 63–6; S. Ben-Ami, 
The Origins of the Second Republic in Spain (Oxford, 1978), pp. 213–38.
112 For the ‘popular fiesta’, see S. Juliá, Madrid, 1931–1934: de la fiesta popular a la lucha 
de clases (Madrid, 1984), pp. 7–21. For ‘redemption and emancipation’, see Cruz, Una 
revolución, pp. 74–101. 
113 El Noroeste, 15 Apr. 1931; Región, 15 Apr. 1931. For similar scenes in Madrid, see ABC, 16 
Apr. 1931.
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an outright majority with fifteen councillors out of twenty-one seats.114 In 
Aller and Lena, the results were annulled due to complaints of irregularities 
and later repeated.115 Yet political control did not mean a political or cultural 
monopoly and the underlying conflicts and pressure points at the local level 
along with the re-emergence of the right would be central to the emergence 
of radicalism in 1932.
Two-and-a-half months after the municipal elections, the wave of 
enthusiasm for the young Republic translated into an overwhelming victory 
for the Republican–socialist coalition in elections for the Constituent 
Cortes. Even though no party gained an overall majority, the PSOE boasted 
the most seats (116). The Republican deputies belonged to a number of 
different parties. Described as a party ‘without ideas or ideals’, the Radical 
Party led by Alejandro Lerroux, who had moderated the populist, firebrand 
views of his youth, followed the socialists with ninety seats. The Radicals 
possessed a relatively well-developed apparatus on a national level, although 
they were weak in Asturias. Towards the end of the year, the Radical Party 
withdrew from government and moved to oppose the government from the 
centre-right.116 The left wing of the Radicals had peeled off in 1929 to form 
the Radical Socialist Party, which was characterized by anticlericalism and 
left-wing populist Republicanism. The Republican ranks were completed 
by a number of parties who combined prominent, influential leaders with 
a small membership, which did not bode well for binding the masses to 
the new Republic. Prime minister and minister of defence, Manuel Azaña, 
led the left–Republican party Republican Action, while veteran politicians 
Niceto Alcalá Zamora and Miguel Maura, who occupied the presidency of 
the Republic and the ministry of the interior respectively, belonged to the 
small Liberal Republican Right.117
Given the small apparatus and membership of the Republican parties, 
the socialist movement would provide the ‘arm and support’ for the 
Republic.118 Yet the socialist position towards the Republic was complicated. 
114 For the results, see J. Girón, ‘Elecciones y partidos políticos en Asturias, 1890–1936’, 
cited in D. Ruiz et al., Asturias contemporánea, 1808–1975: Síntesis histórica. Textos y documentos 
(Madrid, 1981), p. 118; La Voz de Asturias, 14 Apr. 1931. 
115 See La Voz de Asturias, 14 Apr., 2 June 1931. For the rerunning of elections, see Ben-Ami, 
Origins, pp. 270–4. 
116 P. Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the 
Second Republic (London, 1978), p. 98. For the Radical Party, see N. Townson, The Crisis of 
Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Spanish Second Republic (Brighton, 2000).
117 For the Republican parties, see J. Avilés Farré, La izquierda burguesa y la tragedia de la 
Segunda República (Madrid, 2006).
118 L. Araquistaín, El ocaso de un régimen (Madrid, 1930),  quoted in Bizcarrondo, Historia, p. 2. 
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Reformism, moderation and reliance on the levers of state power – whether 
through arbitration or representation – had always been hallmarks of 
Spanish socialist politics, but occupying positions of political power proved 
a divisive issue during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and the Republic. 
Indalecio Prieto, a pragmatic, centrist socialist ‘who made no claims to 
Marxist faith’, was appointed minister for the economy alongside two other 
socialist ministers: Francisco Largo Caballero, a veteran trade unionist 
leader and now minister of labour, and Fernando de los Ríos, minister 
of justice. Julián Besteiro, a professor of logic who held a rigid, scientific 
view of the road to socialism, opposed their position and strongly rejected 
socialist participation in Republican governments.119 
Even as the socialists co-operated in the construction of the Republic, 
they were careful to explain that the Republic of 14 April was not their 
regime. The Republic was a ‘kind of capitalist antechamber to Socialism’.120 
Such sentiments were expressed at both the level of national and local 
politics. In May, Cándido Barbón, a socialist councillor in Mieres, declared 
socialists to be ‘the best and most enthusiastic defenders of the Spanish 
Republic’, yet it was ‘still bourgeois and we are socialists’.121 This sentiment 
was echoed by González Peña two weeks later at the SOMA congress and 
reflected the wider position of the socialist movement.122 Attempting to 
resolve this tension as the Republic was built and contested would prove to 
be an important component in radicalization. 
Left-wing opposition to the Republic came from the Communist Party 
and the anarchist movement. The PCE did not have any representatives 
in the Constituent Cortes and was guided by the isolationist Comintern 
policy of the Third Period, which rejected collaboration with other parties. 
Whereas the dissident communists of the tiny Workers’ and Peasants’ Bloc 
(BOC) celebrated the arrival of Republican democracy, the PCE rejected 
the new regime and demanded ‘all power to the Soviets!’123 The anarchists’ 
position was more complex. They welcomed the fall of the monarchy 
insofar as the Republic would ensure that, at least in principle, unions and 
119 P. Heywood, Marxism and the Failure of Organised Socialism in Spain, 1879–1936 
(Cambridge, 1990), pp. 112–9, the quotation at p. 112.
120 Heywood, Marxism, p. 116. 
121 La Aurora Social, 15 May 1931. 
122 La Aurora Social, 29 May 1931. See also S. Juliá, ‘“Preparados para cuando la ocasión se 
presente”: los socialistas y la revolución’, in Violencia política en la España del siglo XX, ed. S. 
Juliá (Madrid, 2000), p. 166.
123 For a summary, see H. García, ‘De los soviets a las Cortes: los comunistas ante la 
República’, in Palabras como puños: la intransigencia política en la Segunda República, ed. F. 
del Rey (Madrid, 2011), p. 112.
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associations could operate freely.124 Their criticism of authority, state power 
and formal political participation made them no friend of the Republic, 
although this did not stop anarchists from voting in elections, particularly 
in 1931 and 1936. The CNT grew to a membership of a million in 1932, 
even as the movement had become mired in divisions over strategy. These 
differences culminated at the end of summer 1931 with the signing of 
the ‘Treintista’ manifesto. The thirty signatories believed in moderation, 
union discipline and preparation prior to any attempt at revolution. In 
contrast, a sector of the CNT under the influence of the more radical yet 
numerically small FAI believed that revolution was nigh. The radical sector 
prevailed. The Treintistas were expelled over the following months and the 
CNT embarked on a process of ‘revolutionary gymnastics’ – priming the 
masses for insurrectionary action. The strategy aimed at revolution through 
an escalating dynamic of collective action followed by police repression. 
Between January 1932 and December 1933, the CNT attempted three ill-
fated revolutionary movements that tested the Republican authorities.125 
The challenge to the Republic did not emanate solely from the left. 
Most of the political right opposed the Republican project. The Catholic, 
monarchist right coalesced into two main positions: catastrophism and 
possibilist ‘accidentalism’. The former included recalcitrant monarchists, 
who would form Renovación Española in 1933, and the Carlists, an ultra-
conservative movement characterized by its opposition to liberalism and 
industrial modernity through a defence of monarchism, Catholicism and 
an idealization of a traditional rural socioeconomic order.126 The Carlists 
would be joined by Spanish fascism, whose most prominent, yet still 
very small, party – Falange Española (FE) – was not founded until 1933. 
These groups did not believe in an accommodation with the Republic and 
preferred to plot its violent downfall. Carlist militias engaged in military 
training from 1931.127 In contrast, the ‘accidentalist’ position signified 
participating in the Republic without actively supporting it. Parliamentary 
seats could be used to undermine the Republic from within. The 
‘accidentalist’ position was occupied by the parties that coalesced into the 
first mass Catholic political party in Spanish history: the Confederation 
of Autonomous Right-Wing Groups (CEDA). Its origins lay in National 
124 Ealham, Class, p. 76; Casanova, Anarchism, pp. 3–4. 
125 Contrasting interpretations in Casanova, Anarchism, pp. 53–83 and Ealham, Class, pp. 
108–31.
126 See M. Blinkhorn, Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931–1939 (Cambridge, 1975); J. Canal, 
El carlismo: dos siglos de contrarrevolución en España (Madrid, 2000).
127 Blinkhorn, Carlism, p. 63.
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Action, an organization created at the end of April 1931 and rebadged as 
Popular Action (AP) from spring 1932. Under the leadership of José María 
Gil Robles, a lawyer from Salamanca, AP joined forces with other groups, 
including the Valencian Regional Right, to form the CEDA in 1933, a 
loose organization united by the principles of religion, fatherland, order, 
family, work and property.128
Catholicism provided a powerful unifying and mobilizing tool for the 
political right. That the new regime would reshape the relationship between 
the Catholic Church and the state was unavoidable, given the established 
privileges of the Catholic Church, the latter’s association with the monarchy 
and the strong current of secularism and anticlericalism that ran through 
Spanish Republicanism and the left. Unsurprisingly, the Church met the 
new regime with apprehension.129 The hierarchy showed initial caution, 
which was not always shared by parish priests, as revealed by the many letters 
to the press criticizing priests for anti-Republican sermons.130 A significant 
watershed moment for the ‘religious question’ occurred on 11–13 May, when 
the playing of the monarchist national anthem in Madrid sparked a riot and 
a wave of anticlerical incendiarism that affected convents, religious schools 
and churches, and spread to Andalusia and the Levante.131 
The burnings facilitated the reorganization and consolidation of the 
political right after the proclamation of the Republic thanks to the identified 
need to defend the Catholic faith, which was galvanized further by the 
debate over the draft Republican constitution in autumn 1931. The original 
draft had ‘aroused deep clerical apprehension’, which worsened over the 
course of the debate.132 The new carta magna separated the Church and 
state. It removed state funding of the clergy, dissolved the Jesuit order and 
placed limitations on others; it asserted state-licensing of marriage, and 
restricted the public display of faith, such as religious processions. Revision 
of the Constitution deriving from the self-appointed defence of the Church 
proved to be the ‘rallying cry’ for the right and demonstrations took place 
128 For the CEDA, see J. R. Montero, La CEDA: el catolicismo social y político en la II 
República (2 vols, Madrid, 1977).
129 W. J. Callahan, The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1998 (Washington, D.C., 2000), pp. 
276ff. See also Lannon, Privilege, pp. 179–80.
130 E.g. El Noroeste, 23 May 1931.
131 For a summary of incidents, see A. L. López Villaverde, El gorro frigio y la mitra 
frente a frente: construcción y diversidad territorial del conflicto político-religioso en la España 
republicana (n.p., 2008), pp. 195–203.
132 Callahan, Catholic Church, pp. 286–92, the quotation at 287; for Asturian National 
Action’s response, see Región, 8 Oct. 1931.
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across Spain.133 Over the next few months, National Action extended its 
organization in Asturias and across the country, with newly enfranchised 
women a particular target for recruitment.134 In Asturias, women’s groups 
formed in Gijón, Oviedo, Mieres and Avilés in January and February 1932, 
and female AP activists in Gijón created and ran their own combative 
newspaper, Acción.135 This combination of right-wing reaction and left-wing 
anticlericalism was critical to the emergence of radicalism in 1932.
Reform of the relationship between the Church and state was one plank 
of the policies pursued by the Republican–socialist governments from their 
offices in the ministries in Madrid. Yet building the new regime was also a 
local affair. The crowds that celebrated the arrival of the Republic thronged 
the public galleries at the first municipal council meetings to observe 
Republican democracy in practice.136 The new municipal councillors saw 
themselves as representatives of their local communities and as conduits 
for a new kind of democratic politics removed from the stagnation and 
corruption of the monarchy. It was the ‘people’ who had brought the 
Republic and they were invoked as the ‘driving soul’ behind the new 
regime.137 Celso Fernández, the republican mayor of Langreo, explained to 
the press that his priority was to do away with ‘old cacique-style techniques’ 
in contracting workers in favour of ‘strict justice’.138 The municipal council 
chamber would be the platform for the regeneration of Spain.
In the ‘red’ valleys of the Asturian coalfields, beneath the belching 
chimneys and smog described by Arlt, mayors and councillors attempted to 
combine constructing the Republic with negotiating competing pressures 
from their constituents and the responsibilities of office as workers, political 
groups and communities agitated and petitioned in favour of their own 
133 Preston, Coming of the Spanish Civil War, p. 35. For rallies in Salamanca, see Vincent, 
Catholicism, pp. 180–3. 
134 For the decision to expand in Asturias, see Región, 10 Jan. 1932. For Galicia, see E. 
Grandío Seoane, Los orígenes de la derecha gallega: la CEDA en Galicia (1931–1936) (Sada, 
1998), pp. 102–6 and for Salamanca, see M. Vincent, ‘The politicization of Catholic women 
in Salamanca, 1931–1936’, in Elites and Power in Twentieth Century Spain: Essays in Honour 
of Sir Raymond Carr, ed. F. Lannon and P. Preston (Oxford, 1990), pp. 115–26. See also I. 
Blasco Herranz, ‘“Tenemos las armas de nuestra fe y de nuestro amor y patriotismo; pero 
nos falta algo”: la Acción Católica de la Mujer y la participación política en la España del 
primer tercio del siglo XX’, Historia social, xlviii (2002), pp. 15–19.
135 Acción, 27 Feb. 1932. 
136 E.g. in Mieres, Región, 25 Apr. 1931.
137 J. M. Macarro Vera, Socialismo, República y revolución en Andalucía (1931–1936) (Seville, 
2000), p. 21. See also Juliá, Madrid, p. 7.
138 El Noroeste, 23 Apr. 1931.
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objectives. The coalfield communities were far from homogenous. A number 
of factors, including industrial development and company paternalism, 
had shaped a landscape of largely small communities in which political 
rivals cohabited and coexisted at the workplace, in the bar and in cultural 
institutions. The communities were crisscrossed by tensions and pressure 
points, as well as different axes of identification and potential mobilization. 
This image of intimate communities, in which individuals engaged in bitter 
conflict but also occupied common ground and shared a political idiom, 
provides the foundation for understanding the development of radicalism 
during the rest of the Republic.
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2. Building and contesting the Republic (1931–2)
To celebrate the proclamation of the Republic, the government declared 
15 April a national holiday. That morning, a festive 1,200-strong column 
bearing Republican banners, flags and red, yellow and purple streamers 
set out to walk the fifteen kilometres from the arms-manufacturing town 
of Trubia to Oviedo. They were greeted by the political authorities and a 
municipal band on the outskirts of the capital before joining the crowds 
thronging the streets, mirroring celebrations that were taking place across 
Spain.1 Two years later, another group of citizens from Trubia repeated the 
journey, although this time by train and for a different reason. On arriving 
in Oviedo, the crowd, which included many women, unfurled banners and 
marched through the centre of the city to the courthouse. Eighty of them 
entered and the remainder shouted ‘freedom for Josefa!’ outside. Josefa 
Álvarez, a twenty-three-year-old from Trubia, was on trial for stabbing and 
killing her ex-fiancé, who had abandoned her after she became pregnant with 
their child.2 Whereas in 1931 the troupe of trubiecos celebrated the promise 
of the new Republic, in 1933 they demanded it uphold its promise of justice, 
which in this case meant advancing women’s rights. In demonstrations like 
these, citizens across Spain expressed their own vision of Republican reform.
The Republic was not simply rolled out from Madrid, but a product 
of the interaction of the conflicts and mobilization that occurred at a 
local level. Citizens and workers, energized by the new political context, 
presented demands to employers and municipal authorities that pursued 
the promise of justice associated with the Republic. This chapter examines 
arenas and forms of political practice in order to probe how the interaction 
of citizens and authorities gave shape to the Republic at a local level and 
the tensions and conflicts that emerged, such as over the use of the police 
force. Tensions over policing would be central to radicalism in 1934, but 
an examination of the aforementioned factors in 1931 and 1932 exposes the 
lack of radicalism at the beginning of the Republic. The episodes of conflict 
show a desire for moderation and the peaceful conciliation of interests. 
1 La Voz de Asturias, 16 Apr. 1931; El Noroeste, 16, 17 Apr. 1931.
2 Josefa was acquitted and was greeted by applause on leaving the courthouse. N. Aresti, 
‘El crimen de Trubia: género, discursos y ciudadanía republicana’, Ayer, lxi (2006), 261–85.
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Community was an important foundation for political action. 
Demonstrations and delegations of petitioners claimed to speak for and 
embody collectives, whether citizens, members of a political party or trade 
union, or residents of a given locality. Republican justice was also imagined 
through local frames of reference regarding community justice. Such an 
approach complicates the tendency to divide forms of collective action – 
or ‘repertoires’ – into so-called ‘modern’ and ‘pre-modern’ categories or, as 
recently formulated by Cruz in the Spanish context, ‘communitarian’ and 
‘cosmopolitan’. Whereas the former focused on the local sphere of politics 
and involved ‘rigid’ and ‘violent’ tactics, the latter involved claims made on 
national and international politics and employed non-violent strategies like 
strikes, demonstrations and petitions.3 At the heart of such a classification 
of collective action is how politics is conceptualized, particularly whether 
the political is restricted to the more formal aspects of political participation 
or widened to the relationships of power within social relations. As Kaplan 
and Radcliff have shown in the context of Spain, mobilizing on behalf of 
the local community – the bread riots, for example – was an important 
form of political engagement.4 It was neither limited to rural areas, nor 
necessarily localist in focus. While the strike was the predominant form of 
collective action in the coalfields during the 1930s, the forms of political 
engagement were much wider, richer and resist reduction to categories of 
rural and industrial, pre-modern and modern. Casting the net wider and 
understanding the relationship between forms of action is necessary to 
understand the dynamics of radicalization.
The promise of the Republic
In early 1932, Avance, the Asturian socialist daily, commented that 
communities had ‘awoken’ under the Republic in an ‘explosion of sleeping 
desires and repressed impulses’.5 Energized by the new political context, 
citizens presented petitions and demands to municipal councillors. In so 
doing, they gave voice to community demands and attempted to wrest the 
Republic into being in their daily lives. Their demands tended to centre on 
improvements in infrastructure and services, such as roads, washhouses, 
schools or street lighting. The petitions were often framed in terms of the 
3 R. Cruz, Protestar en España (Madrid, 2015), p. 18.
4 See T. Kaplan, Red City, Blue Period: Social Movements in Picasso’s Barcelona (Berkeley, 
Calif., 1992) and P. Radcliff, From Mobilization to Civil War: the Politics of Polarization in the 
Spanish City of Gijón, 1900–1937 (Cambridge, 1996).
5 Avance, 14 Jan. 1932. Councillors in Aller were inundated with demands by July 1931 (La 
Aurora Social, 10 July 1931).
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alleged neglect or abandonment of a neighbourhood or village, particularly 
when compared to the surrounding districts. Criticizing councillors for 
neglecting to bring certain villages into the light of scientific modernity 
could be a potent way for rivals to score political points by drawing on 
inter-town rivalries or harnessing anxieties about being left behind in the 
progress towards industrial modernity.6 The arrival of ‘Edison’s discovery’ 
could be a major source of local satisfaction. It was feted in Hueria de 
San Tirso (Mieres) with a ‘succulent banquet’, speeches and toasts.7 The 
combination of municipal councillors articulating their duty to represent 
their communities and the association of the Republic with progress and 
modernity meant that the demands presented by citizens tended to receive 
a sympathetic hearing.  
The desire to represent the community’s interests led to municipal councils 
adopting a mediating role between citizens and the mining companies, for 
many of the demands concerned the effects of mining activities. Roads were 
often blocked by spoil heaps or the water supply suddenly disappeared. 
Republican and socialist councillors, who saw themselves as guardians and 
protectors of the local community’s interests, responded to complaints by 
groups of citizens by negotiating with the companies on the community’s 
behalf. Councils requested the assistance of the mining companies to mitigate 
the effects of the industry and contribute to improvements to infrastructure. 
This made sense in the light of the companies’ financial clout and the 
legacy of paternalism, but it was also a moral question. For socialist and 
Republican councillors, it was the companies who had created the problems 
that communities faced. In Mieres, councillors demanded that Fábrica de 
Mieres took responsibility for ‘depriving the local communities of water’ and 
reminded the company that the municipal authorities were not going to solve 
the problem.8 Councillors did not present an uncompromising attitude or 
seek to open up a front in the class struggle. There was nothing radical about 
the mediating role that they adopted. Instead, councillors, backed by citizens’ 
demands, attempted to maintain a fragile social contract whereby companies’ 
investment in infrastructure compensated for the damage industry caused to 
the environment of the coalfields.9 
The Republic provided an opportunity for communities to link 
improvements with the wider project of Republican ‘justice’. A case from 
6 E.g. El Noroeste, 30 Jan. 1932.
7 El Noroeste, 4 Aug. 1931.
8 Archivo de Mieres (AM), Actas municipales, 8 Aug. 1931 to 10 March 1932, fo. 4.
9 E.g. Archivo de Langreo (AL), Actas municipales, 29 Jan. 1931 to 10 Sept. 1931, fo. 62; 
Archivo de Aller (AA), Actas municipales, 2 Oct. 1930 to 3 Oct. 1931, fos. 184–5.
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1932 involving residents of Langreo and Laviana illustrates how defence 
of the community, ideas of the Republic and community justice were 
interlinked, and how the former could lead to frictions over the exercise of 
state authority. On 14 April 1932, a year after celebrating the proclamation 
of the Republic, residents of Sama joined politicians in the central square of 
the town. A jet of water spouted twenty metres into the air and was greeted 
with ‘delirious displays of enthusiasm’.10 The date of the inauguration was 
significant. It marked the first anniversary of the proclamation of the Second 
Republic, and the unveiling of the water supply formed part of the festivities 
held in Sama and across Spain. The Republic had delivered the town clean 
water via modern infrastructure. The political intent to link the supply with 
the regime was underlined by the fact that it was inaugurated before it 
was even ready. Engineers had made the ceremony possible in April, but 
only in July did the supply enter regular service.11 The inauguration was the 
culmination of socialist councillor Enrique Celaya’s decades-long campaign 
for a new water supply. For Celaya, his campaign derived from his duty as 
both ‘a socialist and a citizen’. He had fulfilled the will and needs of the 
local community, as he had aimed to do since his election as a councillor 
eighteen years earlier.12
Construction of the new supply had not been without problems. The 
source of the water lay in Laviana and there had been friction between the 
councils since work on the pipeline began in 1930. Simmering tensions 
boiled over in early 1932. Civil guards had to be deployed to protect the 
construction workers and a strike was called in Laviana in protest.13 Twenty-
three diverse organizations from Laviana, encompassing shopkeepers, 
socialist and anarchist groups, the Ateneo and musicians, united to send a 
telegram to the minister of the interior demanding that he remove the civil 
governor (his representative in the province), who bore responsibility for 
public order. The defence of community assets brought diverse associations 
and political groups together in an impassioned defence of a resource that 
they believed belonged to the local community. They should be justly 
compensated for access to a resource that was their inheritance as Laviana 
residents and they appealed to the government to recognize and negotiate 
10 Avance, 15 Apr. 1932.
11 El Noroeste, 1 July 1932.
12 Avance, 15 Apr. 1932. See also the interview with Celaya, Avance, 23 July 1932.
13 Región, 15, 16 March 1932; Avance, 15 March 1932. A. Fernández García, Langreo: 
industria, población y desarrollo urbano (Gijón, 1980), pp. 266–7; A. R. Felgueroso Durán 
and A. Fernández García, ‘La gestión de los socialistas en el Ayuntamiento de Langreo entre 
1909 y 1936’, in Historia del socialismo en Langreo 1897–1997, ed. A. Fernández García and J. 
Girón (Gijón, 1997), pp. 168–9.
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with the local community as an entity in its own right. Their protest was 
motivated in particular by the deployment of the Civil Guard, a move they 
considered completely unwarranted.14
Municipal authorities were not simply a channel for responding to 
demands, arenas for party political squabbles or bureaucratic mechanisms 
for managing construction permits or local taxes. Councillors also assumed 
a proactive role in constructing the new Republic, which could even mean 
pushing the boundaries of legality, as occurred in the case of cemeteries. 
Burial grounds and funeral processions had long been a contentious issue 
and a focal point for Republican and anticlerical agitation prior to 1931. 
There were three kinds of cemetery in Spain in 1931: municipal, parish and 
private. While municipal cemeteries were notionally under public control, 
keys were usually in the hands of the parish priest, who controlled whether 
bodies were buried in the Catholic or civil area – the latter commonly a small, 
badly kempt zone adjoining the Catholic cemetery. Yet prior to the approval 
of a clear legal framework to deal with municipal and parish cemeteries 
in 1932, municipal authorities, emboldened by the publication of a bill to 
secularize parish cemeteries, removed the walls between Catholic and civil 
cemeteries in places that included Cuenca, Zaragoza and Barcelona. The 
council in Langreo ordered the removal of the wall between the Catholic 
and civil areas of the municipal cemetery even earlier – in October 1931 
– after the parliamentary debate on the articles relating to religion in the 
Constitution, but prior to the publication of the cemetery bill in December. 
Enthusiasm for building the Republic was such that authorities enacted 
legislation faster than legislators worked, although councillors were careful 
to flex their muscles regarding municipal cemeteries rather than Church 
property. Tearing down the wall was a barometer of the progress of the 
Republican project. By removing barriers, they symbolically emancipated 
the dead.15
The secularization of public life across the country extended to the 
substitution of religious street names in favour of a nomenclature invoking 
the Republic, freedom, the Republican martyrs of the December 1930 
14 Telegram from Laviana to the minister of the interior, 14 March 1932, Archivo Histórico 
Nacional (AHN), Gobernación (A), folder 7A, file 19.
15 For a detailed discussion, see M. Kerry, ‘The bones of contention: culture wars and 
the secularisation of cemeteries and death practices in the Spanish Second Republic’, 
European History Quarterly, xlix (2019), 73–95. For details of Barcelona, see ABC, 8 Dec. 
1931. For background, see J. Jiménez Lozano, Los cementerios civiles y la heterodoxia española 
(Barcelona, 2008 [1978]) and M. Martorell Linares, ‘“The cruellest of all forms of coercion”: 
the Catholic Church and conflicts around death and burial in Spain during the Restoration 
(1874–1923)’, European History Quarterly, xlvii (2017), 657–78.
54
Unite, Proletarian Brothers!
rising, or even Karl Marx.16 Councils also attempted to tax church bells, 
as occurred in Langreo, although the decision was overturned.17 Even so, 
the self-appointed secularizing missions of municipal authorities were not 
an immediate frontal onslaught of the Church at the local level. Religious 
education and the display of religious images were no longer compulsory in 
primary schools from May 1931, but little changed in the Asturian coalfields 
despite the power Republicans and socialists wielded on municipal 
councils. Religious images initially removed from schools in Mieres were 
reinstated by October and religious education continued, while in Aller it 
simply moved to the end of the school day.18 This relative moderation in 
1931 was the result both of a Republic that was still in the process of being 
defined and of municipal authorities that sought to balance the competing 
demands of different constituencies. The implementation and struggles 
over secularizing policy would be a critical factor in radicalization in 1932, 
as left-wing activists became increasingly frustrated at the lack of a tangible 
secular Republic in their everyday lives. 
The politics of labour
Petitioning the municipal authorities was a common form of collective 
action in the 1930s, but the pre-eminent tool of working class political 
practice was the strike. Asturias – and the coal valleys in particular – was a 
hotspot for labour conflict during the Second Republic. The province led 
the country in total number of strikes in 1932 and 1933 and in the number 
of strikers in 1932.19 Strike action was a rich phenomenon; the workforce 
and the unions differed in their interpretations of what it meant and how 
it should be employed. 
16 E.g. J. M. Macarro Vera, Socialismo, República y revolución en Andalucía (1931–1936) 
(Seville, 2000), p. 250; A. L. López Villaverde, El gorro frigio y la mitra frente a frente: 
construcción y diversidad territorial del conflicto político-religioso en la España republicana 
(n.p., 2008), p. 204; M. Thomas, The Faith and the Fury: Popular Anticlerical Violence and 
Iconoclasm in Spain, 1931–1936 (Eastbourne, 2013), p. 52.
17 AL, Actas, 24 Dec. 1932 to 30 Sept. 1933, fos. 9, 95. For Aragón, see M. P. Salomón 
Chéliz, Anticlericalismo en Aragón. Protesta popular y movilización cívica (1900–1939) 
(Zaragoza, 2002), pp. 356–9.
18 El Noroeste, 21 Oct. 1931. See also M. del M. Pozo Andrés and B. Hortañón González, 
‘El laicismo en la escuela pública’, in Laicismo y catolicismo: el conflicto político-religioso en la 
Segunda República, ed. J. de la Cueva Merino and F. Montero García (Alcalá de Henares, 
2009), pp. 296–7.
19 A. Shubert, The Road to Revolution in Spain: the Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860–1934 
(Urbana, Ill., 1987), p. 149.
55
Building and contesting the Republic (1931–2)
There were different kinds of stoppage in the coalfields during the 1930s. 
A fatal accident in a pit sparked an automatic stoppage as a collective gesture 
of mourning (and a chance to investigate the cause). Other spontaneous 
stoppages were quite different; workers downed tools in a wildcat strike if 
wages went unpaid or they considered a disciplinary action taken by foremen 
or the employer to be unjust.20 Such strikes were not under union control 
and differed from planned strikes, which were officially declared with a list 
of demands and usually involved a union. Strikes were also accompanied 
by a range of ritualized activities, including propagandizing missions in the 
streets, articles in the press to win the battle for public opinion, and raising 
strike funds by visiting other places of work on payday.21 
At the level of union ideology and strategy, there was a clear difference 
between the UGT and the CNT. The UGT placed its faith in the state. 
Socialist moderation and reformism focused on growing the UGT as 
an organization and using the state to do so; this had been the strategy 
followed by Largo Caballero during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and 
it continued under the Republic with Largo Caballero now minister of 
labour.22 The ‘mixed juries’ introduced by Largo Caballero – a new iteration 
of the 1920s arbitration committees – were intended to channel demands 
through the mechanisms of the state, thereby tying the masses to the system 
and increasing socialist prestige by growing the movement and confirming 
the efficacy of socialist strategy. The socialist position at the beginning of 
the Republic was thus to eschew strike action. 
Cleaving the masses to the Republican system was also a way to 
undermine the CNT. The anarchist principles of the CNT meant that they 
preferred direct action, placing their faith in workers’ collective strength to 
force an employer’s hand, rather than channelling their demands through 
the state. Yet anarchists’ rejection of arbitration committees and preference 
for direct action did not preclude mediation. During a lengthy conflict at 
the Fondón pit in autumn 1932, striking anarchists were willing to negotiate 
via the mayor and civil governor; indeed, it was the former who found 
20 For a similar desire to assert control of the labour process in Wales, see L. James, The 
Politics of Identity and Civil Society in Britain and Germany: the Miners in the Ruhr and South 
Wales, 1890–1926 (Manchester, 2008), p. 27.
21 For different forms of stoppage, see R. Church and Q. Outram, Strikes and Solidarity: 
Coalfield Conflict in Britain, 1889–1966 (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 10–13.
22 See P. Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in 
the Second Republic (London, 1978), pp. 7–9 and J. Aróstegui, Largo Caballero: el tesón y la 
quimera (Barcelona, 2013), pp. 259–99. 
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the solution to the strike.23 As occurred elsewhere in Spain, the role of the 
mayor as a mediator was often central to the resolution of labour conflicts.24 
However, the 1932 Law of Associations made this task difficult, as it forced 
anarchist associations to seek legal authorization in order to operate. During 
a nine-month strike at the Duro-Felguera steelworks between 1932 and 1933, 
councillors were unable to mediate in a dispute between the CNT and the 
company because the civil governor refused to allow them to do so unless 
anarchists followed the requirements of the Law.25
The first major strike of the Republic exemplified the differences between 
the socialists and anarchists and constituted the most important struggle 
between the SUM and the SOMA for hegemony over the workforce during 
the Republic. The root of the strike lay in a desire for the reinstatement 
of the seven-hour working day in the mines. The SUM called for its 
immediate, direct implementation while the socialists preferred government 
mediation. The SUM prepared a general strike for June 1931, which the 
SOMA criticized as an attack on the Republic. This set the scene for a 
test of their respective strength and influence at the beginning of the new 
regime. As a general strike, the stoppage failed. On the first day, 7,000 
mineworkers followed the SUM’s call to down tools while 20,000 entered 
the pits. The conflict became deadlocked. In an attempt to extend the 
strike, SUM activists engaged in sabotage, and shootouts occurred between 
strikers and those still working.26 The strike did not result in a clear victory 
or defeat for either socialists or anarchists. The SUM failed to achieve the 
immediate re-introduction of the shorter working day and at the end of the 
summer Largo Caballero, the socialist minister of labour, decided to impose 
it by decree.27 
The June strike was exceptional for its scale – as conflicts in 1931 tended 
to be localized and short – but not for its objectives. Improving working 
conditions and increasing wages tended to be the focal point of workers’ 
demands during the first year of the Republic, but as the economic situation 
evolved, so did the nature of the demands. From the beginning of 1932, the 
23 M. Castejón Rodríguez, ‘La patronal hullera asturiana en la Segunda República’ 
(unpublished UNED PhD thesis, 2009), pp. 380–1. 
24 F. Cobo Romero, De campesinos a electores: modernización agraria en Andalucía, 
politización campesina y derechización de los pequeños propietarios y arrendatarios: el caso de la 
provincia de Jaén, 1931–1936 (Madrid, 2003), p. 225.
25 Negotiations were also hamstrung by Duro-Felguera’s intransigence (Región, 25 Feb., 26 
Apr. 1933).
26 Telegram from the civil governor to the minister of the interior, 1 June 1931, AHN, 
Gobernación (A), folder 7A, file 7; El Noroeste, 3, 5, 11 June 1931; La Aurora Social, 5 June 1931.
27 El Noroeste, 27, 29 Aug. 1931; Castejón Rodríguez, ‘La patronal’, p. 351. 
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coalfields faced significant economic problems, which companies blamed 
on the high levels of unsold coal stocks, wage increases, the seven-hour 
day and the cost of Republican labour legislation, including holidays. A 
small number of mining companies closed or went bankrupt, including El 
Caudal, which owed its workers five months’ wages, and Hulleras de Riosa, 
which left 800 unemployed.28 Others implemented short-time working and 
reduced piecework rates.29 These were the first symptoms of problems that 
plagued the industry during the second half of 1932 and throughout 1933.
The SOMA hierarchy constantly exhorted its members not to strike in 
accordance with the socialist strategy of avoiding strike action so as not to 
undermine the Republic. Yet the socialist rank and file consistently went on 
strike in 1931 and 1932. On one occasion, a strike in Barredos (Laviana) was 
actually called by the local SOMA section, while on another, mineworkers 
refused to enter the Sotón mine in protest at accidents, a decision which 
was praised by a SUM official because it defied the exhortations of the 
SOMA officials.30 SOMA leaders attributed such strikes to the ‘spirit of 
youth’, ‘irresponsible elements’ or ‘people of little or no responsibility’, who 
spread ‘confusion’ and deceived the rank and file.31 Socialist officials thus 
recognized that socialists did go on strike, even as they reinforced the anti-
strike message and the self-image of socialists as moderate and sensible in 
their politics. In fact, the SOMA leadership had already shown concern 
at the prospect of rank-and-file militancy. At the SOMA congress in May 
1931, the Executive Committee modified the union’s statutes in an attempt 
to restrict the ability of local sections to call strikes. In theory, they could 
no longer do so.32 
The unintended consequence of the SOMA’s anti-strike attitude was to 
encourage strike action. For socialists, strike action could be an expression 
of support for the Republic as mineworkers attempted to press for the social 
justice associated with the regime through higher wages, better working 
conditions and an assertion of working-class power. Condemnation of the 
rank and file for striking did not prevent SOMA officials intervening in 
disputes. Rather, the union quickly involved itself in strikes in order to 
accelerate their resolution.33 Paradoxically, the combination of a socialist at 
28 Avance, 3, 17 Jan., 19 Feb., 14 Apr. 1932; Región, 10 May 1932. 
29 Región, 19, 20 Feb. 1932. 
30 El Noroeste, 1, 3, 15 July 1931. 
31 Avance, 10, 11 May, 7 Sept. 1932. 
32 Región, 8 May 1931; Shubert, Road, pp. 143–4; El Noroeste, 26 May 1931. 
33 E.g. conflicts at the Llamas and Mariana pits and in Olloniego (La Aurora Social, 6 
Nov. 1931; Avance, 20 Nov., 4, 5, 6, 13 Dec. 1931).
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the helm of the ministry of labour, the arbitration mechanisms fashioned 
by this ministry, and a socialist desire to avoid strikes, created the ideal 
opportunity for strike action.
The strike was the quintessential tool of political practice in the coalfields, 
but not everyone could strike. Across the country, unemployment was 
an increasingly pressing issue.34 Unemployed workers in Oviedo and the 
coalfields held meetings and organized demonstrations in 1931 demanding 
‘bread and work’, and in early 1932 a commission of women petitioned 
the municipal council in Aller to find work for the former employees of El 
Caudal.35 These demands were targeted at the municipal authorities, which, 
along with the provincial deputation, organized public works that were the 
traditional solution to unemployment. Under the Republic, the ministry of 
labour also tasked councils with creating local labour exchanges to aid the 
placement of unemployed workers. Public works were initially forthcoming, 
but councils soon ran out of funding. The council in Mieres did not renew 
the contracts of its labourers and in Oviedo public works halted. Over 200 
workers from the 250-strong workforce of temporary workers were laid 
off.36 The acuteness of the situation was compounded by a rise in the price 
of bread to its peak in 1932, sparking protests in Mieres and further afield.37
One solution to unemployment and rising prices was to labour illegally. 
The case of the chamiceros, who extracted coal from surface mines [chamizos] 
on mining companies’ property, provides an insight into how mineworkers 
imagined the local economy. In the summer of 1932, the Civil Guard 
increasingly harassed a number of chamiceros operating in San Martín del 
Rey Aurelio, with some cases ending up in court.38 The chamiceros responded 
by organizing assemblies and electing a committee to defend their interests, 
with which the socialist-led council refused to engage, despite there being 
a socialist member on the otherwise Communist-dominated committee.39 
34 Interwar unemployment in Europe has been the subject of a recent wave of scholarship, 
e.g., M. Perry, Prisoners of Want: the Experience and Protest of the Unemployed in France, 1921–
1945 (Aldershot, 2007) and Unemployment and Protest: New Perspectives on Two Centuries of 
Contention, ed. M. Reiss and M. Perry (Oxford, 2011).
35 E.g. Región, 28 Apr. 1931; El Noroeste, 30 July 1931; letter from Aurora García (and 
others) to the municipal council of Aller, 19 June 1932, AA, box 532, folder: Asuntos obreros 
1932; Avance, 3 Jan. 1932.
36 C. Benito del Pozo, El ayuntamiento republicano de Oviedo, 1931–1936 (Oviedo, 1989), 
pp. 88–9; El Noroeste, 22 July 1932.
37 Región, 30 Apr., 4 May 1932; Preston, Coming of the Spanish Civil War, p. 39; J. Casanova, 
Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain (1931–1939) (Abingdon, 2004), p. 23.
38 See AHPA, AP, box 78434, files 174, 176, 177, 183 (1932).
39 El Noroeste, 15 Oct. 1932; Avance, 18 Oct. 1932.
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The chamiceros offered a solution to the problem they themselves posed. 
They offered to sell the coal they mined to the company for an agreed fee.40 
In essence, they sought to formalize their activities such that they would be, 
in effect, freelance workers.
The chamiceros’ solution was underpinned by a particular notion of a 
moral economy at the local level.41 In the face of material urgency, they 
argued that the market should be remoulded in order to afford an equitable 
distribution of work for miners. The imperative of employment justified the 
chamericeros’ infringement of property rights. This was a moral economy 
in its broadest sense of attempting to change the priority of the market 
to the employment of local workers over the profit margins of businesses. 
There was a moral and economic imperative to make the best use of natural 
resources for the collective good of the local community. The chamiceros 
demanded the social justice promised by the Republic, whether sincerely or, 
from a Communist position, in an attempt to place the authorities under 
pressure using maximalist demands to unmask the bourgeois nature of the 
Republic. In any case, there was little radical in how the chamiceros acted. 
They attempted to reach a negotiated settlement that did not fundamentally 
disturb the relationship between capital and labour. Rather than socializing 
the means of production, they were willing to pay the mining company a 
fee for the right to mine coal.42 For the mining companies, however, it was 
an attack on their right to manage their property as they wished.
 The underlying logic in the moral economy of the chamiceros paralleled 
practices in rural areas in other parts of Spain where peasants undertook 
agricultural tasks without the consent of the landowner and demanded 
payment afterwards.43 From autumn 1931, these incidents increased, with ‘[a]
n astonishing number of occupations and “illegal cultivations” of properties 
[taking] place in provinces such as Huesca and Teruel’. In Puebla de 
Valverde (Teruel), groups entered an estate and ploughed the land, cut trees 
and collected wood. They stopped when the mayor appeared, ‘on condition 
that the authorities agreed to obtain the title deeds from the proprietor, 
as the locals believed that the village had a rightful collective claim to the 
40 Avance, 8 Oct. 1932.
41 The foundational text is E. P. Thompson, ‘The moral economy of the English crowd in 
the eighteenth century’, Past & Present, l (1971), 76–136.
42 Avance, 8 Oct. 1932.
43 E.g. in Bujalance (Córdoba) (R. Cañete Marfil and F. Martínez Mejías, La Segunda 
República en Bujalance (1931–1936) (Córdoba, 2010), p. 177). E. Majuelo Gil traced 




property’.44 Sometimes the demands were more radical, as citizens opened 
up a new front in decades-long local conflicts over the sale and privatization 
of common land. This distinguishes the cases of the land invasions from the 
chamiceros, even if both formed part of a longer tradition of transgressive 
actions that reordered the market in line with a local understanding of a 
moral economy.45
Cases of poverty-stricken workers undertaking direct action to gain 
food were not unheard of in interwar Europe and consumer protests were 
particularly in evidence at the end of the First World War. In Weimar 
Germany, hungry citizens engaged in direct action during periods of 
economic distress, such as forcing the ‘sale of foodstuffs at lower prices’ 
during the early 1920s or plundering fields during the Great Depression.46 
Therein lies a key difference between Germany and Spain. Spanish 
agricultural workers operated in the favourable political and legal context 
offered by the Republic, rather than the crises of the early 1920s and the 
Depression. Under the Republic, ‘for the first time the balance of legal 
rights swung away from landowners to the rural proletariat’.47 Invading 
estates responded to hunger and a desire for land, but also the opportunities 
opened up by the creation of the Republic.
The solution proposed by the chamiceros was not the only one sought 
by workers within the existing framework of capitalist relations in the 
coalfields. As the coal companies struggled with falling demand for coal, 
workforces proposed collective contracts to avoid the closure of mines.48 
Under collective contracts, mineworkers took charge of the labour and 
extraction process and sold the coal back to the company. Such a solution 
located industry’s woes in the organization of production rather than market 
forces. Removing the company’s representatives – the foremen and deputies 
– would allegedly resolve the company’s economic problems. As with the 
chamiceros, there was little militant in these proposals. Instead, rank-and-
44 Casanova, Anarchism, pp. 21–2. 
45 See P. Radcliff, ‘Women’s politics: consumer riots in twentieth-century Spain’, in 
Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain, ed. V. Lorée Enders and 
P. Radcliff (New York, 1999), pp. 301–23.
46 Schumann argued these acts were simply direct action prompted by material need 
rather than necessitating an explication based on sophisticated notions of a moral economy 
(D. Schumann, Political Violence in the Weimar Republic, 1918–1933: Fight for the Streets and 
Fear of Civil War (New York, 2012), pp. 11–4, 238–9). 
47 E. Malefakis, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Spanish 
Civil War (New Haven, Conn., 1970), p. 170.
48 E.g. at Industrial Asturiana (Avance, 13, 21 Sept. 1932); Carmona mine in Mieres 
(Avance, 13 May 1932). 
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file discontent at the SOMA’s response to the problems in the coal industry 
would give rise to radicalism in labour matters at the end of 1932.
Property
Trespassing onto private property in times of economic need, whether to 
extract coal or plough land, was not the only way in which property was 
at the centre of conflict during the 1930s. The distribution of land was one 
of the central preoccupations of the Republican–socialist government. The 
nature of agricultural property and farming practices in Spain meant there 
were a large number of landless labourers on the latifundia of the south, 
who struggled to subsist thanks to seasonal underemployment and low 
wages. The Republican–socialist government planned a substantial land 
reform for fourteen provinces across Extremadura, Castile, Andalusia and 
La Mancha, in which land would be subject to compulsory purchase and 
distributed to peasants. The September 1932 law was limited in practice and 
by the end of 1933, only 4,399 families had settled on 24,203 hectares of 
land.49 Spain was not the only European country to enact land reform ‘to 
bolster … legitimacy and stave off social unrest’, nor was it the only one to 
fail. In eastern Europe, the Baltic and the Balkans, governments failed to 
address ‘the power and influence of large [land]owners’ or ‘establish a group 
of moderately prosperous peasants who would have been the lynchpins of 
social and political stability’.50
Access to land was one facet of the struggle for property. A further 
problem was posed by housing. Housing shortages had long been a problem 
in cities and industrial areas across Europe, from the Ruhr industrial 
region to Barcelona, where housing was insalubrious and overcrowded.51 
In Europe, the lack of housing became particularly acute at the end of the 
First World War, thanks to a number of factors, including migration to 
the cities, the removal of rent controls, lack of construction during the war 
and an increase in marriages in its aftermath.52 In Asturias, the quality and 
49 Malefakis, Agrarian reform, p. 281. For recent reflections, see J. Carmona, J. R. Rosés 
and J. Simpson, ‘The question of land access and the Spanish land reform of 1932’, Economic 
History Review, lxxii (2019), 669–90.
50 L. Boswell, ‘Rural society in crisis’, in The Oxford Handbook of European History, 1914–
1945, ed. N. Doumanis (Oxford, 2016), p. 253.
51 J. R. Shearer, ‘Shelter from the storm: politics, production and the housing crisis in the 
Ruhr coal fields, 1918–24’, Journal of Contemporary History, xxxiv (1999), 19–47; C. Ealham, 
Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898–1937 (Abingdon, 2005), p. 5.
52 For Vienna and Paris, see H. Gruber, Red Vienna: Experiment in Working Class Culture, 
1919–1934 (New York, 1991), pp. 45–73 and T. Stovall, Paris and the Spirit of 1919: Consumer 
Struggles, Transnationalism and Revolution (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 36–48, 193–212. For 
62
Unite, Proletarian Brothers!
adequate supply of homes was a long-running issue.53 The Jesuit Sisinio 
Nevares heaped praise on the SHE for the homes it built in Aller, but the 
thirty-three ‘cuarteles’ containing 465 dwellings and the fifty ‘single-family 
houses’ were clearly insufficient for 4,000 miners.54 The situation was so 
desperate that those who migrated to the coalfields to work had to sleep in 
barns and hórreos (traditional Asturian granaries).55
During the Republic, discontent and agitation over housing in the 
coalfields centred on rent, rather than the supply or quality of housing 
stock. Struggles over rent occurred across Spain during the first year of 
the Republic, including in Barcelona, Huelva, Cádiz and Seville. In the 
Catalan capital, agitation against rents had surfaced prior to the Republic 
and, under the stewardship of anarchist activists, mushroomed into a 
strike in the summer of 1931.56 The dynamic was different in the Asturian 
coalfields, where there was no strike but a significant wave of activism 
in 1932 that emerged in response to a government decree in December 
1931. The new legislation allowed tenants to petition for a reduction in 
rent. Tenants’ leagues (Ligas de inquilinos) emerged in the coalfields – 
as they did across the country – to press for reductions.57 Some of the 
leagues predated the Republic, such as in Oviedo and Gijón, but the 
new political context facilitated their creation and growth. By May 1932 
an Asturian regional federation had been formed, with the participation 
of seven coalfield leagues (Turón, Boo, Moreda, Pola de Lena, Mieres, 
Sama, Laviana), along with Trubia, Gijón and Avilés.58 The coalfield 
leagues featured prominent socialist involvement and were often based at 
the local Casa del Pueblo. The speedy organization of the leagues, along 
with the mobilization and results they achieved cannot be understood 
without a look at the pre-existing traditions of community activism and 
organizational frameworks in the coalfields. 
Berlin, see E. Rosenhaft, Beating the Fascists? The German Communist Party and Political 
Violence, 1929–1933 (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 10–11.
53 See J. M. Jove y Canella, Topografía médica del concejo de San Martín del Rey Aurelio 
(Madrid, 1923).
54 S. Nevares, El patrono ejemplar: una obra maestra de Acción Social (Madrid, 1936), p. 211.
55 Fernández García, Langreo, p. 262. 
56 Ealham, Class, pp. 93–5, 100; N. Rider, ‘The practice of direct action: the Barcelona rent 
strike of 1931’, in For Anarchism: History, Theory, and Practice, ed. D. Goodway (London, 
1989), pp. 88–94; Cruz, Protestar, p. 86.
57 Gaceta de Madrid, 30 Dec. 1931. The decree was later modified (Gaceta de Madrid, 12 
March, 18 June 1932). Leagues existed across Spain (e.g., see details in Noticiero de Soria, 16 
June 1932).
58 Región, 23 May 1932. 
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The leagues provided a new vehicle for citizens to fight for the social justice 
they identified with the Republic. As banners held aloft by demonstrating 
members of the league from Muros del Nalón, a town near the coast, 
proclaimed: ‘We demand justice’ and ‘The law must be fulfilled’.59 Activism 
in Asturias attempted to exploit the opening provided by legislation in 
contrast to protests against evictions in post-First World War Paris or the 
Communist-organized rent strike in 1930s Germany, which were defensive 
reactions to a quickly deteriorating economic situation.60
Women played a prominent role in rent activism both as organizers and 
as a target for support. At league meetings in Trubia and Oviedo most of 
the audience was made up of women and two women were appointed to a 
neighbourhood committee in the provincial capital.61 In Aller and Trubia, 
organizers spoke in the name of and appealed to working-class mothers: ‘As 
women, as proletarian mothers, it hurts us to see our children barefoot and 
poorly fed because of the excessive RENT THAT WE PAY [sic]’.62 Women’s 
activism drew on pre-existing traditions of women mobilizing at the local 
level in defence of community-based justice.63 Nevertheless, orators at 
meetings were men, reflecting male predominance in positions of power in 
local politics.
Whereas CNT activists in Barcelona favoured direct action due to their 
lack of ‘faith in Republicans’ and the ‘notoriously intransigent landlord 
class’, coalfield leagues instead emphasized their desire for the harmonious 
conciliation of interests through reaching ‘friendly’ agreements between 
tenants and property owners.64 The league in Mieres declared its pride at 
having negotiated lower rents while maintaining good relationships with 
the owners. They preferred to channel tenants’ demands through the courts 
if an agreement was not possible. The league in Aller took pride in having 
‘triumphed in every case dealt with by the justice system’.65
59 La Voz de Asturias, 22 June 1932. 
60 P. Swett, Neighbors and Enemies: the Culture of Radicalism in Berlin, 1929–1933 
(Cambridge, 2004), p. 45.
61 Avance, 15, 21 July 1932. 
62 Avance, 10 July 1932. For the same phrasing in Trubia, see Avance, 15 July 1932. French 
tenants framed their demands in terms of wartime sacrifice (Stovall, Paris, p. 202).
63 See Radcliff, ‘Women’s politics’, pp. 301–23 and T. Kaplan, ‘Female consciousness and 
collective action: the case of Barcelona, 1910–1918’, Signs, vii (1982), 545–66. For women’s 
prominence in Berlin rent strikes, see Swett, Neighbors, p. 45.
64 Ealham, Class, p. 101. 
65 Avance, 1 June, 10 Oct. 1932. 
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If the leagues were moderate in practice, the language was often bullish 
and asserted the collective power of the working class. The league in 
Mieres scoffed at landlords who ‘badly counselled … think justice will not 
be done’ and warned that the league would make sure that it was.66 The 
problem lay in the fact that reaching ‘friendly’ agreements was not easy. 
Landlords defended their interests and even fuelled conflict by evicting 
tenants or raising rents.67 Tensions ran high in some areas. One league 
leader was arrested in Pola de Laviana for punching a landlord who had 
insulted him. The landlord in question was accused of refusing to respect 
both the legislation and the ‘correct instructions’ of the league. Instead, he 
had announced an increase in rents. The league protested at the arrest by 
gathering outside prison before assembling in front of the landlord’s home 
in a menacing manner. The landlord took refuge in the home of the socialist 
deputy mayor. Ironically, it was the secretary of the tenants’ league who 
protected the landlord from the crowd by personally escorting him home.68 
Rent activism was an arena in which citizens – and women in particular 
– mobilized to construct the justice they associated with the Republic in 
their everyday lives, through their own actions. For landlords, the wave 
of requests for rent reduction could be symptomatic of how the Republic 
meddled in their affairs and destabilized the traditional social order. 
Resistance to rent reduction meant that tenants also became very aware of 
the limits of Republican reform. In 1932, tenant activism was moderate and 
conciliatory rather than radical, although disputes over rents would become 
increasingly bitter over the next couple of years. 
Governance 
The state was a key actor in the dynamics of conflict. It did not exist as a 
monolithic entity, but a network of channels and institutions, formed by 
different layers of administrative responsibility and power.69 The policing 
of society lay in the hands of multiple levels of the state, including the 
mayor as the immediate authority at the local level, the civil governor 
66 Avance, 1 July 1932. 
67 E.g. Avance, 28 May, 2, 10 July 1932.
68 Avance, 2 July 1932. The league later protested at the landlords’ ‘campaign’ against the 
leaders (Avance, 12 July 1932).
69 My approach to the state is influenced by M. Mann, e.g., his ‘The autonomous power of 
the state: its origins, mechanisms and results’, European Journal of Sociology, xxv (1984), 185–
213. For a sociological perspective on the state in relation to collective action, see Breaking 
Down the State: Protestors Engaged, ed. J. M. Jasper and J. W. Duyvendak (Amsterdam, 
2015).
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(the government’s delegate in the province) and the state security forces 
themselves. The Spanish state security force’s actions played a key role in 
the dynamics of collective action. The state security forces were often an 
agent that escalated protest to the point of violence, thanks to the particular 
political culture and training of the security forces, even as they attempted 
to uphold law and order.70
Historically, the Spanish left had had an uneasy relationship with the 
principal arm of law enforcement, the Civil Guard, which had been created 
in 1844 as a rural gendarmerie to deal with brigandage. The Civil Guard 
was not well equipped to police mass protests and strikes, even as it was 
increasingly called upon to do so. Far from neighbourhood police officers, 
civil guards were stationed in municipalities away from their place of origin 
and housed in barracks with their families that were isolated from the 
community, although they often maintained ties with the local elite.71 In 
the Asturian coalfields, the SHE had paid for the construction of Civil 
Guard barracks and many company security guards were ex-civil guards.72 
The corps itself cultivated a strong sense of ‘honour’ and closely identified 
with its mission to protect the patria and the social order, which was 
imagined in terms of traditional social hierarchies.73 The Civil Guard had 
not been willing to intervene to prevent the fall of the monarchy, but there 
was nevertheless ‘an underlying sensation that the corps was incompatible 
with the new political order’ due to its ‘ultraconservative’ mentality.74 At the 
beginning of the Republic, the Mieres municipal council agreed to solicit 
the dismissal of civil guards stationed in the district for their ‘many crimes’ 
and to draft regulations for a new ‘republican guard’ with a ‘civic character’.75 
There was also an immediate campaign in Asturias for the removal of 
Lisardo Doval, a Civil Guard commander in the province, for the torture 
and mistreatment of prisoners during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. 
At the first council meeting in Gijón, councillors agreed to demand his 
70 E.g. Cruz, Protestar, pp. 89–90; Casanova, Anarchism, p. 18; E. González Calleja, En 
nombre de la autoridad: la defensa del orden público durante la Segunda República española 
(1931–1936) (Granada, 2014).
71 See F. Chamberlin, ‘Honor-bound: the military culture of the Civil Guard and the 
political violence of the Spanish Second Republic, 1931–1936’ (unpublished UCSD PhD 
thesis, 2017).
72 Nevares, El patrono, pp. 29, 23.
73 On these themes, see G. Blaney, ‘The Civil Guard and the Spanish Second Republic 
(1931–1936)’ (unpublished University of London PhD thesis, 2007) and Chamberlin, 
‘Honor-bound’.
74 Blaney, ‘Civil Guard’, pp. 105–6, 110; González Calleja, En nombre, pp. 90–1.
75 AM, Actas, 16 May 1928 to 1 Aug. 1931, fos. 104, 112.
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transfer out of the province – a move that was supported by a motion from 
their counterparts in Mieres – and they later organized a commission to 
collect denunciations of Doval’s conduct. The provincial press published a 
flurry of letters denouncing his behaviour or else springing to his defence.76 
Doval was removed from Asturias, but he would return to direct the police 
operation in the province after the revolutionary insurrection. 
The government had recognized the potential problems posed by the 
Civil Guard at the beginning of the Republic, but had little choice but to 
rely on it. Tentative plans for a people’s ‘civic guard’ were finally shelved in 
favour of creating a new corps – the Assault Guard – to supplement the Civil 
Guard.77 Envisaged as a more modern force for policing urban disorder that 
would show ‘hardness without brutality’, the Assault Guard was modelled 
on other European forces, including the German Schutzpolizei and the 
French Garde Republicaine Mobile. Assault guards operated in squads, 
as opposed to in pairs, were trained in crowd control and armed with 
truncheons and machine pistols. Despite the prestige and money invested in 
the Assault Guard – who numbered 12,000 by the end of 1932 – they failed 
to offer a fundamentally different policing strategy to the Civil Guard.78 The 
government also developed legislative measures to protect the Republic, 
namely the Law for the Defence of the Republic that was promulgated in 
October 1931. The law authorized restrictions on civil liberties in order to 
defend the constitutional order. Over the next couple of years – before the 
Law of Public Order replaced it in July 1933 – the law was deployed against 
those agitating against the Republic, including the conspiring monarchist 
right and the rebellious left, particularly the anarchist movement.79 
The policing of Spanish society in the new Republic constituted a thorny 
matter for the state, as underlined by a number of violent clashes that 
occurred between the security forces and crowds at the end of 1931 and 
beginning of 1932. While these episodes did not happen in Asturias, they are 
important for what they reveal about the exercise of state power at the local 
level in Spain in the 1930s. The most emblematic occurred in Castilblanco 
and Arnedo. In both cases violence erupted when security forces attempted 
to break up a demonstration. In Castilblanco, a remote, poverty-stricken 
76 Región, 17 Apr., 12 May 1931; AM, Actas, 16 May 1928 to 1 Aug. 1931, fo. 104; El Noroeste, 
19 Apr., 2, 22 May 1931.
77 González Calleja, En nombre, pp. 131–3. 
78 González Calleja, En nombre, pp. 140–6. On France, see J. M. Berlière, ‘The difficult 
construction of a “Republican” police’, in Policing Interwar Europe: Continuity, Change and 
Crisis, 1918–1940, ed. G. Blaney (Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 14–30.
79 Discussion in González Calleja, En nombre, pp. 190–9. On implications for the 
anarchists, see Ealham, Class, pp. 69–70.
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village of 3,000 inhabitants located in Badajoz province, socialist-authorized 
marches took place on 30 and 31 December 1931 in the context of a strike. 
When the mayor ordered the dissolution of the demonstration, a tussle led 
to a shot being fired by the four civil guards present which killed a member 
of the crowd. Demonstrators jumped on the guards, beat them to death, 
mutilated them and destroyed their weapons.80 Days later, on 5 Januaury – 
and before public consternation had receded – civil guards opened fire on 
demonstrators in Arnedo, in La Rioja province. There had been a lengthy 
prelude to this, consisting of friction between Faustino Muro (a shoe factory 
owner), workers and trade unionists in 1931. Muro had encouraged votes for 
the monarchist slate in the April municipal elections and sacked workers 
for political reasons. After the proclamation of the Republic, workers had 
repeatedly protested about the working conditions and dismissals at his 
factory. An arbitration committee found in the workers’ favour, but Muro 
refused to acknowledge the ruling. The sacking of a worker led to a general 
strike in January 1932. A peaceful demonstration was held in the town 
to celebrate an agreement reached between governor, socialists and local 
bosses. The shouting, dancing protestors converged on the main square. 
A shot was fired wounding a civil guard, and his fellow guards opened fire 
without warning. Eleven were killed and thirty injured, from a one-year-old 
child to a man in his sixties.81
The violence in Castilblanco and Arnedo contributed twelve of the 103 
deaths caused by the Civil Guard between 14 April 1931 and 5 January 1932.82 
Explanations of these episodes tend to focus on two factors. First, the 
culture of the Civil Guard, namely its rigidity and emphasis on upholding 
its honour and the unsuitability of its weaponry for crowd control.83 
Second, the rapid politicization of rural areas that posed a challenge to 
municipal and provincial authorities in managing competing interests 
and demands at the local level. In many areas of Spain, councillors who 
had never exercised political power before occupied council chambers. 
This dramatic shift in municipal politics, particularly in rural areas, 
coupled with the massive growth in unionization translated into a formal 
80 On Castilblanco, see M. Baumeister, ‘Castilblanco or the limits of democracy – rural 
protest in Spain from the Restoration monarchy to the early Second Republic’, Contemporary 
European History, vii (1998), 1–19; R. Trullén Floría, ‘Castilblanco como sinécdoque: el 
discurso contrarrevolucionario de interpretación de la Segunda República’, Historia social, 
lxxxiii (2015), 55–71; González Calleja, En nombre, pp. 98–105.
81 This summary is based on C. Gil Andrés, La República en la plaza: los sucesos de Arnedo 
de 1932 (Logroño, 2002).
82 Figures from González Calleja, En nombre, p. 113. 
83 As argued by Chamberlin, ‘Honor-bound’, particularly pp. 167–73.
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politicization of towns and villages across the country. As new forms of 
politics and a new balance of power emerged in the countryside due to 
the politicization engendered by the Republic, rural elites responded with 
force.84
In narratives of the Second Republic, episodes like Castilblanco and 
Arnedo often appear as localized phenomena that punctuated national 
political life. Such a view overlooks the tensions over state power at the 
local level and the importance of community as a framework for making 
sense of political developments and as a framework for action. The strength 
of feeling invested in the local community combined with the historically 
weak articulation of the Spanish state meant that local communities tended 
towards ‘self-policing’ or self-governance. This extended beyond remote 
areas of Badajoz. As a socialist councillor in Langreo said when discussing 
a proposal for the council to stop paying the Civil Guard’s telephone bill: 
‘[we] socialists are those who need the Civil Guard the least’.85 In a similar 
manner, when the different organizations in Laviana united to telegram the 
government to protest against the construction of the water supply in early 
1932, they singled out the deployment of the Civil Guard for particular 
criticism. They expressed indignation in the name of the community at the 
threat of force. The government was acting in a ‘dictatorial’ manner that 
was completely unwarranted.86 Over the coming years, this principle would 
be asserted even more strongly. While the socialists believed in participating 
in the state and using the levers of state power to implement reform, this 
could coexist with traditions of the self-policing pueblo at the local level. 
The following years saw frequent assertions that the local left could better 
police public order, and this rhetoric turned into reality, as the coexistence 
of the state security forces and the left became increasingly difficult in the 
coalfields.
Such uneasiness, if not opposition, at what was considered to be the 
intrusion of the state into working-class communities was a sentiment 
not limited to the coalfields or Spain. In Berlin, residents of working-class 
districts ‘universally’ regarded police with ‘suspicion’.87 In the Ruhr and 
South Wales, cuts in welfare or intrusion into the family home to assess 
a family’s claim to benefit payments triggered a ‘rising cycle of protest’, 
84 The dynamics also reflect longer traditions of rural revolts and riots (Baumeister, 
‘Castilblanco’, pp. 11–17).
85 AL, Actas, 17 Sept. 1931 to 21 Apr. 1932, fo. 118. 
86 Telegram from Laviana to the minister of the interior, 14 March 1932, AHN, 
Gobernación (A), file 7A, document 19.
87 Swett, Neighbors, p. 215.
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exacerbated by mass unemployment in these industrial areas.88 The state was 
an active player in the unfolding dynamics of protest. In Spain, the promise 
of Republican justice and corresponding investment of moral authority in 
the state meant that allegations of ‘betrayal’ by agents of the state were 
keenly felt, particularly in 1934. This was not just a question of Republican 
reform, but also a dispute over the reach and exercise of state power.
The construction of the Republic at a local level occurred through the 
interaction of pressure from competing interest groups, administration of 
laws and orders emanating from Madrid by the municipal authorities, and 
oversight and policing from the civil governor and Civil and Assault Guard. 
Between 1931 and 1932, the Asturian coalfields saw increasing agitation as 
citizens and residents seized the opportunity to assert the interests of their 
community and other groups with whom they identified. The Asturian 
coalfields proved to be an area with a high capacity for organization and 
struggle, thanks to the political traditions forged over many years and, in 
particular, the dense network of political and union institutions, such as 
Casas de Pueblo and neighbourhood associations. These institutions and 
associations were foundations for projecting claims about the community.
There were moments of tension in strikes, tenant activism and over the 
actions of the police forces, but there was little radicalism in these episodes. 
Radicalism emerged from friction between rival groups on the left and the 
cleavage between left and right as moulded by the context of the Republic, 
namely the way it reconfigured the place of religion in Spanish society. If 
the classic view proposes that radicalization was a frustrated response to 
employer and right-wing intransigence in the face of Republican reform, 
the story requires greater sensitivity to the shifting political context of the 
Republic during the 1930s, as well as the dynamics of politics at the local 
level.
88 A. Zukas, ‘Explaining unemployed protest in the Ruhr at the end of the Weimar 
Republic’, in Unemployment and Protest: New Perspectives on Two Centuries of Contention, 
ed. M. Reiss and M. Perry (Oxford, 2011), the quotation at p. 160. For Britain, see S. Ward, 
Unemployment and the State in Britain: the Means Test and Protest in 1930s South Wales and 
North-East England (Manchester, 2013).
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3. Anticlericalism, dissidence and radicalization 
(1932–3)
You said that I had a church wedding … Criticize me when you see my children 
saturated with clericalism or when my father kneels on the cold slabs of the 
church … If citizens’ private lives interest you so much, why, you great cynic, 
did you not object to your brother Socrates applying for a post office licence 
under the Primo de Rivera dictatorship? Your family observes church marriages, 
applies for posts during the dictatorship and you are a pretender for a thousand 
beatas … Where is your radicalism now, when not long ago you offered your 
hand to a priest?1
José Estrada penned this torrent of disparaging remarks in response 
to criticism published by Communist rivals. For Estrada, a socialist, 
their behaviour did not match the radical political ideal they claimed to 
espouse. His scorn, underpinned by a charge of hypocrisy, was typical of 
the mudslinging between leftists that was prevalent in the first years of the 
Republic. Anticlericalism was an important way of showing one’s radical 
mettle and played a prominent role in rivalry within the left, between 
socialists, Communists and anarchists. Attacking the Church, whether 
rhetorically or physically, was also a way of reacting to a re-emerging and 
re-organizing political right in 1932. The importance accorded to religion 
in Spain might appear to set the country apart from wider Europe, but 
religion played a role in political struggles more widely. In the crisis of 
the Weimar Republic, Communists foregrounded militant anticlericalism 
in order to mobilize working-class support and undermine the German 
Social Democratic Party, while in France ‘the clerical/anticlerical division 
remained an important structurant of political life’ between the world wars.2 
The cleavage over religion was particularly marked and at times noted as an 
important feature of struggles in towns and villages across Spain, yet its role 
in fuelling radicalization in the Second Republic has been largely neglected.
1 Avance, 24 July 1932. 
2 T. Weir, ‘The Christian front against godlessness: anti-secularism and the demise of 
the Weimar Republic, 1928–1933’, Past & Present, ccxxix (2015), 201–38; K. Passmore, From 
Liberalism to Fascism: the Right in a French Province (Cambridge, 1997), p. 45. See also D. H. 
Bell’s emphasis on friction over religion in Italy in Sesto San Giovanni: Workers, Culture and 
Politics in an Italian Town, 1880–1922 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1986).
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Between 1932 and 1933, a current of radicalism developed in the 
coalfields. It had its roots in conflicts over the role of religion at a local level, 
both as an element of intra-left rivalry and as a symptom of the revival 
of the right and the lack of progress in constructing a secular Republic. 
However, religious divisions were not the sole drivers of radicalism. As 
the coal industry continued to struggle, the SOMA attempted to respond 
through pivoting in strategy to embrace strike action. Rather than the 
union radicalizing into line with the grassroots, its solutions to ameliorate 
the situation of the workforce only widened the growing breach between 
the rank and file and the union hierarchy, entrenching dissidence and 
fomenting greater radicalism. This was particularly evident in younger 
activists, whose role in spearheading radicalism is widely acknowledged.3 
Radicalism was expressed in two ways. Rank-and-file activists sought new 
ways of building working-class unity and re-appropriating the ‘radical’ 
label. From late 1932, socialists responded to a shift in the political mood 
in the coalfields by explicitly refashioning radicalism such that it did not 
contradict moderation and reformism. A year later, this radical impulse 
shifted further to the crystallization of a particular vision of the Republic, 
as a militant and uncompromising ‘social Republic’.
Religion, rivalry and radicalism
On 8 October 1931, the debate in the Republican Constituent Cortes on 
the draft constitution turned to the role that the Church would play in 
the new state. As this phase of parliamentary debate loomed, Juan Pablo 
García, a young Asturian socialist lawyer, had written in the socialist weekly 
La Aurora Social that ‘the clerical problem [was] the true touchstone of 
radicalism and democracy for Spanish politicians (men and parties)’. 
Recent parliamentary votes had served to ‘unmask’ those claiming to be 
radicals.4 The debate was ‘emotional and divisive’ and positions hardened in 
parliament.5 Beyond the walls of the Cortes, rejection of Catholic belief and 
practice was also a significant marker of radical zeal. Since August, citizens 
had regularly denounced parish priests for anti-Republican sermons in the 
provincial press or in person to the civil governor.6 
3 See work by S. Souto Kustrín, particularly Paso a la juventud: movilización democrática, 
estalinismo y revolución en la república española (Valencia, 2013).
4 La Aurora Social, 18 Sept. 1931. 
5 For a summary, see W. J. Callahan, The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1998 
(Washington,D.C., 2000), pp. 274–94, the quotation at p. 288. For more detail, see V. M. 
Arbeloa, La semana trágica de la Iglesia en España (8–14 octubre de 1931) (Madrid, 2006).
6 Such denunciations were claimed to be a daily occurrence (Avance, 15 Dec. 1931; El 
Noroeste, 13 Jan. 1932).
73
Anticlericalism, dissidence and radicalization (1932–3)
Alleging religious belief or practice was an important way of slurring 
rivals and thereby asserting one’s own radical credentials. Accusations, 
counteraccusations and denials of religious practice flew back and forth 
between rival newspapers in Asturias in 1932. An article in anarchist 
Solidaridad singled out a Communist for selling religious images, while 
one individual wrote to El Noroeste denying a report in socialist Avance 
that he had given money to the parish priest of Baíña (Mieres). He retorted 
that socialists received payments from the priest and sent their members to 
confession in return.7 One young socialist used the forum afforded by the 
provincial press to boast that he had convinced his wife-to-be to reject the 
‘pack of wolves’ intent on using her to claw him back to Catholicism.8 These 
claims – for example, that a socialist had taken his daughter to a different 
village in order to baptize her – and counterclaims should be treated 
carefully.9 Rather than providing unambiguous evidence of actual religious 
practice, the slurs informally regulated the public and private conduct 
of leftists by reinforcing values and delineating the limits of acceptable 
behaviour. The desire to distance themselves publicly from rumours reveals 
how damaging the taint of religiosity could be to leftist reputations at the 
local level. 
There was radicalizing potential in these prying eyes and public slanders. 
The pride in anticlericalism and desire to display radical zeal led to political 
groups formalizing this policing mechanism through internal procedures 
to eject members who were not sufficiently anticlerical. The PCE in Turón 
expelled one of its members for religious observance, proclaiming ‘that is 
how we communists react to those who humiliate themselves before the 
Church’.10 In a similar vein, the Socialist Youth (JS) in Asturias proposed a 
formal ban on its members ‘attending and practising religious acts’ and that 
‘atheist, antireligious and materialist tasks [be made] obligatory’, though 
the proposal was rejected after fierce debate.11 This was not restricted to 
Asturias. In Jaén, in Andalusia, the JS agreed that members should not have 
relationships with young women ‘proud of their religiosity’.12 Whether the 
policy was enforced or not, it demonstrated a commitment to upholding its 
anticlerical – and therefore radical – self-image.
7 Solidaridad, 18 July 1931; El Noroeste, 18 June 1932. 
8 Avance, 24 Nov. 1932.
9 La Aurora Social, 6 Nov. 1931. 
10 El Noroeste, 13 Nov. 1932.
11 Avance, 16, 18 July 1933.
12 A. M. Moral Roncal, La cuestión religiosa en la Segunda República española: iglesia y 
carlismo (Madrid, 2009), p. 64. 
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The nature of anticlerical rivalry on the left was moulded by the secularizing 
context of the new Republic. The Republic decreed the separation of 
church and state and secularizing legislation signalled that ‘the Church was 
to be a voluntary association for those willing to subscribe instead of the 
guardian of Spain’s identity and conscience’.13 The measures introduced by 
the Republican–socialist government removed the Church’s control over 
key aspects of citizens’ lives, including marriage, education and death. 
Crucifixes were removed from school walls and civil burials were provided 
for. In practice, the implementation of government legislation depended 
on the nature of local politics. In Salamanca, which was a stronghold of 
Catholicism and conservatism, weddings continued to be religious affairs 
and there was no growth in civil burials.14 In the left-wing coalfields of 
Asturias, meanwhile, the impulse to undermine the ‘Catholic compass’ was 
strong and activists continued to push the boundaries of secularism in order 
to present themselves as the most radical.15 Criticizing past contact with the 
Church was a way of smearing one’s opponents and positioning oneself in 
the radical vanguard. 
The official secularism of the Republic fuelled and complicated the 
spiralling race to reject religion. The change in the national political 
landscape recalibrated what it meant to be radical. Secular values were no 
longer as radical as they had been prior to 1931. In order to appear radical in 
1932, activists had to surpass state secularism. At the same time, espousing 
militant anticlericalism meant that an activist might be vulnerable to attacks 
from rivals, as many – if not most – activists’ pasts did not meet the new 
exacting standards. Prior to 1931, it had not been easy to avoid a church 
wedding, baptism or simply contact with a priest. As José Estrada pointed 
out, it was unfair to judge an individual’s radical credentials according to 
their past actions when avoiding the Church’s control of rites of passage 
had been very difficult prior to the Republic.16 But such occasions could 
nevertheless now be used to besmirch a rival’s reputation.
Leftists did not solely measure their radical mettle against one another. 
Tensions existed within the left, but also started growing between leftists 
and Catholics as the secularizing project of the Second Republic started 
13 F. Lannon, Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy: the Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1975 
(Oxford, 1987), p. 181. 
14 M. Vincent, Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in 
Salamanca, 1930–1936 (Oxford, 1996), p. 68. 
15 On the ‘compass’, see M. Thomas, The Faith and the Fury: Popular Anticlerical Violence 
and Iconoclasm in Spain, 1931–1936 (Eastbourne, 2013), pp. 32–3.
16 Avance, 24 July 1932.
75
Anticlericalism, dissidence and radicalization (1932–3)
to impact on the everyday lives of citizens in 1932. Announcements in the 
provincial press trumpeted the first civil marriages and civil burials in towns 
and villages as victories over tradition and superstition. Parents in Tiraña 
(Laviana) of a baby registered without a baptism were congratulated for 
‘having liberated the child from the clerical dunking’, while speeches at 
a civil wedding in Boo emphasized the ‘civic value of the act, calling on 
those present [at the reception] to imitate their example’ and not be stifled 
by ‘clerical despotism’.17 Such ceremonies were interpreted as marking the 
arrival of secular Republican modernity. Religious ceremonies no longer 
defined the nature of the local community. A riot occurred in Villarubia de 
Santiago (Toledo) when a girl was baptized against her parents’ will.18
Catholics had already voiced their criticism of the Republican project 
in 1931 through the modern weapons of an ‘aggrieved interest group’: 
petitions and rallies.19 The Church mobilized Catholics to make monetary 
donations to replace reduced state funding of the Church, and parents’ 
associations were created to defend Catholic education.20 Catholic women 
visited the homes of (young) women in their communities to press them 
into following the dictates of Catholic doctrine, a practice denounced by 
articles in Avance. Catholic women were accused of repeatedly pressuring a 
woman in Ciaño-Santa Ana to demand a church wedding ceremony and of 
insulting young female socialists in La Cuesta (San Martín del Rey Aurelio), 
Carbayín and Laviana.21 The tone of such episodes indicates the bitterness 
of the atmosphere in the towns and villages and how Catholic reaction to 
secularization served to stimulate more militant, stubborn and outraged 
expressions of anticlericalism locally (and vice versa).
The friction between Catholics’ expression of identity and the leftist 
proclamation of secular values is particularly evident in struggles over 
crucifixes. In early 1932, crucifixes were removed from school classrooms 
across Spain in accordance with a ministerial order.22 In many areas, 
including Castile, Andalusia and Galicia, Catholics organized public 
17 Avance, 21 Jan., 10 Apr. 1932. 
18 Thomas, Faith, pp. 57–8.
19 Vincent, Catholicism, p. 183. For petitions, see e.g., J. M. Macarro Vera, Socialismo, 
República y revolución en Andalucía (1931–1936) (Seville, 2000), p. 259.
20 E.g. Región, 13, 16, 17 Feb., 13 Apr., 2 July, 28 Sept. 1932; Hoja parroquial de Santa María 
la Real de la Corte, 7 Feb., 11 Sept., 4 Dec. 1932. 
21 Avance, 21 Feb., 8 Apr., 20 May, 16 Aug. 1932. For similar accusations in Valencia, see 
S. Valero, Republicanos con la monarquía, socialistas con la República: la Federación Socialista 
Valenciana durante la II República y la Guerra Civil (1931–1939) (Valencia, 2015), p. 85.
22 Gaceta de Madrid, 14 Jan. 1932.
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demonstrations to protest or even reverse the removal of crucifixes from 
schools, sometimes destroying the Republican symbols that had replaced 
the religious image.23 Such demonstrations did not occur in the Asturian 
coalfields, where Catholic organization was much weaker. Instead, Catholics 
expressed their dissent towards the secularizing regime on an individual 
level by wearing crucifixes around their necks – a practice applauded by 
Acción, a new weekly newspaper run by Catholic women in Gijón, and 
encouraged by the Asturian AP leader Cernuda.24 
The proliferation of crucifixes around the necks of Catholics sparked a 
reaction from leftists. A socialist in Tuilla appealed for young men to ignore 
women sporting crucifixes ‘when strolling, when dancing, in everything 
to do with daily life’, while the JS in Turón declared themselves ‘not 
prepared to tolerate’ what they described as a Jesuit-inspired ‘ignominious 
campaign’. They demanded the authorities act.25 Elsewhere the crucifix was 
mocked. A group of people waited outside mass in La Felguera in June 
accompanied by a dog wearing a crucifix, while youths in Mieres and 
Sama rang bells to ridicule young women wearing crucifixes as they passed 
on their evening stroll.26 In doing so, the youths adapted the mocking 
tradition of the cencerrada – a form of rough music frequently employed 
to taunt remarrying widows or widowers, or someone marrying outside the 
community – that was the Spanish variant of European charivari.27 On this 
occasion, youths retooled the cencerrada for contemporary political needs. 
The young women were censured for transgressing the new moral standards 
of the community. Catholicism was not welcome, nor was it representative 
of the Asturian coalfields. The cencerrada and the crucifix-wearing dog were 
an assertion of a local secular hegemony believed to be under threat in the 
face of a reorganizing Catholic right in 1932. 
Leftists pressured authorities and teachers into observing secularism in 
1932 as a way of exhibiting their own radical zeal. This policing ranged from 
entering a municipal school and demanding a teacher hand over books and 
the wall-mounted image of Christ, to reporting a parish priest to the civil 
23 Vincent, Catholicism, p. 185; Macarro Vera, Socialismo, p. 261; E. Grandío Seoane, 
Los orígenes de la derecha gallega: la CEDA en Galicia (1931–1936) (Sada, 1998), p. 116; M. 
González Probados, O socialismo na Segunda República (1931–1936) (Sada, 1992), p. 129.
24 Acción, 26 March, 16 Apr., 14, 21 May, 4 June 1932; Región, 24 Feb. 1932. 
25 Avance, 16, 30 Apr. 1932. 
26 Región, 22, 25 June 1932; El Noroeste, 13 Apr. 1932.
27 On charivari and rough music, see N. Zemon Davis, ‘The reasons of misrule: youth 
groups and charivaris in sixteenth-century France’, Past & Present, l (1971), 41–75; E. P. 
Thompson, ‘Rough music reconsidered’, Folklore, ciii (1991), 3–26.
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governor for criticizing the Republic.28 Denunciation was more common 
than direct action. Young militants, who tended to be the most active in 
these cases, tried to place pressure on municipal and provincial authorities 
to uphold their more radical vision of the Republic. At times, they backed 
their demands with veiled threats. The JS in Aller requested that the 
municipal authorities enforce the prohibition on public demonstrations of 
faith – as mandated by article 27 of the Constitution – and warned otherwise 
of ‘greater evils that favour no-one, as we youths are not going to consent 
to the trampling on any articles of the current Constitution, especially by 
those who merit the repulsion of all citizens of liberal spirit’.29 These young 
militants policed both the parish priest and the Republican authorities to 
demand that secularization be enacted more quickly and deeply than it had 
been thus far. As in the case of crucifixes, criticism centred principally on 
the public exhibition of Catholic faith. Militants sought to curtail the way 
Catholic symbols sacralized the public space of streets and squares.30 
Public space was therefore central to struggles over religion. The 
Constitutional requirement that the authorities approve religious 
processions, such as during Holy Week and on local feast days, provided 
opportunities for anticlerical mayors to ban them in the name of the law 
or over fears for public order. While for Catholics a procession expressed 
a parish’s devotion and affirmed local identity and tradition, preventing a 
procession was a Republican – or anticlerical – victory. The degree to which 
processions were banned varied a great deal. Thirty-nine were banned in La 
Rioja in the spring/summer of 1932, while the situation was less restrictive 
in Andalusia.31 In Salamanca, processions occurred as usual outside the 
provincial capital, but not in the city itself.32 
Schools operated by mining companies were a battleground over 
religious symbols and the nature of education itself. Relative moderation 
in 1931 gave way to conflict in 1932 and the consequent radicalization and 
hardening of positions on the part of parents and the mining companies. 
In autumn 1931, the ministry of education banned those without teaching 
qualifications from working in schools and later reiterated the secular 
28 El Noroeste, 8 Jan., 30 March 1932. 
29 Avance, 7 Jun. 1932; AA, Actas, 30 May 1932 to 9 Feb. 1933, f. 39.
30 M. Delgado Ruiz, ‘Anticlericalismo, espacio y poder. La destrucción de los rituales 
católicos, 1931–1939’, Ayer, xxvii (1997), passim. 
31 C. Gil Andrés, Echarse a la calle: amotinados, huelguistas y revolucionarios (La Rioja, 
1890–1936) (Zaragoza, 2000), p. 382; A. L. López Villaverde, El gorro frigio y la mitra 
frente a frente: construcción y diversidad territorial del conflicto político-religioso en la España 
republicana (n.p., 2008), p. 214. 
32 Vincent, Catholicism, p. 186.
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character of education in a ministerial circular in mid January 1932.33 The 
ban meant that the Dominican school in San Martín del Rey Aurelio 
owned by Duro-Felguera was closed for much of the 1931–2 school year 
because the teachers lacked the required teaching qualifications and the 
company was unwilling to substitute them. The municipal authorities 
requested that  the company cede them the school, but were unsuccessful. 
Workers threatened a strike if the schools did not reopen and offer a secular 
education in March 1932.34 In defiance, Duro-Felguera reopened the school 
with suitably qualified Dominicans – citing a petition that the company 
had in fact gerrymandered – and 2,000 workers responded with a ten-day 
strike.35 The strike revealed both the strength of conviction of the workforce 
and the importance of religious schooling to the mining companies.
The strike would prove to be the only victory over a mining company in 
the matter of religious education. Companies reasserted their authority in 
the schools they owned at the beginning of the next school year. Hulleras 
del Turón demanded proof of baptism in order to register pupils and SHE 
made it clear that the confessional nature of schooling was non-negotiable; 
‘and this is occurring in a secular state?’ asked Avance.36 The newspaper 
claimed to have been inundated with letters of protest, although it hoped 
the matter would not spiral into strike action. Undeterred, SHE refused to 
back down and instead closed the schools, a decision which affected nearly 
2,000 children.37 Some 2,000 people attended a rally on 25 September in 
defence of secular education. When a busload of attendees passed through 
Cabañaquinta, their shouts in defence of secular schools were met with 
a cry of ‘down with the Republic’. Youngsters had to be restrained from 
leaving the bus to give the individual ‘what he deserved’. Even though the 
civil governor claimed to have solved the matter by ensuring that religious 
education classes would be optional, the schools remained closed.38 
Despite the pressures from left-wing activists at the local level, leftist 
councillors and mayors in the coalfields remained cautious. They attempted 
to balance respect for different beliefs and upholding Republican secularism. 
33 Gaceta de Madrid, 14 Jan. 1932. For complaints, see e.g., Región, 24 Feb. 1932. 
34 El Noroeste, 17 March 1932. 
35 M. V. Álvarez Fernández, La escuela del paternalismo industrial asturiano (1880–1937) 
(Gijón, 2006), pp. 281–2; Á. Mato Díaz, La escuela primaria en Asturias (1923–1937): los 
procesos de alfabetización y escolarización (Oviedo, 1992), p. 267; El Noroeste, 24 Apr. 1932.
36 Avance, 10, 13 Sept. 1932.
37 Avance, 13 Sept. 1932 ; Álvarez Fernández, La escuela, p. 284.
38 Avance, 27 Sept., 4 Oct. 1932; Álvarez Fernández, La escuela, pp. 284–5; Mato Díaz, La 
escuela, p. 197.
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While some councils placed restrictions on Catholic funeral processions, 
which they interpreted as contravening the constitutional prohibition of 
public displays of faith, Catholics could express their religious identity by 
placing crosses on tombs or funeral carriages.39 Likewise, the provincial 
deputation removed chaplains from welfare institutions, but made it clear 
that chaplains funded by private donations would be allowed to practise. 
The deputation was ‘non-denominational’ not anticlerical.40 Toeing this line 
was difficult when the authorities were under pressure from both Catholics 
and left-wing activists, who were dissatisfied with the pace of secularization 
for opposing reasons.
Frustration at the continued presence of Catholicism in public life and a 
resurgent right – along with unrealistic expectations at the extent to which 
religion would disappear from public life – was manifest in episodes of 
violence against shrines from mid 1932. Such attacks on Church property 
often occurred just before the feast day of the local patron saint. This served 
to disrupt the occasion as a Catholic collective performance, in which 
the parish and local community were affirmed as coterminous.41 In mid 
September, an explosion destroyed an image of Christ at a hermitage in 
Turón and similar assaults occurred on religious images in Sobrescobio, 
Santa Rosa (Mieres) and beyond Asturias in 1932.42 The turn to violence 
was a marked contrast to 1931, when feast days had been relatively peaceful. 
The desecration of images attempted to accelerate Republican secularizing 
legislation and enforce an image of the local community as secular. Avance 
claimed the attack in Turón resulted from rumours that the priest had 
planned an unauthorized procession that ‘was opposed by the pueblo’. 
The newspaper thus justified iconoclasm for reflecting the community’s 
desires.43 According to this view, the community was consubstantial with 
anticlericalism. 
These attacks on Catholic images in late summer 1932 also occurred 
in the specific context of a failed military coup. In August 1932, General 
Sanjurjo and a group of fellow plotters initiated an uprising in Seville in 
39 The authorities in Mieres routinely authorized the erection of crosses at graves while the 
1933 regulations on funeral processions in Aller allowed religious and political symbols (AA, 
Actas, 18 Feb. 1933 to 6 Jan. 1934, ff. 182–3). 
40 AHPA, Actas de la comisión de la Diputación Provincial, 29 Dec. 1931 to 12 Sept. 1933, 
ff. 196–9, 208–9.
41 See Delgado Ruiz, ‘Anticlericalismo’. For a similar emphasis on disruption coinciding 
with Holy Week in Aragón, see M. P. Salomón Chéliz, Anticlericalismo en Aragón. Protesta 
popular y movilización cívica (1900–1939) (Zaragoza, 2002), pp. 281, 288.
42 Región, 18 June, 17 Aug. 1932; Thomas, Faith, pp. 54–6.
43 Región, 15 Sept. 1932; Avance, 14, 15 Sept. 1932. 
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the traditional style of a pronunciamiento by declaring a state of war and 
expecting the government to step aside. The conspirators were critical of the 
direction being taken by the Republic, particularly the statute of autonomy 
that attempted to fulfil the aspirations of Catalan nationalists.44 The poorly 
supported coup was easily suppressed by the government and led to a 
wave of revenge attacks, which were frequently directed at the Church.45 
Targeting the Church was an established form of demonstrating political 
discontent, as occurred in Barcelona in 1909, and May 1931 in Madrid and 
southern Spain.46 There were attempts to set fire to churches and convents 
in Seville, and in the Asturian coalfields, councillors in Langreo singled out 
‘churches and convents’ and a Duro-Felguera confessional school as ‘centres’ 
of conspiracy. The chairman assured the council that such centres had been 
under surveillance for a while. Communist councillors presented a motion 
with fifteen demands covering local and national politics – seven of which 
centred on the Church.47 The failed coup also stimulated a new wave of 
restrictions on religious practices by municipal authorities in the south of 
Spain, including taxes on the tolling of church bells and the banning of 
Catholic funeral processions.48
The Communist motion in Langreo was voted down, but the response 
from socialist councillors shows how the coup helped to propagate a 
radical mood. Belarmino Tomás, speaking for the socialists, asserted their 
combativeness. Like the Communists, socialists were ‘radical’, but they were 
also a party of government and would abide by the government’s plan of 
action.49 This statement was not significant in itself, but it was symptomatic 
of how socialists embraced self-identification with the label ‘radical’ over 
the course of 1932, which represented a distinctive shift from 1931. Local 
divisions and rivalries pushed socialists to adopt the radical label, even if 
this was limited to rhetoric over an actual shift in political practice. 
In 1931, socialists had loudly proclaimed their moderation and 
responsibility in contrast to Communist and anarchist ‘extremists’, whose 
attitude was portrayed as dangerous, unrealistic and immature. Socialists 
44 For the coup, see E. González Calleja, Contrarrevolucionarios: radicalización violenta de 
las derechas durante la Segunda República, 1931–1936 (Madrid, 2011), pp. 81–106. 
45 P. Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the 
Second Republic (London, 1978), p. 73. 
46 See J. C. Ullman, Tragic Week: a Study of Anticlericalism in Spain (Cambridge, Mass., 
1968).
47 Macarro Vera, Socialismo, p. 251; AL, Actas, 28 Apr. 1932 to 17 Dec. 1932, ff. 98–99, 100.
48 Macarro Vera, Socialismo, p. 252.
49 AL, Actas, 28 Apr. 1932 to 17 Dec. 1932, ff. 98–9. 
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sarcastically mocked those who interrupted a meeting in Sama for being 
‘the real revolutionaries’ and derided Communists in Aller for striking ‘for 
sport’.50 Yet by 1932, socialists were claiming to be the ‘true revolutionaries’. 
In Olloniego they drew a clear line between themselves and the Republican 
bourgeoisie, ‘no matter if [the latter] call themselves radical’.51 There 
had been a shift in the mood among rank-and-file militants. To be a 
Communist was now fashionable – or so an activist from Ujo claimed – 
while mineworkers at La Cobertoria complained that ‘he who makes the 
most outrageous comments [at workplace assemblies] is the one who comes 
out best’.52 Attempting to wrest back the labels ‘radical’ and ‘revolutionary’ 
from Communists and anarchists was the socialist response to this, possibly 
out of a fear of being outflanked on the left. The voguishness of radicalism 
was due in part to those who had joined a different political group during 
the Republic needing to prove themselves to their new comrades. The 
zealousness of the converted was remarked upon in Turón and Bazuelo 
(Mieres), where the non-unionized and former members of Primo de 
Rivera’s right-wing political movement, Unión Patriótica, now fashioned 
themselves as ‘the most revolutionary’.53
Yet the socialist attempt to wrestle back the label of ‘radical’ in 1932 was 
little more than rhetoric. The strategy pursued by the SOMA in mining 
conflicts did not change. Socialists still condemned strike action, which was 
‘a very revolutionary tactic for “simpletons”, idiots and the naïve’. Strikes 
would ‘undoubtedly’ harm workers if not deployed responsibly.54 In his 
criticism of a CNT-led strike at the Fondón pit in Sama, SOMA leader 
Graciano Antuñac learly spelled out the distinction between radicalism and 
strike action: 
One is not more radical or more revolutionary for being an early riser and 
declaring strikes for trifling reasons. It is necessary to choose the right moment 
for the fight against capital. But it is also necessary to know what are the 
demands, because otherwise, instead of victories, there will be failures.55
As a socialist from Mieres clarified at the end of 1932, to be a ‘revolutionary’ 
worker could not ‘be understood in the negative sense that certain individuals 
extol, for whom hold-ups and crime are fully justified’. Rather, he defended 
50 La Aurora Social, 14 Aug., 11 Sept. 1931.  
51 Avance, 17 Apr. 1932. 
52 Avance, 25 Aug., 6 Dec. 1932. 
53 Avance, 23 March, 15 July 1932.
54 Avance, 15 March, 30 July 1932. 
55 Avance, 24 Sept. 1932. 
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‘persevering action, daily conquests, consolidating positions taken from the 
bourgeoisie, in order to continue along the road to emancipation’ because 
‘the opposite would mean cultivating our own ruin’.56 Socialists were radicals 
for they desired the transformation of society, but this did not necessarily 
entail confrontational strategies. Rather, socialists reconfigured radicalism 
to denote restraint – and thus responsible socialists had always been radical. 
This attempt to reconcile radicalism and moderation meant socialists still 
distinguished themselves from Communists and anarchists.
Militancy grew over the following year. Rhetorical radicalism continued, 
but the vigorous appeals for action and a more combative style of politics 
meant that strategic moderation eventually disappeared. In October 1933, 
the JS from Hueria de San Andrés (San Martín del Rey Aurelio) called for 
more controversias, as they were ‘the best way of propagating socialist ideals 
and educating the masses in a Marxist and revolutionary way, inciting, 
thus, the rebellious spirit innate in all proletarians’.57 Rather than simply 
contesting the categories ‘radical’ and ‘revolutionary’, the appeal was for a 
militant attitude to be actively instilled in the working class.
The coal crisis 
Socialist participation in government made it difficult for them to redefine 
radicalism. They did not have the same freedom to adopt a militant, 
oppositional attitude as anarchists or communists. This cut to the heart 
of a major problem facing social democratic parties in Europe, which 
was particularly acute in Germany but also apparent in other countries 
where social democratic parties held government office, such as France 
and Britain. Governing within a capitalist system while attempting to 
defend the demands of their working-class constituency was a challenging 
combination at the best of times, but it was made even more so by the 
Great Depression. Social democratic ministers were often reluctant to 
challenge the prevailing liberal economic orthodoxy, which counselled 
cuts in expenditure to balance the books.58 The German Social Democratic 
Party was unable to change course economically and the association of 
socialists with the defence of the Weimar Republic became a hindrance, 
as disgruntled voters turned to extreme options adept at channelling the 
radical mood into a rejection of Weimar democracy. 
56 Avance, 29 Dec. 1932. 
57 Avance, 4 Oct. 1933. 
58 But see French socialists’ desire to ‘stimulate demand’, J. Jackson, The Politics of 
Depression in France, 1932–1936 (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 40–1. 
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Germany had been hit particularly hard by the shockwaves from the Wall 
Street crash in 1929. In the industrial heartland of the Ruhr, unemployment 
climbed rapidly. Half the workforce – 187,000 men – was dismissed between 
1930 and 1932, by which point there were six million jobless nationally.59 
Unemployment was also high in British mining regions. In July 1931, nearly 
40 per cent of the insured population were unemployed in County Durham 
and 41 per cent in Glamorgan, while in certain areas unemployment was 
higher still, including Jarrow on Tyneside, where it reached 73 per cent.60 
Across Europe, ten million were unemployed in 1931. In Spain, the situation 
was different. The effects of the crash hit later and did not have the same 
rapid, deep impact, although the economy slowed and unemployment 
remained an endemic problem during the Republic. This was due in part to 
the effects of Primo de Rivera’s massive investment in public works during 
the 1920s along with the structural underemployment that formed part of 
Spain’s agricultural economy.
The Asturian coal industry did not experience the same level of 
unemployment seen in the German and British mining areas – or even the 
Basque iron mines, where the number of workers dropped by a third between 
1929 and 1933 – even as it faced difficulties.61 Piecework rates were reduced, 
the workforce at Hulleras de Riosa shrunk by two-thirds, and Hulleras 
del Turón introduced short-time working.62 Rather than symptoms of a 
worldwide economic slump, workers interpreted the difficulties through 
a political lens, which is testament to the level of politicization of Spanish 
society during the Republic. In Turón the finger was pointed at the ‘the 
attitude of a certain person of great influence in … Altos Hornos de Vizcaya 
[the owner of Hulleras del Turón], who showed himself to be against the 
regime’, a sentiment later echoed in Figaredo.63 
Mineworkers’ frustrations prompted the proliferation of small-scale 
conflicts. Avance lamented that cases such as a twenty-four-hour strike in 
protest over a disciplinary matter in Barredos (Laviana) were ‘frequently 
repeated’ while a socialist from Caborana expressed his frustration at the 
‘atmosphere of conflicts in … peaceful [Aller]’, which ‘sometimes come 
59 A. Zukas, ‘Inscribing class struggle in space: unemployed protest in the Ruhr in late 
Weimar Germany’, Labour History Review, lxxx (2015), 31–62, at p. 39. 
60 S. Ward, ‘The means test and the unemployed in South Wales and the north-east of 
England, 1931–1939’, Labour History Review, lxxiii (2008), 113–32, at p. 113.
61 R. Miralles, El socialismo vasco durante la II República: organización, ideología, política y 
elecciones, 1931–1936 (Bilbao, 1988), p. 114.
62 El Noroeste, 9 Sept. 1932; A. Shubert, The Road to Revolution in Spain: the Coal Miners 
of Asturias, 1860–1934 (Urbana, Ill., 1987), pp. 144–5.
63 Avance, 9 March, 27 Aug. 1932. 
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from the flippancy of the workforce, though more often they are due to 
the clumsiness and impertinence of the bosses’.64 The SOMA hierarchy 
continued to pursue a strategy of avoiding strike action, although socialists 
often participated in locally organized strikes in defiance of SOMA orders, 
including a twenty-hour solidarity strike with Industrial Asturiana workers 
threatened with the company’s closure and the resultant loss of 1,200 jobs.65 
These seeds of rank-and-file dissent flowered into internal opposition within 
the socialist mining union over the following year. 
Pressure on the SOMA continued to grow as the economic situation 
deteriorated. The SOMA appeared to be slowly changing position. The 
union joined the rank and file in criticizing the mining companies’ ‘offensive’ 
against the workers in August and the Executive announced a general strike 
soon afterwards.66 Yet the strike was cancelled twice after employers made 
promises to address the union’s demands.67 The announcement that Fábrica 
de Mieres, Duro-Felguera and Hulleras del Turón were to close their mines 
indefinitely in mid November left the reluctant union with no choice. The 
SOMA called a general strike and 25,000 downed tools for six days, even as 
the socialists continued to emphasize their moderation. The solution they 
proposed included a number of measures to increase the consumption of 
coal.68 
The November general strike seemed to confirm SOMA’s hegemony in 
the coalfields. It received mass backing and an attempt by anarchists and 
Communists – who were swept up in the strike – to prolong the stoppage 
failed. Even in Turón, where the SUM’s call received most support, only 
25 per cent continued the strike.69 While anarchists and Communists were 
unable to resist being drawn into socialist strikes, the reverse was not true.70 
Even so, rather than confirming the SOMA’s dominance, the strike served 
to legitimize the rumbling dissent within the socialists’ own ranks. For the 
leadership, the November strike was a means of responding to rank-and-file 
demands and quelling dissent, not a curtain-raiser for further militancy. The 
SOMA considered the negotiated solution to the strike as a legitimation 
64 Avance, 9 July, 15 March 1932. 
65 For the strike, see El Noroeste, 24 Sept. 1932. 
66 Avance, 9 Aug. 1932. 
67 Avance, 18 Sept., 23 Oct. 1932. 
68 Shubert, Road, p. 145. 
69 Avance, 22 Nov. 1932; Región, 22 Nov. 1932.
70 E.g., see a CNT-organized solidarity strike to support Duro-Felguera metalworkers in 
December (Avance, 10 Dec. 1932; Región, 10 Dec. 1932; M. Castejón Rodríguez, ‘La patronal 
hullera asturiana en la Segunda República’ (unpublished UNED PhD thesis, 2009), p. 382).
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of their state-centred, moderate approach to conflicts between capital and 
labour. The rank and file held a different view. They considered it a signal 
that their long-running discontent was legitimate and that the union was 
aligning itself with the more militant grassroots. The SOMA even felt the 
need to quash publicly rumours that they were going to collaborate with 
other unions in a general strike.71 
The solution to the general strike was short-lived and did not prevent a 
further decline in the fortunes of the mining industry. At the beginning of 
1933, mining companies announced further closures and dismissals and El 
Noroeste observed that the situation was ruining shopkeepers’ businesses.72 
Faced with this panorama, the SOMA balloted its members on a second 
general strike. They voted overwhelmingly in favour: 15,128 for strike action 
and 113 against. Again, the strike appeared to be a success. It received 
widespread support in the coalfields and the SOMA managed to negotiate 
a settlement, which was overwhelmingly ratified by 15,105 votes to 410. The 
agreement aimed to reduce coal production through a 10 per cent reduction 
in the labour force. This would be achieved through an early retirement 
and subsidy scheme that paid workers not to work.73 Retirement would 
be voluntary, but forced retirement would follow if there were not enough 
volunteers.74
Yet not only was the solution insufficient to improve the fortunes of the 
struggling coal industry, it also contributed significantly to the radicalization 
of the wider workforce. When details of the lay-offs emerged, they proved 
unpalatable to the mineworkers. Subsidies for those dismissed would be far 
lower than wages, young mineworkers would lose their jobs as well as older 
miners and the companies would decide who was to be removed from the 
workforce if there were not enough volunteers.75 Faced with the unattractive 
pensions and unemployment subsidies, there were too few volunteers for 
redundancy or retirement and so companies were obliged to paste up their 
own lists of those to be dismissed. 
The publication of lists of workers deemed excess to requirements led to 
a wave of strikes.76 Mineworkers had their own criteria as to who should 
retire. Avance published their articles criticizing the lack of volunteers in 
their pits – in Vegadotos (Mieres) purportedly only 20 per cent of eligible 
71 Avance, 4 Dec. 1932. 
72 El Noroeste, 5, 15, 21, 26, 27 Jan. 1933.
73 Shubert, Road, p. 146. 
74 Avance, 3 March 1933. 
75 Revista Industrial Minera Asturiana, 16 March 1933. 
76 Avance, 8, 18, 21 March 1933.
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older mineworkers had solicited retirement – even as the newspaper 
scolded the authors for their impatience.77 The SOMA leadership censured 
unhelpful rumours spread by ‘extremists’ and tried to reassure workers, 
aided by Avance. The socialist daily reported that most workers favoured 
the retirement and subsidy scheme and that there were many volunteers. 
Yet the need for these reports, several articles penned by SOMA president 
Amador Fernández, official SOMA press releases and an extensive speaking 
tour by SOMA leaders to explain the measures is revealing of the widespread 
opposition and discontent in the coalfields.78 
The scheme did achieve its objective in reducing the workforce – 2,795 
workers were either retired or receiving subsidy payments by the end of 
June 1933.79 Yet the process had not been smooth. Young mineworkers 
in particular spearheaded protests. Indignation at the dismissal of young 
workers while those over sixty continued to work sparked wildcat strikes 
in Siero and the Nalón valley.80 A lyrical article in El Noroeste explained 
that ‘young and strong’ mine workers’ desperation was manifest in a 
plunge towards revolution and a desire for violence. The author augured a 
threatening future: ‘a deaf and black storm of repressed courage, of restrained 
impetus, is dragging itself aggressively and obstinately, relentless and rough, 
intoxicated by explosions and liberated cries. Why this suffering?’81 Even 
those who had kept their jobs resented the levy on their wages to pay for 
the subsidies, which meant that ‘a revolutionary wave … [was] being born 
again in the depths of the mines’.82 
In Germany, too, unemployment hit young workers particularly hard. 
Some young males withdrew from society while others, humiliated and 
angered at losing their status and independence, gravitated towards the 
Communists and Nazis in search of ‘material assistance, the sense of 
belonging and order, [and] the action-first mentality of radicalism’. These 
groups provided them with a ‘reconstructed “family”’ and a sense of 
purpose.83 The politics of ‘action’ espoused by movements that engaged in 
77 Avance, 17 March 1933. 
78 Avance, 15, 14, 17 March 1933. 
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80 El Noroeste, 26, 28 March 1933.
81 El Noroeste, 6 Apr. 1933.
82 El Noroeste, 9 Apr. 1933.
83 P. Swett, Neighbors and Enemies: the Culture of Radicalism in Berlin, 1929–1933 
(Cambridge, 2004), pp. 109–13. See also S. Reichardt, ‘Violence and community: a micro-
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street violence attracted those seeking the redemption of class or nation and 
who rejected or were tired of ‘sterile’ democratic politics.84 The particular 
Asturian context led to a different effect. Young socialists did not move 
to the Communist ranks in great numbers. They channelled their anger 
and resentment into ‘action-first’ radicalism within socialism. Socialism was 
refashioned as the radical and revolutionary option. The Asturian JS claimed 
that Lenin was more aligned with Spanish socialists than Communists 
by publishing a commentary on an extract from his 1905 text ‘Social-
democracy and the provisional revolutionary government’. Five months 
later, a delegate from the JS National Committee observing a plenary 
meeting of the Asturian JS accused the Asturians of being obsessed by the 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and using the language of communists.85 
Claiming Lenin for socialism was a clear bid to position themselves as the 
revolutionary vanguard and emphasize the radical character of their politics. 
The national JS followed with extracts from Lenin’s The State and Revolution 
in its mouthpiece Renovación during the first few months of 1934.86
Militancy was not confined to younger workers. It quickly erupted in 
the autumn in the wake of a third general mining strike organized by the 
SOMA. Called in response to the companies’ cancellation of payments 
to the retirement fund created after the previous general strike, the strike 
was peaceful. It resulted in a provisional extension of the agreement that 
had ended the previous conflict while the government worked towards 
a definitive solution.87 Yet simmering resentment soon re-emerged via 
numerous wildcat strikes in October and November when mineworkers 
did not receive their wages. Reporting on a spontaneous strike of 2,000 
mineworkers at Fábrica de Mieres, El Noroeste asked for what had the last 
mining strike been fought.88 The solution negotiated by the SOMA had 
done little to alleviate the overall situation of the coal industry while the 
union continued to refuse to sanction wildcat strikes. The Mieres SOMA 
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M. Perry (Oxford, 2011).
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88 El Noroeste, 13, 26 Oct. 1933; Avance, 13 Oct. 1933. 
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regional committee advocated patience, blaming strikes on ‘irresponsible 
elements’ who were ‘taking advantage of the discontent’.89 Patience was 
little consolation for mineworkers owed wages, not least as rank-and-file 
militancy achieved results. After 2,000 went on strike in Mieres, Fábrica 
de Mieres quickly announced that October’s wages would be paid the 
following day. Grassroots pressure achieved more immediate results than 
the SOMA. The radical attitude among the rank and file was hardening. 
Even as Fábrica de Mieres paid workers at some pits, two mines remained 
on strike in solidarity with those still waiting.90
Frustrated with the deteriorating situation of the coal industry and 
the SOMA’s inability to provide a vision or strategy to improve the state 
of affairs, mineworkers of different ideologies were turning to workplace 
unity to defend their interests collectively. The new initiatives drew on the 
traditions of pit-based assemblies in which workers from different unions 
debated and elected their representatives during disputes, but extended 
them further towards a more vigorous form of rank-and-file unity that had 
been catalysed by the general mining strikes. Back in February, joint strike 
committees had been formed at pit-level without the sanction of the SOMA 
and were relevant enough for Avance to pour scorn on them, labelling them 
a ‘comedy’.91 Further committees followed during the September general 
strike. At La Nueva pit, it was formed by representatives of the socialists, 
anarchists, Communists and unaffiliated, while in Ciaño-Santa Ana workers 
of ‘all tendencies’ attended a ‘huge [magna] assembly’.92 These rank-and-file 
initiatives threatened the authority and strategy of the SOMA.
Much more challenging for the SOMA than pit-based initiatives was 
the creation of the cross-union Pro-Workers’ Unity Committee (CPUT: 
Comité Pro-Unidad de los Trabajadores) in Blimea at the beginning of 
1933.93 The CPUT committee was formed of delegates representing the 
socialists, anarchists, Communists and the non-unionized. This inclusion 
of the unaffiliated was novel. It indicated the desire for all workers to 
have a voice in the urgent circumstances facing the industry and marked 
a departure from the existing strategy of trying to capture the unaffiliated 
89 Avance, 12 Nov. 1933. 
90 Avance, 15, 18 Nov. 1933.
91 Avance, 5, 19, 21, 23 Feb. 1933.
92 El Noroeste, 26 Sept. 1933; see also 13, 29 Sept. 1933.
93 The CPUT only receives a brief mention or footnote in the historiography (see D. 
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(1984), 113–22, at p. 117.
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or members from rival unions. The CPUT reportedly had the ‘enthusiastic 
backing’ of twenty-one of the twenty-three sections of the SOMA regional 
committee in San Martín del Rey Aurelio, which was traditionally a bastion 
of socialism, and also enjoyed the support of Communists in Requejo 
(Turón).94 The CPUT was symptomatic of a desire for a new direction for 
the left that put unity above the interests of individual parties and trade 
unions and recognized that convergence between them was unlikely. 
The socialist representative on the CPUT was José Estrada, the same man 
who six months earlier had engaged in a public exchange of slurs with his 
Communist rivals. Estrada was an important socialist in San Martín del 
Rey Aurelio. He had been president of the Socialist group in Blimea and 
secretary of the SOMA regional committee in 1932.95 Now Estrada appealed 
for ‘the fusion of all workers for the defence of common interests and rights, 
without anyone giving up their ideology or tendency and without having 
to leave their respective Unions’.96 In effect, Estrada had put his finger on 
the problem. The respective mining unions made regular, routine calls for 
working-class unity, but achieving the collapse and absorption of a rival 
union was unrealistic. Estrada declared this strategy ‘absurd’; instead, ‘unity 
ha[d] to be made beyond ideological tendencies and beyond, moreover, all 
of your leaders’.97 
Seeking an alliance at the level of the rank and file was a challenge to 
the SOMA and its principle of leaving strategic questions to the union 
leadership. Unsurprisingly, the socialist hierarchy was not interested. 
The Socialist Group and SOMA Regional Committee met to discuss the 
‘indiscipline’ of Estrada for conspiring with ‘external and enemy elements’ 
and quickly expelled him. Estrada hit back, criticizing the ‘spiritual myopia’ 
of the SOMA bureaucracy.98 Little more about Estrada appears in the 
archival record. It is possible that he had converted to Communism and 
attempted to subvert the SOMA from within. In any case, the events of 
1932 had pushed him to engage with his rivals in Blimea.
Unity initiatives at a local level were not a phenomenon limited to Asturias, 
but were a feature of political activity on the left in Europe at the time, 
including in southern France and the Welsh coalfields.99 Neighbourhood 
94 El Noroeste, 1, 5 Feb. 1933. 
95 A. Fernández Pérez, Tiempos heroicos: diccionario biográfico del socialismo asturiano 
(Oviedo, 2013), pp. 282–3.
96 El Noroeste, 4 Jan., 1 Feb. 1933.
97 El Noroeste, 11 Feb. 1933.
98 Avance, 8 Jan. 1933; El Noroeste, 1 Feb. 1933.
99 For France, see G.-R. Horn, European Socialists Respond to Fascism: Ideology, Activism 
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networks and kinship links could serve to forge alternative paths of solidarity 
in a crisis. However, evidence is fragmentary and, as Stephanie Ward pointed 
out in the context of British mining areas, the co-operation of different 
political groups – including those beyond the left – could be fragile and did 
not mean that previous fractures had been overcome.100 
The consolidation of workplace-based assemblies and committees as 
mechanisms for unity and dialogue led to growing dissent in the socialist 
ranks. At an assembly chaired by a SOMA member in September 1933, 
workers agreed not to return to the mines until the SOMA solution had 
been debated at a workplace assembly, and strongly criticized the socialist 
mayor of San Martín del Rey Aurelio for preventing them from holding 
meetings.101 Spasms of dissidence had manifested themselves throughout the 
year. SOMA members were thrown out of the section in Piñeres (Aller) for 
criticizing the leadership.102 There was a growing rift between the hierarchy 
and grassroots in the Asturian socialist movement in 1933, something which 
is frequently highlighted by historians for the rest of Spain.103 Across the 
country, thousands of members left the UGT. Its membership shrank 
to 400,000 in 1933 after a high point of over a million in 1932.104 Yet in 
Asturias, even as the SOMA lost touch with its members, the union did 
not implode or collapse as an organization, whereas in the Ruhr tens of 
thousands of voters switched from the German Social Democratic Party 
to the Communists in the summer of 1932.105 In Asturias, however, there 
was no viable alternative in the coalfields. For SOMA members, moreover, 
sharp criticism of the leadership did not necessarily contradict union 
membership. The union could still be an effective vehicle for militancy. 
Besides, if unity was the solution to the problems of the working class, why 
leave the socialist ranks?
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Frictions and growing militancy formed part of a wider radicalizing 
climate in coalfield towns and villages in 1933, driven by tensions over other 
community pressure points. Conflicts between tenants and landlords were 
increasingly bitter. In Oviedo, the Tenants’ League expressed its satisfaction 
over the reduction in rents achieved over the past year, yet it also wrote to the 
minister of justice demanding the cessation of a judge who was alleged to 
favour the landlords.106 The Tenants’ League in Sama warned landlords to stop 
evicting tenants and follow the procedures established by the law. A month 
later, three firecrackers [petardos] were thrown onto the roof of the home of a 
lawyer who advised landlords in Langreo.107 Even though it is not possible to 
draw a strong causative link between rent activism and this particular attack, 
the fractious atmosphere was clear. In Aller, the league’s anger at a landlord’s 
‘intransigence’ and ‘reprehensible methods’ in a case that had already gone to 
trial sparked a boycott of a theatre owned by the landlord. The boycott had 
‘the support of all working class organizations in the municipality, without 
exception’.108 This militancy deriving from tenant activism was also evident 
nearly 2,000km southwest of Asturias on the island of Tenerife. In the spring-
summer of 1933, members of the Tenants’ League went on strike when a court 
ruled in favour of an eviction. The conflict escalated. The authorities closed 
union and tenants’ centres and arrested their leaderships, demonstrations 
erupted in protest and a warehouse full of straw was set on fire.109 
Mining companies mirrored the resistance shown by landlords. 
Hulleras del Turón demonstrated obstinacy in its resistance to Republican 
secularism. School inspectors confirmed a socialist denunciation that the 
company demanded proof of baptism in order to register at the school and 
made a number of recommendations, including that religious education 
be optional and timetabled outside of normal class hours. Days later, the 
mayor’s district representative reported that the school staff had taken the 
children to mass against the orders of the school inspector and, after the 
de la Salle brothers refused to co-operate, the mayor of Mieres ordered the 
arrest of one of the teachers.110 
106 Avance, 16 March 1933. 
107 Avance, 19 Feb. 1933; Región, 18 March 1933. 
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The implicit social contract between the mining companies and residents 
of the coalfields was eroding. Municipal councils were frustrated at the inertia 
and lack of co-operation from mining companies. After months of fruitless 
battling with them, the council in Langreo decided to take Carbones La 
Nueva to court for not repairing damage to public services and in a separate 
case called for the arrest of the director of Carbones Asturianos.111 The 
difficulties in fulfilling their role as guarantors and defenders of the local 
community and their own workforces led in some cases to a more militant 
and aggressive statement of municipal power. During the September 
mining strike, socialist and Republican councillors in Langreo reached the 
point of questioning property rights. They demanded ‘new legislation’ on 
the ‘property of mines’ in which mineworkers would take precedence over 
the owners. As one councillor reasoned, ‘mining concessions represent a 
leasehold contract and when one of the parties fails to uphold the agreement, 
the contract is broken and should then be rescinded’. The radicalism of the 
motion surprised Communist councillors, who claimed that it would achieve 
nothing and failed to answer working class demands.112 For supporters of 
the motion, the companies’ inability to offer stable employment meant they 
had broken a social contract with the mineworkers and local communities. 
Property rights and the relationship between the local community and the 
companies were now open to renegotiation. 
In the context of the same September mining strike, striking miners 
in Mieres used coercion to prevent the transportation of coal and further 
disrupt the local economy. The SOMA Executive Committee distanced 
itself from this use of violence, yet at the same time instrumentalized it as a 
warning: ‘the companies and authorities would do well to interpret it as the 
firm resolve and intent to take the movement to the limits of resistance’.113 
Whereas in 1932 the SOMA leadership had embraced the radical label 
yet rejected violence, towards the end of 1933 its position was now more 
ambiguous. This attitude is inextricably linked to the context of political 
upheaval due to the collapse of the Republican-socialist coalition and the 
new militancy in the rhetoric of the president of the PSOE and minister of 
labour, Francisco Largo Caballero. 
The rhetoric of radicalism
Largo Caballero’s militant turn came as Republican-socialist collaboration 
in government neared its conclusion. The government had come under 
111 AL, Actas, 7 Oct. 1933 to 16 June 1934, ff. 29–30, 39–40.
112 AL, Actas, 24 Dec. 1932 to 30 Sept. 1933, ff. 181–2. 
113 Avance, 23 Sept. 1933. 
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increasing pressure for a variety of reasons, including obstructionism in 
parliament, a deepening division within the Radical Socialist party that 
formed part of the governing coalition, mounting economic difficulties and 
right-wing success in municipal elections held in parts of central Spain. A 
particular problem was posed by events in a small village in Cádiz province in 
January 1933. A nationwide anarchist-organized revolutionary insurrection 
failed across the country, but in Casas Viejas libertarian communism was 
proclaimed. Three guards were killed and eight peasants died, six of whom 
were burned inside a shack. The Assault and Civil Guard killed fourteen 
peasants they arrested after defeating the insurrection.114 Information slowly 
emerged detailing the actions of the Assault Guard and parliamentary 
questions and investigations ensued. The government was cleared of 
responsibility, but the affair was very damaging and became a ‘Calvary’ for 
the cabinet. The final blow to the Republican-socialist government came 
in September, when results of the elections to the Court of Constitutional 
Guarantees confirmed the resurgence of the right and widespread support 
for Radical Party, who sat in opposition to the government parties in 
Cortes.115 When the Republican-socialist government fell, President Alcalá 
Zamora turned to the Radical Party. Lerroux’s cabinet failed to obtain the 
confidence of the Cortes and instead his fellow Radical, Diego Martínez 
Barrio, produced a government that shepherded the legislature towards 
national elections in November.
Frustrated reform, rank-and-file discontent and the fracturing of the 
Republican-socialist government formed the backdrop to Largo Caballero’s 
change in rhetoric. In the summer of 1933, he gave two key speeches as 
part of his attempt to reconnect with the socialist grassroots. He reiterated 
the socialist movement’s commitment to socialism and, significantly, 
in a speech at the JS summer school on 12 August, he stated that it was 
impossible to build socialism within a bourgeois Republic.116 Even as the 
final destination was socialism – as it had always been – there were now two 
roads available: gaining power through elections or the use of force. In this 
‘double scenario’, the latter was to be employed if the former was blocked 
or if the socialists’ enemies broke with legality. Largo Caballero continued 
114 The canonical study is J. Mintz, The Anarchists of Casas Viejas (Bloomington, Ind., 1994 
[1982]). See also J. Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain (1931–1939) 
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94
Unite, Proletarian Brothers!
to sketch this ‘double scenario’ through the election campaign.117 In his 
speeches, he repeatedly justified the socialist trajectory during the Republic, 
criticized the Republicans for allegedly expelling the socialists from power 
and demanded power for the socialists in order to build a ‘social Republic’. 
Largo Caballero, however, talked himself into a corner. Electoral defeat in 
November reduced his double scenario down to one.
Radicalization affected not only the veteran trade unionist and his 
followers, but also broad swathes of the socialist movement. A more 
aggressive assertion of socialist identity and the delineation of a sharper 
‘social Republic’ are palpable in Asturias from much earlier than the election 
campaign. The attempted coup by Sanjurjo a year previously had sparked 
a national ‘wave of pro-Republican fervour’ and in Sama workers declared 
themselves prepared to ‘take to the streets’ to defend the Republic.118 The 
coup served to strengthen the affective bonds between socialists and the 
regime, and started to shape a particular idea of the Republic as more 
assertive and left wing. Councillors in Oviedo demanded the Constitution 
be implemented to deepen the regime, while Avance insisted the Republic 
make ‘a sharp turn to the left’.119 A more muscular Republic was needed, 
rather than engagement with the Republic’s opponents. 
The radical rhetoric was a more assertive expression of socialist ideology 
and strategy, but portraying it as a straightforward rejection of Republican 
democracy is simplistic. The militant mood in 1932 and 1933 actually served 
to sharpen Republican loyalty, although this allegiance was to a particular 
vision of a ‘social’ Republic. The crystallization of this understanding of the 
Republic was reflected in Avance’s editorial the day before the Republican-
socialist government fell: 
The idea of a ‘Republic for all’ makes sense for those who want a Republic, but 
there are people who do not want it, as occurs with every new regime. Well, 
these people should not be taken into count in the progress of the regime. The 
Republic has to be introduced against them.120
The struggle against the Republic’s enemies was framed in more aggressive 
terms. The Republic had to be introduced in a more radical manner, 
117 S. Juliá, ‘Los socialistas y el escenario de la futura revolución’, in Octubre 1934: cincuenta 
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disregarding those who opposed the Republican-socialist project of the first 
biennium. The language was more militant, but it was far from a decided 
rejection of the Republic, still less a call for an immediate revolution. 
Socialists continued to ridicule anarchists who had been engaged in a 
months-long strike in La Felguera for thinking they could defeat Duro-
Felguera or carry out a social revolution.121 
When the Republican-socialist coalition collapsed in September 1933 
and the president entrusted the centre-right Radical Party with forming 
a government, the socialist rank and file did not reject the Republican 
framework, as was clear in the appeal to action by the Turón JS: 
Before they change the course of the Republic towards the right, we will exhaust 
ourselves in the struggle to prevent it. This is not a threat. We are determined 
to throw ourselves into the struggle, no matter how hard it is, before they take 
the direction of the current revolution away from us.122 
The Socialist Youth was the first line of defence of the Republican ‘revolution’, 
which echoed Largo Caballero’s rhetoric that combined criticism of the 
Republican parties with a defence of Republican state interventionism and 
the achievements of socialist ministers between 1931 and 1933.123 Indeed, 
the vision of a more sharply defined social Republic reflected the demands 
agreed at the national congress of the UGT in autumn 1933 in which the 
socialist union demanded more state intervention in the economy, including 
the nationalization of industry.124
The militant defence of the Republic and the socialist rediscovery of 
a radical identity meant that the vision of the Republic was increasingly 
conceptualized in class terms.125 Avance’s rhetoric became ever more militant 
and the newspaper instructed its readers that:
IF THEY SPEAK TO YOU OF A REPUBLIC FOR ALL, REPLY: Republic 
for me, because I work. Not for everyone. Not the capitalist who lives at my 
expense. No to equal defence for his misappropriation and my rights. I want 
my Republic, the Social Republic.126
121 Avance, 1 Aug. 1933. 
122 Avance, 17 Sept. 1933. 
123 Aróstegui, Largo Caballero, pp. 326–7. 
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To an extent, Avance’s rhetoric was electioneering. Through polarizing 
brinkmanship, the socialist newspaper attempted to solidify its core support, 
warning of the dangers of voting for other political options. Yet this radical 
vision also reveals that the socialists had developed a bold, assertive vision 
for the future. In a deteriorating economic situation and now freed from 
the responsibility of national government, they could begin to project a 
new future of a ‘social’ Republic. 
By autumn 1933, the socialist position had shifted away from the self-
proclaimed moderation and pointed criticism of Communist and anarchist 
radicalism that had characterized it in 1931. During 1932 socialists had 
moulded ‘radicalism’ to fit their strategy of moderation in response to 
a change in the political mood in the coalfields, which itself had been 
conditioned by the new Republic. The new secularizing context of the 
Republic instigated the repositioning of oppositional political identities, 
while the resurgence of the right made 1932 a year of much greater conflict 
at the local level than 1931. At the same time, conditions in the mining 
industry deteriorated further, yet the SOMA was reluctant and unable 
to respond in a way that satisfied rank-and-file mineworkers. In fact, the 
SOMA’s position only served to alienate sections of the mining workforce, 
particularly young workers. The grassroots radicalism was channelled into 
piecemeal rank-and-file unity initiatives and evident in the more militant 
and aggressive rhetoric, both in Asturias and from the socialist leadership.
Electoral defeat in November 1933 closed the parliamentary road to a 
social Republic, at least in the short term. According to Largo Caballero’s 
rhetoric, the only option was an ill-defined revolutionary movement and 
over the following months, he directed the planning of  such a movement. 
While the factors outlined in this chapter were at the heart of the emergence 
of radicalism in the coalfields, they do not provide the whole picture of the 
radicalizing dynamic, nor do they explain the revolutionary insurrection. 
Radicalism would continue to combine rivalries and tensions on a micro 
level over an individual’s reputation and place in the community, and 
projections about the wider nature of the community itself, but between 
1933 and 1934 two new radicalizing factors came to the fore: the perceived 
emergence of ‘fascism’ in 1933 and the actions of the security forces in 1934. 
These local struggles channelled and accelerated radicalization and would 
leave Asturias on the threshold of revolution.
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4. Fascism and the politics of policing (1933–4)
In June 1934, L. Vega publicly admonished his neighbours in Tuilla for their 
complacency towards fascism and issued a rallying call to action:
There are those who think that in Tuilla there are no fascists and this is a serious 
mistake as this pueblo cannot be an exception, especially taking into account its 
political history. What is happening is that those individuals are so comfortable 
that they adapt to political circumstances admirably, as we had occasion to 
see when the Republic arrived … Tuilla, we must not cross our arms deluding 
ourselves that it is a paradise, as our enemies are taking up positions cautiously 
and astutely, taking advantage of our excessive confidence and good faith.1
Fascism had to exist in Tuilla for it accommodated a pre-existing right-wing 
presence, yet as a shadowy, conspiratorial threat, there was also something 
qualitatively different about it. Vega’s appeal for urgent action formed part 
of a wave of articles during the eighteen months prior to October 1934 
that focused on fascism in the coalfields. The articles reveal the steady 
incorporation of fascism into political language and associated imaginaries 
of the social and political order at the local level. The rise of fascism was not 
simply the international backdrop to radicalization, but an integral part of 
the radicalization process, thanks to the alleged emergence and growth of 
fascism in the coalfields. Vega’s interpretation of fascism as a transmutation 
of traditional reactionary politics was typical, even as doubts abounded as 
to what constituted – or could constitute – Spanish fascism.2 
Anxieties over fascism injected urgency into political action particularly 
after the defeat of the divided forces of the former Republican-socialist 
coalition in elections in November 1933. Fears were compounded – and 
appeared to be corroborated – by the actions of the new conservative 
administration. The government was not fascist, but the change in policing 
strategy stoked fears about the possible implementation of authoritarianism 
1 Avance, 7 June 1934. 
2 Rivers of ink have been spilled defining fascism. Much less has been written on 
leftists’ understanding of fascism, although work on the response of the British left is 
more comprehensive (K. Hodgson, Fighting Fascists: the British Left and the Rise of Fascism, 




or fascism from above. Stricter and more assertive policing by the security 
forces unleashed waves of protest in the coalfields in 1934, which constituted 
the pre-eminent way in which the change in the direction of the Republic 
was experienced in daily life. The dynamic of protest and more aggressive 
policing sparked an upward spiral of radicalization and a growing alienation 
of the coalfield communities from the state. For Avance, only a revolution 
could resolve this situation. 
Militancy in the face of crisis was one response to the dark panorama 
unfolding for the left in Europe in the mid 1930s. The continued rise of 
the extreme right prompted a period of soul-searching, rethinking and 
realignment within the left between 1933 and 1935. Leftists experimented 
with new economic ideas, including the Belgian ‘Plan de Man’ and left-
wing unity initiatives, aided by the Communist abandonment of the 
isolating ‘class against class’ policy of the ‘Third Period’ (1928–35) in favour 
of Popular Frontism.3 Even in stable democratic states like the Netherlands, 
social democrats debated the strategy of political violence.4 The year 1934 
stands out as being one of particular rebelliousness and restlessness – and the 
year the left ‘finally recorded a success’.5 In addition to the failed Austrian 
socialist rising, the year saw a failed revolutionary general strike in Portugal, 
mass left-wing demonstrations in France, the emergence of violent street 
politics in Britain and several days’ rioting in the Jordaan neighbourhood of 
Amsterdam. Each episode responded to national dynamics, so similarities 
should not be overstated, but they do indicate a deepening political crisis, 
to which left-wing organizations often struggled to respond. The Asturian 
revolutionary insurrection formed part of this international context, even if 
nothing approached the scale of events in northern Spain. 
Identifying the fascist threat
The first ‘fascist’ posters were pasted on walls in Oviedo in March 1933, 
although left-wing organizations appeared untroubled by this.6 Avance 
ridiculed the posters, the Socialist Youth summer school programme did 
3 See G.-R. Horn, European Socialists Respond to Fascism: Ideology, Activism and 
Contingency in the 1930s (New York, 1996). 
4 K. Mennen, ‘Necessary evil, last resort or totally unacceptable? Social Democratic 
discussions on political violence in Germany and the Netherlands’, in Political Violence and 
Democracy in Western Europe, 1918–1940, ed. C. Millington and K. Passmore (London, 2015), 
pp. 98, 100. 
5 G. Eley, Forging Democracy: the History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000 (Oxford, 2002), 
p. 263.
6 El Noroeste, 19 March 1933.
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not reference fascism and antifascism was not central to PCE policy in 
1933.7 Certainly, there were few or no avowed fascists in the coalfields in 
1933, and fascism was still a minor player in Spanish politics. The party 
most closely identified with fascism in Spain, Falange Española, was not 
formed in Madrid until October 1933 (and formally constituted in Asturias 
six months later), by which point FE had become FE-JONS. Nevertheless, 
over the course of 1933 fascism increasingly featured in articles sent in from 
towns and villages in the coalfields with activists like L. Vega identifying 
it in pre-existing political divisions, while simultaneously worrying that 
fascism was a new, hidden, growing threat.8
The dramatic increase in the use of the term ‘fascist’ in 1933 was sparked 
by Hitler’s accession to power and the subsequent destruction of the 
powerful German labour movement, but as a term it was hardly new. 
Labelling something or someone as ‘fascist’ was a common rhetorical tool 
to slur enemies prior to 1933. Both Communists and anarchists denounced 
socialists as ‘social fascists’ and Asturian socialists made a swipe at the 
anarchist FAI by claiming that only spelling differentiated faístas from 
fascistas.9 Nor was employing the term in such a loose way limited to Spain. 
The British Independent Labour Party paradoxically labelled the bill for a 
Public Order Act a ‘fascist bill to stop fascism’, while a British Communist 
described mass unemployment as a characteristic of fascism.10
The conceptual looseness of fascism was part of the process of 
constructing a nascent antifascist culture. Demanding a clear definition 
from disparate individuals in the Asturian coalfields would be unfair, not 
least as socialist leaders themselves understood fascism in very different 
ways.11 The task of translating fascism from the international arena into 
7 Avance, 8, 12 March, 11 Aug. 1933; El Noroeste, 22, 30 March, 6 Apr., 12 May 1933; F. 
Erice, ‘El PCE en Asturias, de los orígenes a la guerra civil’, in Los comunistas en Asturias 
(1920–1982), ed. F. Erice (Gijón, 1996), p. 61.
8 For similar simultaneous discussion in the Basque socialist movement, see R. Miralles, 
El socialismo vasco durante la II República: organización, ideología, política y elecciones, 1931–
1936 (Bilbao, 1988), p. 189. 
9 G. Álvarez Chillida, ‘Negras tormentas sobre la República. La intransigencia libertaria’, 
in Palabras como puños: la intransigencia política en la Segunda República, ed. F. del Rey 
(Madrid, 2011), p. 82; Avance, 30 July 1933.
10 T. Buchanan, ‘Beyond Cable Street: new approaches to the historiography of antifascism 
in Britain in the 1930s’, in Rethinking Antifascism: History, Memory and Politics, 1922 to the 
Present, ed. H. García, M. Yusta, X. Tabet and C. Clímaco (New York, 2016), p. 66. 
11 See F. Gallego, Barcelona, mayo de Barcelona: la crisis del antifascismo en Cataluña 
(Barcelona, 2007), ch. 2; H. García, ‘Was there an antifascist culture in 1930s Spain?’, in 
García, Yusta, Tabet and Clímaco, Rethinking, p. 96. 
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the Spanish domestic context and the everyday reality of the coalfields 
was difficult. The lack of fascist organizations in the coalfields meant 
that it was applied to existing local political divisions, which could mean 
adding it to existing epithets like ‘clerical monarchist reaction’.12 Fascism 
existed as the transmutation of a pre-existing threat, yet at the same 
time there was something distinctive about it that prompted activists to 
wrestle with identifying fascists at the local level. This required defining 
their politics.
Particularly vexing for the Asturian left was the relationship of fascism 
to Catholicism, and an attempt to clarify the issue in Avance only muddied 
the waters. It first described fascism as a ‘reactionary movement’ that sought 
a strong, centralized state and should not be confused with ‘clericalism’, 
only to later predict that Spanish fascism would be based on Catholicism, 
as Spain did not exhibit the ‘combination of circumstances’ necessary for 
‘authentic fascism’.13 For those observing the movements of the political 
right in Asturias, Catholicism appeared to be entangled with the incipient 
Falange. Asturians could sign up to FE at the offices of CEDA-supporting 
Región, while a cathedral canon was one of the first Falangist organizers in 
the province.14 
The lack of clarity was comprehensible given the wider national context. 
The founder of FE, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, proceeded from the 
‘mainstream of conservative Spanish politics’ and was elected to the Cortes 
in November 1933 on a right-wing list that included CEDA and Carlist 
candidates.15 The CEDA’s own position appeared ambiguous to left-wing 
activists as it oscillated between a ‘prudent distancing and an admiration 
which was not always hidden’.16 José María Gil Robles had admired the 
Nazi aesthetic at the Nuremberg rallies in autumn 1933 – and its influence 
would be visible on the aesthetics and pageantry of the rallies of CEDA’s 
youth wing (JAP) in 1934 – but he criticized the position of Nazism on 
religion. Yet determining a pure, ‘authentic’ fascism was not necessarily 
important in identifying a threat to left-wing politics. Engelbert Dollfuss’s 
12 Avance, 5 Sept. 1933. The lack of clarity is noted by many, e.g., S. Souto Kustrín, ‘Octubre 
de 1934: historia, mito y memoria’, Hispania Nova. Revista de Historia Contemporánea, xi 
(2013), 477–81, at p. 488.
13 Avance, 6 Sept. 1933.
14 M. Suárez Cortina, El fascismo en Asturias (Gijón, 1981), pp. 125, 154–6. 
15 M. Vincent, ‘Spain’, in The Oxford Handbook of Fascism, ed. R. J. B. Bosworth (Oxford, 
2009), p. 365. 
16 J. Jiménez Campo, El fascismo en la crisis de la Segunda República española (Madrid, 
1979), p. 71. See also P. Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and 
Revolution in the Second Republic (London, 1978), p. 47. 
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Catholic-infused right-wing authoritarianism in Austria was closer to the 
Spanish CEDA than Nazism, a point not lost on the Spanish left.17 
Criticism of the cinema at the Casa del Pueblo in Sotrondio for showing 
‘another fascist film’ illustrates how the fascist threat was dependent on 
existing ways of imagining political and cultural enemies. The management 
of the theatre at the Casa del Pueblo was subcontracted to a businesswoman 
who had conspired with an ‘important fascist’ to project the film, which 
‘belonged to a Jesuit company’ who allegedly sold them at half the price 
of other films. The classic anticlerical trope of the Jesuits operating in a 
shadowy underhand – ‘Jesuitical’ – manner combined with fascism, which, 
like the Society of Jesus, was depicted as an international conspiracy. The 
tentacles of fascism had surreptitiously reached into the heart of socialist 
organization – ‘the Casa del Pueblo serves for all kinds of fascist propaganda’ 
– and could prey on the unsuspecting rank and file. Fortunately, ‘the working 
class community [pueblo], the community with the greatest socialist faith in 
the province, will not allow this type of show to be projected in the salon of 
the Casa del Pueblo again’.18 To label something or someone as fascist was 
to issue a rallying call to action. The working-class community was called 
upon to oppose the growth of fascism in their towns and villages. 
The context of the Asturian coalfields was different to that of Berlin or 
Paris. In these metropoles, political struggle was often tied to the capture 
or defence of particular urban spaces, whether streets or neighbourhoods. 
Taverns, which were meeting places and headquarters for political groups, 
were central to the struggle to control districts in the German capital and 
Nazi Stormtroopers pursued a deliberate policy of disputing particular 
districts in the capital. Similarly, street fighting between the left and right 
in Paris centred on the control of particular urban spaces. Newspaper sellers 
were a particular target, as political groups asserted their claim to control 
a given space.19 In the Asturian coalfields, the context of leftist hegemony 
and lack of avowed fascists, or at least organized right-wing paramilitary 
street politics, meant that fascism manifested itself in leaflets slipped into 
magazines at the ateneo, propaganda thrown from a car or alleged secret 
meetings.20 Fascism was still an encroachment on leftist territory, but it was 
not a physical presence that invaded from the outside; rather, it emerged 
17 Souto Kustrín, ‘Octubre’, pp. 488ff. 
18 Avance, 26 Oct. 1933. 
19 C. Millington, ‘Street-fighting men: political violence in interwar France’, English 
Historical Review, cxxix (2014); E. Rosenhaft, Beating the Fascists? The German Communist 
Party and Political Violence, 1929–1933 (Cambridge, 1983), especially pp. 22, 111–27.
20 Avance, 1 Aug., 20 Sept. 1933. 
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from within the valleys themselves. Fascism was a conspiratorial threat 
that could destroy the unsuspecting left from within, just as fascism had 
cannibalized European democracies from the inside. The left would only 
realize this when it was too late. Identifying the emergence of fascism thus 
entailed leftists demanding that it be driven from their communities. 
By the election campaign of autumn 1933, the term ‘fascist’ was common 
currency in the Asturian left-wing press, although much more so in 
articles sent in from towns and villages than Avance’s editorials.21 Fascism 
had become an important frame for understanding politics, yet socialist 
activists dismissed the threat posed by right-wing political mobilization. 
CEDA campaigners in San Martín del Rey Aurelio were jeered as ‘those 
catechizing ladies’ and ‘beatas’.22 Ridicule centred on their inferior numbers, 
age and gender, revealing a flash of misogyny, even if the latter did not 
represent all on the left, nor extend to their own female activists.23 The 
term beata referred to religious older women and was implicitly contrasted 
with youthful radicalism. The latter was the harbinger of progress while the 
beatas embodied the old world of obscurantism and superstition. Nor did 
these women have much agency. ‘Friars and priests’ directed the beatas in 
their electioneering activities, an allegation which echoed the fears that had 
divided the PSOE during the parliamentary debate over women’s suffrage 
in autumn 1931. Many continued to believe that women’s votes would be 
dictated from the lectern.24 Right-wing activists did not represent the local 
community as understood by socialists in the autumn of 1933. Socialists 
were still confident in the left-wing character of the coalfields. Ultimately, 
this confidence was not well founded.
The election was fought in very different circumstances to 1931. The 
right was resurgent while the Republican-socialist alliance had collapsed. 
The electoral law favoured broad coalitions and the CEDA entered into 
alliances with several different parties, including centrists and those further 
21 E.g. Avance, 16 Nov. 1933. 
22 Avance, 28 Oct., 2, 10 Nov. 1933.
23 Women were heavily involved in campaigning in Asturias and more widely. For Asturias, 
see M. A. Mateos, ¡Salud, compañeras! Mujeres socialistas en Asturias (1900–1937) (Oviedo, 
2007), pp. 152–7. For female rightist mobilization, see I. Blasco Herranz, Paradojas de la 
ortodoxia: política de masas y militancia católica femenina en España (1919–1939) (Zaragoza, 
2003) and M. Vincent, ‘The politicization of Catholic women in Salamanca, 1931–1936’, in 
Elites and Power in Twentieth Century Spain: Essays in Honour of Sir Raymond Carr, ed. F. 
Lannon and P. Preston (Oxford, 1990). For the anticlerical depiction of the beata, see M. 
P. Salomón Chéliz, ‘Beatas sojuzgadas por el clero: la imagen de las mujeres en el discurso 
anticlerical en la España del primer tercio del siglo XX’, Feminismo/s, ii (2003), 41–58.
24 Avance, 28 Oct. 1933. 
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to the right. In Asturias, the CEDA formed a joint slate with the Liberal-
Democratic Republican Party (PRLD). The PRLD maintained a following 
in Asturias but had not capitalized on the arrival of the Republic despite 
its historical role as a prominent player in Spanish Republicanism during 
the Restoration monarchy. The party had shifted towards the right and 
was vocally anti-socialist. While the right sought alliances, the situation 
was more complicated for the centre-left and left. The fracturing of the 
previous government coalition between socialists and left Republicans and 
the embitterment of the relationship between them impeded collaboration, 
although a few electoral alliances were formed in certain provinces. In 
Valencia, the weakness of the socialists meant they united with the left 
Republicans, while in Malaga, the Communists joined the socialists.25 In 
Asturias, a proposal for an electoral alliance with the Communists at the 
congress of the FSA was hotly debated and received support from coalfield 
delegates. The Executive Committee did not favour the idea and managed 
to deflect it into a vote authorizing the Committee to enter an alliance if 
necessary.26 
The elections were ‘one of the most bitter-fought and violent in Spanish 
electoral history’, though ‘probably the fairest of all’, despite ‘serious fraud’ 
in some areas.27 Abstention was high in areas of anarchist support thanks 
to anarchists’ campaign against participation in the ballot. The results were 
a catastrophe for the PSOE and left republicans. The number of socialist 
deputies halved from 116 to fifty-nine, while the number of deputies for 
Azaña’s Republican Action dropped from twenty-six to five. The Radical 
Socialist party, which had suffered breakaways, collapsed from sixty 
representatives to a single deputy, who was elected thanks to an alliance 
with the Radical Party in León province. The Radical Party added a further 
twelve deputies to finish in second place with 102 seats, thanks to co-
operating in the second round with the CEDA, who returned the highest 
number of deputies in the new Cortes (115). 
25 S. Valero, Republicanos con la monarquía, socialistas con la República: la Federación 
Socialista Valenciana durante la II República y la Guerra Civil (1931–1939) (Valencia, 2015), p. 
101.
26 J. Girón, ‘Asturias, Octubre de 1934: el fracaso de un intento de alianza electoral entre 
socialistas y comunistas’, in Octubre 1934: cincuenta años para la reflexión, ed. G. Jackson et 
al. (Madrid, 1985), pp. 199–201.
27 E. González Calleja, Cifras cruentas: las víctimas mortales de la violencia sociopolítica en 
la Segunda República española (1931–1936) (Granada, 2015), p. 246; N. Townson, The Crisis 
of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Spanish Second Republic (Brighton, 2000), 
p. 193. For allegations of fraud and coercion in Asturias, see Avance, 23, 24 Nov. 1933 and El 
Noroeste, 23 Nov. 1933.
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The results generated consternation and intense debate within the socialist 
leadership. The keys to power now lay in the hands of their opponents 
from the first biennium, the Radicals and the CEDA. For socialists and left 
Republicans, the proximity of the CEDA to power threatened the Republic 
itself. Between the first round of elections on 19 November and the end of 
the year, the executive committees of the PSOE and UGT held a succession 
of meetings in which they debated how to proceed. Acute differences lay 
between Largo Caballero and Besteiro, who presided over the PSOE and 
UGT respectively. Largo Caballero now favoured the preparation of a 
revolutionary movement that could respond to the perceived threat of a new 
administration dismantling the Republic. Building on his proposals, Prieto 
fleshed out a manifesto for a socialist government in January 1934. Besteiro 
rejected these plans, as he did any voluntarist strategies. When Besteiro’s 
own ideas were voted down at successive meetings of the PSOE and UGT 
executives in January, he had little choice but to resign the presidency of the 
UGT. Caballeristas replaced the Besteiristas. Planning the movement could 
now begin in earnest.28 Over the next few months, Largo Caballero oversaw 
preparations with the aid of a mixed UGT, PSOE and JS committee.
The election results were a shock for socialists in the Asturian coalfields. 
The CEDA-PRLD alliance won the most votes on a regional level. In the 
coalfields, the socialists won clear victories, although results higher up the 
valleys were split more evenly or else favoured the right. In El Condado 
(Laviana), where tensions ran high during the elections, the CEDA-PRLD 
obtained 244 votes, while the socialists and Communists received 145 and 
140 respectively.29 Aller was divided between socialists in the lower valley and 
the CEDA-PRLD in the mountains, although ‘the Communists obtained 
many votes in the whole municipal district’.30 
The belittlement of rightist campaigning prior to the elections contrasted 
sharply with the number of votes deposited in ballot boxes and the results 
caused consternation among the socialist grassroots. Activists turned to 
analysing their own communities in an attempt to account for the results. 
Votes for the right did not fit a Marxist interpretative schema of what 
should happen in predominantly working class areas, nor did they match 
the image of community held by local leftists. Unable to account for the 
28 This account is based on J. Aróstegui, Largo Caballero: el tesón y la quimera (Barcelona, 
2013), pp. 340–51; S. Juliá, ‘República, revolución y luchas internas’, in El socialismo en 
España: desde la fundación del PSOE hasta 1975, ed. S. Juliá (Madrid, 1986), pp. 238–40; M. 
Bizcarrondo, Historia de la UGT, iii: Entre la democracia y la revolución, 1931–1936 (6 vols, 
Madrid, 2008), pp. 97–103.
29 Avance, 22 Nov. 1933. 
30 El Noroeste, 23 Nov. 1933. 
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number of CEDA-PRLD votes in Trubia, an activist blamed a coalition 
of treasonous workers and women, both devout older women and the 
daughters of workers.31 Likewise, in Murias (Aller) – the ‘largest centre of 
reactionaries you will ever come across’ – votes for the right were attributed 
to ‘disorganized and disoriented’ workers, women (‘you do not get fed [by 
your mothers] if you do not go to mass’) and the SCOM. Abstention was 
ascribed to threats.32 Women were now assigned agency, albeit the ability to 
coerce men into voting against their interests. Voting for the right was not 
the result of a democratic choice; voters had been duped or coerced.  
The election results led to a radical reaction, which manifested itself in 
the form of a militant backlash. The SOMA called on citizens in Turón to 
boycott a shop for ‘praising our sweat and then laughing at us’, showing 
‘disrespect’ and desiring a regime similar to Nazism or fascism.33 Between 
December and the end of January, shots were fired at the homes of young 
Catholics, at an AP meeting behind closed doors and an address in Oviedo 
denounced publicly for electoral fraud.34 The first two episodes of frustration 
and dissent occurred in areas of Aller with a high percentage of votes for 
the CEDA-PRLD. Tensions resulting from the election results were also 
apparent in other areas of Spain, but manifested differently according to 
local political dynamics. In Ciudad Real province, the socialists appear to 
have borne the brunt of violence, but in an expression of jubilation rather 
than disappointment. In Torre de Juan Abad the Civil Guard beat up 
socialists who had confronted an individual shouting support for fascism 
and the king, and in February a Casa del Pueblo and a socialist mayor were 
both attacked.35
There was a distinct shift in the political winds in towns across Spain, 
and the changes were felt on an individual level. While evidence is slim and 
fragmentary due to the nature of the sources and available testimonies, a 
letter in Avance from Julia Morán, a resident of Pola de Laviana, gives an 
indication of the sense of a shifting political equilibrium at the local level 
and the pressures that accompanied it. Morán was the secretary of the local 
women’s section of the Socialist Group and the widow of a prominent local 
socialist.36 Morán lambasted rumours that circulated in Laviana regarding 
31 Avance, 25 Nov. 1933. 
32 Avance, 17 Jan. 1934.
33 Avance, 7 Dec. 1933. 
34 Avance, 28 Nov. 1933; Región, 3, 27 Jan. 1934. 
35 F. Rey, Paisanos en lucha: exclusión política y violencia en la Segunda República española 
(Madrid, 2008), pp. 343, 346. 
36 Avance, 15 June, 9 Nov. 1932; Mateos, ¡Salud, compañeras!, p. 129. For her biography, see 
106
Unite, Proletarian Brothers!
her and her family in a manner that revealed how a person’s local standing 
was based on a combination of personal and political issues. Although the 
gossip was not directly related to politics, she framed her indictment of 
those whispering about her in a defiant declaration of socialist identity:
In Laviana, like everywhere else, it seems that being a socialist is a crime … I 
affirm [hago constar] that I am a socialist revolutionary and I am not ashamed 
of it. I would be much more ashamed to be a hypocrite and deceitful like 
those señoras who label me thus … We have to be rebels because that is what 
these times require. The day we have to go out into the streets, [we] female 
revolutionaries and rebels will respect those who respect us, but those who 
slander and libel us – they will receive what they deserve.37
Morán felt corralled and under pressure in the intimate community of 
Pola de Laviana due to the change in the political atmosphere after the 
elections. She reacted not by withdrawing, but by reaffirming her identity 
in a militant manner. 
Morán did not frame her criticism in terms of fascism, but fascism had 
become an important way of understanding right-wing opposition in the 
coalfields. Importantly, because of the election results, fascism now had to 
exist. The results provided a new impetus for trying to locate the hidden, 
conspiratorial threat of a force that posed an existential danger to the left in 
the coalfields and the provincial capital. During 1934, leftists reported fascism 
‘emerging’ in towns and villages across the coalfields, even if it remained a 
shadowy presence.38 ‘Viva el fascio’ was daubed on walls in La Felguera, 
fascism ‘classes’ were supposedly taught in Trubia and a priest allegedly 
wanted to create a ‘fascist trade union’.39 There was a now greater urgency 
in the fight against fascism. Leftists issued warnings, and confrontation in 
the streets became more commonplace. Socialists passed on the names of 
some ‘monarchist lads’ who reportedly shouted ‘viva fascism’ at ‘comrades’ 
in Caborana and warned that if the situation continued to deteriorate ‘our 
patience will run out and it will end in tragedy’.40 And leftists did respond 
to the threat of fascism. The first copies of the Falangist newspaper FE on 
sale in Oviedo were burned in the street, which led to a scuffle, and a month 
the ‘Diccionario biográfico del socialismo español’ <http://www.fpabloiglesias.es/archivo-y-
biblioteca/diccionario-biografico/biografias/17680_moran-sanchez-julia> [accessed 25 Oct. 
2018].      
37 Avance, 23 Feb. 1934. 
38 Avance, 9 Jan. 1934. 
39 Avance, 16, 17 Feb., 15 Mar. 1934.  
40 Avance, 16 Jan. 1934.
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later communists burned an effigy of Hitler on Shrove Tuesday in a twist on 
traditional transgressive carnival celebrations.41
The domestic fascist threat was now no longer identified purely with 
a semi-hidden local threat. The election of a conservative administration 
beholden to the CEDA meant that there was great sensitivity to a possible 
gradual slide towards authoritarian rule or even fascism. Fears in Spain 
reflected those in Britain and France, where leftists were concerned about 
the trajectory of their governments; indeed the French government was 
depicted as pre-fascist in February 1934.42 Such concerns are understandable 
given that Hitler had been appointed to power through the mechanisms 
of the Weimar Republic, rather than by storming the Reichstag. It was 
unsurprising, therefore, that the newspaper of the Spanish Socialist Youth 
labelled the November 1933 elections a ‘German disaster’.43 Nor was Nazi 
Germany the only example. By mid February, Avance was beginning to talk 
of Austria, where Dollfuss had cemented his authoritarian, corporatist rule 
through gradual, legalistic means, as an example of what could happen in 
Spain.44
This interest in international affairs was not new, but there was a greater 
awareness of what was occurring beyond the Pyrenees in 1934. Lectures at 
ateneos discussed European politics and Avance published appeals for left-
wing unity in France and Belgium.45 The imprisoned German Communist 
leader Ernst Thaelmann was a particular object of interest and support, 
thanks to the 1934 Comintern campaign for his release.46 Organizations 
across the left sent telegrams to the German embassy appealing for his 
freedom and the PCE in Oviedo even called on the Asturian left to take 
advantage of a passing German circus to do so.47 International politics 
filtered down to family celebrations, such as weddings. At a civil ceremony 
41 Avance, 18 Jan., 14 Feb. 1934; Región, 14 Feb. 1934; El Noroeste, 15 Feb. 1934.
42 Buchanan, ‘Beyond Cable Street’, pp. 65–6; B. Jenkins and C. Millington, France and 
Fascism: February 1934 and the Dynamics of Political Crisis (Abingdon, 2015), p. 3.
43 S. Souto Kustrín, ‘Y ¿Madrid? ¿Qué hace Madrid?’: movimento revolucionario y acción 
colectiva (1933–1936) (Madrid, 2004), p. 56.
44 Avance, 15 Feb. 1934. 
45 Avance, 6, 20 May, 31 Aug. 1934. The Madrid-based Communist-turned-socialist 
student Manuel Tagüeña recalled discussing international affairs with his neighbourhood 
cell (M. Tagüeña Lacorte, Testimonio de dos guerras (Barcelona, 1978), p. 34).
46 See A. Rabinbach, ‘Freedom for Thälmann: the Comintern and the orchestration 
of the campaign to free Ernst Thälmann, 1933–39’, in García, Yusta, Tabet and Clímaco, 
Rethinking, pp. 23–42 and S. McMeekin, The Red Millionaire: a Political Biography of Willy 
Munzenberg, Moscow’s Secret Propaganda Tsar in the West (New Haven, Conn., 2003).
47 E.g. Avance, 3, 13, 22, 27 July 1934; El Noroeste, 8 July 1934. 
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in Olloniego, a speech was given in memory of the ‘brave Austrians’ who 
had rebelled against Dollfuss.48 Remarks at a wedding perhaps came easier 
than downing tools. A solidarity strike in February to support the plight of 
the Austrian socialists garnered uneven support.49 
The politics of policing
The election results marked the beginning of a new cycle in Spanish politics. 
The legislature was less stable than during the first biennium. There were ten 
different governments between December 1933 and February 1936. President 
Alcalá Zamora’s lack of faith in the Republican credentials of the CEDA, 
which had the highest number of seats in the Cortes, meant that he tasked 
Radicals with forming governments. First, Radical-led governments relied 
on the CEDA’s backing in the Cortes in order to wield a parliamentary 
majority. From October 1934 onwards, Gil Robles’ party also gained control 
of ministerial portfolios. 
The policies of the new governments were a significant departure from the 
first biennium. Governments did not engage in the wholesale derogation of 
legislation, but did roll back or paralyse emblematic laws closely identified 
with the spirit of the Republic of the first biennium. State financial support 
for the Church was partially reinstated, the law of municipal boundaries was 
removed, mixed juries, which adjudicated on labour issues, were modified. 
Land reform, in which Republican ambitions had so far outweighed results, 
was paralysed. The death penalty was reintroduced and an amnesty was 
issued for those involved in the failed 1932 coup.50 Radical-led governments 
pressured municipal authorities to come into line with the national 
government while council halls also became platforms for dissent, from the 
Basque defence of their traditional economic rights against a new wine tax 
to Langreo’s direct communication of its opposition to government policies 
via telegram.51 The government removed a number of councils that opposed 
government policy, although the largest wave of removals would only occur 
after the revolutionary insurrection of October 1934.
The change in the nature of the Republic was manifest in citizens’ daily 
lives. Holy Week processions – absent in some areas of Spain in previous years 
– returned to the streets. Emblematic of Catholicism’s renewed visibility 
48 Avance, 23 Feb. 1934. 
49 A. Shubert, The Road to Revolution in Spain: the Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860–1934 
(Urbana, Ill., 1987), p. 152; Avance, 20 Feb. 1934.
50 Townson, Crisis, pp. 204, 223–4.
51 For the Basques, see summary in Townson, Crisis, pp. 253–6. AL, Actas, 7 Oct. 1933 to 
16 June 1934, ff. 132–4, 147–8. 
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in Salamanca was the emergence of Jesuits from hiding to participate in 
public life.52 Backed by a more conservative administration, landowners and 
industrialists flouted labour legislation. Discrimination in contracting that 
targeted unionized labourers was the clearest and most common change in 
rural areas.53 Pay dropped and unemployment climbed.54 In the south, the 
lack of rain reduced the olive harvest and councils distributed bread to the 
hungry. While widespread protest did not emerge, a current of resentment 
coursed beneath the surface of rural society.55 The situation in the Asturian 
coalfields was not quite so grave. Employment levels in the mines were 
stable. The principal manifestation of the changed political climate in the 
coal valleys was a shift in policing strategy, although there were also reports 
of landlords taking advantage of the new context to evict tenants.56
The government experienced the country’s state of effervescence on its 
doorstep. Madrid had never been closer to a general strike than during the 
first few months of 1934, due to strikes in construction, hostelry and printing 
and metal trades.57 The state of unrest was exacerbated by the emergence 
of street violence. The publication and sale of Falange’s newspaper led 
to confrontation between supporters and opponents in the streets of the 
capital. FE-JONS, although a minor player in Spanish politics until 1936, 
attempted to flex its muscles by demonstrating its influence among students 
in attacks on left-wing centres. On 9 February, a member of the JS shot 
dead a Falangist leader, Matías Montero, who became their first ‘martyr’, 
and street violence between left- and right-wing youths continued to be a 
feature on the streets of the capital over the following months.58
Under pressure from this combination of circumstances – and the CEDA’s 
demand for a sterner public order policy – the government responded 
52 M. Vincent, Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in 
Salamanca, 1930–1936 (Oxford, 1996), pp. 214–15.  
53 F. Cobo Romero, De campesinos a electores: modernización agraria en Andalucía, 
politización campesina y derechización de los pequeños propietarios y arrendatarios: el caso de la 
provincia de Jaén, 1931–1936 (Madrid, 2003), p. 280.
54 Preston, Coming of the Spanish Civil War, p. 103; Townson, Crisis, p. 204. For examples 
of pay, see J. M. Macarro Vera, Socialismo, República y revolución en Andalucía (1931–1936) 
(Seville, 2000), p. 319.
55 Macarro Vera, Socialismo, pp. 320–2. 
56 Avance, 11 Feb. 1934.
57 S. Juliá, Madrid, 1931–1934: de la fiesta popular a la lucha de clases (Madrid, 1984), p. 351.
58 E. González Calleja, Contrarrevolucionarios: radicalización violenta de las derechas 
durante la Segunda República, 1931–1936 (Madrid, 2011), pp. 202–5. For a firsthand account, 
see Tagüeña Lacorte, Testimonio, pp. 42–4.
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with a crackdown on the possession of arms and explosives.59 The frisking 
of workers proliferated across the country. Anarchists and Communists 
in Bilbao organized a general strike to protest against police attempts at 
the searches.60 On the same day, the Badajoz city council protested that 
the wave of searches was stoking ‘alarm’.61 In the Asturian coalfields, they 
became a daily occurrence and a very personal experience of the assertion 
of state power. Security forces stopped mineworkers on their way to work 
on the main road through the Nalón valley. Avance claimed that those who 
objected to the searches were beaten.62
The searches added to tensions in the coalfields. In Laviana, a series of 
incidents that escalated from the arrest of two men for carrying knives 
reveals the interplay of protest and policing, particularly how left-wing 
activists were willing to contest state power and assert their own vision of 
justice. The two men were jailed in Pola de Laviana for possessing knives 
that Avance alleged were of ‘common usage’ and habitually carried due to 
the nature of mine work. On the day of their arrest, inhabitants of Pola de 
Laviana planned to march on the prison to demand the men’s release, but a 
socialist persuaded them to desist. When two days later it was reported that 
the men would be subjected to a summary trial, a 400-strong demonstration 
forced their release from the prison, which was only guarded by four civil 
guards. The governor sent Assault and Civil Guard reinforcements to the 
town, where rumours spread of orders for the arrest of left-wing leaders 
and a general strike was declared. When the governor heard that the strike 
was to protest at the arrival of security forces, he withdrew them and peace 
returned.63 Mineworkers returned to work only to down their tools again 
on hearing news of the arrest of a socialist councillor, Luis Camblor, who 
was accused of heading the demonstration that released the men. Strikers 
announced they would not return to work until Camblor was freed, and 
women planned a demonstration in protest at further arrests.64 The strike 
ended when a letter from Camblor recommending a return to work was 
read at an assembly authorized by the governor.65 
This complex dance of strikers, police and the civil governor reveals how 
the arrests had concentrated fears over the direction of the government while 
59 Preston, Coming of the Spanish Civil War, p. 103. 
60 Heraldo de Madrid, 12 Feb. 1934; El Sol, 13 Feb. 1934.
61 El Socialista, 14 Feb. 1934.
62 Avance, 13 Feb. 1934.
63 Avance, 20 Feb. 1934. 
64 Avance, 21, 22 Feb. 1934; Región, 21 Feb. 1934. 
65 Avance, 23, 24 Feb. 1934. 
111
Fascism and the politics of policing (1933–4)
also providing an opportunity to resist the new policing policy. Different 
notions of justice clashed. Initially, leftists disputed that carrying a knife 
warranted arrest and a summary trial, but the situation worsened further 
when extra security forces arrived in the town. For the protestors, the state 
was intrusive and its use of force excessive; they were capable of keeping 
peace in Pola de Laviana. The incident also shows the crucial role played 
by political actors in diffusing incidents. Both the governor and socialists 
in Laviana took steps to de-escalate protest, even if this meant the removal 
of security forces. This mediation is important for it would be absent over 
the following months, even though the office of the civil governor did not 
change hands. The lack of dialogue combined with police searches would 
feed a radicalizing spiral through the spring. 
The potential for escalation increased markedly in early March due to the 
appointment of a new minister of the interior. Diego Martínez Barrio, who 
had sought a preventative approach to public order incidents, resigned, 
as he was uncomfortable with government policy. He was replaced by 
Rafael Salazar Alonso, who pursued an assertive, confrontational policing 
strategy, which included militarizing public order and placing restrictions 
on civil liberties through use of the state of alarm. The latter suspended 
constitutional guarantees and authorized the security forces to enter homes 
without a warrant in certain circumstances.66 Salazar Alonso’s policy was 
informed by his ‘Manichean view of politics’, which showed ‘sympathy for 
the right’.67 His memoirs published after October 1934 reveal a tendency 
to see revolution in every incidence of labour conflict and an adversarial 
attitude in which (his) authority was to be upheld at all costs.68 
A more assertive policing strategy could be effective in quashing 
protest.69 But in the Asturian coalfields it was counterproductive. In late 
March, a spiral of action-counteraction-action by security forces and leftist 
organizations revealed the underlying tensions in the coalfields and served 
to fuel increasing resentment, which translated into militancy. The wave of 
searches for arms in left-wing cultural and political centres strengthened 
rather than weakened the resolve of the left. The searches combined with 
the police’s response to protest eroded the affective links between citizens 
in the coalfields and the wider Republican state. Between 22 and 24 March, 
66 E. González Calleja, En nombre de la autoridad: la defensa del orden público durante 
la Segunda República española (1931–1936) (Granada, 2014), pp. 204, 224–6 and Cifras, pp. 
177–8.
67 Townson, Crisis, pp. 222–3.
68 R. Salazar Alonso, Bajo el signo de la revolución (Madrid, 1935). 
69 E.g. in Valencia (Valero, Republicanos, p. 123). 
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security forces carried out searches of Casas del Pueblo, union centres and 
even the home of the Republican mayor of Langreo. Workers responded 
to these searches with a number of localized wildcat strikes.70 A few days 
later police attention turned from union centres to workers themselves. 
Security forces stopped mineworkers on their way to the pit and rummaged 
through their food baskets. While they were at work, the Assault Guard 
‘invaded’ the villages and searched their homes – even seizing a sewing 
machine. Crossing the threshold into workers’ homes was particularly 
offensive. Women protested at the intrusion, which led to four arrests, and 
mineworkers left the mines early in protest.71 Checking food baskets may 
have been humiliating, but entering the household transgressed into the 
intimacy of the home and was an attack on the masculine authority of the 
male head of the household.
Councillors in Langreo raised their voices in protest at the searches for 
targeting the Republic’s supporters and, in particular, at the nature of the 
searches. The socialists criticized the security forces for not showing ‘the 
right level of respect to citizens and organizations’: ‘what is most disgraceful 
is that those who are the target of body and house searches are those 
people and social and political organizations who worked the hardest and 
sacrificed the most in the service of the Republic’. By repeatedly searching 
the very citizens who formed the backbone of the Republic and targeting 
their private property – even breaking furniture and locks – the central state 
transgressed the usual boundaries of its actions and broke a social contract 
between local society and state institutions. Such measures could receive 
approval when used against the Republic’s enemies, but now the security 
forces focused on those whose ‘loyalty to the Republic ha[d] been proven’.72 
Holy Week loomed, with the prospect of the fractious situation escalating 
further as political anger transferred to the Church. Whereas in previous 
years sporadic iconoclastic acts had targeted remote shrines, attacks on the 
Church now occurred in town centres. On Holy Wednesday, dynamite 
was thrown into the patio of the parish church in Sama. The following 
day youths tried to disturb the religious service, leading to a skirmish with 
young Catholics, and stones being thrown at the parish priest.73 Rumours 
of a possible religious procession in Mieres sparked a demonstration that 
was broken up by the Assault Guard, who fired a hundred rounds. The 
security forces arrested left-wing leaders across the coalfields, which fuelled 
70 Avance, 25, 27, 29, 30 March 1934.
71 Avance, 28 March 1934.
72 AL, Actas, 7 Oct. 1933 to 16 June 1934, ff. 141–2.
73 Región, 31 March, 1 Apr. 1934. 
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strikes and protests that received massive support. A stoppage by 1,500 at 
the Mariana pit in Mieres spread to Aller and Lena, leading to 15,000 out on 
strike. The sharp escalation prompted trade unions in Mieres to issue a joint 
appeal for the strikers to return to work.74 It seems unlikely that the arrested 
leaders committed the iconoclastic acts. Rather these were preventative 
detentions to dampen protest. Instead, the arrests were denounced as 
‘arbitrary’ and accompanied by wide-ranging strikes. The arrests appeared 
to confirm Avance’s narrative of an unjust, persecutory state.75 Protest had 
become larger and more militant than in previous years.
The security forces’ actions were a deliberate demonstration of authority, 
and even intentionally provocative. When a Langrean Republican association 
complained to the prime minister that the searches were ‘counterproductive’ 
and would not calm ‘spirits’, their own centre was searched.76 The civil 
governor stated airily that he ‘was sure that this excitation would not 
have any consequences’ and refused to change tack even as the situation 
escalated.77 In marked contrast to his approach to the February conflict in 
Laviana, there would be no change in strategy.78
The initial clampdown by the state security forces in February had 
coincided with the ‘Austrian Civil War’. The short-lived uprising by the 
socialist paramilitary forces, the Schutzbund, was also sparked by arms 
searches conducted by the Austrian state. Indecision wracked the declining 
socialist movement, particularly in Vienna, where the leadership was 
reluctant to pre-empt the state. The February insurrection was thus a 
desperate, last-gasp reaction by a socialist movement far from the height 
of its powers.79 The radical, militant attitudes in the Asturian coalfields 
appear to have been absent in Austria. Austrian socialists displayed ‘verbal 
maximalism’ but their actions were cautious and their demands stopped 
short of calling for a dictatorship of the proletariat as Largo Caballero did.80 
In Spain, socialists framed the situation in urgent terms that served to 
propel radicalization. During a speech in February 1934, González Peña 
74 Avance, 3, 4, 5 Apr. 1934; La Voz de Asturias, 3, 4 Apr. 1934.
75 Avance, 5, 8 Apr. 1934.
76 Avance, 29 March 1934.
77 Avance, 28 March 1934. 
78 In contrast, his counterpart in Valencia negotiated the end of a general strike (Valero, 
Republicanos, pp. 128–33).
79 See A. Rabinbach, The Crisis of Austrian Socialism: from Red Vienna to Civil War, 
1927–1934 (Chicago, Ill., 1983) and C. Jeffery, Social Democracy in the Austrian Provinces, 
1918–1934: Beyond Red Vienna (London, 1995). 
80 Horn, European socialists, pp. 21–3. 
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declared that there were only two ways forward, ‘Germany and Italy, or 
Russia’. The audience rose to its feet, applauded, and many shouted ‘viva 
la revolución’.81 This reduction of political options also drew Asturias into 
a wider European framework and compounded a sense of urgency. Avance 
cultivated the accusation that the left – and therefore the working class – 
was under attack, and contributed to stiffening of resolve and a deepening 
divide between the left and the state through radical, defiant rhetoric. Not 
only did the authorities ‘persecute’ the working class by searching ‘only the 
Casas del Pueblo and the centres of the working class’, but the searches – 
described as ‘razzia’ in reference to house raids conducted during colonial 
warfare in North Africa – meant that Asturias found itself in a ‘full state of 
war’.82 This image of a provocative state persecuting the working class and 
causing the country to slide towards war would be repeated over the coming 
months and formed a crucial part of the newspaper’s framing of the need 
for a revolutionary uprising.
Unite, proletarian brothers!
Whether ‘red, white, yellow, [or] flesh-coloured’, united fronts were on 
everyone’s lips in early 1934, Región observed.83 Less than two months after 
this remark, delegates of the Asturian socialist and anarchist movements 
signed an agreement founding a Workers’ Alliance in the back room of 
a bar in Gijón. The short public announcement in Avance expressed the 
alliance’s intention to combat fascism and war, but in private the agreement 
declared the aim of working towards ‘the triumph of social revolution in 
Spain’.84 Disguising the revolutionary intent enabled the alliance to work 
‘freely, without raising the authorities’ suspicions’.85
Nazism’s ascension to power and the destruction of the German left placed 
renewed impetus on bridging deep divisions on the left. Co-operation was 
nonetheless difficult and progress tortuous in Spain, as it was elsewhere. 
Collaboration between socialists and Communists in Germany and Austria 
was only achieved once the movements were forced underground by 
81 Avance, 4 Feb. 1934. 
82 Avance, 24, 27 March 1934.
83 Región, 3 Feb. 1934.
84 For the pact, see V. Alba, La Alianza Obrera: historia y análisis de una táctica de unidad 
en España (Madrid, 1978), pp. 205–6 and the announcement in Avance, 1 Apr. 1934.
85 ‘Informe del Comité Regional de la CNT de Asturias sobre su actuación y la de la 
Alianza Obrera Regional Revolucionaria en los sucesos revolucionarios ocurridos en la 
provincia de marzo a octubre de 1934’ [undated], CDMH, PS Gijón, J series, box 12, file 2, 
pp. 12–3. 
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dictatorships. In France, the socialist and Communist rank and file had 
demonstrated together on 12 February 1934 in opposition to right-wing 
leagues, but it was nearly six months before the parties signed an antifascist 
unity pact. The road to the French Popular Front agreed in July 1935 would 
be lengthy and winding.86
Discussions of left-wing unity in Spain usually centre on the Catalan 
dissident communist Joaquin Maurín.87 Previously a CNT and PCE activist, 
Maurín was a sophisticated Marxist thinker and anti-Stalinist who had 
co-founded the dissident communist BOC.88 The BOC founded the first 
‘Workers’ Alliance against Fascism’ together with two other minority leftist 
organizations (the Catalan Socialist Union and the treintista Libertarian 
Syndicalist Federation) in Barcelona in March 1933. The Alliance broadened 
after the November elections to include the Catalan socialists, although the 
most powerful and numerous working class organization in Catalonia, the 
CNT, continued to refuse to participate.89 From this Catalan kernel, the 
Workers’ Alliance seeded through Spain, reaching its apogee a year later in 
the Asturian Workers’ Alliance, which was one of a patchwork of alliances 
across the country.90 Yet this genealogy of left-wing unity initiatives only 
goes so far in explaining the emergence of the Asturian Alliance. Equally 
important is both renewed agitation among the rank and file for an alliance 
or united front in Asturias, and a shift in the Asturian anarchist movement. 
Asturian anarchist leaders jailed after the failed anarchist rising of December 
1933 penned a joint appeal to the regional CNT to think afresh about 
collaborating with the socialists. Although opposed by the national CNT, 
the Asturian anarchists nevertheless pursued an alliance over the following 
months.
A renewed wave of grassroots unity initiatives revealed rank-and-file 
collaboration at the local level. Such initiatives had emerged in other 
86 Horn, European socialists, pp. 63–6, 138–42, 149–50. For a detailed analysis of the French 
case, see J. Jackson, The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy, 1934–38 (Cambridge, 
1988), ch. 1.
87 E.g. R. Navarro Comas, ‘El Frente Único, las Alianzas Obreras y el Frente Popular: 
la evolución teórica de los anarquistas ante la colaboración obrera’, Mélanges de la Casa de 
Velázquez, xli (2011), 103–20.
88 For a summary of his thought, see P. Heywood, Marxism and the Failure of Organised 
Socialism in Spain, 1879–1936 (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 142–3. 
89 T. Corkett, ‘Interactions between the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo and the 
Unión General de Trabajadores in Spain and Catalonia, 1931–1936’ (Unpublished University 
of Glasgow PhD thesis, 2011), pp. 45–6. See also A. Durgan, BOC 1930–1936: el Bloque 
Obrero y Campesino (Barcelona, 1996), chs 3 and 4. 
90 Durgan, BOC, pp. 243–8; Alba, Alianza, pp. 96–7.  
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contexts, like the Ruhr, France and Portugal.91 Most prominent in the 
coalfields was the Langrean Pro-United Front Committee, which was 
similar to the CPUT of 1933. The Committee was a cross-union alliance and 
‘revolutionary bloc’ against fascism at the local level that tapped into rank-
and-file enthusiasm. Rallies of ‘extraordinary importance’ attended by up 
to 6,000 leftists were ‘one of the most transcendental events for the future 
of workers’ and the initiative quickly sparked discussion in other union 
sections and even applications to join the Langrean Front.92 The Langrean 
Front featured individuals of prominent standing to a greater degree than 
the CPUT; socialists included a candidate in the 1933 elections who was a 
member of the National Federation of the JS, and the son of the SOMA 
founder. Unity initiatives beyond the Langrean Front included joint strike 
and boycott committees and a candidacy to head the Ateneo in Mieres, all 
of which consisted of varying combinations of socialists, Communists and 
anarchists.93  
The socialist leadership’s response to these initiatives was initial silence 
followed by scolding criticism. Avance’s reaction was woolly: unity ‘need 
not emerge … from any private or local initiatives’ as unity was apparently 
‘already … a reality’.94 Commenting on the Langrean Front, Amador 
Fernández criticized ‘spectacles that leave a lot to be desired’, labelling 
committees formed on local terms ‘unacceptable’.95 Strategic considerations 
belonged to the leadership. Largo Caballero’s position was ambiguous. In 
public he welcomed alliances, but in private he was more interested in 
strengthening the socialist movement than reaching out to Communists or 
anarchists. He favoured an Alliance in Catalonia due to socialist weakness in 
the region. Elsewhere they were ‘tolerated’.96 Such a position was consistent 
with Largo Caballero’s commitment to positioning the socialist movement 
as the sole representative of the working class. 
91 A. Zukas, ‘Explaining unemployed protest in the Ruhr at the end of the Weimar 
Republic’, in Unemployment and Protest: New Perspectives on Two Centuries of Contention, 
ed. M. Reiss and M. Perry (Oxford, 2011), p. 165.
92 Avance, 6 Feb. 1934. For positive reactions, see Avance, 2, 16 Feb. 1934; El Noroeste, 6 
Feb. 1934.
93 Avance, 21 Jan., 9, 14 March 1934; Á. Mato Díaz, La Atenas del norte: ateneos, sociedades 
culturales y bibliotecas populares en Asturias (1876–1937) (Oviedo, 2008), p. 97. 
94 Avance, 7 Jan. 1934. The PCE Central Committee also condemned the Pro-United 
Front Committee (P. Miller, ‘Un movimiento de oposición radical: el PCE en Asturias, 
1931–1934’, Estudios de Historia Social, xxxi (1984), 131–7, at p. 135).
95 Avance, 7 Feb. 1934. 
96 F. Largo Caballero, Escritos sobre la República: notas históricas de la guerra en España 
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It is commonplace to state that the PCE rejected Alliances and maintained 
its preference for a united front from below until September, when their 
position changed. The Asturian Communists joined the Workers’ Alliance 
on the cusp of the insurrection.97 Yet this version of events overlooks the 
frequent collaboration across the left in the coalfields throughout 1934, 
including in boycotts, strikes, committees against war and fascism, and 
during 1 May celebrations, despite Communist criticism of the Alliance.98 
BOC leader Maurín even shared a stage with PCE members at the May 
Day rally in Mieres.99 Asturias does not appear to have been unique, as 
there were cases of grassroots co-operation involving the PCE. In Ourense, 
near Portugal, and in Cádiz, socialists, anarchists and Communists signed 
a Workers’ Alliance in February and co-organized the festivities on 1 May 
respectively.100 If the Communist position was complex, so was that of the 
Asturian anarchists. Despite anarchist signatures to the Asturian Workers’ 
Alliance, many were far from convinced by the initiative, particularly in 
the coalfields. The agreement came under attack from anarchists in La 
Felguera, where the more radical FAI was influential. Dissident voices grew 
in strength over the summer of 1934 and the Workers’ Alliance was only 
ratified by four votes at the regional CNT conference in mid September. 
Most anarchist mining unions voted against it.101
The Alliance did not greatly affect the day-to-day life of left-wing 
activists in the coalfields. The central committee organized some initial 
rallies, designated local representatives, intervened in a couple of 
strikes and discussed some military considerations regarding a possible 
revolutionary movement. But in August, for example, ‘nothing worth 
mentioning occurred in the Alliance Committee’.102 Rather than working 
towards actual revolution – its stated goal – the Alliance was an umbrella 
under which separate unions developed their own projects.103 Planning 
97 E.g. Souto Kustrín, Y ¿Madrid?, p. 82. 
98 E.g. Avance, 8, 29 July, 19 Aug. 1934; El Noroeste, 25 Aug. 1934. 
99 Avance, 3, 5 May 1934, 
100 J. Prada Rodríguez, De la agitación republicana a la represión franquista (Ourense 1934–
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101 ‘Informe del Comité Regional de Asturias de la CNT elevado al Pleno Regional de 
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de la Alianza Obrera Regional Revolucionaria remitido al Comité citado’, 10 Apr. 1936, 
CDMH, PS Gijón, J Series, box 12, file 3, pp. 11, 30–1; Á. Barrio Alonso, Anarquismo y 
anarcosindicalismo en Asturias (1890–1936) (Madrid, 1988), p. 401; El Noroeste, 20 Sept. 1934.
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pp. 11–14. 
103 Bizcarrondo shares this view in Octubre del 1934: reflexiones sobre una revolución (Madrid, 
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the revolutionary movement was a socialist affair and they refused to 
share the arms they were smuggling into the province with anarchists.104 
Rather than the Alliance embedding itself in the everyday functioning of 
union politics, it was a banner that provided a sense of dynamism and 
confidence in future victory. 
Towards the cliff edge 
The Asturian socialists’ decision to put their signatures to the Asturian 
Workers’ Alliance could be interpreted as crowning the process of 
radicalization by bringing the leadership into line with the rank and file. 
In reality, fractiousness continued between the two. The socialist hierarchy 
wanted to limit strike action, but they could not prevent it. Thousands joined 
a PCE-organized strike in April despite SOMA opposition and in May, a 
conflict at the Sotón mine soon revealed the fragility of the leadership’s 
influence over the rank and file. A workforce-organized wildcat strike in 
protest at a mining deputy escalated into a lockout, the deployment of 
security forces to guard the pit, solidarity strikes along the Nalón valley, 
shootouts between strikers and civil guards and the use of physical force 
against jeering female demonstrators.105 The SOMA managed to end the 
strike only for 15,000 to down tools two weeks later when the same mining 
deputy was transferred to a different mine. A self-designated ‘Alliance 
committee’ emerged to lead the strike, although the anarchist SUM and 
the SOMA both distanced themselves from it.106 
The SOMA admonished the rank and file in a manner that recalled 
earlier criticism. For the SOMA, the strike was short-sighted and showed a 
lack of maturity. It aimed at ‘nothing more than to provoke an encounter 
with the security forces to justify revolutionary attitudes in which those 
who start them are never those who end up worse off’.107 As Antuña warned 
the JS in July, what was needed, ‘now more than ever, [was] discipline’.108 
This emphasis on self-control and limiting strike action is usually portrayed 
as an attempt to protect the socialist movement ahead of a revolutionary 
movement, yet it was also the continuation of the existing socialist strategy 
of trying to keep the rank and file on a short leash. 
1977), p. 40. 
104 Souto Kustrín, Y ¿Madrid?, p. 93.
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Meanwhile, a major strike in agriculture had been incubating in the 
south of Spain since the winter, due to the work of the new leadership 
of the socialist landworkers’ union, the FNTT. When the government 
announced the derogation of the law of municipal boundaries, the FNTT 
declared it would strike. The strike did not enjoy the unanimous support 
of the socialist leadership, which feared for the repercussions it might have 
on socialist organizations. The fears turned out to be well founded. The 
government made an early attempt at negotiating a solution, but then 
moved to crush the strike. On 29 May, the harvest was declared a ‘public 
service’, rendering the strike illegal. The strike began on 5 June and while 
it mobilized 200,000 across central, southern and eastern Spain, strikes 
took place in less than a third of the municipalities where they had been 
announced. The press was censored, workers’ centres were closed down 
and the parliamentary immunity of socialist deputies was violated. The 
authorities arrested 7,000 strikers – though in areas like Valencia, most 
were released soon after the conflict ended – and the government replaced 
municipal councils with steering committees.109 The disarticulation of left-
wing organizations in these areas meant they were too weak to participate 
in the October revolutionary insurrection. 
On the northern coast, Avance continued its duel with the authorities. 
As the emblem of socialist radicalism, it had become a target for the 
authorities. The civil governor ordered the sequestration of the newspaper 
on ninety-four days out of 186 in 1934, fined it 25,000 pesetas and jailed 
the editor on three occasions. Such moves only confirmed Avance’s message 
that the state was sliding towards authoritarianism.110 As the newspaper 
battled the authorities in what it described as a ‘war of extermination’ 
on the ‘working class press’, it strengthened its ties with its readers, who 
contributed small donations to pay the fines. The newspaper printed long 
lists of its benefactors.111 Mineworkers in Barredos went on strike when a 
sequestered edition did not arrive.112 The jailed editor Javier Bueno received 
well-publicized visits from fellow socialists, including children, photographs 
of whom were published in Avance. Such visits to Bueno in prison imitated, 
consciously or otherwise, the Communist strategy of sending delegations 
109 F. Cobo Romero, Revolución campesina y contrarrevolución franquista en Andalucía: 
conflictividad social, violencia política y represión franquista en el mundo rural andaluz, 1931–
1950 (Granada, 2004), pp. 104–14; for Valencia, see Valero, Republicanos, p. 143. For arrests, 
see González Calleja, Cifras, p. 217. 
110 Shubert, Road, p. 151. 
111 Avance, 27 March, 21 July 1934. 
112 Avance, 11 July 1934.
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to visit imprisoned German Communist leader Ernst Thälmann in 1934 in 
order to publicize his plight.113 
Outside the walls of Oviedo’s Model Prison, red-shirted members of the 
Socialist Youth paraded in a show of collective strength and support for 
Bueno in a manner that revealed their increasing penchant for the trappings 
of paramilitarism. This martial style – in dress, gestures and actions – had 
spread through interwar European youth politics. The raised fist salute, 
which was first used by German Communists in the 1920s, emerged in 
Spain in 1934 and was performed during demonstrations and by uniformed 
JS members attending the funeral of Juanita Rico – who died at the hands 
of Falangists in Madrid – in June.114 The Socialist Youth propagated martial 
politics through publishing extracts from the Comintern ‘handbook for 
revolution’, Armed Insurrection, and a ‘Decalogue of the Young Socialist’, 
which called on JS members to arm themselves and form militias.115 This was 
politics defined by ‘action’, in which ideological debates became secondary 
to actively fighting one’s opponents.116 Even so, while JS members undertook 
training in preparation for a revolutionary movement, their emphasis was 
on occupying public space and showing collective strength, rather than 
pursuing pitched battles, much as the German Social Democrats’ Iron 
Front in the early 1930s was a form of militant posturing rather than a 
serious street-fighting force.117 While skirmishes between youths occurred in 
Madrid, there is little evidence of such encounters in the streets of Oviedo.118 
The Socialist Youth formed the backbone of the militias who were 
training for the future revolutionary movement. The organization of the 
movement fell to a Liaison Committee with members drawn from the 
PSOE, UGT and JS. Largo Caballero and the Federation of the Socialist 
Youth (FJS) issued directives to the militias.119 In February, just before 
113 See Rabinbach, ‘Freedom’, p. 34.
114 See photographs in Mundo Gráfico, 27 June 1934 and Avance, 4 Sept. 1934. 
115 S. Souto Kustrín, ‘Taking the street: workers’ youth organizations and political conflict 
in the Spanish Second Republic’, European History Quarterly, xxxiv (2004), 131–56, at p. 143; 
Renovación, 17 Feb. 1934; A. Neuberg, Armed Insurrection (London, 1970 [1928]).
116 For politics as action, see M. Vincent, ‘Political violence and mass society: a European 
civil war?’, in The Oxford Handbook of European history, 1914–1945, ed. N. Doumanis 
(Oxford, 2016), particularly at p. 400.
117 For the Iron Front, see D. Harsch, German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism 
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1993), ch. 7.
118 H. García, ‘De los soviets a las Cortes: los comunistas ante la República’, in Rey, 
Palabras, pp. 136, 139; González Calleja, Contrarrevolucionarios, p. 228.
119 Largo Caballero, Escritos, pp. 93–102; S. Souto Kustrín, ‘De la paramilitación al fracaso: 
las insurrecciones socialistas de 1934 en Viena y Madrid’, Pasado y memoria, ii (2003), 204–5. 
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Renovación published the ‘Decalogue of the Young Socialist’, the FJS 
issued a circular urging JS sections to organize armed militias. Thirty-eight 
replied that they were undertaking this task or had done so already, six of 
which were Asturian. The fifth Congress of the Socialist Youth dictated 
that these militias be organized in a military manner, with a clear hierarchy 
and the formation of special technical groups.120 Evidence is thin as to 
the extent of training activists received. Even in Madrid – the heartland 
of the radicalized Caballerista youth – the organization of the JS militias 
was not completed prior to October.121 Hints in Avance provide possible 
indicators of paramilitary training through reference to ‘excursionists’. A 
group from Pola de Lena formed in May only carried out their first trip into 
the mountains in late August.122 
In addition to training militias, socialists engaged in gunrunning and 
the stockpiling of arms. Arms arrived from a variety of different sources, 
including Portuguese revolutionaries, a police chief in Madrid, the Alfa 
sewing machine and small arms factory in Eibar just outside Bilbao, and 
the arms factory in Oviedo, from which they were smuggled out piece 
by piece.123 Local socialist and anarchist groups fundraised for small arms 
purchases and organized creative means of smuggling weapons into the 
province, which meant they obtained a motley collection of weapons.124 
The arms caches were insufficient for the needs of an insurrection, but the 
trafficking did perform another function. The transportation and hiding 
of weapons involved a large number of individuals and creative strategies. 
Engaging in these conspiratorial, illicit activities was empowering, fostered 
in-group bonds and bolstered the crystallization of anti-government feeling 
through encouraging an adversarial, besieged attitude.125 
How to deal with fractious, violent, uniformed street politics was a 
question many European governments faced in the interwar period. In the 
wake of violence at a British Union of Fascists rally in London in June 1934, 
For the financing of the insurrection, see A. del Rosal, 1934: el movimiento revolucionario de 
octubre (Madrid, 1984), pp. 229–33.
120 See Souto Kustrín’s piecing together of evidence of preparations in Madrid in Y 
¿Madrid?, pp. 177–9.
121 Souto Kustrín, ‘De la paramilitarización al fracaso’, p. 204. 
122 Avance, 26 Aug. 1934. 
123 Rosal, Octubre, pp. 234–40.
124 Taibo, Asturias, pp. 80–5.
125 D. Siemens emphasizes the empowering nature of paramilitary activities for German 
men in the context of Nazi Stormtroopers in Stormtroopers: a New History of Hitler’s 
Brownshirts (New Haven, Conn., 2017), e.g. p. 322.
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the British parliament discussed restrictions on the trappings of paramilitary 
style. In Spain, the government banned – at least in theory – political salutes 
in March, flags in June and excursions by uniformed individuals at the end 
of July.126 The government understood paramilitarism as the cause rather 
than the effect – or affected style – of radicalism. As arrests for wearing 
uniforms started taking place, the Asturian JS was defiant, declaring that 
there was no
legal precept which prevents us from dressing in the colour that we choose 
and therefore this Executive Commission recommends all young socialists wear 
[their] red shirts, on Sundays and holidays at least, and when going to bars, 
theatres and festivals [romerías], etc., thereby fulfilling your duty.127
Arrests for wearing paramilitary uniforms continued through August. At 
the end of the month the government introduced new restrictions on the 
political participation of those aged under twenty-three, which Salazar 
Alonso later admitted had been ‘designed to circumscribe the left’.128 The 
JS accused the government of offering them as a ‘sacrifice’ to ‘capitalist 
fascism’ in ‘another of the fascist measures dictated by the monarchizing 
[sic] conglomerate’.129 Decrying the law as fascist went beyond a rhetorical 
flourish; rather it formed part of the wider framing of Spain’s perceived 
onward march towards authoritarianism. 
The perceived threat of the government as a possible midwife to fascism 
contrasted with the alternative revolutionary future depicted by Avance. 
A bellicose state was pushing the working classes to act. In mid August, 
Avance warned that ‘the country, [was] on a war footing’ because of the 
mobilization of the army and rejected the idea that the Republic could 
return to its ‘primitive position’.130 The working class no longer desired the 
Republic of 1931, but rather envisaged a better future through revolution.131 
As the newspaper reiterated:
Capitalism does not tolerate infiltration. Liberal democracy is a miserable 
fiction. The enormous working class mass which, with different nuances in 
its nuclei and people, had placed its confidence [in it], has lost even the 
shadow of its confidence. For the transformation of the property regime in 
126 González Calleja, En nombre, p. 240; Región, 29 July 1934.
127 Avance, 1 Aug. 1934. 
128 Avance, 14 Aug. 1934; Townson, Crisis, p. 263.
129 S. Souto Kustrín, Paso a la juventud: movilización democrática, estalinismo y revolución 
en la república española (Valencia, 2013), p. 67; Avance, 26, 29 Aug. 1934.
130 Avance, 15 Aug. 1934. 
131 Avance, 19 Aug. 1934. 
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a socialist direction, there is only one path, without pauses or hesitation: the 
Revolution.132 
Fatalistically, Avance declared that ‘the only disastrous revolution would be 
that which is not attempted’. Comparing Spain to Austria and Germany, it 
concluded that ‘the case of Spain is, essentially, the same’. The decision had 
to be made between ‘declining rapidly towards disappearance and trying to 
save either everything with victory or a great deal through the fortitude of 
the action’.133 
September opened with a flashpoint in Sama that revealed the continuing 
difficult coexistence of the security forces and the working-class left, and the 
growing fracture between the local community and the wider state. Security 
forces had gathered in the town ahead of a demonstration against war and 
fascism announced by the Women’s Socialist Group and which appears to 
have been unauthorized.134 The march in the evening was peaceful and headed 
by women carrying banners. As it neared the town hall, the security forces 
intervened to disperse it by force. A shot was fired in unclear circumstances, 
which injured a security guard, and the security forces responded with a 
round of firing. Demonstrators and bystanders fled as doors closed and 
shutters slammed down. Three men and three women were injured, and 
a bystander was killed by a shot to the heart.135 Avance’s depiction of the 
aftermath of the shooting was thick with rage and resentment: 
[e]veryone with their arms raised. Seven- and ten-year-old children too. 
Everyone with their backs to the security forces, walking in the direction that 
the latter want … It seems as though we are in the middle of a war. In truth it is 
an invasion. In truth it is the army of a power foreign to the community which 
is corralling, flogging and shooting at it.136
Not only did the security forces humiliate local inhabitants and treat children 
inhumanely, but they were an occupying force that was incompatible with 
the coalfields. 
Avance’s rhetoric was matched by a breakdown in the channels of 
communication between the different layers of the state. The civil governor 
refused to speak via telephone to the mayor of Sama or Matilde de la Torre, 
a socialist deputy who was in Sama at the time. Avance often engaged in 
132 Avance, 30 Aug. 1934. 
133 Avance, 4 Sept. 1934. 
134 This was announced in Avance (1 Sept. 1934). 
135 This account is drawn from Avance, 2 Sept. 1934; El Noroeste, 2 Sept. 1934; El Sol, 2 Sept. 
1934.
136 Avance, 2 Sept. 1934. 
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demagogic provocative remarks about the authorities, but in this case, its 
comments were judicious: ‘On other occasions, [the mayor’s] intervention 
was requested by governors to prevent things which were about to happen, 
which were about to turn into tragedies like yesterday. And the tragedy 
was avoided’.137 The governor showed a similar lack of desire for dialogue 
during a conflict days later at the Fondón mine when the sacking of five 
mineworkers for demanding a minimum wage led to a sit-down strike 
at the coalface with two mining deputies taken hostage. The governor 
responded by sending assault and civil guards, banned the SOMA from 
intervening and avowed that his authority would be maintained at all costs: 
the ‘intolerable rebellion’ would be ‘punished as it deserve[d]’.138 
The growing gulf between the coalfield left and the security forces was not 
limited to Avance’s rhetoric. For the funeral of the bystander killed in the 
demonstration in Sama – Saturnino Fernández, a JS member – the mayor 
requested the withdrawal of the state security forces and the day passed 
peacefully. But the security forces returned to the streets the following day 
and started frisking citizens, to which socialists, anarchists and Communists 
responded by striking. The strike committee even asked people to leave 
Sama to avoid bloodshed.139 The ability of the municipal authorities and 
their supporters to maintain order – their order – by themselves contrasted 
with the impossibility of leftists and the security forces coexisting in the 
streets. The organizing committee of a joint Socialist and Communist 
Youth rally in Oviedo echoed this sentiment. In rejecting the presence of 
the police they aimed to give a ‘day of peace to the gravedigger, jailer and 
hospital staff’’.140
The socialist and Communist rally was to protest against a JAP rally 
at the symbolic Asturian site of Covadonga, in the west of the province. 
Covadonga was mythologized as the eighth-century birthplace of the 
‘Reconquest’ of Spain and was a site of Marian pilgrimage.141 Both supporters 
and opponents understood the long-planned rally as a barometer of support 
for each side in the province. While a successful rally for the JAP would 
show Asturias to be the heartland of true Catholic Spain and a repository of 
disciplined martial virtue, if it were sabotaged by the Workers’ Alliance, the 
137 Avance, 2 Sept. 1934. 
138 Región, 8 Sept. 1934. 
139 Avance, 4 Sept. 1934.
140 Avance, 6 Sept. 1934. 
141 The politics and memory of Covadonga are analysed in C. Boyd, ‘The second battle 
of Covadonga: the politics of commemoration in modern Spain’, History and Memory, xiv 
(2002), 37–64.
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left’s ability to shut down the province would reveal the strength and unity 
of the Asturian working class.
The rally took place on 9 September, the day after the feast day of Our 
Lady of Covadonga. Unsurprisingly, both sides claimed victory. Región 
asserted that ‘nothing [had] impeded the gathering of ten thousand people’, 
even as it denounced ‘coercion’ that prevented sympathizers from attending 
the ‘outstanding’ event. In an image with powerful religious undertones, 
the newspaper explained that one AP member had walked to Covadonga 
due to the transportation problems caused by the strike.142 Meanwhile 
Avance proudly described the strike as ‘absolute’. Strikers sabotaged train 
lines, blocked roads with stones and tree trunks, scattered tacks across 
roads, burned copies of El Debate and ABC and fired on cars, although 
no one was injured.143 The strike was a victory over the right and the state; 
it was a ‘demonstration of unity, the effects of which the concentration of 
police forces from five provinces could not weaken’. Unity provided the 
energy and instilled confidence in victory: ‘United we will always triumph 
whenever we try. United we will be able to introduce a society of justice, of 
workers emancipated from the capitalist yoke’. The ‘bloc’ that was forming 
was ‘indestructible’, even if ‘hours of rough struggle’ lay ahead.144
Preparations for the socialist revolutionary movement continued. 
Coinciding with the JAP rally, socialists botched a sea-borne arms shipment 
of 329 boxes of arms and munitions on a boat called the Turquesa. The 
Civil Guard interrupted the landing of the supplies and only ninety-eight 
made it into the hands of Asturian socialists. Nearly half remained on the 
boat. High-ranking socialists were implicated. Indalecio Prieto, who had 
been present during the operation, managed to escape to Bilbao and only 
parliamentary immunity saved Amador Fernández and Ramón González 
Peña from arrest.145 Twenty-three were detained, including councillor and 
leading Langrean socialist Belarmino Tomás, and the civil governor replaced 
Asturian socialist mayors with his delegates or else stripped them of their 
responsibility for public order.146 
Searches increased in Asturias and across Spain from mid September. In 
the coalfields, security forces entered socialist, anarchist and Communist 
centres, the town hall in Mieres and the socialist-owned San Vicente mine, 
142 Región, 11 Sept. 1934.
143 Avance, 11 Sept. 1934; El Sol, 11 Sept. 1934; ABC, 11 Sept. 1934; Salazar Alonso, Bajo, pp. 
293–5. 
144 Avance, 11 Sept. 1934. 
145 El Noroeste, 12 Sept. 1934. For a detailed account, see Taibo, Asturias, pp. 111–20. 
146 Avance, 12, 13 Sept. 1934. 
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but emerged empty handed, except for a few pistols and, in Turón, a few 
bombs.147 The minister of the interior decreed the state of alarm and there 
was a return to mass searches in the streets. A wave of localized strikes 
in the coalfields revealed the fractious and tense situation, although these 
were expressions of local dissidence rather than revolutionary preparation. 
Socialist policy preferred to avoid a government clampdown and waste 
of resources. The civil governor complained that ‘many strikes are being 
declared on one pretext one day and on a different one the next’ and 
declared them illegal.148 In the midst of rising tensions and as local feast days 
approached, there was a return to targeting religious buildings, including a 
shrine, chapel and a rectory, with fire and explosives.149
The political tensions not only manifested themselves in such attacks and 
tussles between left-wing militants and the state. They were also embedded 
in the dynamics of everyday encounters and reveal the sharpness of political 
divisions at the local level. In the early hours of 1 September, Casimiro D. 
was stabbed outside a bar in El Entrego (San Martín del Rey Aurelio). He 
had been accused of planning to attend the JAP rally and of intending 
to sign-up to the Assault Guard – and therefore betraying the working-
class community – which he vigorously denied.150 Two weeks later a further 
violent encounter occurred in the same area. Jaime C., a forty-four-year-old 
businessman and well-known rightist, recounted that he was on a train 
bound for the rally in Covadonga when Herminio V., a shop assistant and 
Avance contributor, boarded the train and ordered Jaime to alight. This 
policing of behaviour was backed by the threat of violence: when Jaime 
refused to leave the train, Herminio drew a pistol, to which Jaime responded 
by brandishing his own. The train lurched into motion, shots were fired and 
Herminio and his companions jumped off the train. Herminio’s account of 
the afternoon differed markedly. He denied the accusations and claimed he 
had been in a bar all afternoon, which several others corroborated.151 
By the end of September, repeated tussles with state security forces had 
hardened militant attitudes and created a perceptible fissure between local 
society and the broader state. Avance’s rhetoric had traced a narrative of the 
descent of the Republic towards fascism, which fed off the identification 
147 El Noroeste, 22 Sept. 1934. 
148 El Noroeste, 19, 26 Sept. 1934; Región, 28 Sept. 1934; Avance, 28 Sept. 1934. 
149 Región, 15 Sept. 1934; S. Noval Suárez, Langreo Rojo: historia del martirio y persecución de 
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of fascism in towns and villages across the coalfields. The dark horizon of 
fascism was juxtaposed with the bright future of revolution, a prospect 
Avance continued to promote. As searches intensified in late September, 
the newspaper depicted the security forces as a foreign occupying force and 
warned that armies caused wars.152 The state was provoking the working 
class into an inevitable confrontation, while the latter ‘consider[ed] Spain 
to be at the door of a proletarian revolution with a very good chance of 
triumphing’.153
However militant the politics at the local level, they did not amount 
to a crisis of the state. Nor did the crisis of government that marked the 
beginning of October, when the CEDA withdrew its support for Prime 
Minister Samper’s government and he resigned. Socialist leaders Besteiro 
and de los Ríos advised the president to call fresh elections, but Alcalá 
Zamora turned to Lerroux and asked him to form a government with 
CEDA ministers.154 Largo Caballero had been confident that the CEDA’s 
dubious Republican credentials would dissuade Alcalá Zamora from doing 
so, but he miscalculated. Having repeatedly threatened that the socialists 
would respond if the CEDA entered government, Largo Caballero was left 
with little choice when the new ministers were announced on 4 October. 
The Spanish October ran to a stricter and more public timetable than other 
episodes of leftist rebelliousness across Europe in 1934. 
France’s February days and the Austrian Civil War responded to long-
term processes and the specificities of each national context, yet they were 
also respective sudden mass eruptions of militancy within a broader context 
of leftist flux and reconfiguration between 1933 and 1935 as fascism and right-
wing authoritarianism continued to spread across the continent. While 
fascism has often been depicted as the broad contextual frame for the events 
of October 1934 in Asturias, the effects of the perceived threat of fascism 
extended further than this and reached down into the everyday, local level of 
politics in the Asturian coalfields. Fascism, as a new, hidden, conspiratorial 
threat, moulded conflicts and how politics was interpreted in the coalfields 
and how the trajectory of national politics was imagined. The actions of 
state security forces compounded fears of a slide towards authoritarianism, 
as did the new development of the encroachment of the Assault and Civil 
Guard into spaces of left-wing and working-class control, whether homes or 
political centres. The left fiercely resisted this encroachment, which resulted 
in a spiralling cycle of protest and repression. Assertive policing alienated 
152 Avance, 22 Sept. 1934.
153 Avance, 25 Sept. 1934.
154 Preston, Coming of the Spanish Civil War, pp. 123–4. 
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the communities of the coalfields from the Republic, even as revolutionary 
preparations and Avance’s radical rhetoric framed the only possible solution 
to decline as a leap forwards to revolution. 
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5. Revolution
Like many other fellow journalists, Manuel Chaves Nogales rushed to 
Asturias to report on the revolutionary insurrection. Chaves Nogales, a 
liberal Republican and the deputy editor of Ahora who was famed for his 
reports from Soviet Russia, criticized the revolutionary violence which he 
claimed ‘ha[d] nothing to envy, in terms of cruelty, the triumphant Bolshevik 
revolution’. Yet he was also careful to note that ‘a great mass’ of Asturian 
revolutionaries had ‘halt[ed] on the threshold of bestiality’. He was critical 
of the unproven lurid reports of revolutionary brutality that circulated in 
the right-wing press, and informed his readers that even fascists from the 
coalfields were indignant at the fabrications.1 Chaves Nogales was one of 
the few voices to venture a more nuanced interpretation of the Asturian 
October. His reports grappled with the contradictions and limits of the 
realization and destructiveness of the revolution. Such concerns lie at the 
heart of this chapter’s focus on the struggles to define and construct the 
revolution.
The extent to which the insurrection was revolutionary has long been 
debated and is usually framed in terms of whether the movement was 
‘offensive’ or ‘defensive’ towards the Republic.2 Yet reducing October 
1934 to a single adjective does little to convey the reality of a complex and 
heterogeneous event, in which there were different ideas and objectives 
of what the movement should be. The socialist hierarchy in Madrid had 
not planned a social revolution. They had ordered a ‘general strike’, as 
Belarmino Tomás, socialist councillor in Langreo and a revolutionary leader, 
later admitted to the French press.3 For all Largo Caballero’s revolutionary 
rhetoric, it is likely that he envisaged a combination of general strikes and 
armed actions by socialist militias that together would paralyse the country. 
This would precipitate a political crisis in order to prevent CEDA’s accession 
to government, sparking the fall of the government or even ending the 
1 Ahora, 24, 26 Oct. 1934.
2 See, e.g., contrasting views in D. Ruiz, Insurrección defensiva y revolución obrera: el 
octubre español de 1934 (Barcelona, 1988) and J. Avilés Farré, ‘Los socialistas y la insurrección 
de octubre de 1934’, Espacio, tiempo y forma, serie v, Historia contemporánea, xx (2008), 152–3. 
3 Le Populaire, 5 Jan. 1935. See also J. Aróstegui, Largo Caballero: el tesón y la quimera 
(Barcelona, 2013), p. 363 and P. I. Taibo II, Asturias, octubre 1934 (Barcelona, 2013), p. 172.
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legislature itself. The limited aims of such a ‘revolution’, in which strikes 
and insurrections were an auxiliary strategy, would have resembled the 
failed Republican-socialist plot of December 1930 that had sought to 
bring down the monarchy, rather than an attempt to establish a socialist 
regime. In contrast, Asturian Young Socialists complained in 1936 that they 
had believed the 1934 revolution ‘totalitarian’ in its pretensions. They had 
expected a profound change in Spanish political, social and economic life 
akin to a social revolution.4 Instead of adopting a retrospective or macro-level 
approach to the insurrection, it is more useful to examine the revolutionary 
process from the perspective of the committees and militias as the situation 
unfolded before them.5 The process was necessarily ambiguous, contested 
and improvised, as militants struggled to define what a revolution was, who 
was to be included, the fate of those excluded and how a revolutionary 
should act.
Revolutions are often described as having a ‘Janus’ face in that the dream 
of forging a new emancipated society is undercut by a darker side – that 
of revolutionary violence.6 But there is a further way of understanding the 
Janus-faced nature of revolution: in this case, namely, as a liminal moment 
caught between looking to the future and the past. The Asturian October was 
a time of flux and transition (though not an ‘interregnum’), as revolutionaries 
attempted to delineate the limits of a new revolutionary ‘community’ in the 
midst of a situation in which there were ‘radical processes of dissolution and 
reconstruction, and where guiding symbols and previous markers of certainty 
are crushed and reconstituted’.7 The revolutionaries confronted what Hannah 
Arendt described as the problem of ‘beginning’ as they decreed a rupture 
in historical time and tried to conjure a revolutionary future into being in 
4 La Tarde, 24, 27 Apr. 1936.
5 This emphasis on process is influenced by the work of G. Lawson, e.g., ‘Within and 
beyond the “fourth generation” of revolutionary theory’, Sociological Theory, xxxiv (2016), 
106–27.
6 E.g. A. J. Mayer, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions 
(Princeton, N.J., 2000). Some recent approaches have emphasized that violence is a 
‘variable’ in revolution, not an intrinsic characteristic (e.g. R. Gerwarth and M. Conway, 
‘Revolution and counterrevolution’, in Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe, ed. D. 
Bloxham and R. Gerwarth (Cambridge, 2011), p. 142). It is difficult to see how the societal 
reconstruction promised by the ideologies in the first half of the twentieth century would 
allow for a peaceful destruction and reconfiguration of political and social power. 
7 C. F. Roman, ‘Liminality, the execution of Louis XVI and the rise of terror during 
the French Revolution’, in Breaking Boundaries: Varieties of Liminality, ed. A. Horvath, B. 
Thomassen and H. Wydra (New York, 2015), p. 148. Revolution as ‘interregnum’ in J. C. 
Scott, ‘Foreword’, in Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of 
Rule in Modern Mexico, ed. G. M. Joseph and D. Nugent (Durham, N.C., 1994), ix.
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the present.8 Yet even as the revolution opened up a horizon of possibilities, 
revolutionaries also desired to preserve existing social links and an idea of 
community. As an insurrection October 1934 failed, and as a revolution it was 
caught between past and future, preservation and creative destruction. 
Taking control
On 4 October 1934, the announcement of the CEDA’s entry into 
government prompted the socialist leadership in Madrid to issue the order 
for the revolutionary movement to begin. The Spanish socialist leadership 
had laid preparations for a national revolutionary movement, and strikes 
and skirmishes occurred across Spain. The Basque Country was the scene 
of the fiercest clashes outside of Asturias, particularly in industrial areas. 
Militants in most city neighbourhoods and towns in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa 
joined a week-long general strike, punctuated by shootouts with the police, 
widespread sabotage of the railway network and some requisitioning and 
redistribution of foodstuffs.9 The strike was successful in shutting down 
Madrid, but failed to develop into an insurrection. Strikes also occurred 
in the south, including in Badajoz, Malaga, Jaén and Cáceres.10 Events in 
Barcelona responded to a different dynamic. Lluís Companys, leader of the 
Catalan government, proclaimed a Catalan state within a federal republic 
on the evening of 6 October, although this barely lasted twelve hours before 
Companys and his government were arrested.11 
Only in Asturias did the events take the form of a sustained insurrection. 
Teodomiro Menéndez, the envoy destined for Asturias, transported the 
coded message tucked into his hatband to Oviedo by train. The offices of 
Avance dispatched the order to local socialist sections, which were already 
on the alert and, in Sama at least, undertaking guard duties.12  The sound 
of dynamite exploding in the coal valleys in the early hours of 5 October 
signalled the beginning of the revolt. On hearing the explosions, anarchists 
8 H. Arendt, On Revolution (Harmondsworth, 1973 [1963]), pp. 20ff.  
9 J. P. Fusi, El País Vasco: autonomía, revolución, guerra civil (Madrid, 2002), pp. 175–201. 
See J. R. Garai, J. Gutiérrez and J. Chueca, Octubre de 1934 en Euskal Herria (Oñati, 2014) 
for a detailed account. 
10 For a brief survey, see S. Souto Kustrín, ‘Octubre de 1934: historia, mito y memoria’, 
Hispania Nova. Revista de Historia Contemporánea, xi (2013), 477–81. For Madrid, see S. 
Souto Kustrín, ‘Y ¿Madrid? ¿Qué hace Madrid?’: movimento revolucionario y acción colectiva 
(1933–1936) (Madrid, 2004), ch. 3; for Ourense, see J. Prada Rodríguez, De la agitación 
republicana a la represión franquista (Ourense 1934–1939) (Barcelona, 2006), pp. 37–51.
11 For Catalonia, see 6 d’octubre: la desfeta de la revolució catalanista de 1934, ed. A. 
Gonzàlez i Vilalta, M. López Esteve and E. Ucelay-Da Cal (Barcelona, 2014).
12 Taibo, Asturias, pp. 169–70, 179–80; I. Lavilla, Los hombres de octubre (Gijón, 2004), p. 41.
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in La Felguera sent a delegate across the river to Sama to investigate and 
decided subsequently to join the insurrection.13 Stockpiled arms were 
unearthed, and attention turned to ensuring military control of the coal 
valleys by defeating the state security forces.
Preparations for the movement were nevertheless incomplete. Despite 
the gunrunning over the previous months, the revolutionaries were not well 
armed. Only half of the socialist militias had weapons.14 Not every member 
of the socialist ranks had been drilled in preparation for the insurrection. 
Arturo Vázquez, a socialist, later recounted that although he expected 
10,000 participants from Mieres, only 1,300 reliable individuals had been 
entrusted with training and knowledge of the future rising. Trained militants 
in Langreo and San Martín del Rey Aurelio numbered approximately 400 
and 500 respectively.15 Even so, the socialist paramilitary organizations 
were much more developed than that of the Communists, whose MAOC 
(Antifascist Workers’ and Peasants’ Militias) had only started to organize 
shortly before the insurrection.16 When Communists in Sama were invited 
to join the movement, they admitted to not possessing weapons.17 Anarchist 
groups in Gijón had repeatedly requested the socialists share their stockpiles 
of weapons over the previous months, but the socialists had stalled, meaning 
that revolutionaries in the port city were poorly armed.18 The lack of arms 
would never be resolved satisfactorily despite the capture of arms factories 
in Trubia and Oviedo and the improvisation of a rudimentary armaments 
industry in the coalfields. To remedy the shortfall, revolutionaries employed 
dynamite, whose destructive power became an emblem of the insurrection. 
The trained militias were a small proportion of the working-class left, 
yet they vastly outnumbered the state security forces in the coalfields. The 
revolutionaries’ first objective was to attack Civil Guard posts and garrisons. 
In most areas, the battle was relatively short, but in Sama the guards 
resisted for thirty-six hours, which slowed the revolutionaries’ advance.19 
13 XXX [sic], Lo que yo he visto: La Felguera en la revolución asturiana (New York, 1935), 
pp. 9–10; M. Villar, El anarquismo en la insurrección de Asturias: la CNT y la FAI en octubre 
de 1934 (Madrid, 1994 [1935]), p. 119. 
14 J. Rodríguez Muñoz, La revolución de Octubre de 1934 en Asturias: orígenes, desarrollo y 
consecuencias (Oviedo, 2010), p. 236. 
15 Lavilla, Los hombres, pp. 30, 52.
16 In Madrid, the MAOC dated from 1933, at least notionally (see M. Tagüeña Lacorte, 
Testimonio de dos guerras (Barcelona, 1978), p. 38).
17 Lavilla, Los hombres, p. 41. 
18 ‘Informe del Comité Regional de la CNT de Asturias sobre su actuación’, pp. 36–41. 
19 B. Díaz Nosty, La comuna asturiana: revolución de octubre de 1934 (Bilbao, 1974), p. 172. 
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In Aller, SCOM members barricaded themselves in their union centre 
in the only armed resistance to the revolutionaries undertaken by fellow 
civilians. Several died or were captured, while others managed to escape.20 
After the revolutionaries secured the coalfields, attention turned to Oviedo. 
The failure to sabotage the power supply – the signal to revolt – meant 
the uprising had failed to materialize on 5 October as planned. Instead, 
the streets were deserted and the atmosphere was tense, due to a general 
strike.21 The following day militia columns entered the provincial capital 
and managed to gain control of most of the city. Over the next few days 
fighting raged in the city centre, but the revolutionaries were unable to 
dislodge government forces from key buildings, including the Santa Clara 
barracks and the cathedral.
The uprising resulted in a sizeable amount of Asturian territory coming 
under the revolutionaries’ control. The insurrection reached beyond the 
coal valleys and Oviedo to Cangas de Onís in the east and Grado in the 
west, to the coast to the north and south to the border with the province of 
León. The revolutionaries held the upper hand for the first six days of the 
revolt, but during the final week, the momentum shifted to the military 
reinforcements that had arrived by sea and land. The army slowly eroded 
the area under revolutionary control until only the coalfields were left. 
The armed forces were under the command of General Eduardo López 
Ochoa, a liberal and freemason who had been appointed as commander-
in-chief of the 15,000-strong armed forces after Prime Minister Lerroux 
rejected Minister of Defence Diego Hidalgo’s preferred candidate, General 
Francisco Franco. Franco was instead assigned an advisory role. General 
López Ochoa led a regiment of infantry, which descended on Asturias from 
the west; Colonel José Solchaga approached from the east; and General 
Carlos Bosch (later replaced by General Amadeo Balmes) advanced north 
from León, but soon became bogged down by revolutionary resistance in the 
mountain passes. Lieutenant Colonel Juan Yagüe led a detachment of the 
battle-hardened Army of Africa formed by units of the Foreign Legion and 
indigenous Moroccan troops – the Regulares. The air force provided aerial 
support through bombing, which was a particularly terrifying experience 
for residents of the coalfields.22
20 See Taibo, Asturias, pp. 196–8; D. Ruiz, Octubre de 1934: revolución en la República 
española (Madrid, 2008), pp. 292–3. 
21 J. A. Cabezas, Morir en Oviedo: historia en directo (vivencias de un periodista) (Madrid, 
1984), pp. 56–63.
22 S. Balfour, Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War (Oxford, 
2002), pp. 251–2; for López Ochoa’s account, see Campaña militar de Asturias en octubre de 
1934 (narración táctica-episódica) (Madrid, 1936). See also J. E. Álvarez, ‘The Spanish Foreign 
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Government troops reached the outskirts of Oviedo on 11 October, 
which constituted a turning point. The army had already retaken Gijón 
and the insurrectionists in Oviedo had lost momentum. A final push to 
seize the arms factory had not remedied the lack of weapons and it had 
become increasingly clear that the Asturians were on their own, although 
the provincial revolutionary committee felt the need to send someone across 
the lines and all the way to León to read newspapers in order to confirm 
it.23 Regarding the situation to be hopeless, the provincial revolutionary 
committee ordered a retreat on 11 October and distributed 14 million 
pesetas stolen from a bank vault to aid the flight of leading revolutionaries.24 
Even as town and village revolutionary committees fled, the militias did not 
disintegrate. A second provincial committee, formed by younger and more 
radical activists, took the place of the first. This second committee lasted a 
day at most before the revolutionaries regrouped under the leadership of a 
third wave of committees.25 Fighting continued for a further week until the 
government troops entered the coal valleys on 19 October. 
Revolutionary authority was articulated through a network of 
committees. The provincial revolutionary committee functioned as a 
figurehead, but the real dynamism behind revolutionary action lay in the 
committees that managed the revolutionary process at the local level. These 
committees formed in towns or villages, which constituted the logical 
geographical unit for the organization of the insurrection and the locus of 
community-based networks. The composition of the committees reflected 
these solidarities and embodied both the spirit of the Workers’ Alliance and 
previous strike and unity committees. Members of the committees were 
not just prominent local socialists, but also anarchists and communists 
of different stripes. There was a careful commitment to plurality. Political 
groups and unions were allotted proportionately greater influence on the 
committees than their numerical strength to ensure representation for all 
left-wing voices. In ‘eminently socialist’ Mieres, the committee included two 
Legion during the Asturian uprising of October 1934’, War in History, xviii (2011), 200–24. 
Bombing is mentioned in several accounts, e.g., N. Molins i Fábrega, UHP: la insurrección 
proletaria en Asturias (Gijón, 1977 [1935]), pp. 128–9; M. Grossi, La insurrección de Asturias 
(Madrid, 1978 [1935]), pp. 173–5.
23 Taibo, Asturias, p. 390.
24 On the fate of the money, see Taibo, Asturias, pp. 583–7.
25 According to the socialist account, the second committee lasted eight hours. Benavides 
increases this to ten, while Shubert declares it lasted a day (Lavilla, Los hombres, p. 139; M. 
Benavides, La revolución fue así (octubre rojo y negro) (Barcelona, 1935), p. 360; A. Shubert, 
The Road to Revolution in Spain: the Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860–1934 (Urbana, Ill., 1987), 
p. 8); see also Taibo, Asturias, p. 428.
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representatives each from the socialists, anarchists and official Communist 
Party, and one from the dissident communist BOC.26 While there were 
some internal frictions, particularly between dissident communists and the 
PCE, the overall tendency during the insurrection was towards local-level 
co-operation rather than conflict.27
Between re-empowerment and revolution
The seizing of power was depicted as a moment of cathartic release. It 
alleviated the anger and frustration at the harassment of the working class 
caused by the security forces over the previous months. Disarming the 
security forces and occupying the streets asserted left-wing hegemony and 
expressed a particular conception of the social order; the working class was 
now back in control. Carlos Vega, in his report to the PCE, remarked that 
‘reactionary elements’ in Oviedo hid, while ‘workers and women’ appeared 
in the streets and raised their voices to say ‘now it’s our time’ and ‘come out, 
let’s see your faces’.28 A sentimental description of militias departing Pola 
de Laviana enthused that they left ‘the capital of their municipality, the 
whole municipality, in the hands of the representatives of the revolution, in 
many of whom they had placed their confidence and mandate of popular 
revolutionary will through their votes’ in the municipal elections of 1931.29 
The revolution thereby signified the re-empowerment of the left at local level. 
In a similar way, rather than destroying the local seat of political power, the 
new revolutionary committees simply assumed political and administrative 
direction of towns and villages. Militants burned some official documents, 
but did not torch town halls. The local revolutionary committee wrapped 
itself in the cloak of existing authority, to the extent that municipal seals 
were used to validate committee-issued vouchers.30 
The relative normality of life – ‘much more normal than many hastily 
written accounts have suggested’ – similarly reveals a certain continuity in 
the coalfields during the insurrection under the reasserted power of the local 
26 Ruiz, Insurrección, p. 131; Lavilla, Los hombres, the quotation at p. 33.
27 Grossi, a BOC member, unsurprisingly, pointed the finger at the PCE as the focal point 
for ‘disagreements’ (Grossi, La insurrección, pp. 27–8, 45, 48).
28 C. Vega, ‘Copia de un informe remitido al Comité Central del PCE por Carlos Vega 
relativo a los sucesos revolucionarios de octubre de 1934’, CDMH, PS Madrid, box 721, file 
3, p. 8. 
29 Lavilla, Los hombres, p. 75. 
30 A. de Llano Roza de Ampudia, Pequeños anales de quince días: revolución en Asturias 
octubre de 1934 (Oviedo, 1935), p. 181; El Noroeste, 17 Oct. 1934. 
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left.31 In Mieres, as elsewhere, ‘normal life carried on as always [except] a bit 
disturbed by the fear of the aeroplanes’.32 Revolutionaries had no desire for 
the destruction of the economic foundations of coalfield society. Foremen 
were charged with conserving the mines and metalworkers made sure to 
keep the blast furnaces functioning so that they did not cool and crack.33 
Even as goods and cash were pilfered from shops in Siero and Bimenes, 
there was little physical damage to the establishments themselves and in 
areas like Laviana and Allande ‘losses [we]re not worth mentioning’.34 The 
relative normality of life in the coalfields contrasted with that in Oviedo, 
for the capital constituted the frontline. Looting and destruction were more 
common.35 Alfredo Mendizábal, a professor at the University of Oviedo, 
described his ordeal in the midst of the fighting in Oviedo as consisting 
of ‘nine interminable days, with their terrible nights. We could only hear 
gunfire … and the incessant thunder of dynamite’, although he only had 
‘praise’ for the miners who risked their lives to look after them.36 
The case of Laviana provides insight into how revolutionaries sought to 
reconcile the competing aims of preserving social cohesion and re-founding 
the social and economic order in the name of revolution. As in other 
areas under revolutionary control, the use of money was prohibited, but 
the revolutionary authorities developed a novel system that circumvented 
their own ban: the socialist mayor and his deputy organized a monetary 
collection for local shopkeepers. The measure intended to compensate 
businesses – albeit indirectly – for their goods ‘so that small business 
owners [did] not suffer losses’ and the funds continued to grow even after 
the insurrection.37 The improvised system attempted to preserve the fragile 
bonds of community and safeguard the livelihoods of local members of the 
petty bourgeoisie. The initiative in Laviana was unique. Food distribution 
in Pola de Lena had a much sharper revolutionary edge for it divided society 
31 Díaz Nosty, La comuna, p. 174.
32 F. Solano Palacio, La revolución de octubre: quince días de comunismo libertario (Madrid, 
1994 [1936]), p. 52; El Noroeste, 23 Oct. 1934; Llano, Pequeños anales, p. 150.
33 El Noroeste, 29 Nov. 1934; Villar, El anarquismo, p. 125. See also La Veu de Catalunya, 28 
Oct. 1934.
34 Asociación Mercantil Española SA, ‘Segunda Relación de los Comerciantes de Asturias 
que han sufrido quebranto con motive de la huelga revolucionaria’, Barcelona, 5 Nov. 1934, 
CDMH, PS Madrid, J series, box 50, file 3. 
35 Grossi, La insurrección, pp. 28, 41–2; Solano Palacio, La revolución, p. 48. See also 
Región, 15, 18 Dec. 1934 and El Noroeste, 15 Nov. 1934.
36 Cruz y raya: revista de afirmación y negación, Nov. 1934. 




along class lines: the working classes could use vouchers to obtain food 
while the middle class had to pay with money.38 
Replacing money with a voucher system aimed at more than a return to 
the status quo before 5 October or even the elections of November 1933. 
By abolishing money, revolutionaries aimed to strike a blow against the 
socioeconomic underpinnings of society itself. Inhabitants of Oviedo took 
vouchers to shops where staff were forbidden from accepting money, while 
in Mieres a sophisticated system was organized with each family-assigned 
cards allotting them a daily allowance of food. This quota was nevertheless 
calculated using monetary values.39 A similar system was introduced in La 
Felguera after the committee blamed the ‘few scruples of some people’ for 
the need to reorganize the allocation of foodstuffs halfway through the 
insurrection. The value of food allowances was calculated in pesetas.40 What 
mattered for revolutionaries was banning the circulation of money as the 
physical symbol and tangible manifestation of capitalism in the daily lives 
of coalfield residents. 
Banning the use of money was the clearest example of a revolutionary 
measure undertaken during the insurrection. In doing so, the revolutionaries 
acted according to what they believed to be the revolutionary script for 
social revolutions, as defined by previous examples of revolution, the 
teachings of political doctrine and their fantasies of revolutionary utopia.41 
Requisitioning foodstuffs, clothing and transport and reorganizing their 
distribution for the needs of the local population and the insurrectionary 
forces was less clear-cut.42 The measures blended left-wing revolutionary 
dreams with the exigencies of waging war on the state. Reorganizing 
healthcare and controlling the food supply fused radical left ideas with the 
urgent need for committees to pursue greater control over local resources in 
what was developing into a mini civil war.
The language that framed the measures was much less ambiguous. 
The proclamations produced by revolutionary committees and pasted up 
on walls or read out by revolutionary patrols declared that a new world 
was dawning. In separate proclamations issued in Sama and La Felguera, 
38 Grossi, La insurrección, p. 75. 
39 Llano, Pequeños anales, pp. 67, 177–8; Grossi, La insurrección, p. 77. Solano Palacio 
claims money was banned everywhere, except in Sama (La revolución, p. 72).
40 Villar, El anarquismo, pp. 123–4. 
41 See Scripting Revolution: a Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions, 
ed. K. M. Baker and D. Edelstein (Stanford, Calif., 2015).
42 See Ruiz, Insurrección, p. 126; Villar, El anarquismo, pp. 114–15; for Sotrondio, see El 
Noroeste, 23 Oct. 1934.
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the ‘revolutionary movement’ and ‘social revolution’ were announced to 
have ‘triumphed’.43 An eloquent proclamation attributed to libertarian 
influences from the market town of Grado framed the moment slightly 
differently. It declared that a ‘new society’ was emerging from the death of 
the old in a process governed by ‘natural laws’. With power in the hands 
of revolutionaries, the revolution had succeeded, but the fruits of victory 
remained just beyond their grasp: ‘a few hours – no longer – and there will 
be more bread on every table and joy in every heart’.44 
The proclamations announced the revolution as a rupture in historical 
time that constituted a new beginning. Yet the imagined re-founding of the 
social, economic and political order was nevertheless tied to the community 
as the source of legitimacy. In Sama, the revolution was ‘triumphant’ thanks 
to ‘the community [pueblo]’; in Mieres, the committee was the ‘interpreter 
of the popular will’; and in Valdesoto (Siero) money was banned by 
‘agreement of the assembled community [pueblo reunido]’.45 The committee 
in Grado imagined itself to be channelling the community’s desires and 
called on the community to ‘feel intense satisfaction at seeing their ideal 
realized’.46 
The revolutionary enthusiasm, the falsehoods they peddled and 
their unclear authorship mean that historians have been critical of the 
proclamations.47 Certainly the proclamations cannot be read as representative 
of all revolutionaries, still less the communities under their control. Yet 
the proclamations are the only surviving documents produced in the 
heat of the revolutionary process and served to articulate the revolution, 
43 For the proclamation issued by the Sama Revolutionary Committee, see Molins i 
Fábrega, UHP, pp. 88–9; for the proclamation issued by the La Felguera Revolutionary 
Committee, 6 Oct. 1934, see Llano, Pequeños anales, p. 161.  
44 For the proclamation issued by the Grado Revolutionary Committee, undated, see 
Villar, El anarquismo, pp. 90–2.
45 For the proclamation issued by the Sama Revolutionary Committee, see Molins 
i Fábrega, UHP, pp. 88–9; for the proclamation issued by the Mieres Revolutionary 
Committee, see D. Ruiz, Asturias contemporánea (1808–1936) (Madrid, 1975), pp. 104–5; 
for the proclamation issued by the Valdesoto Revolutionary Committee, see Villar, El 
anarquismo, p. 121.
46 For the proclamation issued by the Grado Revolutionary Committee, undated, see 
Villar, El anarquismo, pp. 90–2.
47 E.g. Taibo, Asturias, pp. 454–5; Ruiz, Insurrección, p. 127. Alejandro Valdés, a 
Communist, claimed authorship of one of the bandos (F. Erice, ‘El octubre asturiano. Entre 
el mito y la interpretación histórica’, in De un octubre a otro: revolución y fascismo en el 




announce a radical rupture and open up ‘the realm of the possible’.48 The 
documents framed the situation as revolutionary and individual actors as 
revolutionaries. The socialist Alberto Fernández recognized forty years after 
the events that the propaganda produced was ‘absurd’, yet it was ‘effective 
in accordance with the enthusiasm of the moment’.49 The proclamations 
were not a reflection of reality, but an attempt to call a new revolutionary 
reality into being by encouraging local residents to perceive themselves as 
experiencing a revolutionary beginning.
The proclamations and measures pursued by the committees were one 
way of trying to give shape to the revolution. Another means of defining 
the revolution was through violence. Behind the frontline, the violence 
that accompanied the birth of the new order overwhelmingly targeted 
the Church. As part of the initial wave of violence, church buildings and 
religious images were destroyed across the coalfields.50 As on previous 
occasions, such as the ‘Tragic Week’ of 1909 when convents and churches 
were burned in Barcelona, and as would occur during the Civil War, the 
Church was the institution singled out to ‘bear the sins of the old order’.51 
During the Asturian October, to detain the priest and wreak destruction 
in the parish church formed part of the revolutionary ritual – it was ‘to 
do something revolutionary’.52 In Tuilla, images were publicly burned and 
vestments worn in the street in a public expunging of religion from the 
community.53 Not only was Catholicism the most visible and widespread 
symbol that could be identified with the right, but anticlericalism was also 
an important way of showing one’s radical mettle. 
The revolution would therefore be anticlerical and the majority of the 
victims of the revolutionary ‘furies’ were religious personnel. Thirty-three 
priests, seminarians and religious were killed during the insurrection. Either 
they were murdered, or they died in unclear circumstances, while many 
48 E. Selbin, Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: the Power of Story (London, 2010), p. 24.
49 See Taibo, Asturias, p. 455. 
50 El Noroeste, 23 Oct. 1934; Región, 11 Nov. 1934.
51 M. Vincent, ‘“The keys of the kingdom”: religious violence in the Spanish civil war, 
July–August 1936’, in The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 
1936–1939, ed. C. Ealham and M. Richards (Cambridge, 2005), p. 72. On Tragic Week, the 
classic study is J. C. Ullman, Tragic Week: a Study of Anticlericalism in Spain (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1968).
52 J. Canel [J. Díaz Fernández], Octubre rojo en Asturias (Barcelona, 1984 [1935]), pp. 
145–6. 
53 S. Noval Suárez, Langreo Rojo: historia del martirio y persecución de los sacerdotes en el 




more were arrested and imprisoned. The victims were male. Just as female 
religious would suffer much less violence during the Civil War, in 1934, 
female religious were not only spared the furies, but also escorted away 
from danger in Oviedo. This reflected the ‘taboo’ of killing nuns and a 
chauvinistic attitude that women were not a threat to the revolutionary 
process, which extended to female religious even being asked to provide 
food and medical care.54 A further eleven civilians including well-known 
rightists, company bosses, a magistrate, and a student, also died at the 
hands of revolutionaries, as well as ten civil and assault guards who died or 
were killed away from the frontline.55 Revolutionary violence targeted those 
identified as political enemies of the working class left. 
These killings cannot be reduced to a simple logic, chronology or 
geographical area, but there was a degree of patterning to the violence. 
Several fatalities occurred in an initial settling of scores as revolutionaries 
seized control of the coalfields. In this context, revolutionary violence 
could either subsume or offer a veneer of justification for the extrajudicial 
exaction of popular justice or personal vendettas. The parish priest 
of Valdecuna (Mieres) and Rafael Rodríguez Arango, director of the 
Carbones La Nueva mining company, were both killed on the first day 
of the insurrection in separate incidents. The latter, who had previously 
been attacked in September 1934, was targeted in a case of revenge over 
a labour dispute.56 Adolfo Suárez, a magistrate, was shot by a militiaman 
in Oviedo after being implicated in the Sanjurjo coup.57 The lethal use of 
violence was not just a demonstration of proletarian power and the righting 
of perceived past wrongs. One explanation for the murder of the director 
of the Manjoya dynamite factory posits that the attack was an attempt by 
someone to ingratiate himself with the revolutionary militias.58 In this case, 
the lethal performance of class hatred served to bind the individual to the 
revolutionary community with blood. 
Score-settling was curbed by the rapid assertion of revolutionary 
authority. Once an area was under the control of the committees or 
militias such instances were less common. The most infamous killings 
54 See Llano, Pequeños anales, pp. 17, 26, 35, 50, 61–2, 81–2. For medical care and food 
preparation, see Noval Suárez, Langreo rojo, pp. 33, 107; ACNP, Asturias Roja, p. 76. For the 
‘taboo’, see Vincent, ‘“Keys”’, p. 86.
55 Díaz Nosty, La comuna, pp. 338–40.
56 M. Castejón Rodríguez, ‘La patronal hullera asturiana en la Segunda República’ 
(unpublished UNED PhD thesis, 2009), pp. 404, 415.
57 Canel, Octubre, p. 137.
58 Taibo, Asturias, p. 272.
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occurred in two separate episodes in Turón that stand out for taking place 
in an area firmly under revolutionary control, rather than on the fringes of 
revolutionary authority or at the beginning of the insurrection. Eight de la 
Salle brothers who worked at the school owned by Hulleras del Turón, their 
Passionist confessor and two carabineros (customs guards) were taken from 
their prison on the night of 8–9 October and executed in the cemetery. The 
local parish priest and coadjutor shared their prison but were spared this 
fate. Probing into why they survived may shed light on the deaths of their 
former fellow prisoners. The coadjutor later explained that the two of them 
were saved because ‘only eleven prisoners could fit’ in the lorry.59 According 
to a martyrological account, when the revolutionaries came to collect the 
religious brothers, they questioned the parish priest and coadjutor about 
‘the amount of time they had been imprisoned, their names, etc.’, before 
deciding they could stay.60 Any explanation of the deaths is necessarily 
speculative, but in saving the parish clergy while sending the de la Salle 
brothers and a Passionist confessor to their deaths, the revolutionaries singled 
out the individuals with fewer established links to the local community. The 
de la Salle brothers taught children from the valley, but they were outsiders: 
none was Asturian, they lived a life relatively isolated from the community 
and several had only recently arrived in Turón. The confessor was only in 
the valley to confess the children. The de la Salle brothers worked in a 
school funded by Hulleras del Turón and they could have symbolized the 
local structures of capitalism. 
The brothers were not the only figures connected to Hulleras del Turón 
to be killed. Rafael del Riego, director of Hulleras del Turón, and two 
others figures linked to the company and the local political right were also 
murdered days later. Different explanations have been offered, including 
revenge for blacklisting during labour conflicts or for the killings of civilians 
on the outskirts of Oviedo by government forces, or a desire to silence 
Riego because of what he could later testify about the revolutionaries.61 
While the latter is much less plausible, citizens in Mieres and Sama did 
clamour for reprisals against prisoners in response to reports of killings by 
government forces, and guard duties had to be increased. At the time of the 
second wave of murders in Turón, the revolution was on the retreat, and 
59 Á. Garralda García, La persecución religiosa del clero en Asturias 1934, 1936 y 1937: martirios 
y odiseas (Avilés, 2009 [1977]), pp. 506–8.
60 Los mártires de Turón: notas biográficas y reseña del martirio de los religiosos bárbaramente 
asesinados por los revolucionarios en Turón (Asturias) el 9 de octubre de 1934 (Madrid/Barcelona, 
1934), p. 68. 
61 Taibo, Asturias, p. 447; Ruiz, Octubre, p. 289.
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bombing by government forces was taking its toll. It is possible that killing 
Riego and two other representatives of the political right in Turón was a 
vengeful, symbolic act of revolutionary justice. Similar reprisals would also 
be seen after air raids during the Spanish Civil War.62
The overall tally of approximately fifty deaths, while significant, is 
remarkably low – and much lower than revolutionary violence in the central 
and eastern European soviets at the end of the First World War, which itself 
paled in comparison to the brutality of the wave of counter-revolutionary 
revenge.63 The proliferation of arms, increasing disillusionment during 
the last days of the Asturian insurrection and strain of fighting the army, 
along with a population of tens of thousands under their control begs the 
question as to why vengeful revolutionary violence did not claim more 
victims. Scholars of other revolutionary contexts have underlined that areas 
experiencing a power vacuum or disputes between rival groups for control 
of a given area often see a greater prevalence of violence.64 There was no 
real interregnum or power vacuum in the coalfields, nor were there warring 
revolutionary factions. Revolutionary authority was constituted quickly 
and generally curtailed the use of violence, with the notable exception 
of the killings in Turón. Militias respected the authority and decisions of 
the committees rather than operating independently as marauding bands. 
Those arrested were taken straight to the local revolutionary committee. In 
the case of two Jesuits murdered at the roadside in Mieres, the two clerics 
had first been arrested and taken before the revolutionary committee in 
Mieres. Their captors only executed them when the committee refused to 
take charge of them.65
Revolutionaries in Mieres and Sama protected civil guards from the 
‘mob’ and refused to cede to a popular desire for cathartic violence. When 
the hiding place of the leader of FE-JONS in Mieres was discovered, 
revolutionaries protected him and Belarmino Tomás is said to have sworn 
‘bloody hell, I’ll strangle whoever shoots. They belong to the revolution; 
they’re not yours or mine’ as he shepherded a civil guard through a crowd in 
Sama.66 Tomás distinguished between just and illegitimate uses of violence 
62 Grossi, La insurrección, pp. 106–8; G. Ranzato, ‘The Spanish Civil War in the context 
of total war’, in ‘If You Tolerate This …’: the Spanish Civil War in the Age of Total War, ed. M. 
Baumeister and S. Schüler-Springorum (Frankfurt, 2008), p. 240.
63 R. Gerwarth, ‘The central European counter-revolution: paramilitary violence in 
Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War’, Past & Present, cc (2008), 175–209.
64 Gerwarth and Conway, ‘Revolution’, p. 144. 
65 F. Martínez, Dos jesuitas mártires en Asturias (Burgos, 1936), pp. 43–55. 
66 El Noroeste, 19 Sept. 1935; Taibo, Asturias, p. 220.
143
Revolution
for revolutionary ends. The violence of the revolution was envisaged as 
grander and nobler than the murdering of prisoners. For the revolution’s 
supporters, delineating the boundaries of violence served to define the 
limits of the revolution itself. Young women interceded on behalf of a 
priest, shouting ‘blood, no. Blood, no. Revolution, only revolution’, when 
some wanted to kill him.67 Revolution was distinguished from bloodletting. 
Even though professing anticlericalism was an important marker of left-
wing identity, there was not universal approval of the use of violence 
against the Church. Socialists on the provincial revolutionary committee 
firmly opposed using dynamite against the cathedral, whose tower was an 
important strategic position for the government forces. Militiamen ignored 
their opposition and destroyed an ancient chapel in an attempt to breach 
the cathedral walls.68
The fate of the vast majority of the perceived enemies or threats to the 
revolution was to be remanded in prison. The arrest of engineers, business 
owners and members of clergy were widespread, and other detainees 
included a judge and pharmacists.69 The bosses at Duro-Felguera, despite 
having engaged in a long and bitter dispute with the CNT in 1933, were 
kept confined in the company offices for their own safety. They were 
denied freedom, but were not physically harmed.70 Preventative arrests of 
those perceived as potential enemies merged with taking advantage of the 
insurrection to settle political scores. Given that revolutionaries drew on 
their own experiences in the towns and villages when making arrests, the 
two were virtually consubstantial. A later account of the events in Olloniego 
attributed many of the arrests to the fractious relationship between the 
PRLD and the socialists.71 Unsurprisingly, those arrested were often defined 
as fascists, whether they were members of the Catholic Youth, CEDA or 
priests.72 The term was used flexibly to designate enemies of the revolution.
Even as the patrols made dozens of arrests, many rightists remained free 
or in hiding. If the voting figures from the 1933 elections were an indication 
of political leanings, to arrest all rightists would have been impossible. 
67 Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas de Oviedo, Asturias roja (octubre de 
1934): sacerdotes y religiosos perseguidos y martirizados (Oviedo, n.d. [1935]), p. 75.
68 This occurred as the first committee discussed the withdrawal of the revolutionaries 
(Díaz Nosty, La comuna, pp. 204–5). 
69 For reports on Olloniego, Mieres and Sotrondio, see El Noroeste, 20, 23 Oct., 15 Nov. 
1934. 
70 Noval Suárez, Langreo rojo, pp. 101–5. 
71 El Noroeste, 15 Nov. 1934. 
72 See ACNP, Asturias roja, pp. 60, 199; Los mártires de Turón, p. 58; Canel, Octubre, p. 137.
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When conducting arrests, revolutionaries targeted significant representative 
figures of the right and middle class in an attempt to intimidate right-
leaning citizens. Arrests were thus a symbolic move that underlined the 
forging of a new revolutionary society, while also serving as a warning to 
opponents. The symbolic nature of revolutionary justice extended to the 
revolutionaries’ own ranks. In Oviedo, Teodomiro Menéndez, the veteran 
Asturian socialist leader and a reluctant revolutionary, was responsible for 
those detained by revolutionary patrols in Oviedo. He imprisoned some 
of those brought before him, but released many more. Although some 
younger revolutionaries criticized him, in general there was satisfaction that 
he was going through the motions of implementing revolutionary justice.73 
The performance of authority was sufficient to satisfy the militias. Just as 
arresting the priest and abolishing the use of money was a fundamental 
part of the revolutionary process, so was hauling the detainees before a 
committee or improvised tribunal in order to enact a new form of justice. 
Implicit in reshaping the social order was the understanding that the 
principles underpinning justice had changed. 
Would-be revolutionaries turned to reference points from their political 
culture in order to orientate and understand their actions. They fell back 
on revolutionary ‘scripts’ by invoking or imitating pre-existing models, 
though through their own interpretation. Unsurprisingly, Asturian 
revolutionaries turned in part to the example set by the most recent 
reference point: the Bolshevik Revolution. The intention of creating a 
‘Red Army’ is the clearest example of seeking to emulate the Russian 
revolutionary ‘script’ and indeed it followed, intentionally or otherwise, 
the advice in the Comintern-produced handbook for revolutionaries, 
Armed Insurrection.74 Militias dubbed ‘Red Guards’ already policed the 
rear-guard of the revolution through patrols that stopped and questioned 
residents, conducted arrests and read out proclamations.75 The Red Army, 
meanwhile, would exhibit ‘iron discipline’ and impose severe punishments 
for desertion and disobedience.76 Not all agreed with the prospect of 
a Red Army, particularly the anarchists, although a wall poster in an 
anarchist district of Gijón that spoke of a ‘Red Army’ reveals the issue to 
be more complicated than the clear-cut distinctions made by accounts in 
73 Cabezas, Morir, p. 102; Díaz Nosty, La comuna, p. 279.  
74 A. Neuberg, Armed Insurrection (London, 1970 [1928]), p. 186.
75 Molins i Fábrega, UHP, p. 136. 
76 For the proclamation issued by the Sama Revolutionary Committee, 7 Oct. 1934, see 
Molins i Fábrega, UHP, p. 125. 
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the aftermath of the insurrection.77 The Red Army did not materialize; 
instead, it remained limited to a desire printed on the proclamations. But 
even as a rhetorical device, declaring that a Red Army was the missing 
ingredient for a ‘total triumph’ indicates that the revolutionary process 
was understood and measured according to the Russian precedent.78 
As the militias retreated from the advancing army, forming a ruthless, 
disciplined Red Army would be the way to success. 
Referencing Russia in the proclamations also elevated the Asturian 
insurrection into a longer narrative of epic revolutionary struggles, both 
geographically and temporally. Invoking the Red Army and the Bastille in the 
revolutionary proclamations staked the Asturians’ claim to the importance 
of the insurrection. They were heirs to a longer tradition of European 
revolutions and now the ‘world [was] watching’ them. The revolutionaries 
had to fulfil their historical duty and the expectations of the workers of the 
world, although they could rely on the assistance of the ‘fatherland of the 
proletariat’ to help them construct ‘the solid Marxist edifice on the ashes 
of all that is rotten’.79 Fernando Solano Palacio, an anarchist, reported that 
‘Bolsheviks’ even spread rumours that there were Soviet warships located off 
the Spanish coast poised to come to the Asturians’ aid.80 
More common than international references was the publication of 
domestic ‘news’ in the proclamations. Proclamations reported on alleged 
victories by columns of left-wing militias across Spain, from the capturing 
of provincial capitals to the arrest of leading politicians. The news was a 
complete fabrication. The news – or propaganda – functioned on one level 
to encourage local citizens to contribute to the revolutionaries’ war effort 
and increase collective confidence in victory. On another, the fake news was 
a means of constructing revolutionary authority and legitimacy. The authors 
employed relatively sophisticated techniques to convince local inhabitants 
of the veracity of the reports. A proclamation issued in Grado presented 
news via a list consisting of two curt, informative sentences per province, 
which evoked the style of telegrams and lent it an air of authenticity.81 In 
77 El Llano Revolutionary Committee, ‘Parte del día de hoy’, undated, in Llano, Pequeños 
anales, p. 132. 
78 Sama Revolutionary Committee, ‘Noticias de Madrid’, 7 Oct. 1934, in Molins i 
Fábrega, UHP, p. 138. 
79 For the proclamation issued by the Provincial Revolutionary Committee, 16 Oct. 1934, 
see Molins i Fábrega, UHP, pp. 130–1.
80 Solano Palacio, La revolución, p. 51.
81 El Llano Revolutionary Committee, ‘Parte del día de hoy’, and Grado Revolutionary 




Turón, the committee had taken control of a radio station and broadcasted 
to the local population using loudspeakers. Revolutionary programming 
included ‘imaginary talks’ in French between the Asturian aristocrat 
Pedro Pidal and the French president, at least according to the right-wing 
journalist Luis Bolín.82 
Stress, uncertainty and rumour abounded, and so these reports preyed 
on a local population hungry for reliable information.83 Residents of the 
coalfields could only access the revolutionaries’ version of events or the 
newspapers and flyers dropped by the Spanish air force that encouraged 
the insurrectionaries to surrender. The government-produced flyers denied 
there was any upheaval in Asturias, which residents in the grip of the 
insurrection could see was a patent lie. One revolutionary proclamation 
played on the evident untruth to cast doubt on the government’s claim that 
the rest of Spain was calm.84 Few revolutionaries believed the reports that 
did filter through. A captured mineworker told government forces that the 
revolutionaries thought the radio reports were lies.85  
The news reports were also an expression of exuberant revolutionary 
creativity. Revolutionaries imagined and projected possible, plausible 
futures. Ceferino Álvarez later wrote that ‘we kept people informed about 
everything that was going on, of how we arrived in Oviedo, of how things 
were going’ and ‘we were always objective and limited ourselves to what was 
really happening, to what was true and to what we were hoping for’.86 He 
allowed for a creative interpretation of reality. This revolutionary creativity 
was also patent in expressions of revolutionary identity across walls and 
vehicles, in what was one of the most striking features of the coal valleys 
noted by journalists who visited in the aftermath. Journalists observed that 
‘all of the armour-plated vehicles had big red letters which read: “¡viva la 
revolución!” [and] “Asturias is under our control. UHP!”’ and that there 
were ‘no walls in Asturias in which there is not a viva to Russia scrawled 
or inscriptions like “Let’s save Russia!”’.87 The Belgian Mathieu Corman, 
82 L. Bolín, Spain: the Vital Years (London, 1967), p. 132. 
83 This is a common theme in M. Álvarez Suárez, Sangre de octubre: U.H.P. Episodios de la 
revolución en Asturias (Madrid, 1936), e.g. pp. 58–9.
84 For the proclamation issued by the Provincial Revolutionary Committee, 11 Oct. 1934, 
see Ruiz, Asturias contemporánea, p. 106.
85 Canel, Octubre, p. 107.
86 C. Fontalbat and C. Álvarez, Ceferino Álvarez Rey: historia de un minero de Asturias 
(1907–2009) (Oviedo, 2010), p. 85. 
87 Cabezas, Morir, p. 94; La Veu de Catalunya, 28 Oct. 1934. See also Solano Palacio, La 
revolución, p. 81. 
147
Revolution
who made a detour on his motorcycle journey to the region for some 
revolutionary tourism, saw a road sign that read ‘Gijón 60km’ and under 
which someone had scrawled, ‘Moscow, just a step away’.88 
A revolutionary community
The awkward synthesis of restoring perceived lost left hegemony and 
the revolutionary re-founding of the social order was also evident in 
how a revolutionary community was mobilized. This collective subject 
was constructed partly through violence, which served to cement the 
brotherhood of militiamen and exclude those identified as enemies, but also 
through the symbols and strategies to regulate access to the revolutionary 
community. The requirements of armed struggle meant the mobilization 
of local society and provided an opportunity for people to be protagonists 
in armed struggle and actively participate in reshaping the local social, 
political and economic order. 
The insurrection provided a particular opportunity for young people, who 
played a key role in the militias and the wider revolutionary insurrection. The 
author of a later account of the insurrection in Olloniego was scandalized at 
the involvement of the ‘maddened youth’ who were the protagonists of the 
revolt: ‘sixteen-year-old rascals armed with dynamite and a rifle slung over 
their shoulders’.89 Female protagonism in the insurrection scandalized some 
commentators. There are some limited vignettes of women’s participation in 
the insurrection as fighters. According to the authorities, eighteen year-old 
Dolores Vázquez dressed as a man and carried two pistols on the frontline.90 
But in general, fighting remained a male preserve, reflecting patterns of 
political violence in wider interwar Europe.91 Grossi, a committee member 
in Mieres, claimed that women did fight, yet provides no further evidence, 
while a socialist recounted that women in Mieres were refused arms and 
had to accompany the militias as nurses.92 
Although opportunities for frontline militia service were limited, young 
women did take advantage of the situation provided by the insurrection to 
play an active role in the revolutionary process, even if they were obliged 
to adopt roles less challenging of traditional gender norms. Women’s active 
88 M. Corman, Incendiarios de ídolos: un viaje por la revolución de Asturias, trans. C. García 
Velasco (Oviedo, 2009 [1935]), p. 65.
89 El Noroeste, 15 Nov. 1934. 
90 El Noroeste, 9 Dec. 1934.
91 M. Vincent, ‘Political violence and mass society: a European civil war?’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of European History, 1914–1945, ed. N. Doumanis (Oxford, 2016), p. 400.
92 Grossi, La insurrección, pp. 37, 58; Lavilla, Los hombres, p. 39.  
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participation in the insurrection tended to be in similar auxiliary tasks, such 
as medical care  or food preparation, as was common during the Civil War.93 
In September 1935, a female member of the Communist Youth was arrested 
near Madrid. She confessed to having participated in the insurrection 
as a stretcher-bearer and by transporting dynamite, before hiding in the 
mountains.94 The parents of a young woman arrested in the mountains after 
the insurrection lamented their ‘double disgrace’ in that she had besmirched 
her family’s honour by participating in the revolution and accompanying 
a man to whom she was not married.95 Even Aida Lafuente, the most 
celebrated female revolutionary martyr who is represented as dying with a 
machine gun in her hands, had spent her time working in food preparation, 
or as a messenger or a nurse before Oviedo came under attack.96 Women’s 
participation in violence was much easier to eulogize retrospectively. 
The revolutionary community adapted existing symbols and created 
new ones to help forge a sense of collective identity and cohesion. The 
Internationale was no longer simply a song of ‘hope’ expressing a desire 
for emancipation; it was now linked to armed action and victory.97 It was 
sung after defeating the civil guards in Olloniego, as militias departed for 
the front and when the arms factory in Trubia was captured.98 Singing The 
Internationale was a conscious collective performance of the working class 
as a revolutionary subject. The raised clenched fist became the ubiquitous 
revolutionary gesture. It had originated in the German Communist Party 
in the 1920s and would be the quintessential symbol of antifascism during 
Spanish Civil War.99 When individuals or groups met in the street, they 
raised their clenched fists and uttered the passwords of ‘salud, comrade’ 
or ‘UHP’.100 Requisitioned vehicles with ‘UHP’ daubed in red on their 
93 M. A. Mateos, ¡Salud, compañeras! Mujeres socialistas en Asturias (1900–1937) (Oviedo, 
2007), p. 180. See also El Noroeste, 20 Oct. 1934; Taibo, Asturias, p. 313. On the Civil War, see 
M. Nash, Defying Male Civilization: Women in the Spanish Civil War (Denver, Colo., 1995), 
particularly at pp. 105–9.
94 El Noroeste, 20 Sept. 1935. 
95 El Noroeste, 9 Dec. 1934.
96 Taibo, Asturias, pp. 415–17.
97 Grossi, La insurrección, p. 29. 
98 El Noroeste, 15 Nov. 1934; Solano Palacio, La revolución, p. 54; Díaz Nosty, La comuna, 
p. 219. See also Benavides, La revolución, p. 228.
99 For background, see H. García, ‘Was there an antifascist culture in 1930s Spain?’, in 
Rethinking Antifascism: History, Memory and Politics, 1922 to the Present, ed. H. García, M. 
Yusta, X. Tabet and C. Clímaco (New York, 2016), p. 101. 
100 There are reports of other passwords: ‘PP’ (‘proletarian power’), ‘Trabajadores rojos 
salud’ (‘salud, red workers’), ‘FAI’, ‘Pablo Iglesias’ and ‘Hermanos proletarios, salud’ (‘salud, 
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windscreens sounded their horns three times, once for each letter of the 
password.101 
These symbols and gestures were not simply public performances of 
revolutionary fraternity and support for the insurrection. The gesture and 
password were also a key mechanism for managing the local population. 
They served to regulate access to the revolutionary community. As Vega 
later explained, ‘[e]verywhere the password UHP was demanded’; without 
it, an individual would be ‘arrested and identified straightaway’.102 Yet other 
evidence suggests that militias and committees were not always so zealous 
in excluding those who were not revolutionaries. They did not always 
detain those unfamiliar with the new code of behaviour; rather, at times 
they adopted an instructional role in order to manage the local population. 
In Oviedo, a priest greeted revolutionaries with a fascist salute and ‘salud, 
comrades’. Rather than assaulting or arresting him, the militiamen showed 
him the correct salutation.103 In a similar case in Aller, the revolutionary 
committee instructed a Passionist brother in the correct performance of the 
raised fist salute.104 Revolutionaries were conscious that local society was not 
starkly delineated between friend and foe. Those in the grey zone between 
the two could be incorporated into the revolutionary process. 
Such incorporation could be conducted through coercion. Later reports 
maintain that some were forced to ‘do guard duty or go to the frontline’.105 
Witness statements from an investigation into an assault in September 1935 
include the allegation that the accused and his brother had been coerced into 
participating in the insurrection by undertaking guard duties. He singled out 
the victim of the assault as the revolutionary responsible.106 Some rightists 
and members of the clergy attempted to evade arrest or persecution by 
volunteering their labour in the makeshift hospitals. They could justify this 
ostensible support for the insurrection on humanitarian grounds. Despite 
the intimacy of the coalfield communities, others managed to disguise 
proletarian brothers’). Nevertheless, UHP was the main password (Cabezas, Morir, p. 114; 
Ruiz, Insurrección, p. 98, n. 1; Álvarez Suárez, Sangre, p. 188).
101 Suárez Álvarez, Sangre, p. 104.
102 Vega, ‘Copia’, p. 13. See also C. Vega, ‘Notas complementarias al informe elevado al 
Comité Central del PCE’, CDMH, PS Madrid, box 721, file 3, p. 14.
103 ACNP, Asturias roja, p. 73. 
104 Episodios de la revolución en Asturias: los pasionistas de Mieres (Asturias) y la revolución de 
octubre de 1934. Episodios narrados por los mismos protagonistas (Santander, 1935), pp. 67–8. 
105 El Noroeste, 15 Nov. 1934; Taibo, Asturias, p. 457. 
106 AHPA, AP, box 78437, file 178 (1935).
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themselves as a way of surviving the insurrection.107 The revolutionary 
community was thus formed of a combination of willing volunteers and 
those who understood its new codes and symbols, as well as those co-opted 
into participating in the revolutionary process. Proclamations threatening 
those who looted or disseminated false news reveal the fragility of the 
community that the revolutionaries were attempting to construct and the 
codes of revolutionary honour that underpinned it.
Defeat
The revolutionary utopia proclaimed as triumphant at the beginning of 
the insurrection slowly slipped out of reach during the second week of the 
fighting. The final proclamations accepted that defeat was inevitable and 
began to historicize the insurrection. The third provincial revolutionary 
committee – headed by Belarmino Tomás and based in Sama – framed 
the end of the revolution as ‘a stop on the way, a parenthesis, a restorative 
rest’ and a ‘truce in the struggle’; the insurrection was no longer a historical 
terminus, but part of the onward march towards the inevitable revolution.108 
The anarchist committee in La Felguera echoed these sentiments. The 
revolution now belonged to the future, not the present: ‘When it will be 
we do not know, but we will participate [in it], because our ideas inspire us, 
they make our impulses vibrate and accelerate the pace of our revolutionary 
train’.109
Despite the fragility of revolutionary authority during the final days of 
the insurrection, it did not splinter and collapse. The insurrection ended 
with a remarkable negotiated surrender. Belarmino Tomás crossed the lines 
and parleyed with General López Ochoa. Tomás, prompted by reports of 
murder, rape and looting by government troops on the outskirts of Oviedo, 
had two conditions of surrender: there would be no reprisals and the 
Moroccan troops would remain at the rear.110 According to the agreement, 
the army would enter the coalfields on 19 October. The transfer of authority 
from the committees to the army was relatively orderly. In Mieres, the 
committee released its prisoners and established a transitional authority.111 
107 See M. Kerry, ‘Painted tonsures and potato-sellers: priests, passing and survival in the 
Asturian Revolution’, Cultural & Social History, xiv (2017), 237–55. 
108 For the proclamation issued by the Provincial Revolutionary Committee, 18 Oct. 1934, 
see Ruiz, Asturias contemporánea, p. 107.
109 For the proclamation issued by the La Felguera Revolutionary Committee, 18 Oct. 
1934, see Villar, El anarquismo, pp. 136–7. 
110 See the interview with Tomás in Le Populaire, 5, 6 Jan. 1935.
111 Grossi, La insurrección, pp. 128–9. 
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Meanwhile, revolutionary leaders and militias fled into the mountains. 
Some would go into exile and not return until 1936.
With the defeat of the revolutionary insurrection, the Asturian October 
– or ‘commune’ – entered the pantheon of failed left-wing attempts at 
revolution. Without wider support, it was doomed to fail. The Asturian 
revolutionaries did not envisage that they would be on their own. Their 
confidence in success is evident in the enthusiastic reception given to the 
first planes seen overhead during the insurrection. Before the bombs began 
to fall, the planes were recognized as ‘emissaries’ of revolution rather than 
a reconnaissance mission. A landing strip was even cleared in Laviana and 
shouts of ‘they are ours!’ greeted the first planes that flew over Olloniego, 
where ‘it seemed logical not to suppose anything different … and it was even 
said that a pilot saluted with a raised fist’.112 Revolutionaries wanted to see 
themselves reflected in the pilots. Even as a failed revolution, the Asturian 
insurrection was lived as a revolutionary process. The proclamations 
attempted to call into being a revolutionary future, even if this did not 
actually occur. 
The fate of the insurrection depended on external, national factors. The 
context was far less propitious than the situation in central and eastern 
Europe at the end of the First World War, where defeat, demobilization, 
hunger and the dissolution of traditional political authority offered a 
window for a potential radical left seizure of power. The situation was very 
different in Spain in 1934. There was no crisis of the state, in either its 
legitimacy or capacity to act. Crucially, the military was willing to defend 
the government, though the Army of Africa was drafted in to crush the 
insurrection, as it was believed to be more trustworthy and less tainted by 
domestic politics than the forces on the mainland.113 The critical role played 
by the military is clear when compared to 1931 and 1936. Whereas the army 
refused to stand by King Alfonso XIII in 1931, it was divided in 1936, with 
significant sectors willing to follow conspirators in rebelling against the 
government.
The insurrection was not just an event; it was also a process. It is necessary 
to take the words and ideas of the participants seriously, as they provide a 
window onto the world that they tried to outline and create, even if the 
visions were nothing more than the ink on proclamations pasted on walls 
in public places. As in any revolution, the insurrectionaries had to work 
out how to recast the social, political and economic order, and it is not 
surprising that they swayed between reasserting left-wing hegemony – a 
112 Llano, Pequeños anales, p. 159; Lavilla, Los hombres, p. 26. 
113 Balfour, Deadly Embrace, p. 251.
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situation they were familiar with – and attempts to destroy the existing 
order. The revolution was a liminal moment caught between the reassertion 
of the old and the construction of the new. It was a contested process 
that was understood and defined by participants, whether militias or 
committees, in different ways. The violence and the symbols used to define 
the revolutionary community – who belonged and who did not – went to 
the very core of the struggle to define what the revolution was.  
It is not clear how many died in the Asturian October. In his detailed 
quantitative study of political violence in the Second Republic, González 
Calleja is unable to provide a definitive figure. The blurring of fighting into 
the repression as well as mass burials and the burning of corpses make any 
figure an approximation. The circumstances of death are only known for 
200 revolutionaries, at best a quarter of the final figure. The official death 
toll stands at 855 civilians – which includes revolutionaries, victims of the 
repression and others who died behind the lines – and 229 members of the 
security forces and army in Asturias, which ascends to 1,051 civilians and 
284 soldiers and police for Spain as a whole.114 Most believe these figures 
too low for Asturias and ‘civilian deaths’, which include the militias, are 
generally thought to number around 1,100, to which between 300 and 350 
members of the armed and security forces can be added.115 
One of the victims of the repression was the journalist Luis Higón Rosell, 
better known by his penname Luis Sirval. Like Chaves Nogales, he travelled 
to Asturias to report on the insurrection. His investigation into the reprisals 
by the army brought him to the attention of the authorities and he was 
arrested. Three legionaries, worried about what Sirval had uncovered, visited 
him and demanded that he reveal his sources. When he refused, they shot 
him in the courtyard.116 Denunciation of deaths like Sirval’s and amnesty for 
the thousands imprisoned after October served to be a powerful rallying cry 
for the left, for the repression of the Asturian revolutionary insurrection was 
wide-ranging, bitter and decisive in moulding the fractious and polarized 
nature of politics in the time leading up to the Civil War.
114 E. González Calleja, Cifras cruentas: las víctimas mortales de la violencia sociopolítica en 
la Segunda República española (1931–1936) (Granada, 2015), pp. 11, 176, 232.
115 For similar figures, see Rodríguez Muñoz, La revolución, pp. 825–6; Taibo, Asturias, 
p. 476; Díaz Nosty, La comuna, pp. 337–8. See also E. González Calleja, En nombre de la 
autoridad: la defensa del orden público durante la Segunda República española (1931–1936) 
(Granada, 2014), pp. 228–40.
116 Balfour, Deadly Embrace, p. 255; Taibo, Asturias, pp. 504–10.
153
‘Repression and the redefinition of politics during the long 1935’, in M. Kerry, Unite, Proletarian 
Brothers! Radicalism and Revolution in the Spanish Second Republic, 1931–6 (London, 2020), pp. 
153–80. License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0.
6. Repression and the redefinition of politics  
during the long 1935
On 16 February 1935, Julio C. S. appeared in court charged with the illegal 
possession of a weapon. Julio admitted the pistol was his and testified that 
the Assault Guard had instructed him to find a firearm – an easy task, they 
said, as ‘guns even gr[e]w on trees’ – for they demanded one in exchange 
for a work permit. Julio did indeed claim to have found the pistol under 
a tree. Implausible though his testimony may appear, witnesses, including 
a priest and a foreman, corroborated his statement and the court absolved 
him. Julio fared better than thousands of others who suffered the repression 
of the revolutionary insurrection. Nevertheless, despite his ‘good standing’ 
and non-participation in the events of October, Julio was also caught up in 
the repression and its contradictions: all industrial workers were sacked and 
a gun was required for a work permit, but presenting a weapon appeared to 
indicate that its bearer was a revolutionary.1
The defeat of the October movement led to the arrest of thousands of 
leftists and restrictions on left-wing political activities across Spain. Yet it 
was in Asturias, where the insurrection was defeated in a military campaign, 
that the repression hit the hardest and radically reshaped political, social and 
cultural life in the coalfields in what is labelled here the ‘long 1935’, stretching 
from late October 1934 to the elections of February 1936. Thousands were 
rounded up – many of whom were tortured – and spent months in prison 
as the authorities opened hundreds of investigations into their participation 
in the insurrection. New municipal authorities were appointed who purged 
their workforces. Left-wing institutions were closed down and their press 
silenced. Politics was reduced to ‘order’ – the reassertion of the traditional 
social order and a strong emphasis on respect for authority. 
The revolutionary insurrection was not the only leftist movement 
to be quashed with extreme violence in the interwar period. From the 
Freikorps’ crushing of the Spartakists in Berlin and the brutal suppression 
of the Hungarian Soviet in 1919, to fascist violence against leftist activists 
during the Italian biennio rosso, the revolutionary moments at the end of 
1 AHPA, AP, box 79458, file 138 (1935).
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the First World War saw the transplantation of the violent strategies from 
the war to domestic political problems.2 The construction of right-wing 
dictatorships in the 1930s was accompanied by different tactics. In Austria 
Dollfuss pursued a ‘salami’ strategy of slowly slicing away at the social 
democrats while the inauguration of Hitler’s rule in Germany saw restraints 
on Nazi violence lifted and a period of ‘structured chaos’ that disarticulated 
the left.3 Yet Spain in 1934 was not emerging from a war, nor had the 
formal mechanisms of democratic rule been strangled. The repression of 
the Asturian insurrection was different insofar as it was conducted by a 
democratic regime, although elections and a future return to power of the 
left appeared remote in late 1934. A democratic framework did not preclude 
a repression that prefigured some aspects of the Francoist repression during 
and after the Spanish Civil War. Relying on exclusion and the presence of 
the army was ultimately unsustainable, particularly in the context of the 
Asturian coalfields, and only increased polarization, fashioned a crisis of 
community at the local level and set the foundations for a wave of fragile 
left-wing radicalism in 1936. 
Repression, hot and cold
Faces peered fearfully from behind windows and doors as government 
forces 18,000-strong entered the mining valleys on 19 October 1934.4 Many 
revolutionaries had already fled into the mountains, hiding their weapons 
or leaving them behind in schools or other buildings for collection by 
the army, as agreed by Belarmino Tomás and General López Ochoa.5 On 
entering the coal valleys, the government forces looted and burned Casas 
del Pueblo and some homes, including Tomás’s house, where they grabbed 
everything from watches to a kilogram of fruit jelly.6 These terrorization 
strategies had been employed during the capture of Oviedo, when 
government troops murdered patients in the hospital and between twenty-
2 On this period, see e.g., R. Gerwarth, The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed 
to End (London, 2016).
3 T. Kirk, Nazism and the Working Class in Austria: Industrial Unrest and Political Dissent 
in the ‘National Community’ (Cambridge, 1996), the quotation at p. 41; R. Bessel, Political 
Violence and the Rise of Nazism: the Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany, 1925–1934 (New 
Haven, Conn., 1984), pp. 98–105; D. Schumann, Political Violence in the Weimar Republic, 
1918–1933: Fight for the Streets and Fear of Civil War (New York, 2012), p. 270. 
4 E. López Ochoa, Campaña militar de Asturias en octubre de 1934 (narración táctica-
episódica) (Madrid, 1936), pp. 163, 171.
5 See P. I. Taibo II, Asturias, octubre 1934 (Barcelona, 2013), p. 474. 
6 For the ransacking of Tomás’s home, see M. Nelken, Por qué hicimos la revolución 
(Barcelona, 1936), p. 164.
155
Repression and the redefinition of politics during the long 1935
five and fifty prisoners in the Pelayo barracks. They also engaged in murder, 
rape and looting in the peripheral districts of the city. The techniques drew 
on Spanish experiences of conducting a decades-long colonial war in North 
Africa, and for Franco, appointed military advisor by the minister of defence, 
Asturias was a frontier war.7 Soldiers sold watches and other pilfered goods 
in improvised markets, just as they would during the Civil War.8 Not all 
approved of the soldiers’ behaviour and some officers attempted to restrain 
the actions of their troops.9 
The hot repression was soon replaced by the round-up and prosecution 
of suspected revolutionaries in a vast campaign that continued throughout 
1935. Nearly fifty provisional prisons had been created within two 
days of the end of the insurrection and summary military trials began 
immediately.10 At least 15,000 Asturians are calculated to have passed 
through the prison system as a result of the revolutionary insurrection 
and 2,587 were still incarcerated in 1936.11 The state of war – proclaimed 
in the whole of Spain on 6 October – was eventually replaced in Asturias, 
as in regions like Barcelona, Madrid and Vizcaya, with the state of alarm, 
which dictated censorship of the press and restrictions on civil liberties and 
the right of association. It remained in place until January 1936.12 Troops 
continued to be stationed in the coalfields even after the state of war 
was lifted and throughout 1935 they gave the impression that the valleys 
were subject to military occupation. Foreign observers also remarked on 
the omnipresence of khaki uniforms and restrictions on groups in public 
spaces in Oviedo. British Labour MP Leah Manning reported in late 
1934 that security forces ‘hustle[d] workers wherever they could find two 
or three of them together’ and nine months later Argentinian journalist 
Roberto Arlt wrote that Oviedo felt like the ‘inside of a prison’ as ‘three 
7 S. Balfour, Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War (Oxford, 
2002), pp. 253–4. See also P. Preston, The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination 
in Twentieth-Century Spain (London, 2012), p. 82; M. R. de Madariaga, Los moros que trajo 
Franco (Barcelona, 2006), pp. 139–43. For comments on the figures, see E. González Calleja, 
Cifras cruentas: las víctimas mortales de la violencia sociopolítica en la Segunda República 
española (1931–1936) (Granada, 2015), p. 229.
8 Taibo, Asturias, p. 475; M. Seidman, The Victorious Counterrevolution: the Nationalist 
Effort in the Spanish Civil War (Madison, Wis., 2011), p. 43.
9 Balfour, Deadly Embrace, p. 254. 
10 Preston, Spanish Holocaust, p. 84; Taibo, Asturias, pp. 475, 513.
11 Taibo, Asturias, p. 542.
12 For a chronology of the states of exception, see E. González Calleja, En nombre de la 
autoridad: la defensa del orden público durante la Segunda República española (1931–1936) 
(Granada, 2014), pp. 329–31.
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out of five’ people on the streets were dressed in military uniform. It was 
‘impossible to talk without armed witnesses’.13 
The cold repression encompassed the beatings and torture that 
accompanied the authorities’ search for fugitive revolutionaries and firearms. 
Even if killings were not the order of the day, non-lethal physical violence 
was central to the daily experience of real or suspected revolutionaries in 
prisons and coalfield towns and was the main mechanism for terrorizing the 
Asturian left. Manuel García recalled that every day a lorry of assault guards 
arrived in Olloniego and beat everyone in sight.14 In prisons and detention 
centres methods of torture included the ‘tri-motor’ (suspending the victim 
from their wrists, which were bound behind their back), the ‘laughter 
pipe’ (running a gauntlet of guards) and the ‘water bath’ (submerging the 
prisoner in freezing water before beating them). The degrading abuse also 
included the use of hammers on knees and hands and twisting or applying 
heat to sexual organs.15 A former councillor in Oviedo was subjected to a 
half-hour beating followed by six-and-a-half hours spent standing facing 
the wall under the threat of death if he moved. Others were beaten and 
left for days without food or drink, or, in a particularly degrading move, 
forced to lick toilet bowls. In Turón, civilians, including women dressed in 
mourning, were present and participated in torture sessions. Two Falangists 
whose fathers had been killed by the revolutionaries beat an imprisoned 
socialist councillor to death.16 
Such was the treatment to which prisoners were subject before they were 
formally charged or put on trial. The beatings were not usually intended 
to be lethal, although the number of suicides and deaths in detention – 
along with the numbers incapacitated for future work – indicates a lack of 
regard for the welfare of prisoners at the very least. Prisoners committed 
13 L. Manning, What I Saw in Spain (London, 1935), p. 86; R. Arlt, Aguafuertes (andaluzas, 
marroquíes, gallegas asturianas, vascas y madrileñas) (Paracuellos de Jarama, 2015), pp. 272–3.
14 Cited in Taibo, Asturias, p. 500. 
15 The denunciations included detailed reports on the repression and were distributed 
as pamphlets (Los presos de Asturias, ¡Acusamos! ... (n.p., 1935)) and reproduced in other 
accounts (e.g. Nelken, Por qué). For digital versions of the denunciations by Félix Gordón 
Ordás, Fernando de los Ríos, Julio Álvarez del Vayo and Vicente Marco Miranda, see 
<http://www.asturiasrepublicana.com/crirep.asp> [accessed 6 Nov. 2018]. See also Ignotus 
[M. Villar], La represión de octubre (Barcelona, 1936). For English versions, see Manning, 
What. In 1936 the newspaper Ayuda published a series of testimonies of torture and La 
Libertad reproduced a letter and the signatures of women attesting to its veracity on 4 Feb. 
1936.
16 ¡Acusamos!, pp. 17–18. F. Gordón Ordás, ‘Por la salud del régimen. La represión 
en las provincias de Asturias, León y Palencia’, 11 Jan. 1935, available at <http://www.
asturiasrepublicana.com/criticagordon3.html> [accessed 6 Nov. 2018].
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or attempted suicide by cutting or stabbing themselves, and one man 
(allegedly) threw himself into the Nalón river and drowned when in the 
hands of civil guards.17 Such deaths were the result of prisoners’ desperation 
or an attempt by the authorities to disguise a death in custody.18 
Lisardo Doval, the ‘Jackal’, was a key figure in the use of torture. Doval, 
a major in the civil guards, was appointed ‘special delegate of the minister 
of war for public order’ and given carte blanche in his task of combing 
the region for revolutionaries. He was familiar with Asturias, for he had 
commanded the Civil Guard in the province in the 1920s. For six weeks 
in November and December 1934, the security forces under his orders 
ranged through Asturias and León undertaking mass arrests. Two thousand 
individuals passed through his headquarters – the Adoratrices convent in 
Oviedo – where torture was systematic. An outcry over Doval’s actions and 
his ‘relish for brutality’ led to an investigation and he was sent back to 
Spanish Morocco in December, a decision that disappointed the mining 
bosses.19 Despite Doval’s removal from the region, he was only one of the 
‘“specialists” in anti-subversive struggle’ and torture continued after he 
left.20 
The most infamous episode from the repression occurred in the early 
hours of 25 October. In revenge for the death of twenty-five soldiers in a 
truck explosion, twenty-four prisoners were bundled into a lorry and taken 
to Carbayín, where they were shot or hacked to death and their bodies 
secretly buried. Such nocturnal ‘sacas [removals]’ would be a preferred 
method of extrajudicial killing during the Spanish Civil War.21 Rumours 
soon circulated as to the fate of the men taken to Carbayín. Their relatives 
investigated the whereabouts of the missing men and discovered the 
cadavers. The military authorities handed over just one body (the others 
being interred in a common grave), which only fuelled rumours and horror 
stories of how the prisoners had been treated.22
The killings in Carbayín were exceptional, yet only hindsight provided 
this relative comfort. At the time, they appeared to be further evidence of a 
17 Región, 2 Dec. 1934; AHPA, AP, box 79450, file 24 (1935); El Noroeste, 17 Feb. 1935. 
For a similar alleged suicide by drowning, see El Noroeste, 19 Dec. 1934. For further cases, 
including Teodomiro Menéndez, see Taibo, Asturias, pp. 551–2, 562.
18 El Noroeste, 19 Feb. 1935. 
19 Preston, Spanish Holocaust, pp. 87–8; M. Castejón Rodríguez, ‘La patronal hullera 
asturiana en la Segunda República’ (unpublished UNED PhD thesis, 2009), pp. 420–1. 
20 González Calleja, En nombre, p. 234.
21 Gordón Ordás, ‘Por la salud’.
22 Taibo, Asturias, pp. 484–6.
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blanket, indiscriminate terrorization that encompassed the intentional use 
of lethal violence. Of the twenty-four victims in Carbayín, not all were 
revolutionaries. One was a CEDA-supporting teacher, while another had 
been arrested for a traffic offence.23 The military authorities had threatened 
fugitive revolutionaries with the death penalty. López Ochoa issued a 
proclamation on 20 October dictating that ‘all those who are found to 
possess weapons or explosives [over the next twenty-four hours] will 
undergo summary trial and be shot if found guilty’.24 His pronouncements 
fleshed out into policy the justifications for lethal violence that had been 
voiced by politicians and could be read in the press. The cabinet itself 
approved death sentences for military officials involved in the rebellion in 
Catalonia, although these were later commuted.25 Even though only two 
death sentences were carried out of the many handed out to revolutionaries 
who had participated in the Asturian insurrection, it was not clear at the 
time that sentences would be commuted and that extrajudicial killing would 
be rare. The repression was not a finely tuned instrument. Fugitive and 
captured revolutionaries and their families were under no illusions as to the 
fate that could await them. Women, fearful that the Carbayín executions 
would be repeated, held nocturnal vigils outside the improvised prison in 
Sama to impede further sacas.26
Military campaigns against left-wing militias and the unchecked use 
of violence in repressing left-wing revolutionary movements occurred in 
other areas of Europe in the interwar period. But the repression of the 
1934 revolutionary movement operated in a different manner to other 
European states. The repression did not occur in a power vacuum or in 
the fragile situation of unconsolidated state power after the First World 
War in central Europe. Here the ‘mobilizing power of defeat’, backstabbing 
myths, the dissolution of borders and traditional political authority, and 
frustrated imperial and national dreams shaped the white terrorization of 
radical left political movements, including the Munich and Hungarian 
Soviets in 1919.27 Nor was the repression akin to the shockwave of violence 
23 Taibo, Asturias, pp. 484–6.
24 González Calleja, En nombre, p. 234; F. Aguado Sánchez, La revolución de octubre de 1934 
(Madrid, 1972), p. 304; J. Rodríguez Muñoz, La revolución de Octubre de 1934 en Asturias: 
orígenes, desarrollo y consecuencias (Oviedo, 2010), p. 714. 
25 N. Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Spanish 
Second Republic (Brighton, 2000), pp. 273–4. See also B. Díaz Nosty, La comuna asturiana: 
revolución de octubre de 1934 (Bilbao, 1974), p. 350. 
26 M. Benavides, La revolución fue así (octubre rojo y negro) (Barcelona, 1935), p. 460. 
27 For a summary, see Gerwarth, Vanquished, ch. 9. For Germany, see M. Jones, Founding 
Weimar: Violence and the German Revolution, 1918–19 (Cambridge, 2016).
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that followed Nazism’s ascent to power, which disoriented and crushed the 
German left in 1933. In March and April, groups of Stormtroopers broke 
into and destroyed Social Democratic Party property, raised Nazi flags, and 
tortured socialists, as the police either looked on or colluded in the acts.28 In 
Asturias, even as the violence and occupation of socialist centres sent out a 
clear message about which authority held sway in the coalfields, the Spanish 
army did not seek to cement a new political project. The distinctiveness of 
the repression of the Asturian October lies in the mass use of state violence 
by a democratic regime rather than a nation-state suffering the fallout of 
war or constructing a dictatorship. 
For residents of the coalfields, the widespread use of violence and 
indiscriminate arrests were a shocking exhibition of state power, but even 
those members of the working class untouched by violence struggled to 
avoid the purges of the workforce. Factories and mines closed their doors 
and cancelled all contracts. Testament to the scale and blanket nature of the 
dismissals is the number of files opened in 1936 to investigate the sackings. 
Within five months, 7,000 individual files had been opened.29 When mines 
began to reopen in mid December 1934, it took weeks for the workforce to 
be replenished. By February 1935, only 531 were back at work at Fábrica de 
Mieres, which constituted a fifth of the former mining workforce, to say 
nothing of those employed in steel production.30 
All industrial workers were forced to reapply for their jobs in a carefully 
controlled process that assumed workers were guilty until proven innocent. 
This process was closely managed by the mining and steel companies 
and security forces – and, at SHE mines, by the SCOM.31 It provided an 
opportunity for companies to reassert their authority after the experience 
of the first biennium of the Republic, by selecting those they wanted to 
admit as workers. Workers soliciting employment at Duro-Felguera had 
to file past a civil guard who had survived the revolution. He alone could 
determine whether they were readmitted to employment.32 The authorities 
introduced a new identity card that was required in order to work. Mining 
companies supplied the cards and four photographs of the worker: one for 
the card, one for the company and two for the local police forces.33 The 
28 Bessel, Political Violence, pp. 102–3; D. Siemens, Stormtroopers: a New History of Hitler’s 
Brownshirts (New Haven, Conn., 2017), pp. 333–4.
29 Avance, 3 July 1936. 
30 Región, 3 Feb. 1935.
31 Taibo, Asturias, p. 482.
32 El Noroeste, 15 Nov. 1934. 
33 Boletín oficial de la provincia de Oviedo, 5 Dec. 1934. 
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withholding of identity cards over the following months prevented many 
from working and was another tool for disciplining the workforce.34 The 
process of obtaining a job was complicated further by the security forces’ 
requirement of a firearm in exchange for work: those who handed in a 
weapon would not be prosecuted as long as they were not leaders or had not 
committed blood crimes.35 Yet individuals risked being charged with illegal 
possession of a firearm, as happened to Julio C. S.
The mining companies took advantage of the favourable context provided 
by the defeat of the insurrection to remove benefits that mineworkers had 
gained. The right to free coal was withdrawn, workers were evicted from 
company housing and companies stopped paying pensions and subsidies, 
which violated the agreements reached with the SOMA in 1933.36 The 
situation in the coalfields was a radicalized version of what was occurring 
across the country as employers lowered wages and increased working 
hours in what constituted a ‘drastic worsening’ of working conditions.37 In 
Valencia, where the Workers’ Alliance was second in strength to Asturias, 
union centres closed for months, working hours were extended, wages were 
lowered and union membership fell. In rural areas, the ‘combination of the 
legacy of disunity, repression and recession [left them] demoralized and 
their unions eviscerated’.38
Sackings also occurred at municipal councils. More than 2,000 councils 
were removed across Spain and replaced with councillors from the 
governing parties, which in the coalfields led to districts managed by the 
Radical Party, CEDA and PRLD.39 The new municipal steering committees 
dismissed whole corps of municipal workers. Several units were dissolved 
in Oviedo, including butchers and tax collectors, who had to reapply for 
their jobs.40 The municipal authorities in Laviana agreed to suspend all 
municipal teachers on 31 October, while in Langreo ‘suspicious’ teachers 
34 E.g. Región, 25 Apr., 4 May 1935; La Tarde, 24 June 1935.  
35 López Ochoa, Campaña, pp. 175–6. 
36 Taibo, Asturias, p. 482; Región, 13 Dec. 1934; El Noroeste, 25 Dec. 1934.
37 F. Rey, Paisanos en lucha: exclusión política y violencia en la Segunda República española 
(Madrid, 2008), p. 439; J. M. Macarro Vera, Socialismo, República y revolución en Andalucía 
(1931–1936) (Seville, 2000), pp. 373–4. 
38 R. Purkiss, Democracy, Trade Unions and Political Violence in Spain: the Valencian Anarchist 
Movement, 1918–1936 (Brighton, 2011), pp. 322–4. For Galicia, see J. Prada Rodríguez, De la 
agitación republicana a la represión franquista (Ourense 1934–1939) (Barcelona, 2006), p. 63. 
39 Townson, Crisis, p. 279.
40 C. Benito del Pozo, El ayuntamiento republicano de Oviedo, 1931–1936 (Oviedo, 1989), p. 
110. 
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were removed.41 The provincial deputation revealed a zealous desire to purge 
undesirable workers by sacking hospital staff for a variety of reasons – not 
simply for undocumented absences during the insurrection, but also for 
previous suspensions.42 The purges were thus an opportunity to reconfigure 
the workforce according to the new authorities’ image. In other parts of 
Spain, the authorities also seized the chance to assert a different political 
and economic order.43 Teachers in Valencia were sacked.44 The government 
decreed a new category of ‘abusive strike’ which allowed contracts to be 
cancelled when a strike was called for reasons unrelated to work or which 
did not adhere to the timetables set out in labour law.45  
The atmosphere was oppressive in the Asturian coalfields as curfews, safe 
conducts and restrictions on meetings constrained the activities of citizens. 
Many classrooms were turned into army billets and in some cases remained 
so until the end of 1935.46 Casas del Pueblo, co-operatives and cultural 
centres were looted, burned and closed, or turned into prisons, as occurred 
to the Casa del Pueblo in Sama, which an anarchist described as a ‘den of 
torment’.47 The SOMA was suspended at the request of the civil governor, 
although in fact he wanted the union dissolved.48 With centres ransacked or 
closed, the institutional heart of local communities for many was removed, 
profoundly reshaping previous patterns of sociability.
Journalists painted a sombre image of the coal valleys during the long 
1935. In the absence of work, misery quickly gripped households in late 1934. 
In Mieres, women and children begged for leftovers from the soldiers’ mess 
and the town was ‘submerged in a sea of tears and sorrow’.49 La Felguera 
was a ‘picture of misery’ and there was a ‘tragic silence’ in miners’ houses 
in Ujo where ‘at the windows and balconies, squalid and barefoot children 
[could] be seen, along with poverty-stricken women with brick-coloured 
41 L. Borque López, El magisterio primario en Asturias (1923–1937): sociedad y educación 
(Oviedo, 1991), pp. 206, 209.
42 AHPA, Actas de la comisión de la Diputación Provincial, 19 Sept. 1933 to 17 Sept. 1935, 
ff. 308–12.
43 E.g. for Andalusia, Macarro Vera, Socialismo, p. 371.
44 S. Valero, Republicanos con la monarquía, socialistas con la República: la Federación 
Socialista Valenciana durante la II República y la Guerra Civil (1931–1939) (Valencia, 2015), p. 
150.
45 Gaceta de Madrid, 3 Nov. 1934.
46 For updates, see Región, 24 Feb. 1935; El Noroeste, 27 Feb., 17 Apr., 22 Oct. 1935. 
47 Taibo, Asturias, pp. 474–5; Ignotus [M. Villar], La represión de octubre, p. 244.
48 Región, 30 Nov. 1934; El Noroeste, 30 Nov. 1934. 
49 El Noroeste, 6, 15 Nov. 1934. 
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skin, thin, sickly and threadbare’.50 The absence of male workers due to 
death, exile or imprisonment often left families without principal wage 
earners. Women bore the burden of providing for both their families and 
imprisoned male relatives.51 The effects of the vast police–military operation 
on local society would become clearer in 1936, but appeared to have already 
engendered a deepening distrust of the authorities, particularly the security 
forces. Rumours that diphtheria vaccines were designed to damage the 
mental development of children led to them refusing to attend school and 
running from the Civil Guard.52 The authorities were sufficiently frustrated 
to declare publicly that the rumours were ‘absurd’.53 
The repression trapped communities in a social half-life that continued 
through 1935. Unemployment was a significant problem for Mieres as the 
annual fiestas neared while in Sama the celebrations took place ‘with the 
liveliness that is feasible in these moments’.54 The opening of cinemas and 
some cultural centres did little to alleviate the sombreness and in any case, 
restrictions remained. The Ateneo Obrero in La Felguera reopened at the 
end of November, but there were to be no meetings, and it had to close 
at nine o’clock in the evening. In a measure that confirmed the stasis and 
isolation of the coal valleys from Spanish political life, only existing stocks 
of newspapers and books could be read. Only bars remained as a space 
where unrepentant revolutionaries could discuss their ideas and dissect 
current affairs in hushed voices.55
Yet conversing in the tavern was dangerous. The security forces also went 
to bars to glean information on fugitives and arrested those who criticized 
the repression.56 Relying on eavesdropping and disguising policemen as ‘cart 
drivers’ or ‘villagers’ suggests that town and village communities offered 
little help in pursuing revolutionaries and that the police had to resort to 
subterfuge.57 But the dynamics of repression cannot be reduced to a binary 
of external military forces oppressing the population of the coalfields. 
The underground left continued to wield a certain amount of power 
and exert pressure on residents. At the same time, the authorities relied 
50 El Noroeste, 11 Dec. 1934; A. Camín, El valle negro (México, 1938), p. 104. 
51 See the testimony of Á. Flórez Peón in Memorias de Ángeles Flórez Peón “Maricuela” 
(Oviedo, 2009), p. 36.
52 El Noroeste, 21, 30 March 1935. 
53 El Noroeste, 10, 22 March 1935.
54 El Noroeste, 26 June, 28, 30 July 1935. 
55 El Noroeste, 15, 30 Nov. 1934. 
56 Región, 20 Nov. 1934; El Noroeste, 9 Apr. 1935.
57 Región, 20 Nov. 1934.
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on denunciation and collaboration from citizens to police the population 
– half a million pesetas was found in Sotrondio thanks to the work of 
informers.58 Surviving letters from the archive and testimonies drawn from 
court records do not provide a comprehensive picture of denunciation and 
collaboration, but they do reveal how the insurrection and its repression 
intensified political and personal rivalries that divided communities in the 
coalfields.
Citizens sent many hand- and type-written letters to the authorities 
denouncing their neighbours for participating in the insurrection and 
providing information to aid the repression. One letter alleged 150 
revolutionaries had retreated to a cave with three to four thousand guns, 
dynamite and food for six weeks. Only those who knew the password 
could gain access. Another embellished an accusation that SOMA leader 
Graciano Antuña had handed out fistfuls of banknotes with the writer’s 
own theorization of the origins of the insurrection. A handwritten note 
in Asturian dialect provided a long list of alleged revolutionaries. The 
brief descriptions, such as ‘the son of one who used to be a butcher…’ 
and ‘Belarmino, son of one from Ronzón who has a wooden leg and was 
president of the communist centre’, could only be deciphered by someone 
familiar with the community.59
Collaborating with the authorities as an informer could confer a degree 
of power in the reconfigured political context. Yet influence did not 
equate to impunity despite some appearing to confuse the two. Jesús P. 
R., a mineworker and informer for the Civil Guard, was drinking in a bar 
in Turón one evening when he publicly announced that he had enemies 
locally because he was an informer and therefore enjoyed ‘influence’. He 
asked a man present, Francisco G. G., how he would react to provocation, 
to which Francisco said he would do nothing. Jesús – emboldened by his 
status and state of inebriation – illustrated his point by assaulting Francisco 
and then the bar owner. Despite the influence he claimed to enjoy, the Civil 
Guard arrested him and he was prosecuted.60 
58 For denunciation, see Accusatory Practices: Denunciation in Modern European History, 
1789–1989 (Chicago, Ill., 1997), ed. S. Fitzpatrick and R. Gellately. For Spain, see P. 
Anderson, The Francoist Military Trials: Terror and Complicity, 1939–1945 (New York, 2010). 
For the money, see El Noroeste, 2 Jan. 1936.
59 Confidential note, Madrid, 14 Nov. 1934, CDMH, PS Gijón, J series, box 50, file 
1; letter to Commander Doval from a worker from Santa Ana, 12 Nov., 1934, CDMH, 
PS Gijón, J series, box 50, file 1; untitled, undated, handwritten note [statement by Pilar 
Bernaldo de Quirós], CDMH, PS Gijón, J series, box 50, file 1.
60 AHPA, AP, box 78442, file 15 (1935).
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Informing could confer power and influence with the authorities, but it 
was not without risk. Participants and those who supported the insurrection 
still walked the streets, even if they could not express their politics openly, 
and some were willing to avenge or protect themselves from ‘miserable 
informers’ with violence if necessary.61 When Belarmino G. C., a day 
labourer, was arrested for shooting a miner at midnight in mid August 1935, 
he claimed that he was the real victim in this particular case as the town was 
‘harassing him to death’ for passing information to the Civil Guard.62 In 
the case of the death of Manuel G., Región reported that there were several 
explanations circulating, ‘but the most widespread … is that Manuel is 
accused of having denounced several individuals who had taken part in the 
revolutionary events’.63 
True or not, claiming harassment by fugitive revolutionaries aligned 
the individual with the side of the law and presented himself – the cases 
invariably involve male protagonists – as an upstanding member of the 
community. It was a logical line of defence. Belarmino G. G., when 
questioned regarding an assault of which his brother stood accused, blamed 
the victim for the attack: 
everything that has now happened is because two days after the revolution 
was declared Salvador [the victim of the attack] went to the house under 
investigation and, armed with a rifle, he forced them to hand over the shotgun 
they had ... to the Revolutionary Committee ... at the same time they forced 
them [sic] to do guard duty, which they refused to ...
Belarmino embellished his account by accusing Salvador of possessing 
looted money, which he based on hearsay and Salvador’s alleged expansive 
spending in bars.64 
The statements to the police paint a clear picture of a society divided 
between revolutionaries and upstanding citizens enduring unbearable 
oppression that continued even after the military defeat of the insurrection, 
but denunciations provide a more differentiated image of their communities. 
Framed as personal appeals to Doval, they made pointed criticism of the 
authorities and their own communities. They alleged, for example, that a 
corporal had accepted a bribe to remove socialists from prison and that 
rightists were colluding with revolutionaries in order to save themselves.65 
61 El Noroeste, 17 Nov. 1934. 
62 AHPA, AP, box 78438, file 158 (1935). 
63 Región, 25 July 1935. 
64 AHPA, AP, box 78437, file 178 (1935).
65 Letter to Commander Doval from El Entrego, 24 Nov. 1934, CDMH, PS Gijón, J 
series, box 50, file 1.
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One criticized the ‘rich’ for saving revolutionaries in a gesture of gratitude 
for having survived the insurrection, while another warned Doval that 
parish priests ‘go around intervening on everyone’s behalf and you should 
not listen to them’.66 Certainly three priests claimed after the Civil War that 
treating former revolutionaries well during the long 1935 saved them from 
the wave of anticlerical violence at the beginning of the conflict, although 
it is unlikely that more than a handful did this.67 In indicating their 
frustration that justice lacked the required zeal, the letters’ authors reveal 
that individuals proactively tried to shape the repression in the coalfields, as 
occurred in other contexts of denunciation in which the repression meant 
‘the state [was put] at the disposal of its citizens’; the latter could draw upon 
the resources of the former.68
Beneath the imagined clean dividing lines of politics, the repression was 
complicated by the entanglement of personal and professional relationships. 
In the case of a murder of a company guard by his subordinate at the 
entrance to the Fondón mine, the accused, Avelino C. G., argued that he 
had acted in self-defence. The deceased had repeatedly threatened him, as 
Avelino had reported the guard’s sons for participating in the insurrection. 
While he foregrounded the insurrection and aligned himself with the law, 
witnesses suggested that their differences lay in work matters that predated 
October 1934.69 The repression intensified the fragmentation of society as 
personal affairs became public and politicized once refracted through the 
lens of the revolution.70 
A province under quarantine 
Less than a month after the end of the insurrection, an international delegation 
arrived in Oviedo for what turned out to be a ‘brief and tempestuous’ visit. 
66 Letter to Commander Doval from a worker from Santa Ana, 12 Nov. 1934 and untitled, 
undated, handwritten note [statement by Pilar Bernaldo de Quirós], CDMH, PS Gijón, J 
series, box 50, file 1.
67 Á. Garralda García, La persecución religiosa del clero en Asturias 1934, 1936 y 1937: martirios 
y odiseas (Avilés, 2009 [1977]), pp. 405–7, 463, 546. 
68 P. Anderson, ‘Singling out victims: denunciation and collusion in the post-Civil War 
Francoist repression in Spain, 1939–1945’, European History Quarterly, xxxix (2009), 7–26, at 
p. 12. For these themes in the context of the Second World War, see also J. Gross, Revolution 
from Abroad: the Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia 
(Princeton, N.J., 2002).
69 AHPA, AP, box 78437, file 167 (1935).
70 As Kalyvas warned, it is important not to assume that the master cleavage maps onto 
local cleavages in civil wars (S. Kalyvas, ‘The ontology of “political violence”: action and 
identity in civil wars’, Perspectives on Politics, i (2003), 475–94).
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The British Labour Party activist and former MP Ellen Wilkinson, who 
had visited Spain the previous year to seek support for the International 
Relief Committee for the Victims of German Fascism, journeyed to the 
province alongside Labour Party peer Lord Listowel and Bourthoumieux, 
a lawyer from the Association Juridique Internationale, after visiting Prime 
Minister Lerroux and an imprisoned Largo Caballero in Madrid. On arrival 
in Oviedo, a ‘hostile crowd’ gathered outside the café where they dined, 
and followed them to a meeting at the Provincial Deputation with Doval. 
He quickly expelled the delegation from the province.71 The Asturian right-
wing daily Región revelled in their expulsion and praised the protestors 
for giving Listowel, Wilkinson and Bourthoumieux the reception they 
‘deserved’. The newspaper accused them of only showing interest in the 
treatment of prisoners and neglecting the destruction of Oviedo.72
Región’s delight in the expulsion of the overseas visitors was rooted in a 
wider desire to control the narrative of the insurrection and the repression. 
Right-wing publications presented the revolutionaries as a barbarous, 
ungodly horde beholden to foreign ideologies. Theirs was a vision of a ‘nation 
under siege … with only the sword of the army and the shield of Catholic 
faith to protect Spain’.73 The Manichean depiction was central to the election 
campaign of February 1936 and would underpin Francoist and Republican 
narratives during the Civil War.74 The portrayal of the insurrection was also 
heavily gendered, from an emphasis on gruesome atrocities, which were not 
usually true, to highlighting female participation. As the female body was 
also the repository and guarantor of national honour, the nation was under 
threat, while women’s activities during the insurrection were brandished as 
evidence of the breakdown of the social order.75 
The Asturian press added an additional angle to this portrayal of the 
insurrection. For Región, Asturias had been martyred in a criminal rebellion 
by the revolutionaries, whose betrayal of their patria meant they had 
forfeited their right to call themselves Asturians. Región propagated a 
71 M. Perry, ‘Red Ellen’ Wilkinson: Her Ideas, Movements and World (Manchester, 2015), pp. 
302–7, the quotations at p. 305. 
72 Región, 16 Nov. 1934. See also protests by business leaders and the JAP (El Noroeste, 
16, 17 Nov. 1934). For their reception in Britain, see H. García, The Truth About Spain! 
Mobilizing British Public Opinion, 1936–1939 (Brighton, 2010), p. 26. 
73 B. D. Bunk, Ghosts of Passion: Martyrdom, Gender, and the origins of the Spanish Civil 
War (Durham, N.C., 2007), p. 51. 
74 For these discourses during the Civil War, particularly the nationalistic component, see 
X. M. Núñez Seixas, ¡Fuera el invasor! nacionalismos y movilización bélica durante la guerra 
civil española (1936–1939) (Madrid, 2006).
75 For a discussion of the gendered readings of the insurrection, see Bunk, Ghosts, ch. 4.
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rigid narrative in which the province had to atone for its sins on its own. 
Asturias, an extrapolation of ‘martyred’ Oviedo, was a victim of ‘Marxism’ 
that had ‘suffered for Spain’ and could only heal itself sealed off from the 
rest of the world, in what constituted a performance of autarchic penance.76 
Reconstruction now fell to the ‘people of order’. Silencing the left and 
restricting political options reduced politics in the long 1935 to a narrow 
understanding of politics as order.
Región was zealous in policing this narrative and attacking those who 
criticized the repression. It labelled calls to investigate the treatment of 
revolutionaries a ‘farce’ and ‘an insult to the Spanish Army, to Asturias 
and to Spain’; it was ‘Región and Asturias against the ‘anti-patria’.77 The 
newspaper was not alone in attempting to control the portrayal of Asturias. 
The Oviedo city council proposed a ban on the sale of newspapers which 
deviated from the right’s narrative and agreed to appoint a committee 
of ‘paladins of truth’ to combat the ‘calumnies’ spread in the press in a 
move of chest-thumping regional pride.78 Six months after the expulsion of 
Wilkinson, Bourthoumieux and Listowel, the governor general of Asturias, 
ejected French observers from the trial of those committing murders in 
Turón during the insurrection. He accused them of meddling in Spanish 
affairs that were no business of theirs.79
Censorship and the ban on left-wing organizations in Asturias meant 
that the right-wing newspapers had no competition in the dissemination 
of their narrative of events. Yet investigations by deputies protected by 
parliamentary immunity and reports published abroad raised awareness of 
the atrocities committed during the defeat of the revolutionaries and the 
torture of those imprisoned. By early 1935, the government was forced to 
acknowledge international criticism directed at the repression in Asturias 
and published its own version of the insurrection.80 Luis Bolín, the London 
correspondent for the conservative daily ABC, led a campaign by Spanish 
monarchists that included ‘talks on the BBC and … articles for the Morning 
Post’ to counter reports of torture. Such reports encompassed the pamphlet 
Spain, October 1934 with a foreword by the French writer Henri Barbusse 
and produced by International Red Aid (SRI) – a Communist organization 
– and an article in Foreign Affairs penned by Luis Araquistáin, a leading 
76 Región, 11 Nov. 1934. 
77 Región, 12, 30 Nov. 1934. 
78 The council sent a telegram to the minister of the interior in protest (Región, 3 Nov. 
1934; AO, Actas, 16 June 1933 to 16 June 1934, ff. 71–2, f. 119).
79 Región, 19 June 1935.
80 Townson, Crisis, p. 284. 
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Caballerista.81 In Spain, there was greater freedom to publish outside of 
Asturias. Heraldo de Madrid and Bilbao’s El Liberal published accounts of 
the insurrection. The Asturian socialist newspapers that were permitted in 
1935 avoided reporting on the insurrection and the repression to prevent the 
wrath of the authorities, focusing instead on internal doctrinal and strategic 
matters.
The struggle over reporting on the insurrection and the repression 
formed part of the ‘invention’ of October, which was a central battleground 
of Spanish politics during the long 1935.82 This invention emerged 
through newsprint and a flurry of pamphlets and books with contrasting 
interpretations of the insurrection. There were martyrological accounts from 
clerical victims and right-wing commentators, eyewitness accounts from 
those who had lived through the insurrection, such as Aurelio de Llano, 
and leftist accounts, including the novelized version penned by José Díaz 
Fernández and published in Diario de Madrid.83 Región was outspoken in its 
criticism of the serialized publication of Díaz Fernández’s heroic depiction 
of the revolutionaries, which it labelled a ‘pile of pages full of lazy and 
deplorable writing’, and appealed to all Asturians to protest to the editor of 
Diario de Madrid.84 
For Región, the military was the sole bulwark against the return of 
revolution. It was the ‘little soldiers’ who had brought ‘tranquillity on the 
night of 20 October’ and peace depended on their presence.85 The perceived 
threat posed by the dangerous revolutionary other was revealed in an 
anxious motion presented at a council meeting in Oviedo:  
It is no secret for anyone that one of the main causes of the helpless situation 
of our city was its insufficient garrison. Oviedo is surrounded by an important 
industrial and mining zone ... there is military industry and explosives 
production which are of national importance. Related to this is the patriotic 
need that the garrison be increased.86 
81 García, Truth, pp. 26–7; for Bolín’s account, see L. Bolín, Spain: the Vital Years (London, 
1967), pp. 135–6. Reports included Spain, October 1934 (Paris, 1935); L. Araquistáin, ‘The 
October Revolution in Spain’, Foreign Affairs, xiii (1935), 247–61.
82 R. Cruz, En el nombre del pueblo: república, rebelión y guerra en la España de 1936 
(Madrid, 2006), pp. 70ff.
83 E.g. Los mártires de Turón; Llano, Pequeños anales; Molins i Fábrega, UHP; Díaz 
Fernández published his account under the pseudonym José Canel, see J. Canel [J. Díaz 
Fernández], Octubre rojo en Asturias (Barcelona, 1984 [1935]). 
84 Región, 2, 3, 4, 7 Aug. 1935.
85 Región, 21 March 1935.
86 AO, Actas, 22 June 1934 to 10 Jan. 1936, f. 140. See also Región, 31 Jan. 1935.
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The only solution was to bolster the defences of the city, which appeared 
under siege by a working class synonymous with revolution. In emphasizing 
the importance of the military to safeguarding the social order, Región did 
not openly appeal for military intervention in politics – as would occur in 
July 1936 – nor was it especially vocal in defending the army as a repository 
of Spanish identity and tradition. Rather, the army simply guaranteed 
security. Repeated troop manoeuvres and exercises in 1935 were thus a 
reassuring spectacle for the ‘people of order’.87 In July, CEDA leader and 
minister of war, José María Gil Robles, oversaw manoeuvres in the coalfields 
involving 3,000 troops using live ammunition, and a military parade in 
Oviedo, which recalled scenes from after the insurrection.88 
The difficulty in relying on the presence of the military to safeguard 
social peace was the repeated invocation of the spectre of revolution, which 
served to inculcate anxiety. As Región warned its readers, ‘[t]he working 
masses retain their arms because they want to repeat the attack’.89 On 
several occasions in 1934 and 1935, rumours spread through the province 
of planned strikes, arms caches and the return of revolution, playing on 
existing anxieties that were fed by the press. The far right fanned them 
further in accordance with their desire to undermine the political order. 
Frustrated at the destabilizing effect of rumours, the governor fined those 
responsible, including a leading Falangist and his wife.90
For those who did not identify with the narrative propagated of the 
insurrection and the reduction of politics to ‘order’, the political atmosphere 
– choked by censorship and restrictions on the freedom of association – was 
stifling. One individual, describing himself as an ‘honourable worker who 
loves work and culture’, wrote an open letter to the civil governor in July 1935 
asking ‘publicly if it is possible for one to be a Communist, socialist, “leftist 
Republican” or simply a liberal’ as ‘it actually appears to be the opposite’. The 
author hid his name and location as there was ‘a serious threat ... hanging over 
me if I disclose the daily harassment of which I am the object because I am a 
socialist’. He ended by questioning, ‘are we allowed to think?’91 
Relying on censorship and the presence of the military was ultimately 
unsustainable. Neither could absolute control be wielded over the narrative 
87 Región, 15, 17, 18, 25 May 1935; El Noroeste, 25 Sept., 8 Nov. 1935. 
88 El Noroeste, 23 July 1935. 
89 Región, 27 Nov. 1934.
90 For example, El Noroeste, 27 Dec. 1934, 30 Apr., 7 June 1935; Región, 18 Sept. 1935. For 
the authorities’ response, see El Noroeste, 2 Apr. 1935; Región, 20 Sept. 1935; J. M. García de 
Tuñón Aza, Apuntes para una historia de la Falange asturiana (Oviedo, 2001), p. 39.
91 La Tarde, 8 July 1935. 
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of events, nor Asturias remain under quarantine indefinitely. In the midst of 
the national election campaign in early 1936, the state of alarm was lifted in 
the province and the Asturian left was finally able to discuss the insurrection 
and repression in the public sphere. Región could not hide its rage: 
The leftist newspapers, now free of the gag, have thrown themselves into the 
most shameless campaign in which the central theme is the repression by the 
security forces of the horrors of the red October in Asturias. Photomontages, 
fiddled statistics [and] articles drool calumnies over the Civil Guard and Army.92 
An opportunity
The long 1935 provided the right with an unprecedented opportunity 
to redirect the Republic. The banning of unions and left-wing political 
parties in Asturias, the ‘gag’ on their press and the imprisonment and 
exile of activists afforded right-wing groups the unchallenged freedom to 
paint an alternative vision of the Republic. New municipal councils and 
steering committees across the country meant municipal resources could be 
redirected at the local level and previous agreements overturned. Religious 
orders returned to provincial welfare institutions and councils in Langreo 
and Aller paid the food and cleaning bills of the armed forces in their 
districts.93 Sensitive to the change in political winds, parish priests requested 
that municipal authorities return parish cemeteries that previous councils 
had seized using Republican legislation. Councillors were sympathetic but 
reluctant to relinquish their hold on burial grounds. They were more open 
to overturning bans on funeral processions with the raised cross.94
Yet little was achieved by these administrations, which were more 
content with balancing budgets after the alleged profligacy of the previous 
administration rather than rechannelling the Republic at the local level. 
There was also little effort made to alleviate the social problems caused 
by the repression. Welfare initiatives introduced by the newly appointed 
councils were ad-hoc, precarious affairs that relied on volunteers – often 
young women – and donations, and owed much to traditional private forms 
of charity. The meagre resources struggled to deal with the sheer number of 
those who required aid; in Langreo alone, over 500 families received 35,000 
92 Región, 11 Jan. 1936.  
93 For a similar return of religious personnel in Andalusia, see Macarro Vera, Socialismo, 
p. 371. 
94 See the decision to consult lawyers on the cemetery in Langreo, while the ban on 
Catholic funeral processions was revoked in San Martín del Rey Aurelio (AL, Actas, 23 June 
1934 to 12 Sept. 1935, f. 79; Región, 2 Jan., 23 March 1935). 
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pesetas in cash hand-outs.95 After an initial wave of activity, these initiatives 
fizzled out. The canteen for children in Turón closed in mid April due to 
a lack of funds despite repeated appeals for donations.96 The authorities 
showed little interest in providing widespread, systematic welfare assistance.
A more sustained attempt at aid may have facilitated more support for the 
new municipal authorities. As regards trade unions, there was also little to 
attract former members of the SOMA or the SUM to the SCOM in terms of 
the latter’s achievements. As the only legal mining trade union, the SCOM 
was ideally placed to assert itself as an effective voice for mineworkers, but the 
mining companies preferred to ignore it. When SHE refused mineworkers 
the paid holidays they were legally owed, the SCOM’s protests fell on deaf 
ears. This obliged the SCOM to overturn its strategy of co-operation with 
the company, and it threatened a strike. Finally, the authorities intervened 
to force the SHE to bow to the legislation. Despite this victory, there is no 
evidence it aided the union.97 The SHE’s reticence reflected the companies’ 
contentment with repression as a means of controlling the demands of the 
workforce, rather than improving living or working conditions. They were 
content with ‘cutting off a few heads [and] punishing the rebels’, as the 
social Catholic canon, Maximiliano Arboleya, complained.98 When the 
mining bosses finally turned to Arboleya in February 1936 to find a way of 
making their workforce more sympathetic to them, it proved too late for 
any effective action to be undertaken.99 
The political right was unable to capitalize on the opportunity to expand 
offered by the absence of a public left-wing challenge in Asturias. Popular 
Action, which claimed over 50,000 members in the province in 1935, did 
not experience a surge in membership.100 Right-wing organizations in the 
coalfields were fragile. JAP rallies in the coalfields relied on orators from 
Gijón, the women’s section of AP in Sama acknowledged it was struggling 
and the Catholic Youth had a small membership.101 There was an attempt 
at the national level to attract workers to the right via a National Labour 
95 Región, 28 March 1935; El Noroeste, 5, 27 Apr. 1935.
96 At the time, it was feeding 220 children (El Noroeste, 14 Apr. 1935). For earlier appeals, 
see El Noroeste, 21 Feb., 6 Apr. 1935. 
97 Castejón Rodríguez, ‘La patronal’, pp. 427–8. 
98 Arboleya’s letter is cited in D. Benavides, El fracaso social del catolicismo español: Arboleya 
Martínez, 1870–1951 (Barcelona, 1973), p. 555. 
99 Benavides, El fracaso, pp. 618–19, 627, 629–32. 
100 J. R. Montero, La CEDA: el catolicismo social y político en la II República (2 vols, Madrid, 
1977), i. 374.
101 Acción, 28 Dec. 1935; Región, 24 July, 13 Oct. 1935.
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Front, which was financed by Catholic Action and aimed to bring together 
independent unions in an organization that could constitute an ‘alternative 
to the UGT’, but it was ‘extremely weak’ in practice.102 Its Asturian branch 
brought together the SCOM and independent unions from Avilés and 
Gijón, yet did not spark a revival of the SCOM’s fortunes. Nor did appeals 
for new independent, ‘apolitical’ unions have much effect.103
The right blamed their failure to expand on a ‘hostile’ environment, 
including the social pressures of qué dirán (‘what will the neighbours say?’), 
which deterred local residents from visible support of the right.104 There is 
evidence that political divisions were sufficiently cemented to prevent mass 
changes of allegiance across the left–right divide. A new Catholic school 
in La Argañosa – a left-wing stronghold in Oviedo – had only managed 
to recruit forty students two months after opening.105 The left continued 
to exhibit strength despite being unable to mobilize publicly. Despite the 
restrictions, there were a small number of strikes in 1934. The authorities 
came down hard on any stoppage. Those who downed tools during the 
trial of revolutionaries from Turón were sacked and then subjected to a 
two-week lockout.106 A UGT-CNT construction strike in July revealed a 
resilient left undeterred by the robust response from the governor. Despite 
a ban on assemblies, violence against strikers and the use of blackleg 
workers, the strike lasted for two months and was successful: those sacked 
were readmitted and the demand for a forty-four-hour working week was 
achieved. The governor tied himself in knots in an attempt to deny that 
there was a strike. Admitting it would have meant holding his hands up to 
a failure in his management of provincial affairs.107 The strike indicated both 
the strength of the left (even when it had to work underground), and the 
inability of the authorities to offer any solution except force to what they 
perceived as threats to public order (rather than the expression of economic 
discontent).
If the overall picture was one of stagnation and paralysis in the coalfields, 
it did not differ markedly from the spectacle offered by national politics. 
While the Radicals and CEDA shared government office, they did not see 
eye to eye. The revolutionary insurrection was a point of contention that 
made co-operation difficult. The Radicals did not share CEDA’s attitude to 
102 Montero, CEDA, ii. 576–80.
103 Región, 13, 28 Dec. 1934, 20 July 1935; El Noroeste, 14 Feb. 1935. 
104 Región, 24 July 1935.
105 Región, 6 Oct., 10 Dec. 1935. 
106 On strikes in 1935, see Castejón Rodríguez, ‘La patronal’, pp. 421–2, 427, 429.
107 Taibo, Asturias, pp. 578–80. 
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death penalties for former revolutionaries. Two CEDA ministers resigned 
in April after they refused to sign the commutation of the death sentences 
of Ramón González Peña and Teodomiro Menéndez, which provoked a 
governmental crisis. The subsequent government formed solely of Radicals 
and the small PRLD lasted a month before it collapsed. CEDA’s strategy of 
slowly inching towards control of the government appeared to be working. 
The centre-right Republicans ceded the majority of ministries in the 
following administration to CEDA and Agrarian Party deputies, including 
Gil Robles as minister of war. As the CEDA consolidated its position, 
it hardened its political line. Filiberto Villalobos, the PRLD minister of 
education, was vilified and forced to resign due to the lack of support for his 
education reforms. Manuel Giménez Fernández, the social Catholic CEDA 
minister of agriculture, saw his agrarian reform watered down to inefficacy 
through amendments.108 The combination of political differences between 
the Radicals and the CEDA, the weakness of the former and the lack of 
interest in government-led reform of the latter, meant that the long 1935 was 
a year of a political half-life in which little was achieved.109 
The return of the left 
In the post-insurrectionary context of hunger and misery, left-wing 
organizations tried to introduce their own initiatives to assist supporters 
and family members, but their efforts were hampered by the repression 
and having to operate covertly or else under the protection afforded by 
parliamentary immunity. The initial priority was to extract fugitive 
revolutionaries from Asturias, which began in late December.110 According 
to Taibo, 200–300 went into exile, although the figure seems low given that 
121 alone went to the USSR and the main nucleus was located in France and 
Belgium.111 Help for those imprisoned in Asturias took longer to organize, 
and incarcerated socialists were frustrated at the lack of immediate assistance. 
Legal aid arrived in the form of socialist lawyer Mariano Moreno Mateos, 
who was quickly overwhelmed by the volume of investigations. Communist 
108 See J. R. Montero, La CEDA: el catolicismo social y político en la II República (2 vols, 
Madrid, 1977), ii. 173–207; J. Tusell, Historia de la democracia cristiana en España (2 vols, 
Madrid, 1974), i. 282–312.
109 E.g. much hand-wringing regarding poverty and unemployment only resulted in a 
desultory amount spent on public works (Townson, Crisis, p. 281).
110 Taibo, Asturias, pp. 545–6.
111 Taibo, Asturias, pp. 533, 593; La Tarde, 4 May 1936. They were looked after by the 
International Mining Federation (J. S. Vidarte, El bienio negro y la insurrección de Asturias 
(Barcelona, 1978), p. 416).
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organizations, including SRI, are regarded as effective in providing aid, but 
it was not until spring 1935 that SRI initiatives gained a clear organizational 
form and there was still no SRI committee in Oviedo by mid April 1935.112 
That same month, the SRI founded the National Committee of Aid for 
the Victims of October, which was backed by socialist, Communist and 
Republican organizations, and channelled funds to families and prisoners. 
The Association of Defence Lawyers for Those Indicted for the Events of 
October was similarly an SRI-funded cross-party organization (although 
the socialists distanced themselves from it at national level). It provided 
legal support for prisoners across Spain and was established in Gijón from 
March.113 
Legal assistance aside, the suppression of left-wing political parties and 
unions meant organizing aid was very difficult. Women played a prominent 
role in facilitating the organization of aid; female parliamentary deputies 
visited prisoners and transported orphans out of the province, and other 
politically active women arranged clandestine meetings in the mountains.114 
Protected by parliamentary immunity, the Communist Dolores Ibárruri 
and socialists Matilde de la Torre, Veneranda Manzano and María Lejárraga 
supported families through initiatives like the Committee in Aid of 
Working-Class Children, which raised 50,000 pesetas and evacuated 500 
children. The Committee was the new label for the Women Against War 
and Fascism committee formed in 1934.115
Even as activists on the ground occupied themselves with supporting 
112 See the letter from Mariano Moreno Mateos to Juan Simeón Vidarte, 23 Dec. 1934, 
in Vidarte, El bienio, pp. 331–2; L. Branciforte, El Socorro Rojo Internacional en España 
(1923–1939): relatos de la solidaridad antifascista (Madrid, 2009), pp. 160–3; A. Elorza 
and M. Bizcarrondo, Queridos camaradas: la Internacional Comunista y España, 1919–1939 
(Barcelona, 1999), p. 229; letter to an unnamed ‘comrade’ from the SRI National Executive 
Committee, 15 Apr. 1935, in AHPA, AP, box 78446, file 62 (1935).
113 For the National Committee and SRI, see Branciforte, El Socorro. For Asturias, see 
Letter from Rufino García to SRI Central Committee, 29 March 1935, AHPA, AP, box 
78446, file 62 (1935).
114 M. A. Mateos, ¡Salud, compañeras! Mujeres socialistas en Asturias (1900–1937) (Oviedo, 
2007), p. 181. For the authorities clamping down on the left, see e.g., El Norooeste, 20 Aug., 
8 Oct. 1935; AHPA, AP, box 78446, file 62 (1935).
115 See L. Branciforte, ‘Legitimando la solidaridad femenina internacional: el Socorro 
Rojo’, Arenal, xvi (2009), 27–52, at pp. 43, 45–6; F. Erice, ‘Mujeres comunistas: la militancia 
femenina en el comunismo asturiano, de los orígenes al final del franquismo’, in Los 
comunistas en Asturias (1920–1982), ed. F. Erice (Gijón, 1996), especially p. 322; Mateos, 
¡Salud, compañeras!, p. 181; Ayuda. Portavoz de la solidaridad, 27 Feb. 1936. For Ibárruri’s 
versión, see D. Ibárruri, Memorias de Dolores Ibárruri, Pasionaria: la lucha y la vida 
(Barcelona, 1985), pp. 187–90.
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prisoners, much of the movement, including those in exile and in prison, 
was engaged in debating future strategy. The defeat of the revolutionary 
insurrection and the repression meant that the socialists required a new 
way forward. Fierce, lengthy discussions took place in prison galleries 
and through correspondence and newsprint as socialists argued over the 
future of the movement.116 The debates and political manoeuvrings led to 
the definitive crystallization of three factions with contrasting views on 
alliances with other political parties, and, to a lesser extent, purges and 
responsibility for the insurrection.117 The left faction was identified with 
Largo Caballero, who had been arrested in his nightclothes on 14 October 
and remained imprisoned in Madrid. Prieto, who maintained a pragmatic, 
centrist position, had fled across the border to France hidden in the boot of 
a car. Besteiro headed the smaller, conservative wing of the socialists. With 
Largo Caballero imprisoned, Juan Simeón Vidarte became the de facto 
leader of the PSOE. He pursued a strategy of rebuilding an alliance with 
the left Republicans, which was welcomed by Prieto.118 Although Largo 
Caballero had approved Vidarte’s initial moves in April, the Caballeristas, 
which included important sections of the JS, were far from impressed by 
the attempt to resurrect the Republican–socialist alliance. The frictions 
between Caballeristas and reformist Prietistas increased from late spring 
and culminated in the resignation of Largo Caballero over a matter relating 
to the PSOE’s statutes at the end of the year. The internal struggle to 
control the socialist movement would continue through 1936 and during 
the Spanish Civil War.119
The left Republicans had been immersed in their own process of 
reorganization in the months prior to discussing a possible alliance with the 
socialists. Azaña’s Republican Action merged with former Radical Socialists 
116 E.g. Prieto’s articles were collected in Documentos socialistas: escritos de Indalecio Prieto, 
Ramón González Peña, Toribio Echevarría, Amador Fernández, Antonio Llaneza, Alejandro 
Jaume, Francisco Torquemada, jóvenes presos de Asturias y de Madrid, etc., etc., ed. I. Prieto 
(Madrid, n.d.). For Caballerista criticism, see C. de Baráibar, Las falsas “posiciones socialistas” 
de Indalecio Prieto (Madrid, 1935) and for criticism of Caballero, see G. M. de Coca, Anti-
Caballero: crítica marxista de la bolchevización del partido socialista (1930–1936) (Madrid, 1975 
[1936]).
117 J. Aróstegui, Largo Caballero: el tesón y la quimera (Barcelona, 2013), p. 379.
118 H. Graham, Socialism and War: the Spanish Socialist Party in Power and Crisis, 1936–1939 
(Cambridge, 1991), p. 20; letter from Prieto to the Executive Commission of the PSOE, 23 
March 1935, in Prieto, Documentos, pp. 19–26. 
119 This summary of a complicated struggle is based on Aróstegui, Largo Caballero, pp. 
379–417; Graham, Socialism, pp. 20–4. See also S. Juliá, La izquierda del PSOE (1935–1936) 
(Madrid, 1977), pp. 5–28; P. Heywood, Marxism and the Failure of Organised Socialism in 
Spain, 1879–1936 (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 164–7.
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and a Galician Republican party to form the Republican Left (IR) in April 
1934. Five months later, Martínez Barrio’s breakaway Radicals merged with 
another group of Radical Socialists to create the Republican Union (UR). 
Despite tensions, the IR and UR reached a working relationship by May 
1935 and momentum grew behind the left Republicans through the rest of 
the year. In the middle of November, Azaña, whose rallies attracted crowds 
of up to 400,000 supportive of an amnesty and a renewed progressive 
Republican project, sent the socialists a letter proposing an alliance. The 
Caballerista response was to demand that all of the working-class left, with 
the exception of the anarchists, be included. In their eyes, Communist 
involvement would prevent the PCE outflanking the socialists and weaken 
the reformist Prietistas. 
Largo Caballero’s demand that the PCE be included in the alliance brought 
the Communists ‘out of the ghetto’, but the latter was also facilitated by a 
change in Comintern policy.120 At its seventh congress in September 1935, 
the Comintern endorsed a policy of popular fronts, according to which 
Communists would collaborate in the defence of bourgeois democracy. 
This was a significant departure from the ‘class against class’ policy of the 
Third Period (1927–34) that had prohibited alliances with other political 
groups and attacked social democrats as ‘social fascists’. The change was due 
to the rise of fascism and rank-and-file unity initiatives. In France, fears of a 
bellicose Germany and the continued rise of right-wing leagues stimulated 
the desire for a broader popular front than the socialist–Communist pact 
signed in the summer of 1934. The French socialists endorsed the policy of a 
popular front in June 1935 and the following month socialists, Communists 
and the middle-class Radical party jointly celebrated Bastille Day.121 Political 
positions had shifted, and so had language and symbols. The red flag and 
The Internationale mixed with the French tricolour and the Marseillaise. The 
French Communists switched from invoking the working class to emphasize 
the ‘people’.122 This nationalization of Communist political language would 
become evident in Spain in 1936 in the PCE’s shift towards speaking in the 
name of the ‘working people’ as opposed to the working class.
There was a further bone of contention within the Spanish socialist 
ranks, which centred on the ‘Bolchevization’ demanded by sectors of the 
120 Graham, Socialism, p. 19.
121 G.-R. Horn, European Socialists Respond to Fascism: Ideology, Activism and Contingency 
in the 1930s (New York, 1996), pp. 98–101; J. Jackson, The Popular Front in France: Defending 
Democracy, 1934–38 (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 22–51.
122 For this emphasis on the people, see J. Wardhaugh, In Pursuit of the People: Political 
Culture in France, 1934–1939 (Basingstoke, 2009), Bastille Day at p. 84.
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Socialist Youth. The Caballerista leadership of the JS produced a pamphlet, 
Octubre: segunda etapa, in early 1935 that constituted a withering attack on 
‘reformism’ and ‘centrism’. They positioned themselves as the revolutionary 
vanguard, demanded a purge of the socialist ranks and called for the PSOE 
to leave the Second International.123 Demanding ‘Bolchevization’ may have 
been a way of ‘deflect[ing] public attention from the PSOE left’s passivity 
during October 1934’ and letters from Spanish exiles to Largo Caballero 
calling for the expulsion of those who had not participated in the revolution 
would have made for uncomfortable reading for him.124 Members of the 
Asturian JS rejected Octubre in a letter of 5 March. They criticized Soviet 
Communism, advocated an alliance with the Republicans and remarked 
that ‘there is no other betrayal – recognize it well – than those who have 
boasted of their exalted revolutionism only to have shown excessive 
cowardice in practice’, in what was a pointed criticism of the Madrid JS 
for their relative inaction during October 1934.125 The ‘Bolchevization’ 
matter was closely bound up with frictions within the socialist movement. 
The letter was widely circulated and in various versions adulterated to be 
strongly censorious of Largo Caballero, who believed the letter a Prietista 
strategy to undermine his position.126 
Asturias is often cited as a bastion of Prietista reformism and the 
aforementioned letter from young members appears to confirm this. The 
reality was more complex and the position of Asturian socialists was far from 
homogeneous. Gonzalez Peña and Antuña expressed support for Prieto and 
Largo Caballero respectively in March 1935.127 A fawning letter of support 
for Largo Caballero from Moscow in early 1936 feted October 1934 as a 
‘glorious’ struggle against fascism that had united workers. The signatories, 
which included a dozen Asturian socialists, demanded ‘Bolchevization’ via 
a struggle against ‘odious reformism and centrism’ and to learn from the 
123 For the full text of Octubre: segunda etapa, see C. Ramírez, Balance de una ruptura: los 
socialistas en el gobierno, en la guerra y en la revolución (Madrid, 2012), pp. 277–328.
124 For the quotation, see Graham, Socialism, p. 18. Letter from Ruperto García et al to 
Francisco Largo Caballero, Jan. 1936, CDMH, PS Madrid, box 2371. 
125 For the letter from the socialist prisoners in the model prison of Oviedo to the Executive 
Commission of the National Federation of the Socialist Youth, see Prieto, Documentos, pp. 
179–87.
126 Aróstegui, Largo Caballero, p. 388. Prieto in fact claimed to have requested the removal 
of criticism of Largo Caballero from the letter (letter from Prieto to Negrín, 26 June 1935, in 
Prieto, Documentos, p. 112).
127  See P. Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution 
in the Second Republic (London, 1978), p. 136; letter from Francisco Largo Caballero to 
Graciano Antuña, 25 Mar. 1935, CDMH, PS Madrid, box 2371. 
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example set by the USSR.128 The dispersal of the Asturian socialist movement 
in prisons, exile and clandestinity contributed to the fragmenting pressures 
and internal frictions. 
As socialist internal debates raged and the left Republicans and socialists 
moved towards an alliance, the wider political situation was changing. Two 
scandals rocked the Radicals, precipitated their decline and heralded the 
prospect of elections. The first was the Straperlo affair, which implicated 
important figures in the Radical Party, including Lerroux. The matter 
revolved around a fraudulent roulette machine and bribes made in 
exchange for permits to install it. Lerroux was cleared of wrongdoing, but 
as the Radical Party struggled with desertions and internal chaos, the Tayá 
scandal broke. Radical ministers were accused of fraudulently resolving 
a compensation case over a contract involving shipping in Equatorial 
Guinea. The CEDA withdrew their support from the government and 
Prime Minister Chapaprieta resigned on 9 December.129 
Political momentum had grown behind what would become the Popular 
Front, but it was Gil Robles who seemed to have achieved his objectives. 
The implosion of the Radicals left the CEDA poised to control the next 
government at the perfect moment. The party had demanded revision of the 
Constitution ever since its approval in December 1931. Now that four years 
had passed, this could be achieved through a simple majority in the Cortes, 
rather than requiring the assent of two-thirds of the chamber. Importantly, 
however, President Alcalá Zamora doubted Gil Robles’s Republican 
credentials and refused to offer him the chance to form a government. 
Instead, he turned to the Galician Republican Manuel Portela Valladares, 
who piloted the moribund legislature towards elections in February 1936.130 
Furious, Gil Robles began consulting generals, including Franco, on a coup 
d’état that would force the president to appoint a CEDA government.131
The changing political winds were perceptible in Asturias, and in late 
1935, it seemed that the left was poised to return to public life. Rumours 
circulated that municipal councillors were set to resign and those elected in 
1931 would return.132 The governor reasserted his authority by banning ‘the 
advertisement of newspapers in a coercive or scandalous way’ as part of a 
128 Letter from Ruperto García et al. to Francisco Largo Caballero, Jan. 1936, CDMH, PS 
Madrid, box 2371.
129 Townson, Crisis, pp. 315–29, 332–7.
130 Preston, Coming of the Spanish Civil War, pp. 165–71; Townson, Crisis, pp. 336–8.
131 E. González Calleja, Contrarrevolucionarios: radicalización violenta de las derechas 
durante la Segunda República, 1931–1936 (Madrid, 2011), p. 298. 
132 E.g. Asturias, 21 Dec. 1935; El Noroeste, 21, 29 Dec. 1935. 
179
Repression and the redefinition of politics during the long 1935
clampdown on leftist resurgence in Spain more widely.133 Political meetings 
were still illegal, unions could not function under the UGT banner and 
arrests, searches of homes and military trials persisted.134 Faced with this 
panorama, those tasked with preparing the groundwork for elections were 
women. Socialist deputy Matilde de la Torre urged Asturian women – who 
were ‘alone against the enemy’ – to engage in political activities, such as 
checking the electoral register for errors ahead of the elections.135
The state of alarm was lifted in Asturias in early January and 
constitutional guarantees returned across the country. The return of the 
left was immediately felt, but attempts at restricting political expression 
and the threat of military power remained. Although ‘vivas!’ to socialism 
and revolution and red-shirted activists reappeared on the streets of Oviedo 
in jubilant expressions of left-wing political identity, the governor quickly 
banned the public display of political ideas ‘through shirts, insignias and 
gestures’. The measure did not explicitly target the left, but those arrested 
were left-wing activists.136 More ominously, military manoeuvres continued 
in the province even as the election campaign was in full swing. The 
Foreign Legion marched through the streets of Oviedo accompanied by 
cries of ‘death to the socialists’, shooting practice occurred on a daily basis, 
and military manoeuvres took place overlooking Oviedo.137 The threat 
of violence and the assertion of military power were present during the 
election campaign, even when constitutional guarantees were back in force. 
Freed from censorship, a tide of articles in socialist La Tarde focused on the 
use of torture during the repression and paid close attention to the security 
forces’ use of violence during the election campaign.138 Accompanying this 
denunciation of the repression and the euphoric public return of the left was 
the frisking of the opposition for arms. Rather than relying on the authorities, 
left-wing activists assumed the task of stopping opponents and searching them 
for weapons. Stripping opponents of weapons was humiliating, an assertion 
of power and a form of revenge, as well as an attempt to ensure personal 
safety. But it also revealed a fragility and anxiety that would be at the heart of 
radicalism during the Popular Front spring of 1936.
133 El Noroeste, 21 Dec. 1935; González Calleja, En nombre, p. 240.
134 El Noroeste, 1, 4, 10, 17, 19 Dec. 1935; M. Bizcarrondo, ‘Democracia y revolución en 
la estrategia socialista de la Segunda República’, Estudios de Historia Social, xvi–xvii (1981), 
227–459, at p. 344.
135 Asturias, 23 Nov. 1935; Mateos, ¡Salud, compañeras!, pp. 184–5.
136 Región, 12, 14, 16, 29 Jan. 1936. 
137 Región, 7 Jan., 1 Feb. 1936; La Tarde, 13 Jan. 1936; El Noroeste, 9, 14 Feb. 1936.
138 E.g. La Tarde, 15 Jan., 5, 10 Feb. 1936. 
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The long 1935 was a year of political half-life in which little was achieved 
at the national level or by the administrations in the coalfields. There was 
little will to provide an alternative vision of the Republic. Mining companies 
were content with sacking workers and allowing working conditions to 
deteriorate. Politics as order relied on the exclusion of the left, but also 
the spectre of revolution. The problem was that the repression was deep 
and widespread, yet it was not sufficiently protracted to do anything but 
temporarily disarticulate the Asturian left. This ensured that there would be 
a backlash in 1936 once the left returned to public political activity and to 
power after the elections. The insurrection and repression therefore reshaped 
politics prior to the Civil War. Amnesty was a powerful, popular banner for 
the Popular Front, while for the right the insurrection made the spectre 
of revolution very real indeed. But beyond the political campaigns, the 
insurrection and particularly the repression intensified the fragmentation of 
society. Personal affairs, refracted through the lens of the revolution, became 
public and politicized. The repression had politicized society in a particular 
way, which would become evident in 1936. It had been harshest in Asturias, 
but Asturias did not see the most widespread eruption of labour conflict 
or violence in 1936. Instead, the long 1935 configured a particular kind of 
fragile radicalism, which posed problems for Republican governance prior 
to the Civil War.
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7. A fragile radicalism: the Popular Front  
spring of 1936
A week of spring rain had not dampened spirits. When Ramón González 
Peña stepped off the train at Puente de los Fierros on Sunday 1 March 
1936, an enthusiastic crowd greeted his return to Asturias with applause. 
After paying homage to the dead of October 1934 in Mieres, he travelled to 
Oviedo, which he had to enter on foot due to the number of people on the 
streets. La Tarde hailed his return as the homecoming of the true voice of 
the Asturian people, while the occupation of the streets of Oviedo by the 
working class revealed the province to be ‘red Asturias’.1 This image of the 
working class asserting itself in public spaces is typical of both the French 
and Spanish popular fronts in 1936. In France, the massive strike wave of 
June 1936 that greeted the electoral victory of the French Popular Front was 
a jubilant celebration of working-class strength, identity and visibility, even 
as the rise of right-wing leagues and street violence posed serious problems 
for French political life. Yet as hope grew towards an ‘apotheosis’ in France in 
July, in Spain the mood was very different.2 Political and social polarization, 
violence, strikes and right-wing conspiracies mean that the five months that 
separate the general elections of February 1936 and the July military coup 
form one of the most complex periods in Spanish history.
The shadow of the Civil War looms large over the spring of 1936 and 
debating responsibility for the conflict continues to shape historiographical 
debate. According to the Francoist narrative, the Popular Front spring was 
a period of chaos and desgobierno (misgovernment or lack of government 
authority) remedied by a military intervention that saved Spain from 
Communist revolution. The Communist conspiracy was a fabrication, 
although substantial levels of protest and violence across the country – 
labelled by Stanley Payne as the ‘most famous civil disturbance in Spanish 
1 La Tarde, 2 March 1936; El Noroeste, 3 March 1936.
2 For the jubilation and ‘apotheosis’, see J. Jackson, The Popular Front in France: Defending 
Democracy, 1934–38 (Cambridge, 1988), pp. xii, 10. For more on levels of violence, see B. 
Jenkins and C. Millington, France and Fascism: February 1934 and the Dynamics of Political 
Crisis (Abingdon, 2015), p. 151.
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history’ – were not.3 A particular point of contention is the role of the 
government. Gabriele Ranzato and Payne depicted the Popular Front 
governments as fluctuating between impotence, unwillingness to guarantee 
order and facilitation of a revolutionary process.4 Eduardo González Calleja 
criticized this recurrent cliché of Popular Front ‘chaos’ and ‘misgovernment’ 
for neglecting the government’s attempts to curb violence.5 
While there was an increase in political violence (estimates of the number 
of fatalities range from 270 to 450), the spring of 1936 was not a period 
of chaos in Asturias, nor did the region see the development of a proto-
revolutionary movement.6 The legacy of the insurrection and the long 1935 
conditioned the nature of politics in the province, as it did in Spain more 
widely. There was a clear crisis of community evident in purges, boycotts 
and the vigilance of the security forces, which contributed to a renewed 
radicalism. This radicalism was nevertheless fragile, defensive and inwardly 
focused, as political groups, trade unions and workplaces tried to rearticulate 
communities broken by the repression. Leftist militias, distrustful of the 
state, took the policing of the Republic into their own hands, in defence of 
the Popular Front and their own understanding of the Republican project.
Elections
On 15 January 1936, the Republican Left (IR), Republican Union (UR), 
PSOE, communists (the PCE and the POUM) and the Syndicalist Party 
signed the Popular Front agreement. Hardly radical, the pact was a return to 
the spirit of freedom and justice that had inspired the Republican–socialist 
governments of the first biennium. The agreement promised agrarian and 
education reform and an amnesty for those imprisoned for ‘political and 
social crimes’. In contrast to the first biennium, however, the pact promised 
only an electoral agreement. The Republicans would occupy government 
3 S. Payne, ‘Political violence during the Spanish Second Republic’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, xxv (1990), 269–88, at p. 279. For a summary of the historiography, 
see E. González Calleja, ‘La historiografía sobre la violencia política en la Segunda República 
española’, Hispania Nova: revista de historia contemporánea, xi (2013) 403–36.
4 G. Ranzato, ‘El peso de la violencia en los orígenes de la guerra civil de 1936–1939’, 
Espacio, tiempo y forma, serie v, Historia contemporánea, xx (2008), 159–82; S. Payne, The 
Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933–1936: the Origins of the Civil War (New Haven, Conn., 
2006), pp. 197–215.
5 E. González Calleja, En nombre de la autoridad: la defensa del orden público durante la 
Segunda República española (1931–1936) (Granada, 2014), pp. 259–60.
6 E. González Calleja, ‘La necro-lógica de la violencia sociopolítica en la primavera 
de 1936’, Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez, xli (2011) <http://journals.openedition.org/
mcv/3825> [accessed 13 Jan. 2019]. 
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office on their own. Accordingly, the Republican parties were assigned a 
greater number of candidates on the joint election tickets than other parties 
in order to bolster the stability of a future Republican government.7
The right, consisting of the CEDA, the monarchists of Renovación 
Española, the Carlist Traditionalist Communion and the still-minuscule 
FE-JONS, was not united by a similar commonly-agreed programme or 
coalition at a national level. The CEDA, as in 1933, was pragmatic and 
willing to negotiate with different groups to form provincial-level ‘anti-
revolutionary fronts’ and in Asturias the CEDA repeated the joint candidacy 
with the PRLD.8 Backed by huge funds, the CEDA mounted a modern 
mass propaganda campaign across the country, producing 2.7 million 
posters and fifty million flyers with forty different designs. The elections 
were framed as an ‘apocalyptic struggle’ for the soul of the country.9 Región 
warned readers they faced a choice of ‘death or life’ and ‘peace or revolution’. 
The left represented ‘freemasonry, separatism, revolution, Marxism, hunger, 
death’, while the CEDA embodied ‘religion, national unity, prosperity, 
social justice, work, peace’.10 Contrasting the Spanish nation, peace and 
prosperity with the alleged destruction heralded by ‘Marxism’, along with 
insinuating that Moscow controlled the Popular Front, provided some of 
the ingredients for the future political culture of Francoism forged during 
the Civil War.11
The legacy of the insurrection and the repression was central to the 
sharply polarized atmosphere during the election campaign. The country 
was divided between the Popular Front and anti-revolutionary fronts, 
which squeezed out Prime Minister Portela Valladares’s attempt at a centrist 
electoral slate. The situation was tense, and twenty-five people lost their lives 
in violent incidents.12 Despite having been the scene of the insurrection, 
Asturias was absent from the list of provinces with fatalities, although there 
7 See S. Juliá, Orígenes del frente popular en España (Madrid, 1979), pp. 216–21; H. 
Graham, Socialism and War: the Spanish Socialist Party in Power and Crisis, 1936–1939 
(Cambridge, 1991), ch. 1.
8 P. Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in 
the Second Republic (London, 1978), p. 169; J. R. Montero, La CEDA: el catolicismo social y 
político en la II República, (2 vols, Madrid, 1977), ii. 312. 
9 Preston, Coming of the Spanish Civil War, pp. 171–4. See also Montero, CEDA, ii. 317–8.
10 Región, 4, 16 Feb. 1936. 
11 El Noroeste, 16 Feb. 1936. See also Montero, CEDA, ii. 322–6; R. Cruz, En el nombre 
del pueblo: república, rebelión y guerra en la España de 1936 (Madrid, 2006), p. 93. For a 
similar discourse in Andalusia, see J. M. Macarro Vera, Socialismo, República y revolución en 
Andalucía (1931–1936) (Seville, 2000), pp. 397–8.
12 Cruz, En el nombre, p. 97. 
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were scuffles and violent encounters between opposing political groups. 
Activists pasting up CEDA posters exchanged shots with their political 
opponents while a man in a bar in Pola de Laviana was stabbed for refusing 
to shout ‘death to fascism!’13 The Catholic Youth in Sama claimed its leaders 
had received death threats and that one of its members had been attacked.14 
The ballots held on 16 February delivered a narrow victory for the 
Popular Front. Neither the Popular Front nor the right polled more than 50 
per cent of the votes, but the system, which favoured coalitions, meant that 
the Popular Front obtained a clear majority in parliament with 265 seats. 
This grew to 285 in May once elections had been rerun in areas where there 
had been irregularities. Particularly significant in facilitating the victory of 
the Popular Front was the CNT. In a marked change from 1933, there had 
been few anarchist calls for abstention and the promise of amnesty was a 
powerful call for the supporters and family members of those who had been 
jailed in the wake of October 1934.15 The left republicans of IR and UR 
gained 125 seats between them, followed by the socialists with ninety-nine 
seats. The PCE experienced a substantial increase in influence by adding 
fifteen deputies to their existing representative. The parties in government 
between 1933 and 1935 fared badly. The scandal-ridden Radicals collapsed 
from over 100 deputies to just five. The CEDA did better, but losing twenty-
seven seats and dropping to eighty-eight deputies was a disaster insofar as 
it did not deliver ‘all power to the jefe!’ as posters had demanded. There 
was no electoral breakthrough for the fascist party, FE-JONS. Its leader, 
José Antonio Primo de Rivera, lost his seat (which left the party without 
representation in the Cortes) and associated parliamentary immunity.16 
On the announcement of the first results in the early hours of 17 February, 
Gil Robles visited Prime Minister Portela Valladares to persuade him to 
declare martial law rather than hand power to the Popular Front. He was 
joined by the chief of staff, Franco, who attempted to organize a military 
13 Región, 7 Jan., 8 Feb. 1936. For conflicts over posters see also Cruz, En el nombre, p. 97. 
Álvarez Tardío noted the relative lack of lethal violence in areas with previously high levels 
of social conflict, e.g. Barcelona (M. Álvarez Tardío, ‘The impact of political violence during 
the Spanish general election of 1936’, Journal of Contemporary History, xlviii (2013), 463–85, 
at p. 475).
14 Región, 13 Feb. 1936. 
15 E.g. C. Ealham, Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898–1937 (Abingdon, 2005), p. 
148; G. Álvarez Chillida, ‘Negras tormentas sobre la República. La intransigencia libertaria’, 
in Palabras como puños: la intransigencia política en la Segunda República, ed. F. del Rey 
(Madrid, 2011), pp. 103–4.
16 On the elections, see the classic study J. Tusell, Las elecciones del Frente Popular (Madrid, 
1971).
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uprising but failed. Portela Valladares resisted the pressure but had been 
unsettled enough to transfer power to Azaña’s new administration earlier 
than planned.17 After this initial threat to Republican democracy, Gil Robles 
and the CEDA were subdued, for the party was in chaos. Their accidentalist 
strategy lay in tatters. The results reaffirmed many supporters’ ‘disgust’ with 
democracy and they started to turn their backs on the CEDA.18 Support in 
Salamanca ‘evaporated almost overnight’ and the party was ‘thrown into 
turmoil’.19 
In Asturias, the Popular Front achieved a clear victory on a provincial level, 
with 170,000 votes over 150,000 for the CEDA-PRLD, that was reflected in 
Oviedo and the coalfields.20 The exception in the latter was Aller, where the 
Popular Front fell a thousand votes short of the CEDA-PRLD, although 
in all municipalities the rightist slate continued to attract a significant 
minority of voters. While approximately a fifth of the vote went to the 
CEDA-PRLD in Mieres and Langreo, this rose to over a quarter in San 
Martín del Rey Aurelio and Laviana and increased further up the valleys in 
rural areas.21 Compared to the 150,000 votes for the CEDA-PRLD list, FE-
JONS candidates received only a handful of votes.22 Their supporters lived 
in Gijón (112 votes) and Oviedo (52), rather than the coalfields: Falangists 
received nine votes in Mieres, five in Langreo, two in Aller and none in 
Laviana or San Martín del Rey Aurelio.23
Despite the Popular Front victory, the number of right-wing votes was 
again disconcerting for left-wing activists. As in 1933, they tried to account 
for the number of CEDA-PRLD votes. Leftists were perplexed that a class-
17 Preston, Coming of the Spanish Civil War, pp. 179–80; E. González Calleja, 
Contrarrevolucionarios: radicalización violenta de las derechas durante la Segunda República, 
1931–1936 (Madrid, 2011), pp. 302–3. 
18 S. Lowe, Catholicism, War and the Foundation of Francoism (Eastbourne, 2010), pp. 
109–11. 
19 M. Vincent, Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in 
Salamanca, 1930–1936 (Oxford, 1996), p. 239. For similar remarks on Galicia, see E. Grandío 
Seoane, Los orígenes de la derecha gallega: la CEDA en Galicia (1931–1936) (Sada, 1998), pp. 
277–9, 286ff.
20 Boletín oficial de la provincia de Oviedo, 27 Feb. 1936. 
21 For results, see La Tarde, 17 Feb. 1936; Región, 18 Feb. 1936. It could be argued that 
voters for the CEDA-PRLD were in fact voting for the PRLD without sharing the values of 
the CEDA. However, voters still had to stomach the rhetoric of the CEDA and a breakdown 
of voting in Aller indicates that voters did not favour PRLD candidates over the CEDA on 
their ballot papers (Boletín oficial de la provincia de Oviedo, 29 Feb., 2, 5 March 1936).
22 La Voz de Asturias, 22 Feb. 1936. 
23 M. Suárez Cortina, El fascismo en Asturias (Gijón, 1981), pp. 281–2.
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based analysis failed to explain the results. In Ciaño-Santa Ana, the 113 
votes for the right far exceeded the eight local business owners. Thirty-five 
votes for the right in Veneros (Langreo) were explained away as men who 
‘let themselves be beaten by weaknesses’, including selling their ballot for 
a job. Yet in contrast to the reaction to the previous elections, the rhetoric 
had a harder edge in 1936. Voting for the right was a betrayal of the local 
community. It was now the responsibility of the town to ‘unmask’ these 
‘cowards’ and ‘traitors’.24 Violence was absent from the coalfields, but there 
were incidents of retributive acts accompanying victory across Spain, from 
stones thrown at buildings to cases of assault.25
The dominant tone in the streets – and in the prisons – was nevertheless 
the exuberant celebration of victory by Popular Front supporters. In the 
uncertain political interregnum following the elections and before the 
promised amnesty was decreed, there were riots in some prisons across the 
country, including in Oviedo, where the newly elected PCE deputy Dolores 
Ibárruri negotiated the freeing of prisoners on 20 February to diffuse the 
tense situation.26 Those released paraded around Oviedo in a joyous and 
peaceful demonstration of victory. According to La Voz de Asturias, there 
were more people on the streets of the capital the following day than during 
a holiday. Singing crowds flocked to the station to greet SOMA leader 
Amador Fernández, who had been in exile in France and Belgium, and in 
the evening, the municipal band played. It seemed ‘for a moment [that] the 
face of the city had changed completely’.27 The former prisoners returned 
to the coalfields to a rapturous welcome from friends and families who 
deserted mines and workshops to greet them.28 
The image of joyous, singing crowds celebrating a victory that promised 
justice via state-led reform appeared to hark back to the first biennium. 
In addition, the recovery of left-wing political and cultural life seemed 
to indicate a return to pre-insurrection modes of being. Casas del Pueblo 
reopened and councillors who had been removed from office due to the 
insurrection regained their seats. A large audience witnessed the first 
meetings of the reinstated councils in Langreo and San Martín del Rey 
Aurelio.29 Sensitive to the abrupt shift in political winds, mining and steel 
24 La Tarde, 24, 28 Feb. 1936. 
25 See Grandío Seoane, Orígenes, p. 281; Macarro Vera, Socialismo, pp. 402–3.
26 D. Ibárruri, Memorias de Dolores Ibárruri, Pasionaria: la lucha y la vida (Barcelona, 
1985), pp. 227–33. See also Cruz, En el nombre, p. 109.
27 La Voz de Asturias, 22 Feb. 1936. 
28 Región, 22 Feb. 1936; El Noroeste, 23 Feb. 1936.
29 El Noroeste, 23 Feb. 1936; La Tarde, 28 Feb. 1936. 
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companies announced the readmission of workers fired after the insurrection 
before they were required to do so.30 Municipal councils reinstated former 
employees and sacked those appointed after October 1934, annulled previous 
appointments and agreed monetary compensation for workers suspended 
after the insurrection, which symbolically reversed decisions taken by 
the local authorities in 1934 and 1935.31 There was a renewed secularizing 
impulse across Spain manifest in initiatives like taxes on bell-ringing, a 
refusal to sponsor town fiestas and the removal of religious personnel from 
state-run welfare institutions.32 In short, there appeared to be a return to 
life prior to October 1934. As Ramón García Montes, who was a child in 
the Asturian coalfields at the time, recalled, the ‘life of our family returned 
to normal. Everything began to function as it had before the revolution’.33 
Yet the insurrection and repression had fractured communities in the coal 
valleys. There could be no return to the status quo ante. 
Fractured communities
The shadow of October 1934 was ever present in 1936. The insurrection 
formed a key component of Asturian leftist identity on an individual and 
collective level that was invoked in speeches and in the press. Speaking to the 
crowd gathered in Oviedo to celebrate 1 May, the civil governor recalled the 
insurrectionary fallen and claimed their ‘martyrdom and death [had] made 
possible the re-conquest of the Republic’.34 For activists, the insurrection 
constituted the central marker not only of their radical credentials, but 
also of leftist – and by extension working class – identification in 1936. 
Previously they had reeled off their participation in strikes or boasted of 
their anticlericalism when defending themselves in the press; now they 
invoked the insurrection and repression.35
30 M. Castejón Rodríguez, ‘La patronal hullera asturiana en la Segunda República’ 
(unpublished UNED PhD thesis, 2009), p. 430; El Noroeste, 26, 28 Feb. 1936; Boletín oficial 
de la provincia de Oviedo, 26 Feb. 1936.
31 AO, Actas, 17 Jan. 1936 to 31 July 1937, ff. 20, 21; AA, Actas, 5 Dec. 1935 to 23 Apr. 
1937, ff. 43–4, 67; AHPA, Actas, 24 Sept. 1935 to 20 May 1937, pp. 180–4. See also González 
Calleja, En nombre, pp. 263–4; Macarro Vera, Socialismo, pp. 409–10.
32 AHPA, Actas comisión de la Diputación Provincial, 24 Sept. 1935 to 20 May 1937, pp. 
269, 294–7, 349–50; F. Rey, Paisanos en lucha: exclusión política y violencia en la Segunda 
República española (Madrid, 2008), pp. 512–3; G. Collier, Socialists of Rural Andalusia: 
Unacknowledged Revolutionaries of the Second Republic (Stanford, Calif., 1987), p. 143. 
33 R. García Montes, Ángeles rojos sin alas para volar (Siero, 2009), p. 33.
34 La Tarde, 4 May 1936. 
35 For October 1934 as a yardstick during the Civil War, see Graham, Socialism, pp. 19ff.
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Political parties, trade unions and workforces conducted investigations 
and internal purges which probed conduct during the insurrection and the 
long 1935. The PCE cell in Sama met to judge the conduct of ‘comrade 
Damián’ for a statement he had signed when interrogated after the 
insurrection. Recognizing that this was ‘a weakness that Bolsheviks must not 
have’, he apologized and insisted that he had not informed on anyone. The 
cell, after hearing that Damián was a good comrade who had fought well 
in the insurrection, decided to express its disappointment but not to expel 
him.36 Although such ‘self-criticism’ formed part of Communist techniques 
for enforcing party discipline and standards of conduct, the purges and 
investigations were not limited to Communist political culture.37 Socialist 
Party and trade union sections organized assemblies to discuss and judge 
the conduct of members over the previous months and years.38 Even leaders 
were scrutinized. The Socialist Group in Oviedo examined the conduct of 
eminent figures such as Manuel Vigil Montoto (the ‘father’ of Asturian 
socialism), Teodomiro Menéndez and Lorenzo López Mulero, the mayor of 
Oviedo.39 Mining workforces also met to debate the conduct of their fellow 
workers during the repression and the election campaign.40
The purges could appear to be the result of the appeals by sectors of 
the JS for the ‘Bolchevization’ of the socialist movement in 1935. There 
were certainly increasing ties between the socialists and Communists in 
the labour and youth movements, although in different ways. Communists 
recognized the predominance of socialism in trade union organizing and 
their own failure, by agreeing to dissolve their own unions and join the 
socialist organizations at the end of the 1935. Communist SUM members 
affiliated to the SOMA.41 The JS, meanwhile, had come increasingly 
under the influence of the Third International. Negotiations between 
the JS and the JC culminated in the merger of the two organizations in 
1936 to form the United Socialist Youth under a decidedly Communist 
36 Actas de la reunión extraordinaria celebrada por la Célula de Barrio no. 1, de Sama para 
tratar el caso de las críticas al camarada Damián, CDMH, PS Gijón, H Series, box 15, file 
16. T. Rees underlined the importance of ‘willpower’ in the PCE in ‘Living up to Lenin: 
leadership culture and the Spanish Communist Party, 1920–1939’, History, xcvii (2012), 230–
55, at p. 252.
37 See T. Rees, ‘Deviation and discipline: anti-Trotskyism, Bolshevization and the Spanish 
Communist party, 1924–34’, Historical Research, lxxxii (2009), 131–56.
38 E.g. La Tarde, 26 Feb., 23 March 1936.
39 La Tarde, 22 Apr., 13 May 1936. For biographies, see the ‘Diccionario biográfico del 
socialismo español’. 
40 E.g. at the Mariana pit (Región, 25 March 1936). 
41 S. Juliá, La izquierda del PSOE (1935–1936) (Madrid, 1977), pp. 176–81.
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line.42 At the Asturian JS congress in April, reformists received a barrage 
of criticism.43 Yet the purges of spring 1936 in the coalfields – whether in 
trade unions, party sections or at the workplace – overflowed any narrow 
attempt at ‘Bolchevization’ tied to particular political objectives. The purges 
and investigations were instead part of a broader crisis of the left and the 
community.
The purges were fuelled by allegations about members’ and neighbours’ 
conduct that circulated through rumours and whispering campaigns. 
The JS treasurer in La Moral was accused – falsely, it would later prove 
– of supplying arms to the security forces during the repression while the 
secretary of the Socialist Group in Siero declared himself the victim of a 
‘defamatory campaign’, which included accusations of theft.44 The potential 
consequences of the whispers were serious and could include expulsion 
from the union, or social ostracism. A younger mineworker accused of 
signing a petition in support of death sentences for revolutionaries received 
threats and contemplated suicide.45 These whispering campaigns were not 
a brief flurry after the elections, but continued through the spring and into 
the summer. 
To counter the rumours, the accused frequently turned to the press 
in order to appeal for public opinion to judge the matter. Frustrated at 
the allegations and snide comments directed at his wife and children, the 
secretary of the Socialist Group in Siero called on the ‘people of Siero’ to 
judge him.46 Similarly, a civil guard ‘comrade’ wrote to La Tarde to end 
rumours about his brother, a municipal policeman, appealing to ‘all citizens 
and comrades’ to present evidence so that ‘public opinion’ could judge his 
conduct.47 In these appeals, public opinion was coterminous with the left-
wing community, endorsement from which would save the individual from 
ostracism. As the appeals recognized, investigations into an individual’s 
conduct offered the possibility of absolution or redemption. The assemblies 
were a mechanism for remaking ties within a particular Socialist Group, 
trade union section or workforce. Through demonstrating one’s innocence 
to comrades or neighbours, an individual could, in theory at least, absolve 
42 The classic study is R. Viñas, La formación de las Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas (1934–
1936) (Madrid, 1978).
43 For reports of the congress, see La Tarde, 24, 27 Apr., 4 May 1936.
44 For La Moral, see La Tarde, 11 May 1936; for Siero, see Avance, 18 July 1936.
45 La Tarde, 3 Feb. 1936.
46 Avance, 18 July 1936. 




him or herself and re-join a political group or be symbolically re-accepted 
into the community.
One of the difficulties for the accused was the retrospective application 
of standards of behaviour that did not account for the murky realities and 
pressures of the long 1935. Many, like Damián, had not lived up to the 
standards later demanded in 1936, whether due to fear, torture, indiscipline, 
personal relationships and loyalties, opportunism or even a shift in political 
outlook. A common self-defence strategy was to claim to have been duped 
into attending an AP rally or joining a right-wing union in 1935.48 These 
assertions were probably a way of backpedalling fast now that the political 
context had shifted again. 
The rumours, vehement public defences and expulsions reveal the 
profound crisis of community caused by the experience of the insurrection 
and repression. This crisis was also manifest in forms of public ostracism 
that revealed how difficult it was for opposing groups to occupy the same 
social spaces in 1936. SOMA members in Mieres were instructed to leave a 
bar if mineworkers who had obtained jobs after October 1934 entered and 
the owner refused to expel them.49 The retreat of politics to the local sphere 
in order to grapple with the crisis of community is also evident in other 
contexts of political crisis. In working-class districts of Berlin, for example, 
as Swett observed, there was a shift to ‘neighbourhood forms of justice’, 
including shunning, as a defensive response to the economic and political 
crisis of the early 1930s. This retrenchment was a way of asserting power 
over an arena that activists could control – or at least attempt to do so.50 
The threat of an economic sanction issued to the bar owner in Mieres 
carried echoes of a similar strategy that was particularly prevalent in 1936 – 
that of boycotting particular businesses. Boycotts were a form of economic 
ostracism as public collective punishment through the deliberate, collective 
cessation of normal patterns of consumption, with women heavily involved. 
Boycotts were not new in 1936, but they reached a scale and organization 
hitherto unseen.51 Boycotts were organized for political reasons, which 
usually centred on an individual’s role in the repression, or the way they 
voted or campaigned for opponents during the election campaign. Women 
48 La Tarde, 3 Feb., 6 May 1936. 
49 La Tarde, 27 March 1936. 
50 P. Swett, Neighbors and Enemies: the Culture of Radicalism in Berlin, 1929–1933 
(Cambridge, 2004), pp. 216, 221, 294.
51 Particularly after the 1933 elections (Avance, 7 Dec. 1933, 16 Jan. 1934). For Gijón in 1931, 
see P. Radcliff, From Mobilization to Civil War: the Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City 
of Gijón, 1900–1937 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 285. 
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in La Felguera tried to prevent female market-sellers from the neighbouring 
municipality of Siero from hawking their produce in La Felguera for 
allegedly having voted for the right.52 The JS in Bimenes called for the 
boycott of two business owners, one of whom was accused of doing ‘what 
he could to condemn us so that we rotted in prison’ in 1935.53 As a strategy, 
boycotts were not limited to the left: a female baker in Oviedo suffered a 
boycott for having spoken in support of the Popular Front. A committee 
of socialist women retaliated by calling on couriers to stop delivering bread 
to the women who objected to the baker.54 The latter did not constitute a 
boycott in the strict sense of the word; rather the term had developed into 
a byword for ostracism or a collective economic sanction.
The distinctiveness of boycotts in 1936 lay not just in their number, 
but their high degree of organization and the fact that they functioned, 
like the purges, as a form of popular justice. Far from ad hoc measures, 
left-wing boycotts were formalized and rationalized. The Socialist and 
Communist Youths in Langreo issued ‘certificates’ for market-sellers so that 
‘every good citizen, left-wing man or woman’ could ensure they bought 
from a ‘reputable’ supplier.55 There were boycott commissions, meetings, 
and justifications of boycotts printed in the press.56 Boycotts tended to be 
local affairs, but there were some limited attempts to organize them on 
a wider basis. Socialists from Langreo appealed to all Asturian working-
class political and union organizations to send them information on which 
businesses they should boycott.57
The boycott commissions developed elaborate procedures which 
mimicked aspects of a trial. In June, the Sotrondio boycott commission 
organized an assembly attended by delegates from thirty-four organizations 
to discuss the cases of Manuel Ordiz and Manuel Álvarez. Those present 
agreed to uphold the boycott against Ordiz, who was accused of reporting 
individuals to the authorities and blackmailing others with the threat of 
denunciation, and decreed a boycott against Álvarez for collaborating with 
52 El Noroeste, 21 Feb. 1936; La Tarde, 23 March 1936.
53 La Tarde, 18 March 1936.
54 La Tarde, 8 Apr. 1936. For a similar case in Sanlúcar de Barrameda (Cádiz), see J. A. 
Viejo Fernández, La Segunda República en Sanlúcar de Barrameda (1931–36) (Sanlúcar de 
Barrameda, 2011), p. 316. For right-wing boycotts, see also La Tarde, 23 March 1936.
55 La Tarde, 2 March 1936. 
56 For example, three cases in San Martín del Rey Aurelio (La Tarde, 15 May 1936). 
57 La Tarde, 16 March 1936. See also Avance, 7 July 1936; J. Uría, ‘Asturias 1920–1937, el 
espacio cultural comunista y la cultura de la izquierda: historia de un diálogo entre dos 
décadas’, in Los comunistas en Asturias (1920–1982), ed. F. Erice (Gijón, 1996), p. 275.
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the authorities by identifying revolutionaries. Attendees heard pre-trial 
reports, evidence was presented and heard from both sides, there was a 
face-to-face confrontation (careo), and the accused was allowed to defend 
himself. The case ended with a sentence, which could later be revised.58 
This formal mechanism of community justice identified local citizens, as 
represented by delegates from local organizations, as sovereign in these 
matters. 
Imitating legal procedure attempted to show fairness and logic – at 
least in the eyes of the organizers. Boycotts were punitive and divided 
communities but, like the investigations into militants’ conduct, they did 
allow redemption and re-integration into the community. Boycotts were 
an orderly, non-violent and circumscribed strategy. Once a sentence had 
been served, a boycott could be lifted.59 They channelled desires for revenge 
and served as an attempt to remake communities in spring 1936 after their 
fracturing in the insurrection and repression. A boycott was a strategy for 
defending the working class and asserting leftist power, yet the militancy 
was undercut by fragility. Boycotts meant a retrenchment to combatting 
divisions in their own communities. This was an inward-facing radicalism. 
It is difficult to see how the targets of boycotts, whose livelihoods 
were under threat, could consider a time-limited sentence as just or 
magnanimous, or the rhetoric as anything less than threatening given its 
militant edge. Socialist trade unions in Langreo declared their intention ‘to 
boycott and sink all businessmen and professionals who during the period 
of persecution and ignominy suffered by the Spanish people served as 
snitches and stalwarts of reaction’.60 The Antifascist Popular Front in Trubia 
instructed that the working class must not ‘contribute with your money to 
enrich the murderers of the working class. All-out war on those who betray 
our class aspirations’.61 Boycotts bred greater animosity towards the left and 
were symptoms of the chaos and desgobierno of the Popular Front. The 
quasi-judicial role adopted by boycott commissions seemed to show left-
wing organizations’ usurpation of the state, or the latter’s abdication, in its 
role as arbiter in questions of justice.
Fears that the state’s authority was under threat were fed by a further 
development: left-wing activists were assuming the task of stopping and 
searching individuals for arms in public spaces across the country in spring 
1936. As Región astutely observed, the searches meant that ‘the security 
58 Avance, 7 July 1936. 
59 E.g. see the case of Figaredo in La Tarde, 11 May 1936. 
60 La Tarde, 16 March 1936.
61 La Tarde, 2 March 1936.
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and safety of each individual depends on the sympathy or antipathy held 
towards us by those of the “Popular Front”’.62 Yet the situation was not 
one of revolutionary violence or of widespread extra-judicial murder. It is 
impossible to measure the effects of these frequent, intimate encounters 
between left and right, but the removal of weapons by local political 
opponents could only have increased anger and resentment among rightists.
This improvised policing had begun in Asturias in January, when the 
government reinstated constitutional guarantees and left-wing political 
activities were normalized in public life. It became more prevalent across 
the country in late March after rumours that an order by the ministry of the 
interior authorized governors to appoint them to the role.63 These ‘guardias 
de vista’ worked alongside municipal police to search rightists, as occurred 
in El Entrego (San Martín del Rey Aurelio), although there were also 
reports that such guards had been arrested by the Civil Guard for carrying 
firearms.64 The emergence of the patrols was part of the wider growth of left-
wing militias. By May, the antifascist militias of the Communist MAOC, 
which had only established itself after the elections, were carrying out drills 
on Mount Naranco, overlooking Oviedo.65 
Whereas in 1932 groups of JS members had pressured the municipal 
council for the Republican project to be implemented, the policing of the 
Republic in 1936 was different. The patrols confidently took the security 
of the Republic into their own hands. The groups moved between acting 
autonomously and requesting authorization to function as a para-state body. 
In early April, the PCE cell in Sama requested that the governor appoint 
them ‘guarantors of order’ so that they could prevent ‘false rumours’ or 
‘any surprises’ from the armed forces. They also asked the mayor to ban 
rightists from leaving the municipality at ‘certain times’ to prevent alarm.66 
The militias saw themselves as upholding the values and authority of the 
Republican government – and their vision of the Republic more broadly 
– but in doing so, they undermined state power. At the beginning of 
62 Región, 30 Apr. 1936. 
63 The ‘red police’ in Malaga even received a daily wage. González Calleja, En nombre, p. 
280. For restrictions on the right in La Mancha, Rey, Paisanos, pp. 522–31.
64 Región, 1, 4 Apr. 1936. 
65 La Tarde, 6 May 1936; J. A. Blasco Rodríguez, ‘Las MAOC y la tesis insurreccional del 
PCE’, Historia contemporánea, xi (1994), 129–51, at pp. 140–2, 145; J. C. Gibaja Velázquez, 
‘La tradición improvisada: el socialismo y la milicia’, Historia contemporánea, xi (1994), 107–
27, at p. 123.
66 Letter to Comarcal de Langreo from Célula de Calle de Sama, 3 Apr. 1936, CDMH, 
PS Gijón, H Series, box 15, file 18; letter from Frente Popular de Langreo to Comarcal de 
Langreo, 2 June 1936, CDMH, PS Gijón, H Series, box 15, file 18.
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April, there were attempts to curb the activities of the non-official police, 
including a circular issued by the ministry of the interior ordering an end to 
the initiatives across the country, although this had little effect.67
The patrols derived from suspicions regarding right-wing activities 
and an intense distrust of the security forces bred by the repression. The 
memory of torture and beatings weighed heavily. The fixation with the 
security forces was not solely an Asturian phenomenon; newspapers like 
Madrid-based Ayuda, the newspaper of the SRI, also published long lists of 
the names of ‘hangmen’ from the repression.68 Asturian newspapers printed 
not only testimonies of the repression and denunciations of officials for 
their roles, but also continued to report on the movements and transfers of 
civil and assault guards.69 This was not Avance’s broad-brush 1934 narrative 
of a state ‘at war’ with the working class, but a much more personalized 
and intimate expression of a fissure between the state security forces and 
the left. Guards had names and faces rather than simply constituting the 
anonymous expression of state power. 
Scrutiny of the security forces drew not only on the repression but also 
on concerns of collusion between the police and the right. The left had 
long been distrustful of the politics of the security forces, but in 1936, 
these fears became more acute. The Civil Guard in Aller were reported 
to be ‘cohabiting’ with the SCOM prior to the elections and the council 
investigated reports that a municipal employee had been training ‘fascist 
militias’ and disseminating propaganda ‘against the republican regime’.70 
Accusations of double standards fed this criticism, according to which 
the Civil and Assault Guard frisked or beat Popular Front supporters, 
but ignored those performing fascist salutes and shouting death to the 
Republic.71 The veracity of such claims in the polarized climate of 1936 is 
difficult to assess, but the wider European context, in which the police was 
more vigorous in clamping down on the left than the right, shows that it 
would not have been unusual.72
The vigilance of state power was also an important component in the 
construction of an antifascist identity that connected Asturias with the 
circumstances facing left-wing activists across the world. Focusing on the 
67 González Calleja, En nombre, pp. 284–5. 
68 Ayuda, 18 May 1936. 
69 E.g. La Tarde, 8 Apr. 1936. 
70 La Tarde, 7 Feb. 1936; AA, Actas, 5 Dec. 1935 to 23 Apr. 1937, f. 58.
71 La Tarde, 27 March, 4 May 1936.
72 E.g. for Germany, see D. Schumann, Political Violence in the Weimar Republic, 1918–
1933: Fight for the Streets and Fear of Civil War (New York, 2012), p. 252. 
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plight of prisoners and alleging the arbitrary, excessive and politicized use of 
state power linked Asturias – and Spain – to the conditions under right-wing 
dictatorships in particular. A rally in Oviedo and a petition raised awareness 
and protested against the incarceration of Brazilian Communists, while the 
left-wing press, like the SRI’s Ayuda, regularly called attention to the plight 
of imprisoned leftists across the world.73 Such cases functioned as a mirror 
in which Spanish leftists could recognize their own plight and integrate 
themselves into a wider imagined community of antifascist struggle.
The militancy in the streets was in stark contrast to the situation at the 
workplace. The mining industry continued to struggle with a low demand for 
coal, yet labour conflict was practically absent until late May. Even then, the 
wave of strikes was ‘channelled through institutional mechanisms’.74 Short-
time working and unpaid wages eventually led to a general mining strike 
called by the SOMA for 3 June.75 The eighteen-day strike was remarkably 
peaceful, given the tense political situation. The SOMA presented a list of 
demands, most of which were unremarkable, such as the disbursement of 
unpaid wages and pensions. The final two, however, were more radical: the 
state seizure of mines abandoned or closed for unjustified reasons and the 
appointment of a commission to study the nationalization of the industry.76 
Yet the solution agreed to end the strike did not mention nationalization, 
but instead focused on pragmatic solutions to improve the workforce’s 
living standards.77 Soliciting nationalization was a radical rhetorical façade 
that veiled a more pragmatic interior.
The rhetoric embraced by the SOMA leadership and the newly re-
launched Avance during the strike was radical. Graciano Antuña, the SOMA 
secretary, told the rank and file it was impossible to achieve all of their 
strike objectives within a bourgeois regime and invoked the revolutionary 
insurrection, in what had become an obligatory gesture.78 For Avance, a 
revolutionary horizon was beginning to clear; the masses were no longer 
‘toys’, but rather ‘capable of guiding the tiller of the country on their own’.79 
But there was no real attempt to promote a revolutionary project behind the 
radical rhetoric. Instead, the words asserted a muscular role for the socialist 
73 La Tarde, 29 May 1936; Avance, 2 July 1936; e.g., Ayuda, 1 June 1936
74 Castejón Rodríguez, ‘La patronal’, p. 433. 
75 El Carbayón, 4 June 1936; Castejón Rodríguez, ‘La patronal’, p. 436.
76 La Tarde, 1 June 1936. 
77 Castejón Rodríguez, ‘La patronal’, p. 436. Details of the solution in Avance, 27 June 
1936.
78 La Tarde, 22 June 1936. 
79 Avance, 2 July 1936. 
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rank and file in defending the Republic. In contrast to 1934, the left seemed 
to be reassuringly in control.
The relative calm in the Asturian mines was not reflected in other parts 
of Spain. Official statistics for Zaragoza reported seventy strikes during the 
first half of 1936, ‘as many … as had ever before been recorded in a single 
year’. This was due to a range of factors, including the resurgence of the 
CNT and a contraction in the sugar beet industry.80 Unrest deepened in 
the south of the country in particular. Unemployment had grown thanks 
to the prolongation of the winter rain – ‘the heaviest of the century’ – 
which reduced the demand for labour, and strikes erupted once the harvest 
started.81 At the same time, there was a much more muscular assertion 
of power by rural workers that undermined rural bosses’ control of the 
labour process, such as unions dictating the length of the working day or 
deciding on the number of workers required for a task without regard for 
the employer’s own needs. Such moves struck ‘deeply at the autonomy of 
property owners’.82 
Parts of Andalusia, Madrid, Toledo, Salamanca and Extremadura also 
saw land invasions, in which peasants entered and occupied land. Only in 
Extremadura did these take place on a mass scale: 81,000 yunteros occupied 
270,000 hectares in late March.83 The yunteros were hired hands with a head 
of oxen and, although a heterogeneous group, they tended to be peasants 
who had fallen on hard times. During the Republic, yunteros had invaded 
estates in 1932 and 1933 and 1,400 were settled in 1934 thanks to the 1932 
agrarian reform law. But many were later evicted and sought to return to 
the land in 1936. The government began to circulate proposals in March to 
settle thousands of rural labourers and the FNTT, which experienced an 
influx of new members, stepped up its rhetoric. The promise of land reform 
precipitated the invasions of estates, which the government was powerless 
80 G. Kelsey, Anarchosyndicalism, Libertarian Communism and the State: the CNT in 
Zaragoza and Aragon, 1930–37 (Amsterdam, 1991), pp. 136–7. 
81 E. Malefakis in Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Spanish 
Civil War (New Haven, Conn., 1970), p. 367; F. Cobo Romero, De campesinos a electores: 
modernización agraria en Andalucía, politización campesina y derechización de los pequeños 
propietarios y arrendatarios: el caso de la provincia de Jaén, 1931–1936 (Madrid, 2003), pp. 322, 
324.
82 Cobo Romero, De campesinos, p. 321; F. Espinosa Maestre, La primavera del 
Frente Popular: los campesinos de Badajoz y el orígen de la Guerra Civil (marzo–julio de 
1936) (Barcelona, 2007), p. 112; Collier, Socialists, pp. 140–1, the quotation at p. 141.
83 J. Carmona and J. Simpson, ‘Campesinos unidos o divididos? La acción colectiva y 
la revolución social de los yunteros durante la Segunda República en España (1931–1936)’, 
Historia Social, lxxxv (2016), 123–44, at p. 130.
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to stop.84 Faced with the mass wave of direct action, the authorities legalized 
the occupations, with the result that many more peasants obtained land in 
1936 than after the 1932 agrarian reform law. Over the following months, 
the government worked hard to reorganize the Land Reform Institute 
and prepare a bill for a more vigorous, wide-ranging land reform than 
the toothless ‘reform of the land reform’ of 1935. But, in the eyes of those 
opposed to the Popular Front, retroactive legalization only confirmed 
a vision of a lawless rural society which the government was unable and 
unwilling to resist.
The layers of the Republican state – municipal, provincial and national 
– thus faced a number of challenges in spring 1936. The resolution of these 
problems was not aided by the instability of the parliament, despite the 
Popular Front majority in the Cortes. The parliament did not meet until 
mid March and investigations into electoral fraud meant the make-up of 
the Cortes was not agreed until April (and elections were rerun in Cuenca 
and Granada in early May). Almost as soon as the Cortes sessions began, 
President Alcalá Zamora was impeached on a procedural technicality. On 
10 May, Manuel Azaña replaced him as president of the Republic. The 
elevation of the icon of left Republicanism to presidential office removed 
an able politician from the nitty gritty of everyday governmental politics. 
Azaña had hoped that Prieto would follow him as prime minister, but Prieto 
was hamstrung by his own party. The socialist left refused to countenance 
a revival of a Republican-socialist coalition government as the socialist 
internal struggle between the Caballeristas and Prietistas continued.85 
Instead, the premiership fell to the Galician IR politician, Santiago Casares 
Quiroga, who formed a Republican administration. Due to obstructions in 
parliament, the government tended to rule through decrees that were later 
transformed into laws and continued to extend the state of alarm until the 
Civil War.86
The weak government and the challenges facing the country led to some 
brief negotiations aimed at forming a national unity government, although 
the talks and the plan were doomed to fail. CEDA moderates Luis Lucía 
and Manuel Giménez Fernández entered discussions with socialists to 
84 This account is based on S. Riesco Roche, La reforma agraria y los orígenes de la Guerra 
Civil: cuestión yuntera y radicalización patronal en la provincia de Cáceres (1931–1940) (Madrid, 
2006); Espinosa, La primavera; Malefakis, Agrarian reform, pp. 36–71.
85 For socialist politics, see Graham, Socialism, ch. 2. For an overview of Republican 
politics, see Preston, Coming of the Spanish Civil War, pp. 183–5.
86 M. Bizcarrondo, Historia de la UGT, iii: Entre la democracia y la revolución, 1931–1936 
(6 vols, Madrid, 2008), pp. 186–7; González Calleja, Contrarrevolucionarios, p. 243. 
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form an administration to stabilize social conflict.87 Talks had little chance 
of success even before they began. The socialist movement was divided 
and there was no sign of support from the wider CEDA, in which anti-
Republican sentiment was fiercer than ever. Gil Robles, who had not taken 
the negotiations seriously, terminated them on 2 June.88 
Rather than seeking solutions to the problems facing the Republic, 
Gil Robles was more interested in attacking the regime. Together with 
Renovación Española leader José Calvo Sotelo, he used the platform afforded 
by the Cortes to accuse the government of promoting chaos and disorder 
across the country. In his speeches to parliament, Calvo Sotelo combined 
denunciations of violence, strikes and alleged chaos across the country to 
criticize the left and the impotency of the government. He announced that 
if a state without strikes and disorder was a ‘fascist state’, he ‘share[d] the 
idea of that [kind of ] state, I believe in it [and] I declare myself a fascist’.89 
An editorial in Región at the end of May expressed a similar sentiment: 
the alleged crisis of authority was more pressing than upholding the tenets 
of democratic rule. Other countries had shown that a move away from 
democracy was ‘not a catastrophe’.90 
Both Gil Robles and Calvo Sotelo were cognizant of plans to destroy 
Republican democracy. By spring 1936 there were multiple conspiracies 
against the regime, which eventually coalesced around the project designed 
by General Emilio Mola, who was stationed in the Carlist heartland of 
Navarra (although Mola struggled to sign up the Carlists to his project). 
In late May, Mola, the ‘director’, began dictating the instructions which 
would provide the foundation for the July rebellion. Through June and 
July, Gil Robles instructed CEDA cadres to support the coup when it 
occurred and transferred CEDA funds to the conspirators.91 Gil Robles’s 
actions were largely symbolic, for the CEDA’s star had been eclipsed. In 
the wake of the elections, its youth organization, the JAP, had all but 
collapsed as many members switched to the FE-JONS – as many as 
15,000 overall, including half of the membership of the JAP in Gijón.92 
The growth in membership and activity of the FE-JONS came despite the 
jailing of its leader, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, and the party having 
to operate underground, as the Republican authorities grappled with 
87 Montero, La CEDA, ii. 178–201, 206–7. 
88 J. Tusell, Historia de la democracia cristiana en España (2 vols, Madrid, 1974), i. 358. 
89 González Calleja, Contrarrevolucionarios, p. 334. 
90 Región, 28 May 1936.
91 González Calleja, Contrarrevolucionarios, pp. 340–88. 
92 González Calleja, Contrarrevolucionarios, p. 358; Suárez Cortina, El fascismo, p. 187. 
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its anti-left and anti-Republican agitation, particularly the problem of 
violence.  
Violence 
Late on 14 March, Manuel José G. Q. sat drinking cider in a bar called ‘La 
Polesa’ in Sama. Three individuals entered the bar and started an argument 
with him about politics, accusing Manuel José of being a plain-clothes 
civil guard and a fascist. When he pulled out his work permit and military 
papers as evidence of proletarian identity, they claimed them to be false 
and threw them on the floor. A brawl ensued. Manuel José drew a knife 
and stabbed his three assailants, one of whom died instantly from a wound 
to the heart.93 Two days previously and in very different circumstances, the 
leading socialist jurist Luis Jiménez de Asúa was fired upon as he left his 
home on Goya Street in Madrid. Jiménez de Asúa, who had presided over 
the commission which had drafted the 1931 Constitution, survived, but his 
bodyguard died from his injuries.94 
These two incidents capture some of the principal characteristics of 
violence in spring 1936. Both were brief, small-scale encounters resulting in 
one fatality.95 Manuel José’s reaction was founded on defending his honour 
as a working-class male. Policing a particular space was also central to the 
incident in La Polesa. Manuel José’s opponents aggressively policed the local 
tavern as their social space: what right did a plain-clothes civil guard have 
to be in a working-class bar in Sama in March 1936? The violent policing of 
working-class spaces was also evident in other targeted attacks at the level 
of local politics or the community, from two brothers killing a teacher for 
denouncing them after the insurrection to cars being stopped and fired at 
in Moreda and Laviana, the former belonging to the parish priest.96 These 
attacks were often part of a of tit-for-tat chain of escalating encounters 
between left and right at the local level.
The murder of Jiménez de Asúa was the result of FE-JONS switching 
to a new a strategy of targeted assassinations, the aim of which was to 
incite a climate of violence and chaos. The strategy of targeted killings 
was also employed in Asturias. In Asturias, unidentified assailants killed 
93 AHPA, AP, box 78441, file 62 (1936).
94 Details taken from El Sol, 13 March 1936.
95 In 77% of incidents of political violence involving fatalities only one person died 
(González Calleja, ‘La necro-lógica’).
96 L. Borque López, El magisterio primario en Asturias (1923–1937): sociedad y educación 
(Oviedo, 1991), pp. 210–11; Región, 1, 23 May 1936. For similar ‘ambushes’ towards the end 
of the Weimar Republic, see Schumann, Political Violence, pp. 253–64.
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Alfredo Martínez, ex-minister and PRLD leader, at his home, and there 
was an attempt on the life of the civil governor in May.97 In Sotrondio, an 
individual reported that six men had threatened to kill him for political 
reasons and in Siero hired hit men attempted to murder a teacher who 
led the Socialist Group.98 The motives included revenge and intimidation. 
The two were linked: while murders could be an attempt to frighten 
opponents into submission, the far right also intended to spark an escalating 
dynamic of attack and counter-attack in order to spread a sense of chaos 
and undermine Republican authority.99 The rightist press amplified these 
incidents by grouping them together on newspaper pages. 
The spectacle of political violence in public space did not disappear. 
Violence clustered around demonstrations as opponents attempted to 
disrupt collective expressions of strength or project an image of disorder on 
a public stage. In early April, an impromptu celebratory march in Oviedo 
to welcome the return of those exiled in the USSR after the insurrection 
led to a brawl when a passer-by shouted ‘arriba España!’ The Assault Guard 
beat several of the marchers and a fascist was arrested.100 On the anniversary 
of the proclamation of the Republic, a similar scene occurred in Ourense 
while in Madrid a civil guard in civilian clothes and a student were killed 
when shots and small explosions interrupted the military procession. 
The funeral for the civil guard turned into a right-wing anti-Republican 
demonstration, at which five died and 170 were arrested.101
Iconoclastic and anticlerical violence also returned across Spain. The 
attacks included arson attacks on churches and shrines and the destruction 
of stone crosses in public spaces. A recent calculation estimates there were 
thirty-five such attacks in Asturias in spring 1936.102 In a return to the early 
years of the Republic – and in contrast to October 1934 – the targets were 
97 Región, 24 March 1936; La Tarde, 27 March, 4 May 1936. 
98 Región, 29 Feb. 1936; Avance, 4 July 1936. Preston noted the hiring of hit men in Coming 
of the Spanish Civil War, p. 187.
99 For this dynamic in action in the Aragonese town of Calatayud, see N. Moreno 
Medina, La ciudad silenciada: Segunda República y represión fascista en Calatayud, 1931–1939 
(Calatayud, 2008), pp. 84–6.
100 La Tarde, 3 Apr. 1936. 
101 J. Prada Rodríguez, De la agitación republicana a la represión franquista (Ourense 1934–
1939) (Barcelona, 2006), p. 91; Cruz, En el nombre, pp. 134–7; A. Barea’s recollections in The 
Forging of a Rebel (London, 2018 [1946]), pp. 474–6.
102 M. Álvarez Tardío and R. Villa García, ‘El impacto de la violencia anticlerical en la 
primavera de 1936 y la respuesta de las autoridades’, Hispania sacra, lxv (2013), 693–764, 
at p. 705. See also M. Thomas, The Faith and the Fury: Popular Anticlerical Violence and 
Iconoclasm in Spain, 1931–1936 (Eastbourne, 2013), pp. 69–70, 72.
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overwhelmingly buildings and objects as opposed to the bodies of priests 
or religious brothers. The attacks tended not to occur in large urban centres 
in the coalfields, but in more remote and rural areas, where the political 
right and Catholic observance were stronger, and grouped in waves such 
as around Holy Week.103 This renewed anticlericalism did not prevent the 
public celebration of Corpus Christi. The election results had revealed the 
village of Boo to be polarized politically, yet the Corpus procession took 
place in the streets without a problem.104 
Despite a dominant image of state helplessness and left-wing proto-
revolutionary violence, the state security forces caused most fatalities as the 
authorities attempted to respond to left- and right-wing militancy.105 The 
state also used arrests in order to curb violence and reassert its authority. The 
attempted assassination of Jiménez de Asúa in March shocked the country 
and prompted a crackdown on FE-JONS, which was forced to operate 
underground. FE-JONS leaders were arrested across the country. Primo de 
Rivera was detained two days after the attack, and tried and re-arrested on 
different charges in March and April.106 Thirty-seven were jailed in the first 
wave of arrests in Asturias. Further waves of arrests of rightists – Falangists 
and CEDA members – and fines followed in April and May.107 
Supporters of FE-JONS challenged the arrests, which created a further 
problem for the authorities. The right, including Región, bemoaned the 
alleged chaos and lack of authority even as the state asserted its power by 
arresting right-wing leaders. The detentions only confirmed the narrative 
that the right was being persecuted by a state controlled by the left. Deserted 
by state power, citizens now had to assume the ‘terrible’ responsibility to 
take ‘justice into their own hands’.108 When arrests were made in Aller, 
which was developing into a centre of the radical right, sympathizers came 
out to support them en masse, performing the fascist salute and crying 
‘viva Catholic Spain!’. Región revelled in the defiance shown towards the 
Republican authorities: 
103 Álvarez Tardío and Villa García, ‘El impacto’, pp. 750–2. See Región for Valdecuna and 
Villoria (Región, 17 March, 11 Apr., 20 May 1936). See also AHPA, AP, box 79465, files 9, 96, 
133 (1936).
104 Región, 2 July 1936.
105 As shown by Cruz and González Calleja. See the latter’s ‘La necro-lógica’ and Cruz, En 
el nombre, p. 179. 
106 S. Payne, Fascism in Spain, 1923–1977 (Madison, Wis., 1999), pp. 190–3. 
107 Region, 15 March, 21, 24 Apr. 1936; J. M. García de Tuñón Aza, Apuntes para una historia 
de la Falange asturiana (Oviedo, 2001), p. 85; La Tarde, 11 May 1936. 
108 Región, 24 March 1936. 
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Not in Bello, nor in Casomera, nor in Collanzo, nor in Felechosa, nor in other 
areas does the oppressive politics practised by the municipal authorities [in 
Aller] … receive adulation or sympathy. The fascist militias are enjoying greater 
influence and growth in all of Aller ever since their persecution and despite 
having been dissolved.109 
Arrests legitimized their anti-Republican position. In Aller, conflict over 
religion was an exacerbating factor in the arrest of right-wing leaders. The 
protests were energized by heightened tensions locally over the removal of 
religious education, which had long been a vexing and divisive issue in the 
municipality.110
Left-wing activists did not conceal their antipathy towards the security 
forces, but in contrast, aligned themselves with the Republic – or a particular 
idea of the Republic. The socialists strongly identified with Bosque, the IR 
civil governor, for he embodied the more assertive and uncompromising 
left-oriented view of the Republic that matched their own.111 They exhibited 
willingness to police their towns and villages as they considered the Republic 
increasingly incapable of defending itself. The militant attitude was aligned 
with the Republican project as the regime was still identified as supporting 
their interests. The Communist newspaper Mundo Obrero declared in 
mid June that the government could ‘rely on the militias for whatever it 
takes to maintain and develop the policies undertaken under the banner 
of the Popular Front’.112 They saw their own militias policing the streets as 
unproblematic insofar as they were working to uphold the Republic. 
An incident in late May underlined leftist distrust of the security forces 
and the difficulties faced by the civil governor. On the evening of 23 May, 
shots were fired in the midst of a crowd enjoying a two-night open-air 
public party in central Oviedo. JS and JC members disarmed the individual 
responsible. Plain-clothes assault guards intervened, but were also disarmed, 
beaten and insulted by the youths, who handed the weapons to the 
authorities. The following evening, the Assault Guard attempted to heal its 
wounded pride by reasserting its authority. A ‘tall, young, blond individual’ 
fired into the air ‘as though it were a signal’, and assault guards fired into 
the crowd. The lights went out and panic ensued. The governor, who had 
forbidden the presence of the Assault Guard after the previous evening, 
109 Región, 6 May 1936; La Tarde, 6 Apr. 1936.
110 Región, 12, 15, 17, 21 March 1936. 
111 When Bosque was forced to resign, telegrams of support and protest were sent by 
political parties, trade unions and municipal councils, and a strike was called in Mieres 
(Avance, 7 July 1936).
112 Cited in Blasco Rodríguez, ‘Las MAOC’, p. 138. 
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ordered the guards return to their barracks. They disobeyed. Two trucks of 
guards attended the scene and opened fire. The mayor, public prosecutor 
and other political leaders rushed to the scene and managed to diffuse the 
incident. More than 100 shots had been fired, leaving twenty-one injured. 
La Tarde claimed that the attack had been orchestrated.113 
The Assault Guard’s aggressive reaction to being disarmed by citizens 
supports arguments that emphasize the importance of honour in how the 
security forces understood their collective identity and policing role.114 It 
is not clear if the attack was premeditated, but it is difficult to imagine 
it was not connected to the brawl the previous evening. A signal from a 
youth with a Teutonic appearance verges on the cliché, but does match 
the model of a Falangist strategy of tension in which there were attempts 
to spark an escalating spiral of violence and in so doing, spread a sense of 
chaos. Región was unusually subdued in its depiction of the incident and 
minimized the importance of the injuries.115 This contrasted starkly with its 
habitual amplification of conflict and violence.
The reaction of the left to the incident was an exhibition of collective 
power and a willingness to take responsibility for policing the local 
population. The morning after the incident, the unions shut down Oviedo 
with a general strike, which continued until midday the following day. 
Using a general strike to close down a locality as a gesture of protest and to 
demonstrate peaceful left-wing control had occurred on previous occasions, 
as in Sama in September 1934. But this time it affected the provincial 
capital, and left-wing authority was more organized and assertive. Rather 
than simply closing shops and factories or providing an escort for a funeral 
procession, activists’ roles extended further. Circulation was controlled 
through safe-conducts, a ‘red guard’ kept order and traffic access into the 
city was restricted. Even the national cycle race, the Vuelta a España, was 
turned away from the city.116 Región accused the left of holding the city to 
ransom in a much more vocal criticism of the strike than of the Assault 
Guard violence which had precipitated it.117 
The incident was not the only occasion in which the security forces were 
absent as the left controlled the streets. López Mulero, the socialist mayor 
113 La Tarde, 27 May 1936; Región, 27 May 1936. 
114 F. Chamberlin, ‘Honor-bound: the military culture of the Civil Guard and the political 
violence of the Spanish Second Republic, 1931–1936’ (unpublished UCSD PhD thesis, 
2017).
115 Región, 27 May 1936. 
116 La Tarde, 27 May 1936; Región, 27 May 1936.
117 Región, 27 May 1936. 
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of Oviedo, requested that the security forces not be present at a Popular 
Front rally in March. The civil governor agreed.118 The 1 May celebrations 
took place in similar circumstances and La Tarde proudly highlighted the 
lack of ‘a single incident ... which demonstrates that we do not need foreign 
bodies to maintain order’.119 Such sentiments recalled declarations prior 
to the revolutionary insurrection, but much more sharply defined than in 
1934 was the contrast between the security force’s policing methods and the 
order, discipline and serenity that were the watchwords of leftist militancy 
and antifascist identity in 1936. In his speech on 1 May, Mulero eulogized 
the ‘discipline’ of the ‘red militias’ and their massed ranks as ‘the firmest 
bulwark of the security of the Republic’. They were not simply political 
activists but a disciplined ‘proletarian Army’, and the crowd’s applause 
allegedly even sounded like a ‘machine gun’.120 At least this was the idealized 
image that socialist ranks had of themselves as antifascist militants. 
The rallies, strikes and demonstrations in spring 1936 were an exhibition of 
left-wing strength. Organizations had recovered after operating underground 
during the long 1935. There had been a rapid growth in Socialist Youth, 
the reorganization of women’s groups and an intensification of political 
activities involving men and women. Julia Morán, who had criticized the 
political and social pressures in Laviana in 1934, declared her satisfaction 
at returning to the struggle after ‘seventeen months of forced silence’. She 
felt ‘more revolutionary’ and ready to prepare for the ‘definitive battle’.121 In 
contrast to other areas of Spain, where the Popular Front ‘never extended 
beyond the election committee’, in Asturias it became a ‘vehicle for working-
class demands and action’ thanks to local traditions of organization and 
political activity, although these activities were not always sustained and 
there were complaints that not all members were engaged.122 For Avance, 
Popular Front committees were ‘organisms of combat then and should 
118 On these themes, see also Cruz, En el nombre, pp. 146–7.
119 La Tarde, 4, 6 May 1936. 
120 La Tarde, 4 May 1936. 
121 See the list of JS sections prepared for the JS congress in Apr., CDMH, PS Gijón, F 
Series, box 92, file 3. For female activism, see M. A. Mateos, ¡Salud, compañeras! Mujeres 
socialistas en Asturias (1900–1937) (Oviedo, 2007), pp. 190–5 and for a personal testimony, 
see Á. Flórez Peón, Memorias de Ángeles Flórez Peón “Maricuela” (Oviedo, 2009), pp. 65–70. 
For Morán, see La Tarde, 18 March 1936. 
122 A. Shubert, ‘A reinterpretation of the Spanish Popular Front: the case of Asturias’, in 
The French and Spanish Popular Fronts: Comparative Perspectives, ed. M. Alexander and H. 
Graham (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 223–4. For warnings about the lack of political engagement, 
see the letter from Purificación Tomás to Lola Rivas, 29 May 1936, CDMH, PS Gijón, H 
series, box 15, file 16.
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continue to be so now’.123 Unity again became an important watchword. 
By mid July, the Popular Front and re-launched Workers’ Alliances appear 
to have combined into an entangled and indistinguishable whole, with an 
increasing prominence accorded to the language of antifascism and the 
need for unity of action to forestall an attack from the right.124
In other areas of Spain, the left flexed its muscles in the spring of 
1936, from unions pushing closed-shop practices to municipal councils 
introducing new taxes on the Church or wresting back control of hiring 
processes.125 This assertion of left-wing power meant a destabilization of 
the traditional social order and economic practices, which was experienced 
as an encroachment and a threat by certain groups. In areas like Jaén, 
smallholding peasants who periodically relied on wage labourers turned 
to the radical right to defend their interests. In the Asturian coalfields, 
the situation was different. Rather than the left encroaching on terrain 
traditionally the preserve of local elites, such as management of the labour 
process, there was a recovery and reassertion of left-wing power at the local 
level. A greater sense of change was palpable in Oviedo, which had its first 
socialist mayor, and where left-wing demonstrations were more common 
than in previous years. For rightist inhabitants of Oviedo, the sound of 
dynamite to signal the 1 May parade can only have revived memories of 
October 1934 and stoked fears of a revolutionary threat.
Some prefer to see this encroachment, whether the growth in left-wing 
organizations or the more radical assertion of power by new municipal 
authorities, as a ‘revolution’ or ‘dictatorship’ from below.126 There was an 
assertive, radical left attempting to shift the dynamics of power at the local 
level, but no clear revolutionary project. Largo Caballero had returned to 
his revolutionary posturing, but there was no revolutionary plan to back his 
rhetoric. For the socialist left, the ‘erosion’ the government was suffering 
was a problem for the Republican parties rather than affecting the Popular 
Front or indeed the Republic itself.127 Nor was the PCE conspiring to bring 
down the Republic, for the Comintern policy of Popular Frontism required 
the Communists support Republican democracy. The CNT, which did not 
form part of the Popular Front, repudiated the insurrectionary path at its 
congress in Zaragoza in May. 
123 Avance, 28 June 1936. 
124 E.g., the creation of an ‘Antifascist Popular Front’ in Oñón (Mieres) (Avance, 11 July 
1936).
125 Prada Rodríguez, De la agitación, pp. 102–3; Cobo Romero, De campesinos, pp. 328–9. 
126 E.g. Macarro Vera, Socialismo, p. 428.
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Different visions of the Republic continued to compete in 1936, as they had 
done since the beginning of the Republic. In 1936, the Republic demanded 
on the streets of Asturias – and more widely – was an uncompromisingly 
militant social Republic, the Popular Front’s prize for having won the 
elections. In some ways, the militancy was similar to the socialist rhetoric 
prior to the 1933 elections, but rather than focusing on the socialists gaining 
power, the rhetoric in 1936 was a broader principle of a leftist, worker-
led Republic, which would impose itself on those who would not accept 
reform. This vision of the Republic would provide a foundation for the 
antifascist reconstruction of the Republican ideal during the Civil War. 
There was a new wave of violence in Asturias at the end of June and 
rumours spread of a possible uprising. A bombing campaign by the far 
right targeted the Asturian leftist publications La Tarde and Combate, a 
Communist newspaper kiosk, the PCE headquarters in Oviedo, and the 
town hall and a bank in Sama.128 Patrols by left-wing militants increased at 
the end of June as rumours spread of a possible uprising, and there were 
reports of right-wing ‘subversive elements’ sleeping at the Civil Guard post 
in Aller.129 Socialists in Siero reported suspicious movements to the Civil 
Guard who then searched the homes of ‘fascists’.130 
The socialist press swung between frustration and bullishness. Avance was 
exasperated that the state refused to protect left-wing activists who were 
the first line of defence for the Republic. Not only were individuals ‘at the 
service’ of the Republic on trial for seizing weapons from their opponents 
and handing them to the authorities, but they also received longer prison 
sentences than the owners of the firearms.131 At the same time, self-assured 
militias in Sama claimed to be disappointed when a rumoured uprising 
did not materialize.132 Avance piled pressure on rank-and-file militants. 
The security of the Republic was a personal responsibility; they had to be 
vigilant and embody the necessary militant attitude at all times:
All citizens have to be faithful guardians of the basic freedoms that we enjoy. The 
defence of the Popular Front entails the persecution of open or hidden enemies. 
Going out onto the streets on a given night is not enough to defend the security 
of the regime. The security of the regime relies on making it invincible to any 
attack, whatever its level of importance.133
128 Avance, 7, 8 July 1936.
129 Avance, 30 June, 1, 2 July 1936. 
130 Avance, 4 July 1936. 
131 Avance, 1, 11, 14 July 1936.
132 Avance, 4 July 1936. 
133 Avance, 2 July 1936. 
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Yet beneath this radical, bellicose posturing, internal purges and boycotts 
continued as the left continued to attempt to police its own internal ranks 
and reaffirm its hegemony over the local community.134 The radicalism was 
fragile and defensive. 
For Avance, the situation was ‘like in 1933, but worse’. No longer were the 
forces of ‘reaction’ content with gaining control of the Republic, they were 
now intent on destroying it.135 Yet there was no suggestion of a creeping, 
conspiratorial threat of fascism installing itself from government, as in 1934. 
The fascist threat was in the street. Avance demanded that the authorities 
deal with fascist ‘pistolerismo’ or else the ‘working class’ would.136 In fact, 
it would be an escalating case of pistolerismo in Madrid that hastened the 
coming of war. On the evening of 12 July, José Castillo, a socialist Assault 
Guard lieutenant, was shot dead by rightist gunmen.137 Hours later assault 
guards retaliated by murdering Renovación Española leader Calvo Sotelo. 
His death convinced the conspirators to bring forward the planned coup.138
On Friday 17 July, news filtered through to the peninsula of an uprising 
in the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco. The following day crowds gathered 
in the streets of Madrid outside union buildings and cafes to share news, 
rumours and to listen to the radio.139 In Asturias, most of Avance’s front page 
was blanked out by order of the censor, leaving only a snippet of a report on 
workers’ patrols and a cartoon showing muscular workers of the Workers’ 
Alliance standing in the way of a train whistling monarchist conspiracies 
that was driven by Azaña.140 The civil governor, political leaders and union 
officials gathered in the civil government building in central Oviedo to 
monitor developments. They were joined by the military commander 
of the province, Colonel Aranda, who enjoyed the confidence of both 
Republican loyalists and the rebels. Aranda readily agreed to a request from 
Indalecio Prieto, socialist leader and a personal friend, to send a column 
of mineworkers to defend Madrid. Three thousand volunteers departed 
Asturias for the capital that same 18 July. The following day, a Sunday, 
134 E.g. Avance, 26 June 1936.
135 Avance, 26 June 1936.
136 Avance, 9 July 1936. 
137 Cruz attributes the death to Falangists (En el nombre, pp. 138, 198). Ian Gibson’s 
research led him to identify Carlists as responsible, as cited in J. Casanova and C. Gil 
Andrés, Twentieth-Century Spain: a History (Cambridge, 2014), p. 156.
138 Details in González Calleja, Contrarrevolucionarios, pp. 327–9.
139 Barea, Forging, pp. 528–9; R. Fraser, Blood of Spain: an Oral History of the Spanish Civil 
War (New York, 1979), p. 54.
140 Avance, 18 July 1936.
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the streets of Oviedo were quiet and cafes deserted. Having conveniently 
reduced the threat posed by left-wing activists, Aranda slowly concentrated 
the province’s security forces in the capital. That evening, as a light drizzle 
started to fall, Aranda intercepted an order sent from Madrid for his own 
arrest and finally made his move by declaring himself for the rebellion.141
141 For first-hand accounts of the coup in Oviedo, see J. A. Cabezas, Asturias: catorce meses 
de guerra civil (Madrid, 1975), pp. 14–21; C. Martínez, Al final del sendero (Gijón, 1990), pp. 
223–4; J. Ambou, Los comunistas en la resistencia nacional republicana: la guerra en Asturias, 
el País Vasco y Santander (Madrid, 1978), pp. 13–19. 
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The military coup of July 1936 divided the country. It was successful in an 
arc of north-central Spain, from Navarra in the north-east through Castile 
to Galicia in the north-west, and also gained a foothold in the south in 
Cádiz and Seville. The coup failed in much of the south, east and centre 
of the country, as well as a strip along the northern coast consisting of the 
Basque Country, the province of Santander, and Asturias, which remained 
in the hands of the Republic. Aranda’s rising meant that Oviedo, however, 
lay in rebel hands and the city was surrounded until Francoist forces carved 
a corridor to relieve it in October 1936. The final offensive to end the war 
in the north began in spring 1937 when Francoist forces pushed through 
the Basque Country, moving westwards. Bilbao fell in June, Santander 
followed in August and the Francoist army entered Asturias in late summer. 
Resistance in the mountainous east of the province, particularly at the battle 
of El Mazucu, only served to delay the inevitable. On 21 October 1937, 
almost exactly three years after the defeat of the revolutionary insurrection, 
the last ships transporting Republican commanders, troops and citizens 
departed Gijón. The Spanish Civil War lasted another eighteen months, 
but military hostilities in the north had come to an end.
The military rebellion of July 1936 failed as a coup, but paralysed the 
Republican state, ‘shattering both army and police command structures’.1 
The centrifugal forces unleashed by the coup radically shifted the locus 
of political power to the locality or the neighbourhood. Republican and 
left-wing parties and unions formed local committees to control their 
town or village, which often entailed pursuing revolutionary policies, as 
they had done in Asturias in October 1934. Over the following months, 
the Republican state was slowly rebuilt and drew competing sources of 
authority under its control. Reconstruction in a civil war during the 1930s 
also entailed a sharper antifascist re-drawing of the Republic. 
This recasting of the Republic along antifascist lines owed much to 
the radicalism of the pre-war years described in this book. This current 
of radicalism also explains why many activists took up arms to resist the 
1 H. Graham, The Spanish Republic at War, 1936–1939 (Cambridge, 2002), p. 79. To what 
extent the state collapsed is still debated. For a critical meditation, see R. Cruz, En el nombre 
del pueblo: república, rebelión y guerra en la España de 1936 (Madrid, 2006), pp. 247–8.
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rebellion. The number of volunteers who seized arms or wielded those 
provided by the reluctant Republican authorities to resist the rebellion 
should not be exaggerated, for the image of a spontaneous ‘people at arms’ 
was romanticized and a product of Republican war culture.2 Yet the energetic 
initial response to the coup observable in Asturias is inexplicable without 
pre-war radicalism, which was central to the emergence of antifascism 
and to the defence of the Republic during the Civil War. Historians have 
emphasized that antifascism was a transnational movement and a ‘culture 
of exile’ during the 1930s, yet this book underlines that it also emerged from 
the political culture and social circumstances of small communities.3
These communities were not just the location of radicalism. This book 
has argued that ‘community’ is central to understanding the dynamics of 
radicalism. The lines of fracture at the local level and the politicized context 
of the Second Republic led to a fierce contest to capture the nature of the 
community and imbue it with a particular political character. Articles in 
the press, demonstrations and even episodes of violence were all ways of 
delineating the boundaries of the community. This process of policing was 
central to how politics was understood and, by extension, how the process 
of radicalization unfolded. Importantly, while the left was hegemonic in 
the Asturian coalfields during the 1930s, it did not monopolize politics and 
culture. Catholicism continued to play a role in coalfield communities, 
whether in the company schools, annual fiestas or the presence of churches 
and shrines, and the political right existed in the coalfields, even if it was 
much less organized and visible than the left. Moreover, even as the socialist 
SOMA was the dominant union, anarchism had thousands of followers and 
Communist influence outweighed its very small size. Common reference 
points and a shared political idiom provided the foundations for mutual 
understanding but also bitter antagonism. 
The local community, whether imagined as left-wing, anticlerical or 
Catholic, was a vital reference point for the understanding of politics at 
the local level and this was related to the wider national and international 
context.4 Factors like anticlericalism, policing and fascism became drivers 
2 The volunteers were a minority and over the course of the war, the Republic would 
have to rely on conscription. See M. Alpert, The Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 
1936–1939 (Cambridge, 2013) and J. Matthews, Reluctant Warriors: Republican Popular Army 
and Nationalist Army Conscripts in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (Oxford, 2012).
3 E. Traverso, Fire and Blood: the European Civil War, 1914–1945 (London, 2016), p. 262.
4 In a similar vein, see J. Häberlen’s emphasis on how German leftists understood the 
political options available to them in the early 1930s in ‘Scope for agency and political 
options: the German working-class movement and the rise of Nazism’, Politics, Religion and 
Ideology, xiv (2013), 377–94.
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of radicalism because they were interpreted according to a combination of 
local, national and international frames of reference. The bonds between 
the local left-wing community and the wider state soured in the spring 
of 1934 and were embittered by the experience of the repression after the 
insurrection. These affective relationships shaped political understanding 
and were central to the emergence of radicalism. Terms like ‘alienation’ 
and ‘disaffection’ are common in interpretations of the crisis of liberal 
democracy in interwar Europe, but often limited to the realm of metaphor 
rather than embedded in the mechanics of political processes. This book 
has shown how the decisions of actors in the coalfields were shaped by how 
local political experience was perceived to align or diverge from the wider 
state. This underscores the importance of collective mental frameworks, 
fears and experiences of frustration and humiliation in the context of the 
Second Republic as interpreted through actions and language.
A variety of factors contributed to the radicalizing dynamic in Asturias. 
Radicalism first emerged in 1932 against the backdrop of a desire to see the 
local fruition of Republican secularizing policies, the re-emergence of the 
political right, the declining fortunes of the mining industry and intra-left 
rivalry. Importantly, the context of the Republic changed what it meant to 
be radical for the activists in the coalfields. In a democratic, secularizing 
regime buttressed by socialist support, the political playing field had 
shifted. Whereas socialists had been content to proclaim their moderation 
and sensibleness in 1931, the following year they attempted to wrest back 
the self-descriptor ‘radical’ from their political rivals and combine it with 
moderate political practice. Radicalism was therefore contingent and could 
be inflected with different qualities, even if the socialists were unsuccessful 
on this occasion. The socialist leadership also faced a challenging situation 
in the lines. Far from radicalizing into line with the rank and file as is 
frequently described, the SOMA only succeeded in alienating sections 
of the mining workforce, particularly younger workers as the economic 
situation in the coalfields deteriorated. The relationship between the union 
leadership and the membership continued to be fractious through 1933 and 
1934.
These factors combined with other developments, including tenant 
activism and political tensions at the local level and anger at the attempted 
Sanjurjo coup, to create a wave of frustration. But this led to the crystallization 
of a socialist demand for a particular kind of Republic – a social Republic 
– as opposed to disaffection with the regime. The ‘social Republic’ that the 
socialists defined in 1932 and 1933 served to distinguish socialists from the 
Republicans and pointed to a reformist programme of government which 
would be much more uncompromising in its application. As this book has 
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demonstrated, static notions of democracy and the Republic are unhelpful 
for understanding the period between 1931 and 1936.5 Sensitivity to the 
contested, shifting ideas of the Republic is essential to understanding the 
dynamics of political evolution during the Republic, including radicalism. 
The factors outlined shaped the initial radical impulse in the coalfields, but 
do not explain how the revolutionary insurrection occurred in October 1934. 
Two further factors were crucial. The first was fascism. Nazism’s ascension 
to power in early 1933 sparked the emergence of fascism as a common frame 
for understanding the political right in the Asturian coalfields in 1933, yet 
the meaning of fascism and how it could manifest were unclear. Fascism was 
paradoxically believed to represent the traditional political right and a new, 
existential, hidden threat, especially in the coalfields, where fascists were 
difficult to locate. Nevertheless, the November 1933 election results appeared 
to prove that fascism did exist in the coalfields and heightened fears about 
the nature of the coalfield communities. Again, the elusive nature of fascism 
exacerbated anxieties further through 1934. While it is a commonplace to 
dismiss the role of fascism by pointing out the lack of actual fascists in 
1933, this reasoning is insufficient for understanding political practice and 
neglects the interplay of local, national and international politics. The dark 
future augured by the perceived fascist threat conditioned politics in the 
coalfields in 1933 and 1934.
This threat appeared to become more real in the distinctive shift caused 
by the elections that delivered a conservative majority in the Cortes. 
Specifically, a more assertive policing strategy in 1934 brought home, 
quite literally, the change in the nature of the Republic to the residents of 
the coalfields. The frisking of workers and the searching of political and 
union centres stoked an escalating dynamic of protest and anxieties over 
the trajectory of the Spanish state: could authoritarianism or fascism be 
installed from above, as in other European countries? Avance was adept 
at capturing and driving the sense of humiliation among militants in the 
coalfields and the growing fissure between local left-wing communities 
and the wider state apparatus. The newspaper increasingly depicted the 
state – in terms of the government and the security forces – as belligerent, 
persecutory and, importantly, as a foreign force. Civil and assault guards 
invaded the coalfields, rendering resistance a legitimate form of community 
defence, which drew on existing ideas of the ‘self-policing’ pueblo. Even as 
this array of factors explains how men and women in the coalfields were 
motivated to participate in the insurrection, they do not explain its timing 
5 For a more nuanced and richer approach, see T. Buchanan, ‘Anti-fascism and democracy 
in the 1930s’, European History Quarterly, xxxii (2002), 39–57.
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or the preparations for the movement, responsibility for which lies in the 
upper echelons in the socialist movement. 
Like any revolution, the October 1934 revolutionary insurrection 
was paradoxical, multifaceted and contested. It was a reassertion and a 
recuperation of power and the radical left-wing self-image of the coal valleys 
after the humiliation and frustration of the previous months. But it was also 
a sincere attempt at revolution that should be understood as a process rather 
than simply as an event. Committees introduced measures that sought to 
recast social, economic and political relationships in the valleys. Together 
with the militias, they also attempted to define the nature of the revolution 
through policing its boundaries, including the role violence would play 
in shaping the new order. Through the proclamations they produced, the 
committees staked a claim to participating in a longer, wider tradition of 
revolution, stretching beyond the 1930s. It is this revolutionary impulse that 
sets the Asturian October apart from other episodes of left-wing protest and 
collective action in 1934.  
The revolutionary insurrection and the harsh repression that followed 
were critical moments in the polarization of Spanish society. Much has 
been written on the importance of amnesty to the victory of the Popular 
Front, but little on the effects of the repression on the coalfields themselves. 
The long 1935 saw the inability of the right to take advantage of the 
opportunity to re-channel the Republic at the local level, due to a lack of 
interest, resistance from the underground left and a reliance on the threat of 
revolution combined with a dependence on the armed forces. For the left, 
the combination of torture, imprisonment, cancelling of work contracts 
and the removal of pillars of social and political life, such as union centres, 
had a profound and traumatic effect on coalfield society. Individuals tried 
to navigate the radically changed context of the long 1935 in different ways. 
Some concealed their beliefs, while others became informers or joined 
right-wing trade unions, whether due to opportunism, economic or social 
pressures, or a sincere damascene conversion. 
The bitterness engendered by the repression and the different strategies 
employed to survive the long 1935 provided the fuel for a renewed wave of 
radicalism in 1936. The victory of the Popular Front shifted the political 
context locally and nationally and sparked a range of initiatives, including 
purges and boycotts, as left-wing militants grappled with the legacy of 
the revolution and the repression. This revealed a crisis of the community 
as the struggle to reassert radical left-wing hegemony retrenched to the 
communities themselves. The radicalism that these mechanisms generated 
had a harder, brittle edge. This radicalism combined with bellicose rhetoric 
and a profound distrust of the state police, which challenged the state’s 
monopoly on coercive power. Faced by right-wing violence in the streets, 
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leftists, desperate for the regime to protect itself, saw no problem in assuming 
the role of policing the Republic in the streets, for they saw themselves 
as aligned with a militant, antifascist Republic – an understanding far 
removed from April 1931. Leftists had kept order on previous occasions, 
such as during funerals, and had contested the role of the state when 
demanding the release of detained comrades from jail. The willingness to 
undertake this task was due to the crisis of community in 1936, which saw 
the ‘balance of initiative’ shift to the level of the town, as Collier argued 
for Andalusia, but also drew on traditions of the ‘self-policing pueblo’.6 The 
demand for the community to police itself was not a question of the lack of 
state penetration or the weakness of state construction, but about how the 
social order was understood in moral and political terms. 
Radicalization remains a touchstone in histories of the Republic and 
an important prism through which to understand the evolution of the 
Republic. This book has argued that radicalism requires redefining and 
relocating to capture fully the richness and dynamics of 1930s Spanish 
politics, and to understand the revolutionary insurrection of October 1934. 
Radicalism was a confrontational, militant style of politics shaped by the 
historical context of the 1930s and a combination of local, national and 
international political dynamics. Radicalism was not intrinsically linked to 
revolutionary politics, nor was it necessarily anti-Republican. Radicalism 
was located not only in press discourse, union instructions or Largo 
Caballero’s speeches, but also in everyday experiences on a personal and 
collective level. It manifested itself in an assertive, even aggressive, policing 
of political and geographical communities. Radical politics was entwined 
with the personal and private, from stabbings in and outside bars, to the 
effects of rumours and social pressures on individual reputations. Homing 
in on this micro-level of radicalism illuminates its gendered facet, including 
the mocking of the beatas and conflicts over religious marriages. Individuals 
were not the passive receptors of a radicalization process from above but 
active agents in pressuring their fellow citizens as activists, neighbours and 
colleagues at the workplace to conform to certain beliefs and behaviour. 
The front page of Avance on 18 July was heavily censored to remove reports 
of the coup d’état underway in Spanish Morocco. The blanked-out headline 
should have read ‘Cojones and dynamite’.7 Bellicose, macho and assertive, it 
6 G. Collier, Socialists of Rural Andalusia: Unacknowledged Revolutionaries of the Second 
Republic (Stanford, Calif., 1987), p. 142. For a similar argument regarding the Weimar 
Republic, see P. Swett, Neighbors and Enemies: the Culture of Radicalism in Berlin, 1929–1933 
(Cambridge, 2004).




underscored key characteristics of radicalism as a political style during the 
Second Republic. The figure of the radical, antifascist miner brandishing 
dynamite resonates with a mythical image of proletarian males fashioned 
by struggles in the depths of the mines and has proven to be an enduring 
mythical symbol of ‘red Asturias’. But radicalism was a more complex force, 
produced by a variety of conflicts and cleavages in the Asturian coalfields 
both in and beyond the mines, as men and women – citizens, neighbours 
and political activists – attempted to navigate the challenges facing them 
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